The personal vote: constituency service and electoral independence.

The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence.

Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. Harvard University Press, $25.00. In both U.S. House and British parliamentary elections, recent decades have seen an increase in what these authors call the personal vote: that portion of a candidate's electoral support arising from his or her personal qualities and performance record rather than from, say, voters' party identification. So says this comparative study which is based on public opinion surveys and interviews with politicians. The American upswing is well known. In Britain the trend is also up, though personal voting there is meager by American standards.

What accounts for the increase? Cain, et al. put their money on the surge in the number of contacts between incumbent legislators and their constituents. Their analysis is as resourceful and sophisticated as we are likely to get. They have data on such matters as the size of House members' staffs and the percentages of constituents who say they have been contacted by incumbents or their offices. Three times as many Americans reported such contacts in 1978 as in 1958. On the British side, similar contacts are higher per capita, even though parliamentary staffs are virtually nonexistent. In both countries there is a significant relationship between attentiveness to constituents and payoff in votes.

What consequences should we expect from greater voting based on personal factors? More sluggish election turnover rates, the authors suggest. And as legislators beef up their independent electoral bases, other consequences include weaker legislative parties, less presidential clout with legislators, greater interest-group influence, greater emphasis on particularistic, district-centered policy--in general, more policy stalemate.

In fact, party-seat swings in the U.S. House elections have sagged lately. The authors' theory as to why is certainly plausible. But on policymaking matters, has the U.S. displayed that pattern more in recent times than before? The House Democratic party seems to be at least as effective a policy instrument now as it was under, say, Roosevelt after 1937, Truman, or Kennedy. The party caucus is much stronger and the Dixiecrats have subsided. Reagan's pragmatic success with Congress in 1981-1982 will stand comparison with any president's in this century. If increased interest group influence is a worry, look at the passage of the thick Naderite regulatory statutes around 1970, major deregulatory legislation in the late seventies, and the recent tax reform. As for particularism, it is hard to beat 19th-century porkbarrel bills or the Smoot-Hawley tariff. In Britain, despite an inching up of MP independence on roll calls, party government seems alive and well under. Thatcher.