The politics of pardon: Israel and Jonathan Pollard.

"The State of Israel has no connection with Pollard or his family. The State of Israel did not hire him and did not assign him an espionage mission."

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, 11 March 1987(1)

"Granted, I broke the law. But, to tell you the truth, I'd rather be rotting in prison than sitting shiva [seven-day mourning] for the hundreds of thousands of Israelis who could have died because of my cowardice."

Jonathan Jay Pollard, 1990(2)

The continuation of Jonathan Pollard's incarceration is a manifestation of the other side of the Israeli-U.S. relationship. Over the years this connection has become a source of envy and jealousy for a number of countries in the Middle East and elsewhere. Even rare state visits by great powers do not receive the kind of attention and coverage normally devoted to the annual pilgrimages of an Israeli Prime Minister. Likewise many American leaders make Israel a constant fixture in their overseas trips. Such visits have been so routine that they rarely make headlines in Israel. Ever since President Harry Truman overrode the State Department and granted diplomatic recognition within minutes after the formation of the Jewish State, both countries developed a unique and unconventional relationship. Preeminent global status of one and the prolonged political isolation of the other did not inhibit but rather facilitated a deep and enduring commitment and cooperation. During the Cold War years Israel was viewed as America's most dependable and strategic ally in the turbulent Middle East. In return for its proxy role, Israel has been extensively rewarded with a wide range of political, economic and military support and largesse. Neither Israel's non-conventional arsenal nor the occasional unauthorized use of American weapons and technology received the punitive measures that other countries would have faced. In short Israel is special. Unique circumstances of its formation aside, this special relation is often explained in terms of 'shared Western values.' One cannot, however, underestimate the role of electoral arithmetic. Unlike other countries and issues, Israel is a domestic American agenda and hence it attracts considerable attention and political clout, often disproportionate to its size and importance. As Prime Minister Shimon Peres admitted weeks before losing his re-election bid, "I do not know what more to ask."

Yet the plight of Pollard continues. Neither repeated pleas from various Israeli leaders nor the constant lobbying of pro-Israeli circles in the U.S., have succeeded in putting an end to his incarceration. Unlike many countries, Israel is extremely sensitive toward those who have 'worked' on its behalf and it goes out of its way to secure the release of its agents and operatives. Abandonment is not a characteristic of the Israeli security establishment.(3) At times when its agents were killed in operations, it has brought the mortal remains for re-burial in Israel. Therefore, until and unless Pollard is freed and allowed to emigrate to Israel, the issue is far from closed. The persistent Israeli endeavor to secure his release and the prolongation of his imprisonment merely reveal the difficult side of U.S.-Israeli relations.

A CARDINAL TRANSGRESSION

The arrest of Jonathan Jay Pollard and his first wife, Anne, at the gates of the Israeli embassy in Washington on 21 November 1985 marked a new phase in U.S.-Israeli relations.(4) The United States is not merely the preeminent global power but also Israel's major benefactor. Espionage is an integral part of modern diplomacy and even strategic relationships are not immune to this trend. However in recruiting the civilian intelligence analyst to provide sensitive intelligence materials from its strategic ally and patron, Israel committed a cardinal transgression: recruiting a Jewish American to spy for Israel. In doing so, intentionally or otherwise, Israel opened a Pandora's box. The Pollard affair placed American Jewry in a bad light and led to serious emotional stress and insecurity.(5) As a small ethno-religious minority, internal cohesion and unity are indispensable for the ability of Jews to survive and sustain their particularity. Any assessment of the community's behavior cannot be divorced from the demographic situation of the Jews scattered in various parts of the world. While the formation of a state provided a strong political basis for the community, it has not redressed its numerical position. At present the global Jewish population stands at just over eighteen million, much smaller than many other similar ethno-religious groups.

The question of conflicting loyalties is as old as the Balfour Declaration. While Chaim Weizmann was seeking the support and endorsement of the British government for a Jewish national home in Palestine, his critics within Anglo-Jewry were apprehensive of the negative consequences. Any British endorsement of the Zionist claims to Jews being a separate nation, the assimilated Jews feared, would fatally affect the position of the Jews in the Diaspora and jeopardize their hard earned rights as equal subjects. In other words Jews could not claim a special status in Palestine even while fighting for equality elsewhere. Largely to pacify such critics, Lord Balfour unequivocally maintained that a national home for the Jews would not prejudice "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The issue of primordial loyalty was intensified by the Law of Return, a unique piece of legislation that grants the right of immigration to every Jew in the world. Even though this unparalleled piece of legislation was necessitated by peculiar historical circumstances facing the Jewish people, it is not impeccable. The Pollard affair added fuel and substance to accusations of dual and conflicting loyalties of the Jewish Diaspora. For instance in January 1996, U.S. media reported an internal Defense Department memorandum accusing Israel of using its "strong ethnic ties" to steal sensitive intelligence secrets from the U.S. Following an uproar from Jewish circles, the Defense Department denounced the confidential memo as "unfortunate, unofficial and unauthorized." Retraction could not undo the damage caused.

In enlisting Pollard, Israel contributed to the agony of Jewish Americans over the question of loyalty. In the words of one official of the American Jewish Committee:

The Pollard affair raised in starker terms than any of the others the questions that Jewish Americans have traditionally preferred not to have to face: Is there a conflict between Jewish loyalty and American loyalty? If American and Israeli interests do clash, how will American Jews react? What are the dangers of a perceived 'dual loyalty' on the part of American Jews?(6)

For long none of the leading community figures and pro-Israel organizations were able and willing to discuss the Pollard affair let alone lobby for his release. The nature of the Israeli involvement and the content of the stolen intelligence materials were too sensitive for the community. And, the issue refused to whither away.

Over-turning his earlier plea-bargain arrangement, on 4 March 1987 Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. His wife was given two concurrent five-year sentences for her role in the affair. The struggle for his release had just begun. Ever since Pollard was arrested in front of the Israeli embassy, his supporters have advocated various reasons for demanding his release. Every new development renewed demands for his release. Often, the same motive was pursued with a different logic and rationale.

THE FREE-POLLARD CAMPAIGN

If Pollard being Jewish complicates the issue, it also provides a strong sense of purpose and cohesion to the campaign for his release. Irrespective of their political differences, a large majority of Israelis see him as a 'patriot' and national hero. Though no one denies he illegally transferred sensitive intelligence documents to Israel, moral judgments differ. Through his actions he brought enormous benefit and security to the Jewish state and Jewish people. Some argue that though his behavior and conduct were illegal and unauthorized, they were not immoral. Even though it perceives and projects itself as a western society, Israel's orientations and priorities are different. The formation of the Jewish state is strongly rooted in the need and desire for Jewish preservation. Existence and continuation are both the purpose and rationale behind Israel. Under this circumstance the sense of national survival takes precedence over all other issues such as propriety, procedure, legal niceties, honesty and morality. As Ehud Sprinzak aptly summed up the political psychology of the key players in the Pollard affair, their ethics were "shaped when almost everything was permissible. They all grew up in the Palestine of the 1940s, when it was prestigious to cheat on the British and to engage in 'illegal' settlements, 'illegal' defense and 'illegal' immigration."(7) The formation of the state did not eliminate these basic concerns, priorities and modus operandi. It would be safe to argue that consistency or uniformity hardly bothered Israel. Its actions, especially toward the outside world, have been guided by their relative utility to the Jewish state and not by their correctness. This approach is most visibly manifested in the Pollard affair. Even though it was extremely reluctant to admit its complicity in this issue, Israel has never shown any inhibition or constraint in demanding his release.

This partisan approach toward Pollard is more flagrant if one examines the Israeli position toward those who are currently incarcerated in Israel for similar offenses. Israelis generally resent any comparison between Pollard, the patriot, and other 'traitors' who 'betrayed' Israel.(8) However a close scrutiny of individuals currently imprisoned in Israel for espionage and related offenses is essential for placing the Pollard affair in proper context and proportionality. It is vehemently argued that the treatment meted out to Pollard was harsh and disproportionate to the crime. Ever since his conviction this has remained the main and constant theme of his American and Israeli supporters. How does Israel treat those who compromised its security?

Secrecy is one of the fundamental aspects of the Israeli security establishment. More often than not spies suddenly 'disappear' from circulation, are tried in camera and serve their sentence either anonymously or under assumed identities. Mordechai Vanunu, who revealed Israel's nuclear secrets to the Sunday Times in October 1986, was smuggled out of Europe and tried in camera.(9) Even the acknowledgment of the existence of the spies is considered dangerous to state security. The information is made public only when the convict is due for release or had served substantial portion of the sentence. Their movements within the prison and access to the outside world are severely restricted. Vanunu for instance has been kept incommunicado and in solitary confinement. By any stretch of imagination his plight can be compared to the access provided to Pollard. Even after conviction Pollard has greater access to the media while Vanunu had to fight for issues such as family visits, access to telephones and other basic amenities. For instance in July 1995, the Beersheva District Court decided to grant among others two telephone calls a month, monitored by prison authorities. Unlike Pollard, Vanunu did not financially benefit for his revelations and yet is fashionable in Israel to describe him as 'nuclear traitor'.(10)

The other notable case is Marcus Klingberg, a top Israeli scientist, who was secretly tried and jailed for passing information pertaining to biological warfare to the Russians. Even though he was given a twenty year sentence in 1983, the information was made public in Israel only in August 1993. In his late 70s, Klingberg appealed for early release because of his ill-health and pleaded that he was "sick, tired and headed for death. I ask that you let me spend my last few years with my family."(11) His plea for clemency had the recommendation of Yaacov Perry, the then head of the General Security Service (GSS) who felt that Klingberg's early release would not endanger state security and accordingly recommended it to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.(12) Heeding the views of various branches of the GSS who differed with Perry, Rabin decided against freeing Klingberg. Having failed to convince the security establishment Klingberg sought judicial intervention which in December 1995 reached the Supreme Court. Testifying shortly after he relinquished office and became a private citizen, Perry reiterated his position and supported Klingberg's plea for early release. For its part the state argued that 'the existence of the state' takes precedence over mercy and generosity. In January 1996 upholding the lower court verdict, the Israeli Supreme Court denied Klingberg's plea. In its opinion the 77-year old scientist who had suffered several strokes in the previous two years, might remember information that could cause 'incalculable damage' to national security. The judges wrote: "An innocent question from a guest is likely to elicit a response whose damage to state security would be extremely great, without [Klingberg] himself even being aware of the danger entailed by his answer."(13)

This position was not confined to the establishment. A few months after the Klingberg hearing some commentators wrote: "Klingberg is still in possession of the knowledge he acquired while working at Ness Ziona [where biological and chemical research are conducted]. It he is released he will certainly depart our shores. No doubt his former masters at the Kremlin, who still pull the strings of power, will send their lackeys over to have a chat with him, wherever he is."(14) In short, the Israeli treatment of Vanunu and Klingberg indicate that it is entirely up to the state to define and decide the extent of a crime and its punishment. A similar American position vis-a-vis Pollard does not convince Israel or his supporters. However shortly before President Bill Clinton rejected Pollard's clemency Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israel's Military Intelligence, broke with the crowd and argued that Israel "must accept as credible his [Les Aspen's] view that Pollard continues to pose a threat to American security. . . . And Israeli Mordechai Vanunu is being held in jail, in isolation, for a reason similar to that in the Pollard case - the fear that he may leak still-sensitive information."(15)

RATIONALES FOR POLLARD'S RELEASE

Even though it is committed to secure his release, Israel has been careful. It would be impertinent for Israel to demand that America accept its narrow and sectarian agenda and, hence, its campaign for Pollard's freedom revolves around different themes. One example is the proposition that Pollard was a friendly spy whose actions were motivated by ideological commitment. In denying his early release, the U.S. is admitting a certain hidden and undisclosed agenda.

Friendly Spy

The strongest and most consistent campaign has been to portray Pollard as a 'friendly spy.' Even though he spied for a foreign power, that foreign power is neither an enemy nor a rival of the U.S., but a strategic partner. Given the historical friendship and partnership between the two countries, Washington should take a lenient view toward Pollard. In the words of Natan Sharansky, he "was not spying for the KGB. He was spying for Israel, an island of democracy in a sea of totalitarianism."(16) In transmitting sensitive classified materials to Israel, Pollard did not endanger or compromise American interests. He merely spied for Israel and not against the U.S.(17) As such he cannot be treated in the same manner Americans treat 'traitors' like former CIA official Aldrich Ames, "who sell secret information to America's most impeccable enemy."(18) The argument goes that Pollard's efforts have strengthened Israel and hence invigorated American interests in the Middle East. Moreover unlike other American spies Pollard was never charged with treason and hence, his supporters argue, he should not be treated harshly. The lenient treatment of another naval officer accused of spying for Saudi Arabia did not go unnoticed in Israel.(19)

However, the 'friendly spy' argument is a double-edged sword and could also be used against Pollard and Israel. For better or worse, even friends and partners misbehave. The construction of a nuclear plant in Dimona with French assistance was not the first occasion when Israel was less than candid with Washington. For its part the U.S. has taken a lenient view toward various Israeli omissions and commissions and its uncoordinated actions. As a friendly ally, Israel benefits from and is dependent upon American political support, security guarantees and economic largesse. This implies that it has to exercise extreme care in trying to procure sensitive intelligence information from its patron. As CIA Director James Woolsey told CNN in March 1994: "We can't really, in my judgment, start making distinctions between countries that are almost entirely friendly. . . [and] those that are entirely hostile and grade the sentences based on the degree of friendship or lack thereof with the U.S."(20)

Ideological Spy

It is not always easy to define treason. Often political considerations play an active part in determining the damages caused by a particular activity. It is rather fashionable to describe political opponents as traitors and quislings. Weeks and months before his assassination Rabin, for instance, was portrayed by a small but vocal section of right wing Israelis as a traitor who was giving away the land of Israel. However, in the mind of former U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspen there were no doubts. Speaking at the Hebrew University in June 1994, a few months after leaving office, he remarked: "I think Jonathan Pollard was a traitor to his country. I think he deserved the sentence that he got. He didn't do it for Israel. He did it solely for cash. He later made up the notion that he did it for Israel. He is not a hero."(21) Pollard is seen differently in Israel. As one Israeli editorial observed: "Unlike traitors Mordechai Vanunu and Marcus Klingberg, whom some professional bleeding hearts compare to Pollard, he did not betray his country."(22) This portrayal is shared by most Israelis. If the U.S. was not 'Pollard's country', one might easily subscribe to this formulation. Israeli officials and commentators strongly object to the characterization of Pollard being a traitor. In contrast to Vanunu who merely leaked highly nuclear sensitive secrets to the media, Pollard is seen, portrayed and idolized by many as an idealist who was betrayed while fulfilling America's commitment to Israel. Frustrated by the continued withholding of intelligence information to Israel, he decided to intervene and remedy the situation. In an extensive interview in The Jerusalem Post, his second wife Esther remarked:

In 1983, the U.S. and Israel signed a letter of understanding in which they pledged to share vital security information. The U.S. broke that pledge. Essentially, America stabbed Israel in the back by not sharing information about upcoming terrorist attacks, and about the build up of unconventional weapons of war in neighboring Arab states, particularly Iraq. When my husband discovered the kind of information that was being held back, he did everything he could to release that information through legal means and went all the way up to the Under Secretary of Defense's office with his request. He was told to mind his business. Jonathan came under great pressure when he worked for Israel to also reveal information on the U.S. He never turned over to Israel any information except that due to Israel, according to the letter of understanding.(23)

This view is shared by many Israeli and pro-Pollard commentators.(24) In the words of one American commentator the 'moral dilemma' of Pollard was "a direct consequence" of the persistent American attempts to restrict intelligence-sharing with Israel.(25) This author even maintained that Pollard had "never asked for money in exchange for the information he believed Israel needed for its defense. In fact, for the first six months, Pollard did not receive a cent for his services. The idea of payment came from the Israelis." Likewise, Esther Pollard repeatedly maintained that her husband had never 'benefited financially' from his activities. Even otherwise balanced observers like Hirsh Goodman argued that he "worked neither for money nor for an enemy of America."(26) It is undeniable that strong Zionist sentiments and his devotion to the State of Israel made Pollard a potential spy. Yet the operation was not entirely ideological, devoid of financial and other incentives. According to his own admission over a period of eighteen months he received approximately $50,000 from his Israeli handlers, not an insignificant amount. Interpretations differ. Some describe this as 'perks not a way of life',(27) others felt relieved that he "acted for financial reward."(28)

Motivated Persecution

Another familiar and at times powerful argument used to secure his release has been to question or attribute motives to the U.S. military-intelligence establishment. This approach has one distinct advantage. With or without evidence, it is always possible to attribute motives. Certain known and familiar events and developments can be effectively used to attribute a sinister motive for the prolongation of the Pollard affair. This tendency operates at three different levels; one, certain sections of the American establishment had some old scores to settle and hence the harsh treatment for Pollard; two, the opinions and recommendations of certain key officials of the administration were biased and heavily loaded against Pollard; and three, the prosecution violated Pollard's plea-bargain agreement.

The close relationship that the American political leadership maintained with Israel have negative implications as well. While Israel enjoys a special position with the administrative and legislative branches of the administration, the same cannot be said about the executive wings. Part of the American executive resentment seems to be the way Israel has sought to achieve its objectives. Whenever it was denied certain information or inventories by the Pentagon or other national security agencies, it successfully settled issues at the political level. At times administrations have overlooked the recommendations of subordinate bodies and granted Israel access to sensitive intelligence information and satellite photos.

In this scenario, the Pollard lobby believes the villain is Casper Weinberger, the former Defense Secretary whose secret memo seemed to have played a crucial role in Pollard receiving a life sentence without parole. The Defense Secretary informed the Court: "It is difficult for me to conceive of a greater harm to national security than that caused by the defendant." This damning testimony appeared to sway the judge. Efforts to overturn or discredit his observations received a boost when Weinberger was indicted in the Iran-Contra scandal. "Isn't it poetic justice that the man who called for a stiffer sentence and asked the Justice Department to violate a sworn agreement is now the victim of the criminal system himself." This remark by Christian broadcaster Pat Robertson aptly summed up the feelings of those campaigning for Pollard's release.(29)

In early 1994 Aldrich Ames, a high ranking official at the Central Intelligence Agency was arrested and convicted for spying for the former Soviet Union. This added a new dimension to the Pollard campaign and he was depicted as 'a victim of a disinformation and vilification campaign initiated by Ames.'(30) Esther Pollard maintains that her former husband was used as a "convenient scapegoat." She suggested that Ames was responsible for spreading the rumor that information Pollard passed on to Israel was subsequently transferred to the Soviet Union by a mole in the Mossad. Thus it was Ames, not Pollard, who was responsible for the death of Soviet agents working for the U.S. Instead of admitting its monumental failure in preventing Ames, the U.S. security establishment was persecuting Pollard and prolonging his ordeal. Others argued that the U.S. Navy had an 'old score to settle' with Israel over the controversy surrounding the attack on the USS Liberty during the June war of 1967.(31)

A portion of the 'free-Pollard' campaign even invoked the familiar theme of anti-Semitism to discredit Pollard's incarceration. Writing in The Jerusalem Post one commentator went to the extent of arguing that the recruitment of Pollard to his sensitive position itself was part of an anti-Semitic setup. "Hidden within the U.S. intelligence community, Jew-free cells work to undermine Israel. To 'create' a Jonathan Pollard and concomitant whispers of dual loyalty would serve them well." It was equally fashionable to draw a parallel between Pollard and Dreyfus who was accused of spying against the French republic. Some genuinely believe that Pollard is waiting for his Emile Zola while he languishes in prison "where many of his fellow prisons are Black Muslims and American Nazis who threaten his life."(32)

HURDLES BEFORE POLLARD

The Israeli involvement in and its-less-than candid approach toward the whole episode remains a major impediment to Pollard's early release. The official behavior following the exposure of the scandal was clumsy and unprofessional. Contrary to the evidence, Israel maintained that the recruitment and handling of Pollard was a 'rogue operation without proper authorization.' Pollard was recruited by a hitherto unknown security agency named Lakam (Scientific Liaison Bureau) which was under the direct control of the Prime Minister. It is unimaginable that such a sensitive operation could have been handled without proper authorization from the top political echelons. The Lakam head and former terrorism adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Rafi Eitan, always maintained that his actions were with official approval. An investigation headed by Abba Eban, Chairman of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset, declared that "Prime Minister Peres could have and should have known exactly what had occurred and under what circumstances Pollard had been recruited."(33) Following the arrest of the Pollards, Israel opted to stonewall but came under considerable pressure both from the U.S. administration and the troubled American Jewry. In a belated statement issued on 1 December 1985, Prime Minister Shimon Peres assured the U.S. government that Israel was determined to spare no effort to investigate the matter and "if the allegations are confirmed those responsible will be brought to account, the unit involved in this activity will be completely and permanently dismantled, and necessary organizational steps will be taken to ensure that such activities are not repeated."(34)

These brave and reassuring words were not followed by concrete actions. Shortly after dismantling Lakam, the Israeli government rewarded those closely associated with the Pollard affair. The then Trade and Industry Minister Ariel Sharon named Eitan as chairman of the Board of Israel Chemicals, Israel's largest government-owned corporation. Colonel Aviem Sella, the officer in Israel's Air Force who established the initial contacts between Pollard and Eitan, was promoted to the rank of general and named commander of Tel Nof, Israel's largest air base in the Negev. Infuriated by Israel's stance, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz instructed American diplomats and service personnel to boycott the base as long as Sella was in charge. Even though Sella took early retirement from the air force, the damage was done. If these ill-conceived measures were not sufficient, Israel impeded all American requests to question those involved in the affair.

As part of its damage control, Israel promised to hand over all the documents that Pollard had illegally transferred. According to some commentators, overlooking warnings from the security establishment, Israeli leaders returned Pollard's reports to the U.S. "Without them, the U.S. security services wouldn't have had enough evidence of Pollard's spying activities to send him to prison on a serious charge. They [the Israeli leaders] condemned him by supplying the smoking gun."(35) However according to more balanced accounts, Israeli cooperation was a sham. It returned only a fraction of the thousands of documents Pollard had stolen and the American investigation team that went to Israel to interview all those involved was never informed about Pollard's handler Sella.(36)

While initially Israel was unwilling to accept responsibility for Pollard, the situation gradually changed. As Cabinet Secretary, Israel's senior bureaucrat admitted in a signed article in January 1994 that the handlers "were employed by the government of Israel, and presented themselves to Pollard as such. This being the case, it is the government's moral duty, if not its formal obligation, to help bring about Pollard's release."(37) When Pollard was apprehended damage limitation was the top priority. Espionage even between ordinary countries is controversial and more so between closes allies and strategic partners like Israel and the U.S. Israel was primarily concerned with the larger bilateral relations and sought to subdue possible ramifications. However, by its reckless behavior it exposed American Jewry to a search for identity and as William Safire asked rhetorically: Are we American Jews or Jewish Americans?(38) Strongly repudiating the attitude of the American Jewish community, the Jerusalem Post wrote: "Unfortunately, Pollard has had few pleaders in the organized American Jewish community. The fear of the 'dual loyalty' charge is still so pervasive that most of the community's leaders have kept away from the Pollard case as from the plague."(39)

Having recruited him, Israel was unable to be indifferent toward his plight and the support that he had generated following his sentencing. Yet there was a catch. Top Israeli leaders such as Moshe Arens, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Shamir were greatly inhibited by their personal involvement in the whole affair. Pollard was recruited when Shamir was Israel's Prime Minister and the defense portfolio was held by Arens. When he was arrested, Israel was under a national unity government headed by Peres and Shamir was his deputy and Foreign Minister and Rabin was looking after the defense portfolio. The political leadership thus was often accused of not only having abandoned Pollard but also of having "betrayed him by giving U.S. authorities the proof that he was supplying Israel with information."(40) The personal involvement of key leaders prevented the Israeli government from actively and publicly becoming involved on behalf of Pollard. Leading American and Israeli public figures were extremely reluctant to associate themselves with the issue and the campaign was largely confined to Pollard's family members and admirers.

For long Israel confined its involvement only to the legal and humanitarian aspects of the controversy. In January 1988 Justice Minister Avraham Sharir assured Pollard's sister Carol that while Israel would not be involved in the legal aspects, it would do all in its power to help Pollard's humanitarian needs. In September 1989, Health Minister Yaacov Tsur took the unprecedented step of asking the U.S. ambassador in Tel Aviv, William Brown, to release Anne Pollard from prison, on humanitarian grounds. Even though this request raised some eyebrows, the appeal apparently had the official backing of the Israeli government. A few weeks later speaking before the Knesset on behalf of the government, Environment Minister Roni Milo declared that his government had maintained for a long time official contacts with the U.S. administration on the problems, health condition and situation of Anne Pollard. He further added that though it was a painful human tragedy, "the Israeli government has no legal or official standing in the case of a U.S. citizen convicted by an American court." In a dramatic appeal aired by the Voice of Israel on 3 October, Anne Pollard asked Prime Minister Shamir to appeal to President Bush either openly or privately, on their behalf.

In October 1995 Israel's Channel 2 television reported that the Prime Minister's Office had been secretly funding the activities of the Public Committee for Jonathan Pollard. The committee had received some $3 million from what was termed "an institution subordinate to that office." This process had started when Shamir was the Prime Minister and was continued by his Labor successor. This arrangement enabled the government to actively work for Pollard's release without coming into conflict with the American administration. Interestingly, shortly after Pollard was sentenced it was suspected that most of the $150,000 raised in Israel to help pay for Pollard's legal fees were 'donated' by Mossad, "an institution subordinate" to the Prime Minister's Office.(41)

Even though Israel was providing moral and material support to the Pollards, it was clear that real progress would be made only at the political level. In March 1988, less than a year after the Pollards were convicted, seventy Members of the Knesset (MKs) openly appealed to President Reagan to pardon the Pollards so that they could emigrate to Israel. On 15 March 1991, Israel's now defunct weekly Hadashot reported that President Chaim Herzog and the Prime Minister's Office had submitted a request to the U.S. administration for an executive pardon. The timing was interesting since the appeal came shortly after Iraqi Scuds rained over Israel. The Gulf war and the missile attack had generated a renewed warmth toward Israel and it was felt that information provided by Pollard enabled Israel to prepare itself against a possible chemical attack. But in the months before his re-election bid, President Bush turned down Pollard's plea to commute his sentence. For long it had been suggested that a 'request' from Israel's leaders would be sufficient to secure his release. As far back as in December 1989, Pollard's sister Carol told Israel's Army Radio that "a single word from Shamir to Bush would put an end to the entire business." This word was not uttered until July 1992 when Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir became the first senior leader to formally intervene on behalf of Pollard. In a personal letter to President Bush, he requested that Pollard be pardoned. Once again the timing was rather intriguing. Under Yitzhak Rabin, the Labor Party had just won the Knesset election and as the outgoing Prime Minister Shamir had nothing to lose but everything to gain by making this plea. Though ineffective, this was a significant gesture and broke the prolonged silence. It made it easier for his successor and others to actively pursue the matter. As one administration official admitted in September 1995, the Pollard case had been "a regular subject on the agenda" of meetings between U.S. and Israeli officials.(42)

The intensified political campaign by Israel was also necessitated by Pollard's inability to secure a legal solution to his incarceration. Reactivating his legal campaign, Pollard appealed to retract his earlier plea bargain, a move that would necessitate a re-trial. In 1990 a U.S. District judge refused Pollard's appeal to withdraw his earlier guilty plea. Upholding this decision in March 1992, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the U.S. government had not breached the plea bargain agreement. This was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court and ended any legal remedy. Then Pollard decided to appeal for presidential clemency. His application was filed on the eve of the 1992 presidential elections. Many hoped that "Bush will commute the sentence either as a pre-election strategy, or as Bush's final gesture before leaving office, should he be defeated by Bill Clinton."(43) Others argued that only a Democratic victory would result in Pollard's release.(44)

During his visit to Washington in late 1993, Justice Minister Liba'i met with Attorney General Janet Reno and raised the Pollard issue. Following a personal request from Prime Minister Rabin in November 1993, President Clinton ordered the Justice Department to consider the matter. Standing next to the Prime Minister, Clinton remarked: "Under the U.S. Constitution, I do not have to follow the recommendation of the Justice Department, but under our process I have to get one. When I get one, which won't be too long in the future, I will then review it and make a decision." The report of Attorney General Janet Reno was prepared after extensive consultations with the Pentagon as well as national security officials. In an interview with CNN, CIA director James Woolsey opposed any reduction of Pollard's sentence because of the 'type of materials compromised.' Even outgoing Defense Secretary Les Aspen was opposed to any leniency toward Pollard and argued that from prison Pollard had sent fourteen letters containing classified information and hence he continued to be a security risk. According to Aspen, Pollard "clearly remembers classified information which he still has the ability to compromise."(45) Strong opposition came from the Justice Department, Defense Department, CIA and other intelligence agencies. Still, many others were confident that Clinton's statement the previous March indicated the president's determination to commute Pollard, irrespective of Reno's recommendation. However in March 1994 within hours after receiving Reno's recommendation, Clinton acted differently. Rejecting Pollard's application for executive clemency, President Clinton maintained that his decision was based "on the grave nature of his offense and the considerable damage that his actions caused our nation. . . . The enormity of Mr. Pollard's crime, the harm his actions caused to our country, and the need to deter every person who might even consider such actions, warrant his continued incarceration." Some attributed this position to the on-going Whitewater controversy and his unwillingness to make any controversial moves.(46) Furthermore though freeing Pollard would satisfy pro-Israel circles in the U.S., it would have a negative impact upon a President some believe dodged military service during the Vietnam war.

In late September 1995, after the signing of the Oslo 2 Agreement in Washington, Rabin raised the issue again with President Clinton. Rabin was told that the President had not pardoned because he had not received any appeals for clemency. According to Presidential spokesman Mike McCurry the parole board had not forwarded any matter for his consideration, and hence the President "cannot make any decision." For his part Pollard was apprehensive that the parole board would not consider his case favorably and once his application was rejected, he would not be able to make a similar application for two more years. At that point Rabin decided to link Pollard to the signing ceremony. One of the important and often controversial aspects of the Oslo 2 agreement revolved around the release of Palestinian prisoners. Talking to reporters Rabin remarked: "I raised the issue of Pollard against the background of the (Palestinian) prisoner release." The Israeli commitment to release all women prisoners including those 'with blood on their hands' had roused Rabin's domestic critics. A bold gesture from the President, he hoped, would enable the government to convince the public of the wisdom of releasing a large number of convicted Palestinian.(47) This linkage did not go well with Pollard's supporters. While Clinton said he would not decide anything before Pollard appealed to the parole board, the refusal of Israeli President Ezer Weizmann to pardon and release all women prisoners effectively ended the linkage. Days before his assassination, Prime Minister Rabin prepared another letter to Clinton to consider pardoning Pollard. He did this because he thought Pollard might not even appeal to the parole board, for fear of being rejected. Pollard's supporters felt that in agreeing to his request, Clinton could fulfill one of the last wishes of his 'friend'.(48)

In addition to the political campaign, there were suggestions that Israel hoped to secure Pollard's release through a multilateral spy swap. In May 1988, the Israeli media speculated that Pollard would be released as part of a three-way deal involving American, Israeli and Russian spies.(49) Likewise in August 1993, it was suggested that Israel would free Klingberg, "the Americans would release Jonathan Pollard and the Russians would release some American spies. The problem was the Russians had no American spies to offer, and the deal did not take place."(50) In November 1993, Major Yosef Amit, a former intelligence officer convicted on espionage charges, was released by Israel. He was believed to have spied for the U.S. and some felt that his released could have been traded for Pollard. Again in April 1995, the Israeli media speculated over a three-way swap involving Klingberg, Pollard and unnamed American agents in Russia. But nothing came of the speculation.

THE POLLARD CAMPAIGN AND CITIZENSHIP

Even though Pollard and his first wife Anne worked on its behalf, Israel was extremely reluctant to grant them citizenship. Anne's request was granted in September 1991, more than six years after she applied. By then, however, she had been released from prison. Pollard's situation was different and for long the question haunted Israel. There were no doubts about his right to seek and secure Israeli citizenship. Under the Law of Return, Israel is committed to granting such rights to virtually all Jewish immigrants. Former 'Prisoner of Zion' Yosef Begun was given citizenship in 1972 even without a request and nearly sixteen years before he and his family could emigrate to Israel. Should Israel grant Pollard the same favor while he is still in prison? Would it enhance or impede his chances of early release? Israeli opinion is widely divided. Even though one might differ over the 'severity' of the punishment, Pollard was tried by due process. While some political circles felt that Israel should openly endorse and embrace its former agent, others differed. When Pollard was due for a parole hearing in September 1995, many, including members of Pollard's family, felt that being an Israeli would jeopardize his chances.(51) Amnon Dror, who heads the Israel Public Committee for Pollard was not convinced of the citizenship proposal. Weeks before the Israeli government reversed its prolonged opposition he said: "There's a contradiction in terms between expressing remorse and seeking the citizenship of the country you were spying for."(52) Leading a somewhat aggressive and intemperate campaign, his current wife Esther felt differently and was willing to use all the available means to pursue her goal.

For nearly a decade Pollard apparently has tried to secure Israeli citizenship through back channels. Having failed in this route, he began to go public and citizenship became a hot issue in Israeli domestic politics. In July 1995 Pollard formally submitted a request to out-going Interior Minister David Liba'i. Taking a leading role in the effort to gain Israeli citizenship for Pollard, right wing MK Rehavam Ze'evi organized support in the Knesset. When Ehud Barak took over Interior in July 1995, Liba'i made Pollard's request the 'first thing' he handed over to the new minister. In early September, adhering to the traditional reluctance to annoy Washington, Barak rejected Pollard's application.(53) This time, however, the Pollards were in no mood to accept the decision and challenged it in court. In an unusual development on 25 October, the High Court asked Barak to explain and justify his decision within thirty days, though he never did. Within days Rabin was assassinated. Shortly after the mourning period, eighty MKs supported a bill in the Knesset calling on the Interior Minister to grant citizenship to Pollard. This request came amid signs that when Shimon Peres formed a new government, Barak would leave the Interior Ministry and take a more coveted position. On 21 November, exactly ten years after the Pollards were arrested outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, and days before becoming Foreign Minister, Barak reversed his earlier decision and granted Israeli citizenship to Pollard. The overwhelming warmth and sympathy that Israel received from President Clinton and other American and world leaders following Rabin's assassination enabled Israel to make the decision without unduly worrying about the consequences. On 24 January 1996, Interior Minister Haim Ramon issued a passport and citizenship papers to Pollard and hoped "in the near future it will be possible to put Israeli entry stamps into this passport."(54)

CONCLUSION

The Pollard affair is the most controversial aspect of U.S.-Israeli relations. He volunteered to provide highly sensitive materials and Israel found it too attractive to refuse. During the course of eighteen months the naval analyst provided a host of documents hitherto unavailable to Israel. This act has seriously undermined the strong relations between the two countries, especially between their two security establishments. Pollard's Jewishness complicated the position of American Jewry and renewed the debate about dual or conflicting loyalties. Israel's less than honest approach to the whole episode further complicated the picture. Even after the Pollards were arrested and convicted, Israel hoped that it would be business as usual U.S. administrations have traditionally taken a lenient view toward various omissions and commissions by Israel. Previously, a number of sensitive allegations of Israeli impropriety were not seriously investigated or appropriate conclusions drawn. Granting executive clemency is always a political decision and in the United States this means electoral politics. At present the Pentagon and various national security agencies do not favor any lenient treatment toward Pollard. As late as April 1994, an internal CIA document concluded that Pollard "retains the ability to harm our national security because of his intelligence, his power of recollection, his history of significant emotional instability, his history of drug abuse and his overriding loyalty to another country."(55) The question is whether prolonging incarceration outweighs the political benefits of early release. The election of Benyamin Netanyahu as the Prime Minister of Israel in May 1996 adds a new dimension to the Pollard affair. In the past Israel's ability to actively use the political channel to secure his release was greatly hampered by the personal involvement of senior leaders such as Arens, Peres, Rabin and Shamir. As far as it is known, Netanyahu was not directly involved in the Pollard affair. Given his familiarity with the functioning of the American system one may conclude that he will be more forthcoming than his predecessors in campaigning on Pollard's behalf. The final outcome however depends upon the relative political advantage to the incumbent or incoming American president.

NOTES

1. Quoted in George A. Carver, "Pollard: Official rogues", The New Republic (Washington), 13 April 1987, p. 12. Incidentally Shamir made this statement exactly a week after Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment.

2. Quoted in Avi Weiss, "Justice, not vengeance", The Jerusalem Post, 20 August 1993.

3. For instance the issue of former collaborators was a major contentious issue between Israel and the PLO. Likewise Israel is adamant that its collaborators in southern Lebanon receive a fair deal in any peace accord between the two countries.

4. For a detailed background study of Pollard see, Wolf Blitzer, Territory of Lies, (New York: Harper and Row, 1988). See also, Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), pp. 301-323; Bernard R. Hunderson, Pollard: The Spy's Story, (New York: Alpha, 1988).

5. For a brief but interesting discussion of the conflicting American and Israeli perspectives over Pollard episode see, Daniel J. Elazar, "What can we learn from the Pollard case?", Jerusalem Letters: Viewpoints, no. 60, 26 May 1987.

6. Hyman Bookbinder, "American Jews and Israel after the Pollard affair", in William Frankel, ed., Survey of Jewish Affairs, 1988, (Cranberry, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1989), p. 127.

7. Ehud Sprinzak, "Illegalism in Israeli political culture: Theoretical and historical footnotes to the Pollard affair and the Shin Bet cover-up", The Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 47, Summer 1988, p. 94.

8. For instance see Uri Dan and Dennis Eisenberg, "The seeing and the blind", Jerusalem Post, 8 February 1996; "The Pollard proposal", editorial, Jerusalem Post, 3 October 1995.

9. For a most comprehensive account see, Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989).

10. The Jerusalem Report, 9 September 1993, p.6. In an unusual letter published in Israeli daily Ma'ariv on 19 April 1995, Vanunu argued: "It's time you stopped calling me the 'nuclear spy'. I was not a spy and I did not work for any intelligence service."

11. The Jerusalem Post, 5 March 1995.

12. The Jerusalem Post, 7 December 1995.

13. The Jerusalem Post, 29 January 1996. Likewise denying his pleas, the lower court maintained that "when considering the security establishment's concern that Klingberg would endanger state security if released early, and Klingberg's personal situation - even though it represents a humanitarian case - the existence of the state takes precedence." The Jerusalem Post, 9 July 1995.

14. Dan and Eisenberg, "The seeing and the blind".

15. Shlomo Gazit, "Spies and sensitivities", The Jerusalem Post, 4 January 1994.

16. Natan Sharansky, "Pollard: A time for mercy", The Jerusalem Report, 5 November 1992, p. 36.

17. Interview of Esther Pollard, The Jerusalem Post: In Jerusalem Weekend supplement, 31 May 1996, p. 4.

18. "The Pollard rejection".

19. One commentator wrote: ". . . some spies - especially if they are Jewish and try to save Jewish lives by helping a Jewish state - are very much less equal than other spies." Si Frumkin, "A naval story with heart", The Jerusalem Post, 30 January 1996.

20. Quoted in The Jerusalem Post, 25 March 1994.

21. The Jerusalem Post, 7 June 1994.

22. "The Pollard proposal".

23. Interview of Esther Pollard.

24. Among others see, Hirsh Goodman, "Judah or Judas: Forgive him", The Jerusalem Report, 21 April 1994, p. 56; Mark L. Levinson, "Risks and rewards", The Jerusalem Post, 12 November 1993; "Prudence, and Pollard too", editorial, The Jerusalem Post, 24 July 1994; Yisrael Medad, "Purim plea for Pollard", The Jerusalem Post, 4 March 1993; Emanuel A. Winston, "The agony of Pollards", Midstream, vol. 34, no. 5, June/July 1988, pp. 11-16; Weiss, "Justice, not vengeance".

25. Arnold Forster, "Pollard: the U.S.'s Dreyfus", The Jerusalem Post, 7 August 1994.

26. Goodman, "Judah or Judas".

27. Ibid.

28. Gazit, "Spies and sensitivities".

29. Interestingly days before the inauguration of the new administration, out-going President George Bush granted presidential pardon to Weinberger and refused similar a gesture towards Pollard.

30. "The Ames disclosures", editorial, The Jerusalem Post, 28 September 1994. See also "The Ames case and Pollard", editorial, The Jerusalem Post, 25 February 1994; Uri Dan and Dennis Eisenberg, "Cover-up in high places", The Jerusalem Post, 10 November 1994; Carol Pollard, "Parole for Pollard", The Jerusalem Post, 30 April 1995.

31. Gazit, "Spies and sensitivities".

32. Bruce Brill, "Pollard and Dreyfus", The Jerusalem Post, 27 December 1994. See also Forster, "Pollard".

33. Quoted in, Bookbinder, "American Jews and Israel after the Pollard affair", p. 127.

34. Meron Medzini, ed., Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1984-1988, vol.9, (Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992), p. 335.

35. Dan and Eisenberg, "Cover-up in high places".

36. The Jerusalem Report, 19 October 1995, p. 30. According to one Israeli commentator, "The whole investigation had been a sham, and America's fury knew no bounds." Goodman, "Judah or Judas". See also Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, pp. 319-20; Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option, (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 285-303.

37. Elyakim Rubinstein, "The right thing", The Jerusalem Post, 7 January 1994.

38. Quoted in Bookbinder, p. 135.

39. "The Pollard issue", editorial, The Jerusalem Post, 18 August 1991.

40. This point has been frequently highlighted by Uri Dan and Dennis Eisenberg in their weekly columns in The Jerusalem Post.

41. I & P, (Paris), no. 132, April 1987, p. 7.

42. The Jerusalem Post, 1 October 1995.

43. Ibid, 14 October 1992.

44. One Republican activist in the free-Pollard campaign was quoted as saying that the Republicans did not wish to release him because "they don't want him to let loose with any dirt he has." The Jerusalem Post, 15 October 1992.

45. Quoted in The Jerusalem Post, 29 December 1993.

46. Ibid, 25 March 1994. One Jerusalem-based media consultant wrote: "Clinton must be aware that many American Jewish voters care about Jonathan Pollard." Charley J. Levine, "Bring citizen Pollard home", The Jerusalem Post, 27 November 1995.

47. The Jerusalem Report, 19 October 1995, pp. 29-30.

48. Levine, "Bring citizen Pollard home", See also, "Citizen Pollard", editorial, The Jerusalem Post, 23 November 1995.

49. Koteret Rashit, 11 May 1988, in FBIS-NES, 11 May 1988, p. 28. See also The Jerusalem Post, 6 August 1993.

50. The Jerusalem Post, 6 August 1993.

51. Marilyn Henry, "Would Israeli citizenship help or hurt Pollard?", The Jerusalem Post, 24 July 1995.

52. Quoted in The Jerusalem Report, 19 October 1995, p. 29.

53. In March 1989 the then Interior Minister Arye Der'i told Pollard's parents that he had no intention of granting citizenship to Pollard 'unless circumstances chance.'

54. The Jerusalem Post, 25 January 1996.

55. Cited in The Jerusalem Post, 22 November 1994. The report was originally disclosed by Defense Week.

P.R. Kumaraswamy is a Research Fellow in the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.