The politics of the Dalai Lama's new initiative for autonomy (1).

In recent years, the Dalai Lama has pursued a dialogic approach to the Tibet Question. He has significantly modified his views on autonomy and has made a number of fundamental concessions. His present position should clearly be distinguished from the stance he had from the late 1980s until recently. The Dalai Lama's views from that time are still fixed in the minds of many people, but in the main they no longer constitute his approach.

From the late 1980s until recently, for example, the Dalai Lama refused to even imply that Tibet is part of China. He stated in 2000: "The Beijing government often puts pressure on me and wants me to declare that Tibet is a part of the Chinese territory. However, this is not a fact. I will not make such an erroneous statement." (2) He also maintained until recently that Tibetans and (Han) Chinese have no common bonds. In 1987, the Dalai Lama said that "Tibetans and Chinese are distinct peoples each with their own country, history, culture, language and way of life," (3) and in 1995, he put it that "the Chinese and Tibetans are very fundamentally different peoples.... We speak different languages; are of different civilizations, have different customs; our religion and culture, and even our written languages are completely different." (4) The Dalai Lama, as we will show, now no longer excludes Tibet from the Chinese state and does not reject the possibility that Tibetans can be part of the supra-ethnic Chinese nation; at least he has indicated a willingness to confirm these views if negotiations with the Chinese government go forward. (5)

From the late 1980s until a few years ago, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) maintained that for an accommodation to be reached, China would have to renounce all control over affairs in Tibet except those involving foreign affairs and defense. (6) We will show that the Dalai Lama has altered the focus of the autonomy he seeks for Tibet by downplaying enhanced political and economic power and pursuing greater power as to religion and culture. Even in those spheres, he no longer claims an exclusive domain, but acknowledges a willingness to have the People's Republic of China (PRC) "govern and guarantee to preserve our Tibetan culture, spirituality and our environment." (7)

The change in the Dalai Lama's view is linked to prospects of negotiations for greater autonomy being pursued as a result of regular talks by his special envoys with China's representatives. In July, 2002, the Dalai Lama's brother Gyalo Thondup visited Tibet. The PRC's invitation was to set the stage for "talks about talks" that held out prospects of immediate benefits for the PRC government: they would precede President Bush's October, 2002 visit to China, scuttle attempts by some European Parliament (EP) members to extend "recognition" to the TGIE if there were no talks between it and China before July 5, 2003, and ease pressure on Beijing in the run-up to the Olympics. (8) Some PRC leaders were also convinced that any settlement of the Tibet Question could be better implemented during the lifetime of the Dalai Lama, who was 67 in 2002. (9)

The visit of the Dalai Lama's representatives to China in 2002 to 2004 created a quasi-institutional forum to meet, discuss and address issues in a regular manner. The TGIE sees the contacts both as a way to "create atmosphere in a long, drawn-out process" and as a means of setting the stage for resolving differences within a set period. (10) TGIE Premier Samdhong Rinpoche observed that the first round was to say hello, the second for half-tourism, half-talks, the third to reduce fear on the Chinese side, and the fourth to respond to questions raised in the third. (11) The latest round was said to take "a very practical approach to the issues, rather than an emotional one." (12) For its part, the position of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) was that direct contact had become a stable, "established practice" and that the emigres should not be pessimistic about differences between the sides, which may be narrowed through more meetings and exchanges of views. (13)

It is the expression of greater flexibility on key issues of the Tibet Question, together with a push to regularize contact between the parties, that constitutes the Dalai Lama's new initiative for autonomy. Samdhong Rinpoche has said, "We do not regard China as an enemy anymore, but more as a party with which we will have to negotiate. They have sought a reassurance from us on this." (14) Through statements on the relationship between Tibetans and China, the Dalai Lama has tried to provide that reassurance, as a result enduring sharp criticism from Tibet independence supporters. (15) When PRC Premier Wen Jiabao paid a visit to India in April, 2005, moreover, Samdhong Rinpoche welcomed it, the first time the TGIE had ever approved of the visit of a Chinese leader. (16) Asked after the Bern talks whether mediation was needed, he said, "We don't think it is necessary as brokers are needed when disputes are international and since we accept China's sovereignty then the dispute is internal and will have to be resolved between ourselves." Following China's celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Samdhong Rinpoche also noted that in marking the day, "the Chinese government did not accuse the Dalai Lama of anything and the statement was much mild compared to previous year's." (17)

The Dalai Lama has not concisely specified why he has undertaken the new initiative, but a likely reason is that China has not followed a Soviet path to regime change and dissolution, as predicted by emigre leaders in the 1990s, but has risen in importance in the current decade, a phenomenon that narrowly limits what emigre leaders can accomplish by mobilizing supporters. (18) The Dalai Lama has seemingly come to the same conclusion that Western and Chinese scholars have reached: "separatists in China do not have sufficient strength to force the central government to accept their demands of independence or true autonomy unless there is a fundamental breakdown in China." (19) The Dalai Lama also knows that the odds of gains through negotiation are highest during his lifetime and certainly would like to see Tibet again and visit China's Buddhist sacred sites. (20) Beijing's leaders, in turn, are now aware that negotiations provide a "win-win" situation: they win if there is a settlement with the Dalai Lama, because he can best ensure that Tibetans adhere to its terms, and they win nevertheless if they negotiate with him, but do not reach a settlement in his lifetime, because to have brought about negotiations the Dalai Lama will have met key PRC preconditions and the PRC will have shown good faith through negotiating. It is also not coincidental that Chinese officials' renewed interest in the Tibet Question has followed the rise to power of Hu Jintao, the top official in Tibet from 1988 to 1992 (during a period of unrest in Lhasa), who is now the CCP general secretary and PRC president. In what follows, we examine the background to the Dalai Lama's new initiative, outline recent developments, discuss obstacles to a breakthrough dialogue on autonomy, and suggest ways to overcome them.

Changing Wind

In the late 1980s, the 14th Dalai Lama proposed that the government of the PRC could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy, while Tibet would be governed by its own liberal democratic constitution. A decade later, he expressed disappointment that the Chinese government had not responded positively to his proposals or used the framework proposed by Deng Xiaoping that is, apart from the question of total independence of Tibet, all other issues could be discussed and resolved. (21)

Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have pressed PRC leaders to hold talks with the Dalai Lama, and in 2001 the US Congress passed a Tibet Policy Act with the same prescription. European Union (EU) External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes called on China in 2002 to begin dialogue with the Dalai Lama. (22) A European Parliament delegation to China that year did the same, but was told by Beijing leaders that they were not ready for talks with the Tibetan leader. (23) Indeed, HuJintao stated that "it is essential to fight unequivocally against the separatist activities by the Dalai clique and anti-China forces in the world, vigorously develop a good situation of stability and unity in Tibet and firmly safeguard national unity and state security." (24)

In the late 1980s and 1990s, the collapse of the USSR brought a ray of hope to the Dalai Lama. He declined a 1989 invitation from the Chinese Buddhism Association to attend the Beijing funeral rites of the second-highest figure in Tibetan Buddhism, the 10th Panchen Lama, and he won the Nobel peace prize. The US Congress passed a non-binding resolution in 1991 stating that "Tibet is an occupied country" and urging the US to recognize the TGIE as the legitimate government of the Tibetan people.

Times have changed since then. Western and Indian media observers now write about a notable decline in support for the "Free Tibet movement" among political leaders and in wider circles. (25) It now appears that the disintegration of China, hoped for by Tibetan exile leaders, is unlikely. Instead, China has become an ever-greater regional power, a hub for world manufacture, and a catalyst for East Asian integration. Meanwhile, support for independence has seemingly diminished in Tibet, with both exile leaders and foreign supporters acknowledging that the region has no visible opposition movement. (26) The growing middle class, fostered by PRC government subsidies to the region, has not panned out as a force for separatist nationalism, but is inclined to seek stability; staying with China is seen as the best guarantor of Tibet's interests and prosperity. (27)

As a growing power, China has gained support from the international community for the maintenance of its recognized territorial boundaries. During his 1992 electoral campaign, Bill Clinton openly supported the Tibetan exile cause, but changed his policy toward Tibet as soon as he entered the White House. In 2000, George W. Bush said that the US would defend Taiwan if the Mainland attacked it, but in 2003-2004, he opposed Chen Shuibian's referendum proposal and has provided no meaningful support for the Tibetan exile cause. In the 2004 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate John Kerry even endorsed China's "one country, two systems" proposal for Taiwan. A year 2000 EP resolution called for the appointment of an EU Special Representative for Tibet and recognition of the TGIE as the legitimate representative of the Tibetans, if Beijing refused to hold talks with the Dalai Lama within the next three years. Meeting with the Dalai Lama a month before the three-year deadline was to expire, Anders Fogh Rassmussen, prime minister of Denmark, an EU country with longstanding ties to the exiles, stated he did not believe there was a need for new EU or Danish initiatives. (28) When the sixth EU-China Summit was held in October 2003, Tibet was not mentioned. The EU has even considered lifting its arms embargo against China; it asked the PRC to meet four human rights conditions for that to happen, but none involve Tibet. (29)

The Dalai Lama's two major traditional allies have changed their position on Tibet. Britain, which had since 1906 spoken in terms of China's "suzerainty" in Tibet, in an attempt to turn Tibet into a neutral buffer between India and China, now acknowledges PRC sovereignty. (30) During the 2003 visit to China of Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, the Indian government, which had inherited the British "suzerainty" notion, stated that the TAR is a part of China. (31) In return, China recognized Sikkim as a part of India. Although Indian officials argued that their statement represented no change in policy on Tibet, (32) the pronouncement proved a disappointment to Tibetan exiles, with the largest exile organization, the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), stating that "Vajpayee's signing of the declaration amounted to obliterating Tibet." (33) TGIE Kalon Tripa (prime minister) Samdhong Rinpoche said after Vajpayee's visit that "the reality is that Tibet is China's autonomous part." (34) The affirmation of PRC sovereignty by Vajpayee's right-wing regime, which might have been expected to be hostile to China on the Tibet question, was likely a factor in causing the TYC president to speculate that it may take 500 or 1,000 years to make Tibet free (35) and in inducing exile leaders to come closer than ever before to meeting the main PRC condition for negotiations--namely, a public statement by the Dalai Lama that Tibet is an inalienable part of China. During a November 2003 trip to the Vatican, he reportedly made the following statement: "We accept Tibet as part of the People's Republic of China." (36)

The Dalai Lama has entered his seventies and is sometimes ill. Indeed, his life was thought to be in danger in 2002 and the question of his reincarnation was inevitably raised. In an interview with a Taiwanese journalist in 2000, he had already stated that the Tibetan theocracy, based on a reincarnation system, should be abandoned, and that he would not take part in politics if he returns to China. (37) In a speech to Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, he again expressed his preference for ending the system. (38) Many Tibetans in exile express disfavour at this option, viewing it as an abandonment of Tibetan tradition. The most that the Dalai Lama would concede, however, is his intention to not be reincarnated in PRC territory. (39)

Even if the Dalai Lama dies outside the PRC, it is likely that two 15th Dalai Lamas will emerge, one outside China, and the other chosen within China and affirmed by PRC authorities. Such an outcome will weaken the 15th Dalai Lama's power, undermine Tibetan tradition, and increase tensions among Tibetan exiles, China, and the country where the reincarnation is found. The TGIE thus may now prefer that the Dalai Lama dies and is reincarnated within Chinese territory. The 17th Gyalwang Karmapa, the next most prominent Buddhist leader in exile, has stated: "If in his wisdom the Dalai Lama decides to take rebirth in China-held territory, one should not be surprised." (40) Many Tibetans want the Dalai Lama to die in Tibet because if he dies on foreign soil, his "head" and "body" will be separated. This is an important reason why the Dalai Lama is pressing China to speed up the dialogue process.

Given these conditions, as US Tibet specialist Melvyn Goldstein points out, the Dalai Lama and TGIE have three, not mutually exclusive options: 1. maintain the status quo by continuing the campaign of enhancing international support; 2. escalate the conflict by encouraging and even organizing violence in Tibet; and 3. compromise by sending Beijing a message that the Dalai Lama is ready to scale down his political demands in order to preserve a more homogeneous Tibetan homeland. (41) Evidence indicates that the Dalai Lama has chosen the third option and made significant concessions.

The Dalai Lama's Concessions

New thinking about autonomy

The Dalai Lama's Five-Point Peace Plan, presented on Washington's Capitol Hill in 1987, and his 1988 Strasbourg Proposal, before the EP, laid out his initial positions on autonomy. Under the proposal, the PRC would remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy, while Tibet would be governed by its own constitution or basic law. The Tibetan government would be comprised of a popularly elected chief executive, a bicameral legislature and an independent legal system. (42) It would have a special duty to safeguard and develop religious practice. (43) The proposal's inclusion of a directly elected chief executive and independent judiciary represents a fundamental rupture in the current Chinese political system and makes no room for the CCP, implying an end to party leadership. Given its authoritarian system, Beijing will not accept a proposal of this kind. (44)

In 1992, the Dalai Lama demanded that Chinese leaders allow Tibet, Inner Mongolia and East Turkestan [Xinjiang] "to become free and equal partners in a new world order." (45) In recent years, however, the Dalai Lama has emphasized cultural autonomy, played down political autonomy, and shown respect for the Chinese constitutional framework. (46) There was an internal discussion among Tibetan exiles in 1999 about the possibility of proposing a power-sharing mechanism. (47) It is also suggested that the TGIE recognize the reality of CCP leadership in Tibet and the role of the central government in a transitional arrangement. While the central party organization would have the right to appoint Tibet's party secretary, Tibet would have the right to elect its governor. Learning from the practice of India, it is suggested the centre would have the right to remove the governor if necessary. If China lists convincing reasons for an appointed chief executive, the TGIE would agree to postpone direct elections for ten years. (48)

In a 2005 interview, the Dalai Lama presented a substantially changed view of Tibet's relationship with China and prospects for governance in Tibet. He recognized that PRC Tibetans are in some measure Chinese, because Tibetan culture and Buddhism are part of Chinese culture and Tibet is part of China's 5,000-year history. He also affirmed that Tibet gains materially from being part of China. His previous view was that Tibet might benefit in the future from being part of China, but that it does not presently, because China exploits Tibet, so that it benefits from having Tibet and not the other way around.

It was also reported that a TGIE official stated that the Dalai Lama now only wants autonomy as to religious and cultural matters, not political, economic and diplomatic affairs. (49) This position was prefigured by a 2004 statement of Thubten Samphel, the TGIE's spokesman, that Tibetans "should be allowed genuine spiritual and cultural autonomy, and a degree of political space." (50) In terms of religious and cultural autonomy, the Dalai Lama reportedly has been concerned with the following criteria: the ability to live year-round in Lhasa's Potala Palace; to travel in and out of China and to all Tibetan areas; to have full control over the publication and editing of religious texts; and to have undisputed authority to appoint abbots of monasteries and supervise the choice of reincarnations of important lamas. (51) Such concerns are vastly different from those reflected in past assertions that Tibet must have a liberal political system. The Dalai Lama now speaks of enhanced autonomy under the PRC constitution and the need to remain in China to foster economic development. (52)

The borders of an autonomous Tibet

Its conception of Tibet's borders is one of the most sensitive aspects of the Dalai Lama's 1988 Autonomy Proposal: Tibet would take in the whole Tibet Plateau, encompassing the traditional Tibetan areas of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo, an area that comprises one-fourth of PRC territory. Besides the TAR, "greater Tibet" would include most of Qinghai province and parts of Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan, areas where 53 percent of PRC Tibetans live amidst Han Chinese and other ethnic groups. Greater Tibet would become a self-governing democratic political entity. (53)

Although, before the 1950s, Tibet's boundaries and political status were not determined by modern standards, (54) "greater Tibet" is at the core of modern Tibetan nationalism. In negotiations with the Chinese government in 1951, which led to the "17-Point Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet," the Dalai Lama's representatives were set to demand that "the territories taken by Manchu China, the Kuomintang and the new government of China must be returned to Tibet." (55) Since 1959, Tibetan nationalists have sought to create a pan-Tibetan identity, fueling antagonism with PRC leaders, for whom Tibet is confined to today's TAR, the area previously ruled by the Dalai Lama. By 1996, the Dalai Lama had already acknowledged that much of the eastern Tibet Plateau had not been under Lhasa's rule and expressed an interest in cultural preservation, rather than political control of the area. (56) While the TGIE still insisted until at least 2003 that "the whole of Tibet inhabited by the Tibetan people should be given genuine autonomy," (57) the Dalai Lama no longer uses a concept of greater Tibet in the sense of insisting on the erasure of borders in order to achieve unification of all Tibetan areas, but focuses on cultural protection within a Tibetan cultural zone. (58) He avoids emphasizing political boundaries, has stated that "my concern is culture, and spirituality, and environment," (59) and seems to accept there will be no boundary question under the constitutional framework of China.

In a forum on Tibetan autonomy, Professor Ezra Vogel of Harvard University asked whether redrawing boundaries to include Tibetans outside the TAR would be acceptable to China. Zheng Shiping, a US political scientist originally from China, replied, "I don't think it would be possible to change the boundaries. It would just be a waste of time." However, Bhuchung Tsering, director of the International Campaign for Tibet, stressed that "[w]e should look at this issue from a different perspective. Let's put the emphasis on the survival of the Tibetan people. I don't see why this can't be accommodated within Chinese limitations. To the Chinese, the idea of a 'Greater Tibet' seems very sinister. But the survival of the Tibetan people would be acceptable." (60) The PRC government is adamant that "Greater Tibet" is ahistorical and not feasible. (61) At the same time, there has been a proliferation of wushengqu (five provinces and regions) bodies that coordinate the implementation of similar policies across the Tibetan areas. (62) The guarantee to Tibetans outside the TAR of any social and cultural benefit accorded TAR Tibetans may be a suitable way to realize the goal of uniting Tibetans. For example, for a quarter-century, TAR Tibetans have not had to pay regional taxes on farming and herding income. In 2004, Sichuan province exempted its autonomous-area minorities (mostly Tibetans) from paying such taxes. (63) By the same token, TAR Tibetans would be allowed rights accorded Tibetans elsewhere; for example, the right to publicly display photos of the Dalai Lama.

The withdrawal of Chinese troops

The Dalai Lama's 1988 Autonomy Proposal demanded the withdrawal of Chinese troops, in order to transform the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace. Only with the withdrawal of troops could a genuine process of reconciliation begin. (64) China would have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet, solely for defensive purposes, until a peace conference is convened and demilitarization and neutralization are achieved.

The Dalai Lama stated in 2003 that the number of paramilitary People's Armed Police should be reduced in Tibetan cities, implying acceptance of the deployment of Chinese troops. (65) The zone of peace idea remains popular among many exile political leaders and "Tibet supporters," (66) but the Dalai Lama no longer demands a complete withdrawal of the Chinese army, nor does he insist on withdrawal as a precondition for negotiations.

The Hong Kong model of autonomy

The Dalai Lama has demanded that Hong Kong's one country-two systems policy be applied to Tibet (67) and many commentators have considered its suitability for Tibet. (68) Under it, Beijing would be responsible only for Tibet's foreign affairs and defense, while Tibetans would be free to make their own decisions as to other matters. To endorse a Hong Kong model for Tibet, however, the Dalai Lama must be aware of its political implications. Under it, China's sovereignty includes a Hong Kong garrison, Beijing's appointment of all high-level officials, and executive dominance through the tight circumscription of legislative power. This set-up differs fundamentally from what the Dalai Lama demanded in his original autonomy proposal, which was essentially an American-style system of governance. The Dalai Lama does seem impressed, however, with Hong Kong's ability to control the movement of population from Mainland China. Though it will not totally end the migration of Han into Tibetan areas, a Hong Kong model would slow the process. Tibetan autonomy could then focus on the preservation of culture and religion, with Tibetans having a greater say about such matters.

Four Visits

In late 1978, the Dalai Lama established his first direct contact with PRC leaders since 1959. That came to an end in 1993, but indirect contacts via private persons and semi-officials continued. In January 2002 a face-to-face meeting between the Dalai Lama's representatives and PRC officials responsible for Tibet policy took place outside China. This paved the way for a September 2002 visit to Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu and Lhasa by a four-member Tibetan exile delegation, headed by the Dalai Lama's special envoys, Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, and including their special assistants, Sonam Dagpo and Bhuchung Tsering. The same delegation visited Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Yunnan provinces in May and June of 2003, soon after changes in the CCP and PRC leaderships. (69) In a third trip of the same four-member team, in September 2004, they met Minister Liu Yandong, vice chairperson of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and leader of the CCP United Front Work Department, Zhu Weiqun, a vice-minister, Chang Rongjun, head of the UFWD Nationalities and Religion Department, and other Beijing officials. A fourth visit, to discuss autonomy with officials of the CCP UFWD, took place in China's embassy in Bern, Switzerland on 30 June and 1 July 2005.

The four visits have given Tibetans in exile the opportunity to re-establish contacts, explain the Dalai Lama's approach, and engage extensively with new Chinese leaders and officials responsible for Tibet policy. There have been positive effects from the four visits. The TGIE first ordered exile officials abroad to not organize protests against PRC leaders who visit Western countries. It then asked Tibet support groups and NGOs to not be very aggressive in staging such demonstrations and, according to the TYC, demanded that pro-independence activists in India not hold processions or shout anti-Beijing slogans on the occasion of the March 10 commemoration of the 1959 Lhasa uprising. (70) During a 1984 visit to China by Tibetan exile officials, they encountered cadres who complained of the Cultural Revolution and their suffering, but members of the recent delegations were impressed by self-confident officials empowered by China's development and were overwhelmed by the development itself, thus strengthening the idea that Tibet is better off staying in China rather than seeking independence. As the Dalai Lama said, "the best guarantee for Tibet" is to "remain within the People's Republic of China," and "more union, more cooperation is in our best interest." (71) In 2003, an exile special task force discussed how Sino-Tibet relations could be enhanced, with Lodi Gyari consulting with specialists on whether the Dalai Lama should visit China. (72)

On China's side, TAR leaders regarded the first visit as purely private, but Beijing did acknowledge the second visit, and the existence of "official" contact between the two sides. It has also acknowledged that a Tibet Question exists and is in need of resolution. (73) Harsh criticisms of the Dalai Lama as a "splittist" were reduced and his positive efforts to create a constructive environment were explicitly recognized. In 2003, the TAR governor told foreign journalists that China welcomes the Dalai Lama to visit Tibet if he comes as a PRC citizen and recognizes Tibet as an inalienable part of China. (74) In the fourth round of meetings in Bern, Vice Minister Zhu Weiqun acknowledged that direct contacts had become an "established practice" and stated that the Chinese national leadership attached great importance to the contact with His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

The four visits were aimed at building confidence by dispelling misconceptions and distrust. A lack of sincerity and mutual trust remains. In addition, there are fundamental differences in the two sides' conceptions of autonomy. Indeed, the Tibetan exile delegation stated that "there are major differences on a number of issues, including some fundamental ones. Both sides acknowledged the need for more substantive discussions in order to narrow the gaps and reach a common ground. We stressed the need for both sides to demonstrate flexibility, far-sightedness and vision to bridge the differences." (75)

Why the Absence of Substantive Progress?

Despite the four visits, there is no substantive breakthrough. Several reasons account for this. First, some PRC hardliners believe the Dalai Lama's death will be a grave blow to the Tibetan independence cause and that migrants will create a multi-ethnic community in Tibetan areas that will weaken the demographic basis for an independence movement. They even prefer that the Dalai Lama die outside of China, as that may create religious divisions, as has been the case with the designation of the reincarnation of the 17th Karmapa. (76) Most exiles do not deny that the Dalai Lama's passing will sharply set back their cause: one pro-independence member of the Tibetan parliament-in-exile has stated that "[a]s long as he is alive, he will be the foremost motivating factor. After his passing away, for the next 50 years Tibetans will not be able to bring any sort of momentum for their struggle and the Tibetan issue will be lost." (77) Others contend that the Dalai Lama's passing will not mean an end to the Tibet Question.

Second, in Beijing's view, Tibet already enjoys autonomy. In visits to China in 2002 and 2003, Lodi Gyari, the delegation head, confronted Chinese cultural and ideological opposition to the 1988 Autonomy Proposal. Many PRC officials told him that China has already developed a sound system of autonomy, implying it does not need the Dalai Lama's proposal. Lodi Gyari would like Chinese leaders to revise their view of autonomy, taking it as an intrinsic value that provides citizens with inalienable rights, demonstrated, for example, by Tibetans being accorded the right to elect their governor, as opposed to viewing autonomy merely as an instrument for national unity and social control. (78)

A third reason for no breakthrough is a fear that the CCP will lose control if the Dalai Lama returns to Tibet. A senior PRC official has stated that "the Dalai Lama's return to China will bring a great risk of instability. We will then not be able to control Tibet." (79) Reportedly, officials in the TAR fear that with the Dalai Lama in the Potala Palace, "he will inevitably become the source of all authority. Any theoretical separation of church and state will be impossible to maintain and the [CCP] will lose its influence over Tibetans." (80) Although it has been said that of "even a vast majority of Tibetans who are members of the Communist Party, every one of them, would like to be able to see His Holiness" return to Tibet, (81) Tibetan officials in Tibet have been at least as concerned as Han cadres about the Dalai Lama's possible return. For example, when Thubten, head of the TAR Religious Affairs Bureau, was asked whether the Dalai Lama will ever return, he replied, "he has now sunk in the mud too deep to renounce all he had done in the past." (82) Jampa Phuntsog, TAR governor, has said of the Dalai Lama: "It doesn't matter what he says.... His nature--that he wants to split Tibet from China--has not changed," and that it is "too early to discuss the question of the Dalai Lama's homecoming." (83)

In part, top Tibetan cadres display hostility in reaction to exile condemnations of them as "collaborators." (84) They contrast their contributions to Tibet's modernization with exile leaders' support for theocracy and failure to contribute to Tibet's development. The same high-level cadres do, however, distinguish between the Dalai Lama and those around him who are overt or covert supporters of independence, and those who are not wholly averse to compromise. (85) Jampa Phuntsog has stated that "we very much welcome Tibetan compatriots who return, including delegates of the Dalai Lama. Negotiations are good so that we can understand the true feelings of the Dalai Lama, which is the basis for progress." If the exiles were to repudiate claims of "cultural genocide," colonialism, etc., Tibetan cadres might well be willing to work with them after a settlement to the Tibet Question is reached. (86) One might also argue that if the Dalai Lama does return to Tibet with a PRC passport and TV stations show this passport, this will strengthen the comfort level of the PRC government and Tibetan cadres.

A fourth key reason for no breakthrough is that Beijing thinks the Dalai Lama has not met its preconditions. President Jiang Zemin stated in 1998 that before dialogue could begin, the Dalai Lama must "publicly make a statement and a commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China" and "must also recognize Taiwan as a province of China." (87) Premier Wen Jiabao reaffirmed that in 2003 and noted that "regrettably" the Dalai Lama had not met the preconditions and had not genuinely given up independence and separatist activities. (88) PRC government spokespeople continue to uphold the preconditions, indicating that they believe the Dalai Lama has not actually forsaken independence and separatist actions. (89)

Many exile officials also refuse to commit to the idea that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, and in interviews in 1999 in India they gave several reasons for refraining from such a statement. First, the Dalai Lama has already announced that he would not seek independence. Second, the Dalai Lama's public declaration should be linked to China's promise to grant genuine autonomy, but exile officials have argued that PRC leaders are unwilling to make such a concession even if the Dalai Lama offers this declaration. Third, Tibet's history as an independent country is bargaining power for greater autonomy; a public announcement will deprive Tibetans of this power. Fourth, Tibetans want independence, not autonomy; a declaration would mean giving up that goal, which should never be renounced. (90)

Another position was also mentioned: that Tibet was not an inalienable part of China in the past, but is now a part of China, a position the Dalai Lama now seemingly follows. Thus, the TGIE has stated that the Dalai Lama has "acknowledged the de facto status of Tibet" as part of China, but that "the issue of Tibet is yet to be resolved." (91) Queried about whether he is ready to acknowledge that Tibet is an integral part of China, the Dalai Lama replied, "Not that one sentence. Since 1950-51, as far as the central autonomous region of Tibet is concerned, after the seventeen-point agreement was signed, then Tibet became part of the People's Republic of China.... But then in the past, that's up to history." (92)

Because he has not used the term "inalienable," the PRC has not considered sufficient the Dalai Lama's statements thus far on Tibet being a part of China. Beijing does not think the Dalai Lama has met its precondition (93) because he has not repudiated his 1991 statement that "Tibet was an independent country before its occupation by China. It had its own government, now in exile.... There is no justification claiming that Tibet was 'part of China' as Peking claims today." (94) In response to a PRC offer to return the Dalai Lama to Tibet if he becomes a PRC citizen and acknowledges that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, TGIE Department of Information and International Relations secretary Sonam Dagpo said the latter precondition was not acceptable, since Tibet had always been an independent nation until China occupied it forcibly. (95) The PRC and Tibetan exiles may, however, set aside the issue of whether Tibet was independent before 1951, as Britain and China eventually did with the question of the validity of "three unequal treaties" that were the basis for British rule in Hong Kong. (96) In any case, the Dalai Lama's 2005 statement that Tibet is part of China's 5,000-year "history of tradition" excludes insistence that Tibet was always independent, while the Chinese government does not demand that the Dalai Lama affirm that Tibet has always been part of China. (97)

The TGIE has quoted only the Dalai Lama's statements that the Taiwan issue "is not my business" and "mainly depends on the people of Taiwan." (98) Beijing's position is that Tibet and Taiwan must adhere to the one-China policy and recognize each other as a part of China; hence it insists that the Dalai Lama recognize both as inalienable parts of China. (99) For the Dalai Lama, it is thought his image would be damaged if he publicly opposed Taiwanese independence in response to political pressure. Forces working for Taiwanese independence have, moreover, been allies with a goal similar to his own; an acknowledgement that Taiwan is part of China would weaken an alliance enhanced by Chen Shui-bian's presidency.

The Dalai Lama reportedly said in 1998, however, that "Taiwan's future should ... be viewed under the one China policy.... My stand is: I don't support or encourage Taiwan's independence movement." (100) This statement provided a moment of hope for a breakthrough in negotiations, and Kelsang Gyaltsen affirmed at the time that "the Dalai Lama has never doubted the 'one China' policy." (101) The Dalai Lama may revert to that position if it appears that little has been gained from his de facto alliance with Taiwan independence forces. In 2000, he denied a report that "Tibetans and Taiwanese would form a common front to press for independence from China." (102) He may come to view the Taiwan independence forces as taking advantage of the Tibet issue, adding obstacles to creating conditions favourable to dialogue, especially as other allies, most notably the Bush administration, have disapproved of Taiwan's pro-independence moves.

Beijing sees the Dalai Lama's advocacy of autonomy for Tibet as a smokescreen for independence because he fails to stop separatist activities, yet TGIE spokesman Thubten Samphel has claimed to have "no idea what China means by 'separatist activities.'" (103) TGIE/TYC relations are an example of such activities, however: the TYC goal is an independent Tibet headed by the Dalai Lama. It has launched campaigns like "Boycott Made in China" and "No Olympics 2008 in Beijing," (104) efforts blessed by the Dalai Lama's oldest brother, Professor Thupten Norbu (105) and by his prime minister. (106) One of the Dalai Lama's representatives at the ongoing talks with PRC officials addressed the 2004 TYC Tibetan youth leadership training programme. (107) That organization announced the same year its plans to train for "guerrilla activities" and in 2005 stated that it was "opposed to the Dalai Lama's stand," and does "not support the Dalai Lama at all" with respect to the latter's "Middle Way" approach." (108) The same largely holds true for the Students for a Free Tibet, which campaigns for the "fundamental right of Tibetans to independence" and apparently seeks the overthrow of the CCP. (109) Another example is TGIE participation in the pan-separatist Allied Committee of the Peoples of East Turkestan, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, founded in 1985 and still being promoted in 2005. (110) The history of negotiating processes to reach agreements aimed at settling major ethno-territorial disputes shows that no progress is possible if the two sides do not decisively break with nationalist extremists in their midst.

Tibetan Exile Perspectives

The Dalai Lama, the TGIE and pro-Dalai Lama Western scholars have provided several reasons for Beijing to start a dialogue as soon as possible.

View the Dalai Lama as an asset

The main problem lies in the PRC leaders' negative perception of the Dalai Lama. If they change their view, the Tibet problem can be solved. Lodi Gyari argues that Beijing thinks the US is using the Dalai Lama to "split" China; to reduce the chance of his being used by outsiders, the best solution is to let him live in China. As long as the Dalai Lama lives outside China, Tibetan loyalty will follow suit. (111) Kelsang Gyaltsen has said "the Dalai Lama is the only person who would persuade Tibetans to accept an agreement with the Chinese government that would recognize Tibet to be part of the PRC." (112) Orville Schell, dean of journalism at the University of California, Berkeley, has advised Beijing to view the Dalai Lama as an asset who could serve the interests of Han and Tibetans alike, rather than as a die-hard "splittist," and to return him to Lhasa as a religious and cultural avatar. (113) John Kenneth Knaus, a Harvard researcher, has asserted that "for China, it would be a loss of an opportunity to benefit from the presence of the one person who is best able to guarantee peace...." (114)

Consequences of Denying Dialogue

Kelsang Gyaltsen warns that failure to reach agreement with the Dalai Lama could inspire generations of Tibetans to resistance. (115) Lodi Gyari argues that as time passes, the situation will only become less favourable for the PRC: resentment will grow, it will be increasingly difficult to convince Tibetans to accept a solution short of independence, and there will be higher odds of dealing with the dangers posed by the emergence of extreme leaders. (116)

Preventing Political Violence

The Dalai Lama and the TGIE are pledged to a nonviolent strategy, which most Tibetan exile leaders are dedicated to realizing. If that strategy cannot work, radical groups such as the TYC will gain the confidence needed to engage in violence, as was the case for the Irish Republican Army and Hamas in recent decades. For Tibetans, the ideal of embracing peace is a contemporary development. There have been many instances of mass violence in Tibetan history and some prominent exiles do advocate violent struggle. (117)

To prevent radicals from gaining influence, the Dalai Lama is insisting that China begin engaging in dialogue sooner rather than later. He warned in 2003 that if peaceful dialogue does not produce results within two or three years, violence may occur that he is unable to stop. (118) History has shown that when moderates fail, radicals take over and when they do, even more hardline elements emerge to outbid them for support. It is shortsighted to imagine exile violence will favour China because it goes against the Dalai Lama's strategy, damages his reputation as a peacemaker, and serves to justify suppression. Israel adopted that approach in facilitating the emergence of Hamas as a counter to the Palestine Liberation Organization and now faces dire consequences.

Benefits for China's Unity

The Tibet problem directly threatens China's unity, but also has implications for Taiwan and Xinjiang. The Dalai Lama has stated that if China were to address the Tibet issue properly, it could only have positive implications for Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC's international image. (119) With many Taiwanese having moved away from a Chinese national identity in recent years, peaceful resolution of the Tibet issue will help China strengthen its national identity and will persuade Taiwanese leaders to negotiate.

Difficulties from Democratization

The Dalai Lama praises democratization among Tibetan exiles, who in 2001 directly elected the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies. Samdhong Rinpoche was elected Kalon Tripa by over 84 percent of the vote. However, exile democracy is characterized by the overriding power of the Dalai Lama, who gave instructions for direct elections and an increase in parliament's power. Samdhong Rinpoche has said of the Dalai Lama, "we can't do anything without him." (120) Indeed, even a move by the TGIE to close down its Budapest office in 2005 required the Dalai Lama's approval. (121) The exile political system integrates political institutions and Buddhism, (122) and the very top positions are held by monks (the "head of state" and "head of government," so to speak). There are no party politics and criticism of the Dalai Lama is deemed illegitimate among the exiles. (123) Will top-down democratization ensure moderates wield power, or will it empower radicals?

When the Dalai Lama dies, exile democratization may deepen, but that would make it more difficult for Beijing to strike a deal with the TGIE, as a pact will be subject to the will of diverse exiles. The lesson from East Timor is that an early grant of autonomy is an effective way to prevent future independence. If Indonesian strongman Suharto had offered autonomy, the East Timor issue would likely have been resolved. When his successor Habibie offered autonomy in 1999, rapid democratization was already underway in Indonesia and it was too late. If China had made a deal with Taiwan's President Jiang Jinguo in 1986, before Taiwan's democratization, the one-China principle would have become entrenched there.

Preparing the Groundwork for a Breakthrough

Cognitive and ideological gaps between Tibetan exile and PRC perspectives have been so great the two sides have been unable to negotiate. While China sees the Dalai Lama as advocating "disguised independence," the TGIE sees Beijing as playing games. Both sides need to take steps to reduce animosity and increase familiarity with each other's positions; for example, the Tibet exile delegation has attempted to prove the Dalai Lama's autonomy is not equivalent to independence. Both sides need to develop a non-zero-sum game, re-examine tendentious claims, drop recriminations and create a roadmap to negotiations. Instead of being preoccupied with talk of "fake" or "genuine" autonomy, for example, the focus should be on improving the existing autonomy system.

The Dalai Lama's Side

The Dalai Lama needs to reconsider his strategy. The TGIE has enjoyed international successes, but has had little impact in China, where it invites suspicion. It views internationalization as a means of overcoming Beijing's winning position in politics by turning it into the loser in the moral battle; this is reflected in Samdhong Rinpoche's statement: "We have a unique source of strength, which puts us in a position to negotiate with China on equal terms. We have the strength of truth and non-violence, which, if anything, makes us more powerful than China." (124) The sense of international success, measured in terms of the number and level of politicians, cultural figures and NGOs favouring the TGIE position, obscures its view of the realities involved in the politics of creating expanded autonomy for Tibet.

The Dalai Lama should adopt a gradual strategy, (125) starting with cultural autonomy before moving on to other forms of autonomy. There is reason to believe that he is willing to do so. He stated in 2004 that China had to accept three things in order to solve Tibet's problems: "Tibet's unique cultural heritage and compassionate spirituality, and delicate situation of environment." (126) Both sides could cooperate in building the Tibetan economy. While it is legitimate and appealing to hold to a Buddhist green vision of economic development, it is unproductive for the TGIE to reflexively oppose China's economic development projects, (127) especially given that the Dalai Lama has recognized that "all Tibetans want more prosperity, more material development." (128)

Autonomy is not created full-blown, but involves an ongoing process of learning and mutual adjustment. Patience is the key to progress, as it is impossible to remove fifty years of distrust through a few visits. China has reason to be suspicious, due to the historical involvement of the CIA, the internationalization of the Tibet Question, TYC support for Tibetan independence, etc. Moves such as deadlines for negotiations, moreover, have led nowhere, but have only proved the ineffectiveness of those who set them, when no action was taken after the deadline passed. (129) Finally, there is a need to contain rejectionists on both sides. As long as moderates are in power and work towards a cooperative, interactive future, there is hope for a peaceful settlement in the long run.

Beijing's Side

In January 2005, the TGIE, guided by the Dalai Lama, added a new unit, the Task Force on Negotiations. (130) To respond to this initiative, the CCP United Front Work Department should not host Tibetan exile delegations, as that may be misconceived as merely an effort to persuade the world of the Party's beneficent inclusiveness. Rather, the PRC government should rename the working group--now composed of officials from the UFWD, the Department of Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs--as a Tibet Commission, or create such a commission to concentrate work on the issue. It should also extend the scope of official Tibetan exile visits beyond the Dalai Lama's representatives. Apart from the Tibetan exiles' visits and meetings with PRC officials being institutionalized as a forum, held once a year, a working group should focus on education and culture, and an exchange programme should be established between Buddhist schools and institutions. (131)

To facilitate a settlement, Beijing should help the TGIE to create the political space it needs in order to meet such PRC preconditions to negotiations as the recognition that Tibet is an inalienable part of China. If the PRC addresses issues of importance to Tibetans, the TGIE can work around its previous objections to negotiations with preconditions. For example, both sides frame the issue of Tibet's status as a question of history. (132) Emigre leaders claim that the PRC insists they recognize that Tibet has always been part of China (133); despite the pressure, the TGIE holds firm to its position that "Tibet has always been an independent nation." (134) Recently, however, Samdhong Rinpoche has said that from 1640 and 1951, Tibet's governments were local, i.e., not national, in relation to China. (135) This position goes some way toward circumventing the historical issue.

In the 1950s, PRC leaders urged the Chinese to fight against Han chauvinism (da hanzu zhuyi). (136) Since then, attention in minority areas has been on fighting "local nationalism." (137) To restore the balance in Tibetan areas, the government could finance a programme to educate non-Tibetans who migrate there about the achievements of Tibetan culture. An anti-racial discrimination law, similar perhaps to the one planned for Hong Kong, (138) would also address a key issue that creates ethnic tension and could be important in combating employment discrimination. While even a vigorously enforced law will not change the ethnic distribution of labour in Tibet, it would empower jobseekers who face ethnic and "home place" (lao jia) nepotism. (139)

Tibet has never had a Tibetan party secretary. That may be because of a tradition from imperial times to not employ officials in their home areas. Exceptions to this policy now exist, however; in 2003, 18 of the 62 "provincial chiefs" (governors and party secretaries) were serving in their birth provinces. (140) Because there has not been a Tibetan party secretary, many believe Beijing does not regard any Tibetan as competent and loyal enough to hold the office. Yet there are doubtless Tibetans who are qualified for the position: a disproportionate number (6 of 198 full members) of the current CCP Central Committee are Tibetans. (141) A Tibetan party secretary would be regarded as an indication that the CCP trusts Tibetans to lead Tibet.

It is often argued that Han benefit more than Tibetans from development in Tibet, (142) not surprisingly as they heavily concentrate in favoured urban areas, while most Tibetans are peasants or herders. Although there is growing Tibetan migration to cities, ethnic disparities are significant there as well and will persist as long as there is an educational and experiential gap between Han and Tibetans. (143) To compensate for this tendency, preferential policies in the state economy should be reinvigorated and extended to the private sector, including mandates, such as job and shareholding quotas, that favour Tibetans. Wide-ranging affirmative action in Malaysia resulted in greater equality and reduced ethnic tension: in 1970 ethnic Malays owned 2.4 percent of corporate wealth, but by 2003 they had about 20 percent; at the same time, the wealth shares of ethnic Chinese and ethnic Indians rose from 30 to 40 percent, while average per capita income in Malaysia jumped from RM 1,132 in 1970 to RM 13,683 in 2003. (144) Results of affirmative action in Malaysia have been mentioned favourably in official PRC media. (145)

The government could restrict migration to Tibet. To curtail or even ban migration to minority areas of a country is not uncommon: India bars the movement of "mainland Indians" to Nagaland, Kashmir and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Vietnam prohibits "spontaneous migration" to the ethnic minority Central Highlands. (146) For Tibetans to be at the centre of Tibet's economy, they need higher-level skills, but in rural areas especially, there is not much incentive for education, because Tibetan children contribute to family labour resources. (147) The government could pay every Tibetan child who attends school a stipend equal to the child's contribution to the family's income. It would be well worth the expense, as most Tibetans can become prosperous only if education levels rise sharply. A decade ago, Northern Ireland was a disadvantaged part of the UK, but today it is said to have better schools and health care and more cultural amenities than "mainland Britain." The gap between Ulster's communities has been narrowed through subsidies, fair employment legislation, affirmative action, expanded educational opportunities and the adoption by Catholics of education as the main avenue of upward mobility. (148)

Human rights groups have expressed concern over the ban on public displays of the Dalai Lama's photo in the TAR. The ban, in place since 1996, is not enforced in the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan, however, (149) and no untoward consequences have followed, indicating that displays in a religious context can be accommodated without compromising anti-separatism. In 1987, a provisional law to make Tibetan an official language of the TAR was enacted, including a provision requiring officials there to learn Tibetan. (150) Similar regulations have been promulgated in other PRC Tibetan areas, (151) yet in the main, they have not been implemented. It is not yet clear whether the permanent TAR language law, passed in 2002, will meet with the same disregard. (152) While some Han officials serving in Tibet are now being trained in Tibetan, (153) a Tibetan competency requirement would indicate a greater commitment to strengthening Tibetan autonomy.

Finally, international law entitles states to punish separatism, but those punished must be well treated. Abusers of prisoners do sometimes face severe consequences elsewhere in China. (154) That seems rare in Tibet, despite many credible reports of torture, (155) yet harsh punishment for abusers should diminish sympathy for separatism.

Current global and national trends favour peaceful dialogue as a means of resolving the Tibet issue. The international environment is ripe for dialogue. The US government has firmly recognized Tibet as part of China and on several occasions President Bush encouraged Chinese leaders to enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Dialogue with the Dalai Lama will neutralize critics in Western parliaments and help convince many of the Chinese government's good will.

With China's increasing power, the so-called Tibet issue no longer threatens China's national security, and the Dalai Lama's new initiative and statement about Tibet's history and status provide further reassurance. The visits of Taiwan's opposition parties to China in spring 2005 have eased tension across the Taiwan Strait and opened a door to peaceful dialogue. New peace efforts elsewhere, for example between the Indonesian government and Aceh's independence forces, and between Israel and the new Palestinian leaders, reinforce a global trend toward using dialogue to resolve seemingly intractable conflicts.

While the Dalai Lama will have to adopt tough but persuasive measures to ensure the TYC does not derail his new autonomy process, recognition that he has undertaken a new initiative is up to the Beijing leadership, in particularly President Hu Jintao. If Hu Jintao, with his determination, commitment and wisdom, can grasp this golden opportunity to make a decisive move to engage in direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama and to make a number of concessions, (156) there is a possibility that Hu Jintao and the Dalai Lama might share a Nobel peace prize one day. The Chinese, and the world community, should be encouraged to think the unthinkable in this matter, despite many rocks and steep hills remaining on the road to dialogue and the establishment of a noble peace.

Deakin University and Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, October 2005

(1) The authors would like to express sincere thanks for the constructive comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees and Professor Timothy Cheek.

(2) "Dalai Lama Interviewed on Taiwan visit, Cross-Strait ties, US role," Lien Ho Pao, 2 October 2000, reprinted in British Broadcasting Corp/Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC/SWB), 7 October 2000, The newspaper is available, in translation, on Lexis Nexis (5 December 2005).

(3) "Five-point Peace Plan for Tibet: Address to Members of the US Congress, September 21, 1987," Office of Tibet, New York, available on the Office of Tibet Web site, <www.tibetoffice.org>, (14 November 2005).

(4) "Statement by His Holiness, the XIV Dalai Lama on his visit to the United States, September, 1995," available on the Government of Tibet in Exile (TGIE) Web site, <www.tibet.com/DL/hhus95.html>, (14 November 2005). T.C. Tethong, former Minister of Information and International Relations of the Tibet Government-in-Exile (1996-2001), said, "The Tibetan people know that we are different. We have our own language, and own race and history are separate from that of the Chinese." See "Op-ed piece from T.C. Tethong on Tibetan Cultural Week," 14 September 2002, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/9/14_3.html>, (5 December 2005).

(5) "China must Listen to the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Exile Spokesman says," Agence France Presse (AFP), 18 March 2005, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/3/18_1.html>, (5 December 2005)

(6) "Tibetan Government now wants Autonomous Status, Talks with China," Press Trust of India, 22 May 2001, Lexis Nexis (5 December 2005)

(7) Laurence Brahm, "Conciliatory Dalai Lama Expounds on Winds of Change," South China Morning Post (SCMP), 14 March 2005, A4.

(8) Sandip Roy, "Will Dalai Lama follow brother's Tibet visit," Pacific News Service, 28 August 2002, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/8/29_6.html> (5 December 2005); Tenzin Namgyal, "Flashbacks and flashbulbs," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 1 (January-February 2001), available on the Tibetan Bulletin Web site, <www.tibet.net/tibbul/0101/last.html>. (5 December 2005)

(9) "Tibet Settlement Hopeful in Dalai Lama's Lifetime: Exiled Prime Minister," AFP, 5 July 2005, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/7/5_1.html>, (5 December 2005). Samdhong Rinpoche has said that China now considers the Dalai Lama part of the solution, not part of the problem. Also see Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlo, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), pp. 28-29 and fn. 50; they identify a desire for negotiations with the Dalai Lama among first-generation Tibetan communists and senior officers of the 18th Army in Tibet. They refer to a "recent document circulating among Party officials [that] states, 'anyone who thinks the Tibet issue should be dragged on until after the death of the fourteenth Dalai Lama is naive, unwise, and [supporting] the wrong policy.'" They also note "The document argues that it is in China's long-term strategic interest to resolve the issue in dialogue with the current exiled Tibetan leader, and that it must do so while the historic opportunity still exists," a viewpoint with supporters among centrist reformers in Beijing.

(10) "Exiled Tibetan Leaders to Discuss Autonomous State with China," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 March 2005, Lexis-Nexis (5 December 2005)

(11) "Tibet Settlement Hopeful," AFP, 5 July 2005.

(12) Chinese, Tibetans Hold First Talks outside China," Indo-Asian News Service, 3 July 2005, available at http://www.eians.com/stories/2005/07/03/americas-index.shtml.

(13) Central Tibetan Administration, "The Statement of the Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Lodi Gyari, Head of Tibetan Delegation which met Chinese Representatives in Berne, Switzerland," Tibetan Bulletin vol. 9, no. 4 (July-August, 2005), available, <www.tibet.net/tibbul/2003/0303/speciall.html>, (5 December 2005).

(14) "We have to Accept Ground Realities," Outlook (India), 19 March 2005, reprinted in the Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 3 (May-June 2005), available on the Tibetan Bulletin Web site, <www.tibet.net/tibbul/2005/0506/interview2.html>, (5 December 2005).

(15) See N. Bhanutej, "Mantra of Freedom: Cutting a New Path," The Week (India), 18 April 2005 (exile activist Tenzin Tsundue criticizes the Dalai Lama's support for a railway in Tibet); Jeffrey Bowe, "Has the Dalai Lama made the final surrender?" Times of Tibet, 14 March 2005, available on the Times of Tibet Web site, <www.timesoftibet.com>, (29 November 2005) (veteran British Tibet independence activist criticizes Dalai Lama); "Say it ain't so," Gazette (Montreal), 16 March 2005, A28 (newspaper criticizes Dalai Lama's "surrender").

(16) "India's position on Tibet unchanged," TibetNet, 14 April 2005, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/4/14_3.html>, (5 December 2005).

(17) "Tibet Settlement Hopeful," AFP, 5 July 2005; "Rinpoche seeks Full-fledged Autonomy for Tibet," The Tribune (Chandigarh), 3 September 2005, available on the Tribune Web site, <www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050903/himachal.htm>, (5 December 2005).

(18) See Barry Sautman, "China's Vulnerability to Ethnic Minority Separatism in Tibet," Asian Affairs: an American Review, vol. 31, no. 2 (2005), pp. 87-118.

(19) Zhu Yuchao and Dongyan Blachford, "Ethnic Minority Issues in China's Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Implications," Pacific Review vol. 18, no. 2 (2005), pp. 243-264.

(20) "Dalai Lama 'has a Keen Desire to Visit China,'" Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), 4 November 200, Lexis Nexis (5 December 2005).

(21) A.A. Shiromany, ed., The Political Philosophy of His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama: Selected Speeches and Writings (New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Center, 1998), p. 144.

(22) "Indian Defense Minister hopes China will begin Dialogue with Dalai Lama," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 1 (January-April 2002), p. 9.

(23) "China again says no to Dialogue with Dalai Lama," Associated Press, 15 July 2002, available online at the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/7/15_2.html>, (5 December 2005).

(24) "Hu Jintao Vows to 'Crush Tibetans,'" Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 3 (July-August 2001), p. 10.

(25) H.S. Nanda, "Terrorism puts Tibet on Back Burner," United Press International, 11 March 2004, Lexis Nexis; Suresh Kr Pramar, "Mellowing of Dalai Lama," Asian Tribune, 22 July 2004, available on the Asian Tribune Web site, <www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=10489>, (5 December 2005); Nachammai Raman, "'Free Tibet' push fades as India-China ties warm," Christian Science Monitor, 11 April 2005, p. 7.

(26) Jonathan Mann and Jaime Florcruz, "A Look at the Changing Face of Tibet," CNN, 15 September 2003, Transcript # 091501cb.k01, Lexis Nexis, D. Pattanayak, "Watch your Step, Mr. Prime Minister," The Statesman (India), 23 June 2003, Lexis Nexis.

(27) Ragbey and Shahlo, Sino-Tibet Dialogue, p. 26 (discussing "unprecedented affluence" of Tibetans who work for government). See also the statement of Tibetologist Robbie Barnett, that middle-class Tibetans' incomes are increasing rapidly and "they have very good lives," from Barnett "Politics: Fighting for a Future"; the web address indicates that the article is "published" by Columbia University School of Journalism master's degree students] <www.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/newmedia/masters/tibetan/politics.html> (5 December 2005); Barry Sautman, "The new Tibetan middle class," paper presented at the International Conference of Asian Scholars, August 2003, Singapore.

(28) "Danish Premier tells Dalai Lama Tibet Policy will not Change," Dansmarks Radio [Copenhagen, Denmark], 6 June 2003, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6 June 2003, Lexis Nexis.

(29) "EU ups Stakes in Lifting of China Arms Embargo," Guardian, 13 May 2005, p. 1.

(30) Amy Kellam, "Foreign Devils: Law's Imperial Discourse and the Status of Tibet," Griffith Law Review, vol. 12, no. 2 (2003), pp.190-214; "Britain wants China to grant Tibet freedoms," Reuters, 20 October 1999, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/1999/10/21_1.html>, (5 December 2005).

(31) Gyaneshwar Chaturvedi, "India's Tibet Policy," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 1 (January-February 2005), pp. 7-11; "No change in India's Tibet Policy, 'Right Direction' on Sikkim--Vajpayee," AFX--Asia, 27 June 2003, Lexis Nexis.

(32) "China-India Relations 'cannot be Normalized without Addressing the Tibetan Issue': Samdhong Rinpoche: an Interview," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 3 (May-Aug 2003), p. 24.

(33) "Pragmatic India Shakes Hands with Israelis-Palestinians, China-Tibet," DPA, 8 September 2003, Lexis Nexis.

(34) "Exiled Tibetan government Banks on Sino-Indian talks," AFP, 25 June 2003, available at the Phayul Web site, <www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=4427&t=1&c=1>, (5 December 2005).

(35) Austin Ramzy, "Tibetans fear for their Future after the Dalai Lama," available on the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism Web site, <http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/greaterchina/story-tibetans>, (5 December 2005).

(36) [Anonymous], "Vatican Keeps Dalai Lama Meeting Low Key," SCMP, 29 November 2003, p. A8.

(37) Chen Yuhui, "Dalai Lama: Xun qiu Xizang zizhi rei yu Zhongguo fenlie," [Dalai Lama: To pursue Tibetan Self-government, but not Separate from China], Xizang Tongxun, nos. 3-4 (March/April 2002), p. 2.

(38) "Dalai qi zhuanshi zhidu shi hao shi: bao liu yu fo you Xizang jueding" (Dalai: Abandoning the reincarnation system is a good thing; to keep or abandon it is to be decided by the Tibetans), Ming Pao [Hong Kong], 3 April 2001, available at the WiseNews database.

(39) "Dalai Lama will not be reincarnated in occupied Tibet," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 5 (Nov-Dec 2001), p. 8, available at the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/1/10_1.html>, (5 December 2005).

(40) "After the Dalai Lama, Who?" Times of India (TOI), 21 March 2004, available at the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2004/3/22_2.html>, (5 December 2005).

(41) Melvyn Goldstein, "Tibet, China and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question," (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1995), p. xi.

(42) June Teufel Dreyer, "Unrest in Tibet," Current History, vol. 88, no. 539 (1989), p. 284.

(43) Dreyer, "Unrest," p. 48.

(44) For a detailed discussion on the Dalai Lama's original autonomy proposal, see Baogang He, "Why Does Beijing Reject the Dalai Lama Autonomy Proposal?" Review of Asian and Pacific Studies (Seikei University, Japan), no. 22 (2001), pp. 57-72.

(45) Dalai Lama, "March 10 Statement 1992," in Shiromany, The Political Philosophy, pp. 434-436.

(46) "His Holiness the Dalai Lama Explains his Position on China's Preconditions," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 4 (September-October 2003), p. 25.

(47) This followed an international workshop on Tibetan autonomy in November 1999 in New Delhi in India.

(48) Baogang He's interview with Lodi Gyari and Bhuchung Tsering in Washington on 23 July, 31 July, 7 August 2003, with Lodi Gyari in Singapore on 25 March 2004.

(49) Brahm, "Conciliatory Dalai Lama," A4. Subsequent statements of Kate Saunders, International Campaign for Tibet communications director, and Thubten Samphel, secretary, TGIE Department of Information & International Relations, did not dispute the accuracy of Brahm's report on the Dalai Lama's statements. Kate Saunders, "Tibet's autonomy stance," SCMP, 19 March 2005: A14; T. Samphel, "Letter to the Editor," SCMP, 29 March 2005, available at the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/3/30_2.html>, (5 December 2005). Alison Reynolds, director of the Free Tibet Campaign, UK, also did not deny the accuracy of Brahm's quotes; see Richard Spencer, "Dalai Lama offers China a settlement over Tibet," Daily Telegraph, 15 March 2005, p. 12.

(50) Jyoti Malhotra, "China opens Tibet doors," Indian Express, 24 June 2004, http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=49650 (6 January 2006).

(51) Jasper Becker, "China Paves the Way for Possible Return of the Dalai Lama," Independent, 24 September 2002, p. 30.

(52) "Dalai Lama Demands True Autonomy for Tibet," AFP, 7 October 2004, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2004/10/7_1.html (6 January 2006); "Dalai Lama says Remaining in China in Tibet's Interest," PTI, 2 December 2004, Lexis Nexis.

(53) Samdhong Rinpoche, Tibet: A Future Vision (New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, 1997), p. 47.

(54) Carole McGranahan, "Empire and the Status of Tibet: British, Chinese and Tibetan Negotiations," in Alex McKay, ed., The History of Tibet (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 267-295.

(55) Tsering Shakya, A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947 (London: Pimilico, 1999), p. 62.

(56) "Excerpt from ICJ interview with the Dalai Lama," in International Commission of Jurists, Tibet: Human Rights and the Law (Geneva: ICJ, 1997), pp. 349-350.

(57) Luke Harding, "China Meets Dalai Lama's Envoys," Guardian, 28 May 2003, p. 11.

(58) D.S. Rajan, "Beijing and the Dalai Lama: Ice Melting?" South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, paper no. 1271 (28 February 2005), available at the SAAG Web site, <www.saag.org/%5Cpapers13%5Cpaper1271.html>, (5 December 2005); Cai Yongmei, "Fangcai duli yu xizang weilai," [Abandoning independence and Tibet's future], Kaifeng (August 2003), available at the Open magazine Web site, <www.open.com.hk/4j.html>, (5 December 2005).

(59) "His Holiness the Dalai Lama Explains," 2003.

(60) Ken Gewertz, "Panel examines Beijing/Dalai Lama negotiations," Harvard Gazette, 4 December 2003, available at the Harvard Gazette Web site, <www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.04/13-negotiate.html>, (5 December 2005).

(61) "Commentary: Dalai Lama's 'autonomy' claim hypocritical," Xinhua, 1 September 2005, available at the China Tibet Information Center Web site, <http://en.tibet.cn/forum/tad/t20050908_54001.htm>, (5 December 2005); "6.4b yuan Worth of Projects Approved in Tibet," SCMP, 31 May 2005, p. 6.

(62) Rabgey and Sharlho, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era, p. 37. Language and family planning policies evince such coordination, as does the distribution of Five Provinces and Regions Tibetan language textbooks. Ashild Kolas and Monika Thowsen, On the Margins of Tibet: Cultural Survival on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 2005), pp. 114-116.

(63) "Sichuan to exempt ethnic regions from agricultural taxes," People's Daily (Beijing), 12 March 2004, available at the People's Daily Web site, <http://english.people.com.cn/200403/11/eng20040311_137233.shtml>, (5 December 2005).

(64) Samdhong Rinpoche, Tibet: A Future Vision, p. 52.

(65) Cai, "Fangcai duli."

(66) "Tibetans Begin Talks with China for Autonomy," Star of Mysore, 8 August 2005, available at the Phayul Web site, <www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=10402&article=UN+is+'USELESS'%3A+Tibetan+PM>, (5 December 2005) (Samdhong Rinpoche says "no need for defense forces" in Tibet). Please also see "In exile, they Keep their Fingers Crossed," Indian Express, 24 June 2003 (Tibetan parliament in exile seeks zone of peace), Lexis Nexis. "Tibetans Seek to Broaden Support Base at Anti-Globalisation Forum," AFP, 20 January 2004, available on the Students for a Free Tibet Web site, <http://studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?id=170>, (5 December 2005).

(67) [Untitled anonymous news item], Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 5 (November-December 2003), p. 4.

(68) Barry Sautman and Lo Shiu-hing, The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1995).

(69) "Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation sent by his Holiness the Dalai Lama to China," the Government of Tibet in Exile, 11 June 2003, available on the TGIE Web site, <www.tibet.com/NewsRoom/delegation2.htm>, (5 December 2005).

(70) "Talks Progressing, says Tibet's PM-in-Exile," The Nation (Bangkok), 10 March 2005, Lexis Nexis, (5 December 2005); S.N.M. Abdi, "Hardliners reject Softer stance by Dalai Lama," SCMP, 15 March 15, 2005, p. 9; "Kashag's Urgent Appeal to the Tibetan people and Tibet Supporters in the USA and Canada," The Kashag, 3 September 2005, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/9/6_1.html>, (5 December 2005). The TGIE does not criticize the demonstrations that do occur, however. See Albert Amateau, "Chinese takeover of Tibet protested at art opening," The Villager (New York), 3 March 2005, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/3/3_4.html>, (5 December 2005).

(71) "His Holiness the Dalai Lama Explains," p. 24.

(72) Lodi Gyari's question to He Baogong, author's interview of Gyari, 31 July 2003, Washington, DC.

(73) "Commentary: No more Playing Tibet as 'card' for Leaving Tibetans Alone," Xinhua, 26 July 2004, available on the Chinese Embassy in India website, <http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/xzwt/ttxx/t144176.htm>, (6 January 2006).

(74) [Untitled anonymous news item], Xizang Liaowang, no. 5, 2003, p. 4.

(75) Lodi Gyari, "Statement by Special Envoy Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation to China," 13 October 2004, available on the Central Tibetan Administration Web site, <www.tibet.net/flash/2004/1004/131004.html>, (5 December 2005).

(76) "The Sect with Two Heads," Economist, vol. 331, no. 7858 (9 April 1994), pp. 40-42; Barry Searak, "Lama's escape inflames Buddhist rivalry," New York Times, 3 February 2000, p. Al. The Tibetan exiles' apparent order of preference is: 1) the Dalai Lama dies in Tibet and is reincarnated there; 2) he dies outside China and is reincarnated there; and 3) the reincarnation system ends. For some PRC hardliners, the order is reversed.

(77) Lobsang Wangyal, "Tibetan Activists Hold onto Hope as Dalai Lama Marks 45 years in Exile," AFP, 10 March 2004, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2004/3/9_5.html>, (5 December 2005).

(78) Baogang He's interview with Lodi Gyari and Bhuchung Tsering in Washington on 23 July, 31 July and 7 August 2003, and with Lodi Gyari in Singapore on 25 March 2004. For a detailed analysis of different concepts of autonomy, see Baogang He, "Minority Rights with Chinese Characteristics", in Will Kymlicka and Baogang He, eds., Multiculturalism in Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 56-79; for a philosophical approach to the issue see Baogang He, "Confucianism versus Liberalism over Minority Rights: A Critical Responses to Will Kymlicka," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 31, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 103-123.

(79) Quoted in Lodi Gyari, "Don't Shut out the Dalai Lama," Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 2000, p. 28.

(80) Becker, "China Paves," p. 30.

(81) Lodi Gyari, quoted in Mann and Florcruz, 2003.

(82) John Gittings, "Cultural clash in land on the roof of the world," Guardian, 8 February 2002, p. 17.

(83) "6.4b yuan Worth of Projects Approved in Tibet," SCMP, 31 May 2005; Minnie Chan, "Beijing Pledges to Continue Selection Method for Next Dalai Lama," SCMP, 19 July 2005

(84) See Robert Barnett, "Beyond the Collaborator-Martyr Model: Strategies of Compliance, Opportunism and Opposition within Tibet," in Barry Sautman and June Dreyer, eds., Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2006), pp. 25-66; "Tibetan cadres today: collaborators or patriots?" Tibet Press Watch, vol. 10, no. 4 (July 2002), pp. 6-7.

(85) See, for example, the statement of Raidi, former TAR CCP executive deputy secretary, who advised the Dalai Lama to "make some clear choices, and not have at his side those who advocate and incite Tibetan independence with their actions, nor be surrounded by bone-dry Tibetan independence elements." "Tibet Leader says China Opposes Collusion of Taiwan, Tibet separatists," Xinhua, 14 March 2001, available on website of University of Dusseldorf East Asian Institute, <www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/oasien/china/service/bbc/010317.txt> (5 December 2005).

(86) Exile leaders are aware of the negative effects of at least some such mobilizational efforts. "Tibetans urged not to Mar Hu Jintao's America Visit," TibetNet, 5 September, 2005 <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/9/5_1.html> (6 January 2006) (Samdhong Rinpoche states, in the just cited article, "Over aggressive agitations like burning the national flag of China will achieve no more than further hardening and alienating the attitude of Chinese leaders." The PRC government has in turn said, "A person who is pure-hearted in seeking compromise certainly will not sling mud on the other part, while an attempt to win international interference on an internal affair is an obvious denial of the framework that Tibet is part of China." See "Dalai Lama's 'Autonomy' Claim Hypocritical," Xinhua, 1 September 2005, available on the Xinhua Web site, <http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-09/01/content_3431028.htm>, (5 December 2005).

(87) Frank Ching, "Hong Kong Solution for Tibet?" Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 161, no. 31 (30 July 1998), p. 37.

(88) "Chinese Premier Presses U.S. on Taiwan, Trade; Wen Addresses Wide Range of Issues," Washington Post, 23 November 2003, p. A01.

(89) See, for example, "China Strongly Opposes US Presidential Report on Tibet Issue," Xinhua, 24 April 2005, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/4/24_3.html>, (8 December 2005).

(90) Baogang He's interviews with TGIE ministers, 15 November 1999, New Delhi, India.

(91) Samphel, "Letter to the Editor," SCMP, 29 March 2005

(92) "His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains," Tibetan Bulletin, p. 25.

(93) "Dalai zai Yindu Daijile" [Dalai Lama at Darjeeling, India], People's Daily, 3 March 2004, available on the People's Daily Web site, <www.people.com.cn/GB/paper68/11461/1034418.html>, (8 December 2005).

(94) Dalai Lama, "Tibet was an Independent Country," Siromany, The Political Philosophy ..., p. 60.

(95) "Chinese Offer 'Not Genuine,'" Tribune News Service (India), 4 February 2002, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/2/5_2.html>, (8 December 2005).

(96) Richard Baum, "Britain's 'Betrayal' of Hong Kong: a Second Look," Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 8, no. 20 (March 1999), pp. 9-28.

(97) "A Breakthrough on Tibet?" Boston Globe, 2 July 1998, p. A18; interview by Barry Sautman, with a Tibet-specialist UFWD official, Beijing, 26 December 2004.

(98) "His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains," Tibetan Bulletin, p. 24.

(99) "China Opposes Dalai Lama's Political Activities Overseas-Spokesman," Xinhua, 14 June 2005, available on the People's Daily Web site, <http://english.people.com.cn/200506/14/archive.html>, (8 December 2005); "China's Top Legislator, Danish Parliament Speaker Discuss Ties, Tibet," Xinhua, 2 June 2004, available on People's Daily Web site, http://english.people.com.cn/200406/02/eng20040602_145127.html.

(100) "Dalai Lama Opposes Independence for Taiwan," DPA, 17 July 1998, Lexis Nexis.

(101) "Dalai Lama's strategy for China talks explained," Lianhe Bao, 28 October 1998, p. 13, in BBC/SWB, November 9, 1998, Lexis Nexis.

(102) "Dalai Lama Shuns Tibet Independence," The Advertiser (Australia), 29 June 2000, p. 30.

(103) "China Must Listen to the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Exile Spokesman Says," AFP, 18 March 2005, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/3/18_1.html>, (8 December 2005).

(104) Tibetan Youth Congress, "Boycott Made in China," 2004, available on the Tibetan Youth Congress Web site, <www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/bmic.htm> (8 December 2005); Toronto Tibetan Youth Congress, "No Olympics 2008 in Beijing," 2004, available on the TYC Web site, <www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/2008.htm> (8 December 2005).

(105) Thupten Norbu, "Message from the Dalai Lama's Eldest Brother, Prof. Thubten Norbu," available on the Students for a Free Tibet Web site, <www.studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?list=type&type=34>, (8 December 2005).

(106) Pawan Sharma, "Drive to Boycott Chinese Goods Being Re-launched," Hindustan Times, 13 December 2002, available on the Friends of Tibet Web site, <www.friendsoftibet.org/mediaonfot/20021213.html>, (8 December 2005).

(107) Tibetan Youth Congress, "Tibetan Youth Leadership Training Program," available on the TYC Web site, <www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/tyltp2004.html>, (8 December 2005).

(108) "Young Tibet up in Arms," The Statesman (India), 4 July 2003, available on World Tibet Network website, www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/7/4_2.html (7 January 2006); S.N.M. Abdi, "Hardliners reject softer stance by Dalai Lama," SCMP, 15 March 2005, p. 9.

(109) Tsering Tashi, "SFT mark Nobel Prize conferment on the Dalai Lama," 12 December 2004, available on the Times of Tibet Web site, <www.timesoftibet.com/articles/108/1/SFT-mark-Nobel-Prize-conferment-on-the-Dalai-Lama>, (8 December 2005); Brian Marple, Lori Har-El and Laura Market, "Protestors, Welcomers Converge on Chinese Leader's Arrival in New York," The Epoch Times, 14 September 2005, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/9/14-2_1.html> (8 December 2005).

(110) Erkin Alptekin, "Freedom for Tibet: Europe Speaks out," 12 March 2005, available on the Freedom for Tibet--Europe Speaks Out Web site, <www.tibet10march.net/web/redner_alptekin_en.htm>, (8 December 2005).

(111) Baogang He's interview with Lodi Gyari in Washington on 31 July 2003.

(112) "Address of Mr. Kelsang Gyaltsen," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 5 (November-December 2003), p. 18.

(113) Orville Schell, "Chinese Puzzle--Why won't Beijing make Peace with the Dalai Lama?" San Francisco Chronicle, 24 June 2001, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/2001/6/26_3.html>, (8 December 2005).

(114) John K. Knaus, "China's Opportunity to Resolve Tibet Issue," Boston Globe, 8 December 2003, p. A13.

(115) "Address of Mr. Kelsang Gyaltsen," p. 18.

(116) Lodi Gyari, "Don't Shut Out the Dalai Lama," Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 2000, p. 28.

(117) Nicholas Rufford, "Tibet's Brothers in Arms Spoil for a Fight," Gazette (Montreal), 21 November 1999, p. A1. In this article, the Dalai Lama's youngest brother states, "The Chinese only understand the language of violence. So why not give it a shot?" and advocates bombings in Beijing.

(118) [Untitled anonymous news item], Xizang Liaowang, no. 4, 2003, p. 13.

(119) "Dalai Lama Calls on George Bush," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 4, September-October 2003, p. 35.

(120) "After the Dalai Lama, Who?" Times of India, 21 March 2004, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2004/3/22_2.html>, (8 December 2005).

(121) "Kashag Shuts Down Budapest Office of Tibet," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 2 (March/April 2005), available on the Tibetan Bulletin Web site, <www.tibet.net/tibbul/2005/0304/newsbrief.html>, (8 December 2005).

(122) Rebecca French, "A Conversation with Tibetans? Reconsidering the Relationship between Religious beliefs and Secular Legal Discourse," Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 26, no. 1 (2001), pp. 95-114.

(123) Julian Gearing, "Wrangling Hinders Talks with Beijing," SCMP, 12 December 2003, p. 15; Jane Ardley, "Learning the Art of Democracy? Continuity and Change in the Tibetan Government-in-exile," Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 3 (2003), pp. 349-363.

(124) Samdhong Rinpoche, "Non-violent Struggle: Tibet's Legacy to Freedom Struggle," Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 5 (January-April 2002), p. 16.

(125) In 1999, the Tibetan exile officials rejected a gradual strategy suggested by Baogang He because they thought it meant accepting China's rule, acceding to China's legitimacy and confirming China's framework. They insisted that no concession could be made before negotiations.

(126) "Dalai Lama's Tibet Hopes," Toronto Star, 23 April 2004, p. A04.

(127) Beijing now emphasizes that the Dalai Lama should support China's Western Development Project, including the building of a railway to Tibet that is meant to begin operation by 2006. The Dalai Lama, however, has connected such an undertaking with "cultural genocide," and stated, "In general, a railway link is very useful in order to develop, but not when politically motivated to bring about demographic change." "Dalai Lama Brands Chinese Rail Link 'Cultural Genocide,'" Associated Press (AP), 11 September 2005, available on the United Nations Thailand Web site, <www.un.or.th/ohchr/SR/News/2005/DailyNewsBulletin/9/PRC2>, (8 December 2005).

(128) "Dalai Lama's Tibet Hopes," 2004.

(129) The Third International Conference of Tibet Support groups, held in Berlin in 2000, declared it would actively encourage the TGIE to consider the independence option if Beijing refuses to talk with the Dalai Lama. [Untitled anonymous news item] Tibetan Bulletin, May-June 2000, p. 9.

(130) The ten-member Task Force has its own office and includes Kashag (cabinet) members. Rajan, "Beijing and the Dalai Lama."

(131) Baogang He's interview with Lodi Gyari in Singapore on 25 March 2004.

(132) Elliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004).

(133) "Dalai Lama Spokesman: Tibet's Former Independence Can't be Changed,'" AP, 29 June 1998, Lexis Nexis.

(134) T.C. Tethong, quoted in Nidhi Singh, "How the Bodhi Dharma Returned to India," India Currents, June 2001, available on the Friends of Tibet Web site, <www.friends-of-tibet.org.nz/news/june2001update_9.html>, (8 December 2005).

(135) Samdhong Rinpoche, testimony, Joint Meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 22 April, 2004, available at Canadian Parliament website, <www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=81758>

(136) "http://ustlib.ust.hk:211/z39m/CUHK:INNOPAC%2Ccithk:INNOPAC%2CHKBU:INNOPAC%2Chkied:INNOPAC%2Chkpu:INNOPAC%2Chkust:INNOPAC%2CLingnan:INNOPAC%2CHKU:INNOPAC/a?%22Dang+dai+Zhongguo+de+min+zu+gong+zuo%22+bian+ji+bu+bian./" "Dang dai Zhongguo de min zu gong zuo" bian ji bu bian, Dangdai Zhongguo minzu gongzuo [Contemporary China's ethnic work] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1993), p. 106.

(137) See, for example, Chen Kuiyuan, "On the understanding of several questions concerning socialist spiritual civilization," Xizang Ribao, 13 August 1996, p. 1, in BBC/SWB, 16 September 1996, Lexis Nexis.

(138) Hong Kong Home Affairs Bureau, Legislating against Racial Discrimination: a Consultation Paper (Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong, 2004).

(139) Hu Xiaojiang, The Little Shops of Lhasa, Tibet: Migrant Businesses and the Formation of Markets in a Transitional Economy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2006), ch. 4.

(140) Li Cheng, "Analysis of Current Provincial Leaders," China Leadership Monitor, no. 7 (Summer 2003), p. 13.

(141) Li Cheng and Lynn White, III, "The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu gets what?" Asian Survey, vol. 43, no. 4 (2003), pp. 553-597.

(142) Tibetan Commission on Human Rights & Development, Impoverishing Tibetans: China's Flawed Economic Policy in Tibet (Dharamsala: TCHRD, 2000).

(143) Andrew Fischer, Urban Fault Lines in Shangri-la: Population and Economic Foundations of Interethnic Conflict in the Tibetan Areas of Western China (London: Development Studies Institute, 2004); Andrew Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of Recent Economic Growth (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2005).

(144) Eddie Toh, "M'sia Steps up Plans to Attain Bumiputra Goal," Business Times (Singapore), 27 September 2004, Lexis Nexis. Felipe Salvosa, "Mahathir Stresses Economic Gains of Affirmative Action," Business World (Manila), 6 October 2004, p. 1, Lexis Nexis; Jeyakumar Devaraj, "Has Malaysia Really Eradicated Poverty?" Aliran Monthly, no. 2 (2004), available on the Aliran Web site, <www.aliran.com/monthly/2004a/2j.html>, (8 December 2005).

(145) "Mahathir Highlights Equity in Economic Growth," Xinhua, 5 October 2004, available on the People's Daily Web site, <http://english.people.com.cn/200410/06/eng20041006_159148.html>, (8 December 2005).

(146) "Premier Vo Van Kiet on Agriculture in Remote Areas," Nhan Dan (Hanoi), 30 June 1997, in BBC/SWB, 14 July 1997, Lexis Nexis [available only on Lexis-Nexis; Nhan Dan's archive doesn't go back to 1997]; "The Hindu Charioteers," Economist, 14 December 1991, p. 38, Lexis Nexis. "India Refuses Aid," AFP, January 5, 2005, available on Buzztracker website, (6" www.buzztracker.org/2005/01/04/cache/428416.html (6 January 2006).

(147) Gerard Postiglione et al., "Education in Rural Tibet: Development, Problems and Adaptions," China: an International Journal, vol. 3, no. 1 (2005), pp. 1-23; Kolas and Thowsen, On the Margins of Tibet: Cultural Survival on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier, pp. 100-104.

(148) Leo McKinstry, "Ulster is all Right," Spectator, 4 December 2004, pp. 18-19; Bob Osbourne and Ian Shuttleworth, Fair Employment in Northern Ireland a Generation on (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2004).

(149) "Dalai Lama Remains Taboo Subject in Home Region," AFP, 10 August 1999, available on the World Tibet Network Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/1999/8/11_2.html>, (8 December 2005); Laura Newby and Zhang Lijia, "Little Tibet: Even Better than the Real Thing?" China Review no. 27 (2004), available on the Great Britain China Centre Web site, <www.gbcc.org.uk/iss27religion.htm>, (8 December 2005); Seth Faison, "Uncivil Rights: are Tibetans 'Citizens' of China?" New York Times, 31 August 1999, p. A4; "In Remote China, Tibetans Reclaim Lives from Communist Ruins," Associated Press, 12 July 1998, Lexis Nexis.

(150) "Proposal of Regulation on Study, Use and Development of Tibetan," Tibet regional radio, 12 July 1987, in BBC/SWB, 17 July 1987, [available only on Lexis-Nexis, unless one subscribes to Thompson DataStar Dialogue]; "Trial Implementation of Stipulations on Use of Tibetan," Tibet regional radio, 20 July 1987, in BBC/SWB, 30 July 1987, Lexis Nexis.

(151) See Theodore Sorensen and David L. Phillips, Legal standards and autonomy options for minorities in China: the Tibetan case (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004), pp. 10, 25-26, 90-92. In autonomous entities elsewhere, state officials must be proficient in the local language. For example, in Finland's Aland Islands, "[p]rovisions on the linguistic proficiency of a State official in Aland shall be issued by decree with the consent of the Government of Aland" and "the State shall organize training in Swedish for the persons in its service in Aland." See the Legislative Assembly of Aland, "Provisions for Autonomy," section 42, 12 July 1996, available on the Legislative Assembly of Aland Web site, <www.lagtinget.aland.fi/eng/act.html>, (8 December 2005).

(152) Xizang zizhiqu xuexi: shiyong he fazhan zangyuwen de ruogan guiding [TAR Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the Tibetan Language], See Congressional Executive Commission on China, CECC Annual Report, 2003, p. 110, available at Commission's website, <www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/tibet/tibetannrept03.php>. See also Tibet Information Network, "TAR language regulations unlikely to stop growing Chinese influence," 30 January 2003, available on the World Tibet Network News Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/1/30_2.html>, (8 December 2005).

(153) Kate Saunders, "Chinese cadres learn Tibetan and go west: the impact of urbanization," Tibet Information Network, 2 October 2003, available on the World Tibet News Network Web site, <www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/10/4_3.html>, (8 December 2005).

(154) "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Council on Foreign Relations Seminar," Federal News Service, 6 November 2003, Lexis Nexis. "Political Rights and Civil Liberties," Freedom House, 2001, available on the Freedom House Web site, <www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/china.htm>, (8 December 2005).

(155) Physicians for Human Rights, Striking Hard: Torture in Tibet, October 1997, available on the Physicians for Human Rights Web site, <www.phrusa.org/research/torture/tortib2.html>, (8 December 2005).

(156) In March 2005 Baogang He was asked by a high official in the Ministry of Minority Affairs to write a two-page executive summary in Chinese on this point, which has been submitted to the national leadership.