The practical limitations and positive potential of electronic monitoring.
In recent years, the primary argument for adopting EM has been to relieve prison crowding while simultaneously reducing criminal justice system costs by providing a viable alternative to incarceration. The average cost of incarcerating a state or federal inmate has been estimated to range from $60 to $85 per day (Stephan, 2004). In contrast, the daily cost of radio-frequency monitoring is between $3 and $5, and global positioning satellite (GPS) monitoring is between $5 and $11, excluding correctional and law enforcement personnel expenses that can more than double the equipment cost. Many agencies charge EM program fees to the offender based on a sliding scale related to the offender's income.
In addition to reducing prison crowding, the increased surveillance that EM provides to pretrial, probation or parole programs can be expected to have a crime-deterrent effect. Furthermore, EM home detention allows an offender to better meet family responsibilities and to continue schooling or employment. This combination of potential benefits is impressive. And the fact that news media have something tangible to show and describe (e.g., a picture of an anklet) has made radio-frequency and GPS technology a popular innovation.
Some public officials or writers have colorfully referred to home detention or GPS monitoring as an "electronic jail," "electronic tether" or "virtual prison" (Lilly, Ball and Lotz, 1986; Michigan Department of Corrections, 2006; Roberts, 2004). California recently revised its Penal Code (section 3010.9[e]) based, in part, on the presumed public safety provided by EM: "The Legislature finds that continuous electronic monitoring has proven to be an effective risk-management tool for supervising high-risk persons on parole who are likely to re-offend, where [crime] prevention and knowledge of their whereabouts ... [are] high priority for maintaining public safety." According to Peggy Conway (personal communication, Aug. 29, 2007), editor of the Journal of Offender Monitoring, there are now an estimated 130,000 monitoring units deployed daily in the United States. Individual monitoring service companies have predicted a 50 percent growth rate, with annual income exceeding $50 million (Buck, 2006; SecureAlert, 2006).
The most common configuration of offender monitoring is a radio-frequency transmitter unit attached to the offender's ankle with a tamperproof strap. The transmitter sends a signal to a fixed-location receiving unit in the offender's residence. The residence unit uses either a landline or a cellular network to relay information to a service center computer. If the offender is not at the residence at the times stipulated, an alert message is sent to the service center and then relayed to the supervising probation or parole officer. GPS units are similar in design, but the offender also carries a GPS cell phone unit that receives a signal from the ankle unit, or both functions may be combined into one ankle unit.
The location and speed of travel of the offender can be monitored with an "active" GPS system, and a warning signal may be sent to both the offender and the service center if the offender enters a prohibited or "exclusion" area. Computer software can display the offender's movements as often as every minute and provide a printed record for subsequent review by the supervising officer. With a "passive" GPS system, information about the offender's movements is relayed to the monitoring service center after the offender returns to his or her residence and places the GPS unit into a docking station.
Generally, in the past, most offenders assigned to alternative sanctions were those with low-risk, nonviolent criminal histories. In contrast, EM has increasingly been seen as a means of allowing higher-risk individuals to remain in, or be returned to, the community. A Florida study using data from more than 75,000 offenders between 1988 and 2002 concluded that "those offenders on home confinement with EM were significantly more likely to have committed a violent offense as compared with those offenders on home confinement without EM" (Padgett, Bales and Blomberg, 2006). A New York state senator bluntly argued, "It doesn't make sense to use electronic monitoring for Martha Stewart and not for the most dangerous sexual predators who roam free to prey on our children and families" (Bonacic, 2005). A minimum of eight states (California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma and Wisconsin) have enacted laws permitting lifetime GPS monitoring of some sex offenders. In 2006, the U.S. Congress authorized federal grants to state and local governments to assist in "carrying out programs to outfit sex offenders with electronic monitoring units and in the employment of law enforcement officials necessary to carry out such programs" (Public Law 109-248, 2006).
In light of the understandable eagerness of elected officials to solve the persistent issues of prison crowding and public safety, it becomes the responsibility of correctional agencies to be especially clear about typical limitations of this technology. Some corrections professionals have courageously and publicly expressed their concern that the rapid expansion of monitoring is more a political than a practical solution to crime problems (Gunderson, 2006).
Operational Challenges Of Electronic Monitoring
EM places a large burden on corrections personnel. Active GPS is particularly onerous because it produces an overwhelming quantity of data. "More data" is not always better. A study of the implementation of GPS monitoring of sex offenders in Orange County, Calif., reported that each monitored individual generated an average of 19 alerts per day (Gotts and Forster, 2007). The number of alerts dropped dramatically after more experience with the equipment and the vendor. An "alert" is not necessarily a violation. The majority of alerts are caused by technical problems such as low battery power, the GPS unit being separated too far from the anklet or a temporarily lost GPS signal (particularly inside buildings). Ambiguous but false alerts often occur when an offender has been given temporary permission to leave an inclusion area for a legitimate appointment, with the change going unnoted by monitoring center personnel. All alerts are usually followed up on after a grace period of 15 or 20 minutes.
Every monitoring program is forced to develop some strategy to deal with information overload from alerts. What, for instance, should an officer do when a few minor technical violations are recorded that would have gone unobserved under normal conditions of probation or parole? How soon should an officer be notified of a violation? Will the notification be by cell phone, landline, pager, e-mail, fax or some combination of these? How will the officer verify the accuracy of a possible violation or out-of-bounds report? A former home detention officer in Marion County, Ind., told a reporter that he resigned because "it was no longer possible to properly monitor ... detainees. So many violation messages came in," he said, and he "could only respond to the worst" (O'Shaughnessy, 2006).
In practice, some infractions or technical violations must be overlooked--a large number of revocations or reconvictions can jeopardize support for an EM program by actually increasing the prison population, with sentences longer than would have been originally served. On the other hand, increased tolerance of infractions or technical violations encourages an offender to take risks. With certain offenders, a cat-and-mouse game rapidly develops. Offenders on monitored home detention have been arrested for drug sales, gambling and prostitution. (A few offenders have claimed, unconvincingly, that they needed the money to pay the monitoring fee charged by the agency.)
Obviously, not all risks to public safety are avoidable. Inevitably a small percentage of offenders will go off EM and commit violent crimes. At least 25 homicides have been committed in the United States by offenders who were being monitored. (2) In 1995, a California Youth Authority parolee, Grayland Winbush, killed a woman during a robbery. Winbush's monitoring equipment had not been working for three days because, according to his claim, the stationary "home monitoring device power cord was knocked out of its socket by a child" (Chapman, 2003). Probably the most detailed report of a homicide committed by a monitored offender has been documented by Nellis (2006). The report (from the United Kingdom) details a series of staff miscommunications, equipment problems and inadequate offender risk assessments. A newspaper headline after the crime read, "Left to roam ... left to kill." During a radio interview discussing the murder, the director of a crime victims group demanded that EM be abandoned.
Potential damage to an agency's credibility can come from electronic documentation that shows, in subsequent court documents or newspaper accounts, that a violent act occurred after a valid alert was ignored. Therefore, a monitoring agency must be given an adequate budget to meet the full range of program obligations. In addition to costs of purchasing or leasing equipment and paying service center fees, there are significant costs involved in expanding the number of supervising agents required to respond to alerts 24 hours a day. Other expenses may include staff training, increased travel for field visits, making court appearances, checking equipment and maintaining an inventory of spare units. Also, law enforcement personnel outside the monitoring agency may be asked to assist with field visits or arrests when a potential violation occurs. The typical EM caseload of 30 to 60 for radio-frequency monitoring and 10 to 15 for GPS offenders might be capped at seven to 18 with juvenile or high-risk offenders on GPS (Brown, McCabe and Wellford, 2007; Colorado Judicial Branch, 2006).
Home detention obviously requires at least minimal cooperation of the offender's co-residents. Co-residents or family members may benefit from the offender's opportunity to be at home and his or her continued employment, but sacrifices must be expected. Family members are often required to provide a telephone line without Internet access, do grocery shopping, provide transportation to appointments and keep the residence in a presentable condition pending an unexpected visit by an EM officer. Offenders who do not have childcare responsibilities, regular employment or educational classes tend to struggle with boredom and confinement; this can add to tension within the home. Because most offenders are male, women are most often burdened with the extra responsibility. Probation or parole officers should be especially careful to avoid recommending home confinement for violence-prone offenders where the welfare of family members can be jeopardized. In some situations, if the family does not agree to the recommended home confinement, the family can be put in jeopardy of potential retribution by the offender when he or she is later released from prison.
Effectiveness Of Monitoring
EM vendors will naturally emphasize the positive aspects of their products. However, suppliers of EM equipment, in contrast to manufacturers of medical devices or safety equipment, are not required to meet performance standards or to demonstrate the effectiveness of their product. Therefore, a logical question to ask is whether EM can deliver on its promise to reduce crime. The answer is a resounding "maybe." A summary of six EM studies by Gendreau et al. (2000) found that the aggregated recidivism rate for participants in EM programs was somewhat higher (6 percent) than for participants in non-EM programs (4 percent). This simply may be the result of surveillance that reveals offenses that would normally go undetected with customary probation or parole.
In a study that matched offenders on risk and needs factors, the researchers concluded that EM had "little impact" on offender recidivism (Bonta, Wallace-Capretta and Rooney, 2000). EM did, however, increase the likelihood that moderate-risk offenders would remain in some type of community treatment. After EM ends, the rate of convictions of monitored offenders tends to "catch up," over a period of three years, with offenders who were not monitored (see, e.g., Finn and Muirhead-Steves, 2002; Gendreau et al., 2000). Renzema and Mayo-Wilson (2005) conducted the most comprehensive meta-analysis and review of the effectiveness of EM to date, locating 119 empirical studies. After rigorous screening for scientific methodology, the researchers found only two studies in which EM effects were plausible, and both studies had cognitive-behavioral treatment components. They concluded their review with a question:
Is EM simply another fad, another example of what Latessa et al. (2002) called "correctional quackery?" If one looks at gross recidivism rates for moderate to high-risk offenders, it would seem so. Through this review the authors failed to identify any methodologically sound evaluation comparing EM to incarceration, and they failed to find any convincing evidence that EM is superior to other prison diversion programs.
According to Renzema and Mayo-Wilson (2005), the mixed results of EM evaluation studies should not be surprising when one considers the wide range of types of offenders, the typically short duration of monitoring, the diverse treatments that often run concurrently with EM and the varied staff reaction to technical violations.
Currently, EM remains unproved as a long-term, cost-effective correctional tool. But there are bright spots, especially when the technology is combined with certain types of treatment or court orders. The previously mentioned large EM study in Florida (Padgett, et al., 2006) reported substantial positive effects of EM while the offenders were actually being monitored. Hopefully, follow-up data over a period of years will become available for risk-matched groups of monitored and nonmonitored offenders.
The enthusiastic promotion of EM technology by vendors and legislators as a means of enhancing public safety will likely create a public backlash if EM fails to fulfill expectations. However, the potential backlash can be reduced by following statutes that regulate the use of EM and by professional guidelines. For example, the American Correctional Association (1995) has published Standards for Electronic Monitoring Programs that stipulates a level-of-custody classification be conducted in conjunction with rehabilitation programming. According to the ACA standards, EM staff are to "complete an individualized plan for each offender within one week of the installation of any personal monitoring device." Other professional guidelines also include a requirement for risk-assessment procedures (e.g., Crowe, 2002).
Many state statutes have similar requirements. The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission has been mandated to prepare guidelines to determine "appropriate candidates for alternative sanctions which may include ... home incarceration/ electronic monitoring" (Code of Virginia, 17.1-803). The commission must also develop an offender risk-assessment instrument for use in all felony cases. Oregon's Administrative Rules (Section 291-0780020) for the Department of Corrections require that risk-assessment forms be completed for all offenders under intensive supervision, including those being electronically monitored. The California Penal Code (Section 1210.12[b]) requires county probation departments to establish guidelines justifying the need for enhanced monitoring.
In order to justify program costs and the increased deprivation of offender rights, EM programs should not only establish guidelines but also evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts. The programs also should be able to demonstrate that monitoring decreased specific types of crimes among certain types of offenders during a specified period of time compared with those probation or parole programs that did not use such monitoring.
EM programs unnecessarily limit their effectiveness if they rely solely on punishment as a primary strategy of rehabilitation. In most situations, punishment merely suppresses rather than changes behavior. (For example, a noisy high school classroom will get temporarily quiet when the school principal steps in.) Therefore, it is not surprising to find that typical punishment-oriented programs, such as boot camps, have failed to produce long-term, successful re-integration into the community unless the participants return to noncriminal environments (Maruna and LeBel, 2003). The meta-analysis of EM studies by Renzema and Mayo-Wilson (2005) is entirely consistent with what is scientifically known about punishment effects. A more balanced approach to supervision--one that replaces some of the punitive elements of typical EM programs with positive incentives--increases the probability of reducing recidivism. Such an approach might be termed "positive monitoring."
The use of positive incentives should be guided by a well-defined set of principles; otherwise, a supervising officer will not have the legal and professional benefit of conforming to an evidence-based practice. One set of principles that has the backing of decades of laboratory and clinical research is social learning theory (Bandura, 1977). At the most elementary level, social learning theory states that the greater the value and probability of a reward for a behavior (whether the behavior is pro-social or criminal), the greater the likelihood of that behavior reoccurring.
The basic concept of social learning theory is deceptively simple because its application is often counterintuitive. For example, small positive variations in an offender's behavior should be acknowledged even when the behavior does not meet a generally expected social standard. The notion that correctional officers are rewarding offenders for less than normally good behavior may be repugnant to people who do not understand the principles of social learning theory. Nonetheless, it is just such reliance on empirically demonstrated methods of behavior modification that can distinguish professional practitioners from uninformed members of the general public.
As an offender's behavior improves, the standard of performance should be gradually raised. Training a social skill (e.g., getting to appointments on time) is similar to training an athletic skill. Temporary relapses that do not threaten public welfare should not be considered failures, nor should they trigger a revocation of privileges. However, serious violations do require swift sanctions.
Incentives are most effective if they occur shortly after desired progress in behavior or attitude (Akers, 2000). Electronic supervision, in particular, can be used to document and reinforce small behavioral improvements while they are occurring in the offender's usual social environment. An early EM system (Schwitzgebel and Bird, 1970) included a belt-worn transceiver that permitted two-way vibrotactile signaling of offenders. By this means, program staff could unobtrusively contact the offender during an activity, such as attending an electronics repair class. A coded message would tell the offender that he or she had become eligible for a reward. Contemporary radio-frequency or GPS systems that allow an officer to text message or verbally communicate with the offender now provide a convenient means to send a brief acknowledgement of progress. Agencies that use electronic kiosks for periodic check-in can also relay positive messages. The kiosks could be installed at day reporting centers, transportation hubs or other locations convenient and appropriate for offenders.
Rewards or reinforcers may comprise a wide range of positive consequences that are valued in society or subgroups (Akers, 2000; Carey, 2004). Because many offenders lack social or work skills and are not very verbal, the usual talk-oriented treatments tend to be less effective than those interventions that have tangible consequences. Table 1 lists a sample of community-based correctional programs that have used positive incentives. Incentives include letters of commendation, reduced surveillance time, dental appointments, haircuts, food coupons, decreased travel restrictions, clothing, bus passes and tickets to sporting events.
The cost of incentives need not be a significant barrier to implementing positive monitoring. A brief, three- or four-sentence handwritten note of commendation can have a large impact. (3) Young offenders often appreciate music CDs, food items, sports memorabilia or a short ride in a limousine. Changing curfew conditions, permitting travel to a family event and verbal praise at a court hearing are cost-free items that are appropriate for older as well as young clients. The Prince William County Juvenile Court Service Unit in Virginia has an EM supervision program in which $1,000 has been annually allotted to caseworkers to use as incentives for a group of approximately 50 clients. The Advocacy and Case Management Project of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice in Washington, D.C., has allotted up to $1,000 in discretionary funding to purchase services for the caseload of each case manager. The 2006 Michigan ReEntry Initiative budgeted $163 per adult parolee for bus passes. A raffle of a valued item for which tickets are given as rewards is an easy way to minimize cost per client. Some agencies have a community advisory board that donates services and goods. One Pinal County, Ariz., program administrator of juvenile court services reported that obtaining items to be used as reinforcers was less challenging than getting all the staff to actively support an incentive program (D. McBride, personal communication, March 20, 2007).
Both the frequency and the value of incentives should be varied in order to generate an element of surprise. In the psychological literature, such an incentive plan is known as a "variable-interval and variable ratio schedule of reinforcement." One advantage of a variable reward schedule is that it can sustain behavior for long periods of time when no incentive is actually given (as in the case of Las Vegas-style gambling). Explicit promises of a future reward are not consistent with a variable schedule of reinforcement. Without careful planning, promises and contracts can create unrealistic expectations on the part of the offender and set the stage for revocation or an awkward adjustment of the rules by the supervising officer.
Frequent interaction at the beginning of supervision should be gradually tapered off as pro-social behavior becomes maintained by more natural, community-based, long-term incentives. An electronic monitoring system can be viewed as a high-intensity, temporary conduit for administering sanctions and rewards. The goal is to guide the offender into a stable social situation where there is a significant degree of discipline, informal social control and tangible rewards (e.g., a steady job, military service, marriage, constructive recreational activities).
A secondary benefit of positive monitoring is the potential effect on supervising staff. No one knows better than corrections personnel the frustration of continually dealing with individuals who seem unable to avoid hurting themselves or others with impulsive and hostile acts. The opportunity for EM officers to increase their effectiveness by delivering rewards and incentives will be simply more enjoyable than administering sanctions and, thus, will encourage a natural adoption of the procedure.
A Prudent Response
Public officials are mandating the use of EM technology without sufficient examination of its practical limitations. Given the unrealistic expectation that surveillance and sanctions will reduce long-term recidivism, a prudent response of monitoring agencies would be to initiate small, exploratory EM programs using positive incentives.
The strategic use of rewards may run counter to the previous training of many probation and parole officers, but successful applications of social learning theory are well documented. An organizational culture that supports a style of firm, positive interaction with offenders will likely grow spontaneously as staff members witness the results over a period of years. Correctional agencies can begin now to make slow, incremental changes in the nature of supervision contacts that will lead to the development of a legally defensible, effective and evidence-based EM practice.
Akers, R.L. 2000. Criminological theories: Introduction, evaluation, and application, third edition. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing.
American Correctional Association. 1995. Standards for electronic monitoring programs. Laurel, Md.: American Correctional Association.
Bandura, A. 1977. Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Bonacic, J. 2005. (June 15). Senate passes bill requiring GPS monitoring for sex offenders. Press release (Senator Bruno), New York State Senate. Retrieved from www.senate.state.ny.us/pressreleases.nsf.
Bonta, J., S. Wallace-Capretta and J. Rooney. 2000. A quasi-experimental evaluation of an intensive rehabilitation supervision program. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 27(3):312-329.
Brown, T.M.L., S.A. McCabe and C. Wellford. 2007. Global positioning system (GPS) technology for community supervision: Lessons learned. Noblis technical report, No. NTR-2007-#012. Falls Church, Va.: Noblis.
Buck, J. 2006. Criminal offender tracking solution helps lock up new business. Boulder, Colo.: Behavioral Interventions. Available at www.bi.com/pdfs/BI_CS_MPExacuTrack.pdf.
Carey, M. 2004. Social learning, social capital and correctional theories: Seeking an integrated model. In What Works and Why. Effective Approaches to Reentry, ed. American Correctional Association and International Community Corrections Association, 1-33. Lanham, Md.: American Correctional Association.
Chapman, G. 2003. (March 16). Jury hears confession detailing homicide. Oakland Tribune. Available at www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20030316/ai_n14545036.
Colorado Judicial Branch. 2006. Annual report of probation programs FY2006. Denver: Office of Probation Services.
Crowe, A.H. 2002. Offender supervision with electronic technology: A user's guide. Lexington, Ky.: American Probation and Parole Association.
District judge tests electronic monitor. 1983. (March 18). Albuquerque Journal, pp. A-l, A3.
Finn, M.A. and S. Muirhead-Steves. 2002. The effectiveness of electronic monitoring with violent male parolees. Justice Quarterly, 19(2):293-312.
Gendreau, P.L., C. Goggin, F.T. Cullen and D.A. Andrews. 2000. The effects of community sanctions and incarceration on recidivism. Forum on Corrections Research, 12(2):10-13.
Gotts, K. and M. Forster. 2007. (Feb. 6). Global positioning system (GPS) supervision of adult sex offenders pilot project. Orange County (Calif.) Probation Department report.
Gunderson, D. 2006. (Feb. 22). Corrections officials critical of expanded sex offender monitoring. Minnesota Public Radio. Retrieved Oct. 11, 2006, from http://Minnesotapublicradio.org/display/web/2006/02/16/gpstracking/.
Lilly, J.R., R. Ball and W. R. Lotz. 1986. Electronic jail revisited. Justice Quarterly, 3(3):353-361.
Maruna, S. and T.P. LeBel. 2003. Welcome home? Examining the "reentry court" concept from a strengths-based perspective. Western Criminology Review, 4(2):91-107.
Michigan Department of Corrections. 2006. Report to the Legislature: Electronic tether program. Retrieved Oct. 7, 2006, from http://www.michigan.gov/documents/04-0106_Section_402_EMC_155828_7.pdf.
Nellis, M. 2006. The limitations of electronic monitoring: Reflections on the tagging of Williams. Prison Service Journal, 164 (March):3-12.
O'Shaughnessy, B. 2006. (May 2). Staff of 12 tracks 1,700 doing time at home. Indianapolis Star. Retrieved Oct. 7, 2006, from www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? Date=20060502&CategoryNEWS01&ArtNo=605020421&SectionC.
Padgett, K.G., W.D. Bales and T.G. Blomberg. 2006. Under surveillance: An empirical test of the effectiveness and consequences of electronic monitoring. Criminology and Public Policy, 5(1):61-92.
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Stephan, J.J. 2004. State Prison Expenditures, 2001. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
(1) The authors are the original inventors of electronic monitoring. Their family name, "Schwitzgebel," was legally changed to "Gable" in 1982.
(2) These federal and state court cases are on file in the office of the senior author.
(3) One of the present authors sent such a note--on official stationery, with a large and bold signature--to an 18-year-old probationer. A few days later, he received a call from the youth's mother asking if the letter was a forgery. The family had never received any unexpected correspondence from a government agency that was not bad news.
Robert Gable is professor emeritus of psychology at Claremont Graduate University. Kirkland Gable is professor emeritus of psychology at California Lutheran University.
Table 1. Sample Programs Using Positive Incentives to Recognize Progress Agency Program Type of Incentives Used Participant Allen County (Ind.): Parolees eligible for Reduction of 30 days Reentry Court Program early release of electronic monitoring Cumberland County, Juvenile drug Gift certificates, Portland (Maine): offenders reduction in status Juvenile Drug hearings, curfew Treatment Court extension Program District of Columbia, Youths recommended Personal hygiene Juvenile and Criminal for detention items, clothing, YMCA Justice Organization: memberships, bus Case Management passes Project Henrico County (Va.) Drug court Weekly awards during Drug Court: participants court session of gift behavioral guidelines certificates, movie passes, medallions Laramie County (Wyo.) Juvenile probationers Reduction in Department of Family supervision fees, Services: Intensive extension of Supervision Program "personal maintenance time" Loudoun County (Va.), Adult drug offenders Praise from the Adult Drug Treatment court, gift Court: participant certificates, movie handbook passes, medallions Pinal County (Ariz.) High-risk youths on Point system used for Juvenile Court: probation supervised outings, Probation Incentive food, electronic Program and Juvenile equipment Intensive Program Prince William County Youths under Movie passes, gift (Va.), Juvenile Court intensive certificates, food Services Unit: supervision, coupons, day trips incentive component including electronic monitoring San Joaquin County Juvenile drug Food packs, release (Calif.), Juvenile offenders from electronic Probation: Home monitoring Supervision and Electronic Monitoring Program State of Georgia Adult parolees Letters of Board of Pardons and recognition, Paroles: Behavior certificates, Response and reduction of Adjustment Guide supervision level Program Kansas Department of Offenders supervised Enhanced travel Corrections: Behavior by parole services flexibility, going to Response/Adjustment offender's home to Guide recognize accomplishment State of Michigan: Released parolees Bus passes, used Prisoner Reentry bicycles to "promote Initiative intrinsic motivation" transportation service area U.S. Territory of Adults charged with Decreased drug Guam: Adult Drug possession; diverted testing, community Court into program service credited toward payment of fines