The military doctrine of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War: myths and facts.

Soviet historiography did not provide a complete picture of the history of the Great Patriotic War. Victories scored by the Red Army oftentimes were excessively praised and glorified, while its failures and lost battles were mentioned only in passing--as a general rule, without any indication as to the original lineup and balance of forces, own losses and mistakes by military leadership, especially in so far as concerned the coverage of the prewar period and the initial period of the war. Ledokol [Icebreaker] by V. Rezun (Suvorov) struck the reader by the unprecedented manner in which it raised pertinent questions, the intensity of accusations made against unshakeable authorities, and an abundance of unexpected, hitherto unknown facts. It makes easy reading as it has a pronounced journalistic character and is far from the methodology generally adopted in military historiography. All of that made for a big public response among the readers.

Careful analysis, however, shows that many of the author's conclusions hold no water. Thus, the keynote, the pivot of the whole book is the assertion that the Red Army was an army of aggression, that it had been preparing for a preventive strike in 1941, and that Hitler had to preempt the Soviet Union. V. Rezun has no conclusive evidence, no direct proof on this score so he uses indirect, circumstantial evidence, but it is unconvincing. The only thing that it is indeed impossible to disagree with is that the Red Army's operational training, structure and weapon systems were really geared above all toward offensive action, while in the summer of 1941 a powerful force grouping was being concentrated in western military districts. But in this case the author is trying to prove the obvious.

Yes, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA), and later on the Soviet Army, had an offensive military doctrine. The 1939 Field Manual thus summed it up: "Should the enemy impose a war upon us, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will be the most offensive of all offensive armies ever known in history." Politicians and journalists, as a general rule, used to add at this point that an aggressor would be smashed on its own territory and the Red Army would free the working people of those countries from the yoke of landowners and capitalists. That doctrine existed essentially unchanged until 1987.

Yes, from the spring of 1941 the RKKA began to raise an offensive force grouping. A map of that grouping just before the outbreak of the war can be found in the fourth volume of Istoriya Vtoroy mirovoy voyny (A History of World' War II). Military districts, armies, mechanized corps and armies moving forward from hinterland areas are shown in the map more completely and accurately than Ledokol's author did. There is also a map of the disposition of fronts and armies by the onset of combat operations as well as of changes in the force grouping that occurred in the course of battles in border areas. Here, too, V. Rezun makes some military/historical mistakes that could have been forgiven had the author not put an equals sign between the Red Army's offensive doctrine and its supposedly absolute readiness to be the first to start a war in 1941.

It has been proved beyond any doubt that the Soviet leadership did not have a plan to attack Germany (let alone to destroy, conquer or enslave it) that could be seen as analogous to Plan Barbarossa. There was a plan of active offensive operations designed to rout Werhmacht's offensive force grouping, possibly outside Russian borders. Depending on the prevailing political and military situation, that plan could have been carried out by delivering a preemptive strike on an aggressor preparing to attack, by delivering a counterstroke or a retaliatory strike after a brief phase of defensive and holding combat action in a border area or through a combination of the aforementioned methods of strategic action.

That was in theory. In reality, however, by the summer of 1941, the RKKA was not ready either for a strategic offensive or especially for strategic defense, as evidenced by, among other things, extensive memoir literature by German authors.

If V. Rezun's logic is followed and it is accepted that Hitler preempted the Soviet Union by just two weeks, that army, effectively ready for a strategic offensive operation, should have, at the very least, carried out several successful counterstrokes on the operational level, which, as is known, was not, however, the case.

It is quite possible that in the subsequent period, contingent on an international situation favorable to the Soviet Union, Stalin could have come to the conclusion about the expediency of a preventive strike with far-reaching objectives. History, however, does not know the oblique mood: It does not abide hypothesizing on what would have been. We should only assess the actual course of past events, without any conjectures or unjustifiable assumptions.

A thorough analysis of Ledokol's content also calls into question the author's competence and scrupulousness. A careful study of arguments made in the book shows that V. Rezun's principal method of operation is to put forward an unexpected and startling thesis that he then selects "facts" to back up with. In so doing, he is not loath to juggle the facts or deliberately tell semi-truths or even outright lies. Add here the author's rather limited knowledge of military matters and his dilettantism in presenting historical material. Following are some of the most glaring examples of V. Rezun's "revelations" in the military-technical area, the military art, and contemporary history, accompanied by some comments on the author's style and manner of work.

V. Rezun stresses that his principal source of material were Soviet publications available in the public domain. We will follow in his footsteps and only use facts from open sources. (1)

Some of the Author's Military-Technical Revelations

In considering the Red Army's prewar armor and tanks (pp. 27-31), (2) V. Rezun singles out a number of aspects, making a number of assumptions.

First, the BT "aggressor tank" is a fast tank that could not be used on Soviet territory but only on German autobahns as well as "on the territory of Germany, France, and Belgium" (why not The Netherlands or, say, Denmark?). "The BT was designed to operate only on foreign territory." Basic employment: massively, behind enemy lines, at high speeds (100 km/h!), bypassing fortified areas (range, 700 kilometers). It needs the tracks to reach autobahns. More BTs were produced than the overall number of tanks of all types in the world. Unsuitable for defense.

The real picture. First models of the BT tracked and wheeled tank were made back in the early 1930s, when there were no autobahns in Germany yet. The maximum speed of 100 km/h is an overestimate. According to official sources, it was 70 km/h to 86 km/h. What is more, that speed could only be reached by a separate tank in ideal test range conditions. In the event of a massive employment of tanks in march/battle formation their average speed did not exceed 30 km/h to 40 km/h.

Now concerning the number of those tanks. In all, the Soviet industry produced 8,060 BT tanks. Of course, the aggregate number of tanks in the world was higher. Say, in 1939, Germany had 5,260 tanks, Italy 1,400 tanks, Poland approximately 800 tanks, Czechoslovakia about 300, and France about 3,000 tanks while Great Britain by the beginning of the war had 310 tanks as part of an expedition corps. By the outbreak of the war the Red Army still had a considerable number of BT tanks. Their latest modifications were armed with a 45-mm gun that could penetrate German tank armor. If used effectively, BT tanks were quite suitable for the defensive, not only the offensive.

Second, in 1938, the A-20 tank was developed. "The A-20's main role is to use its tracked capability to reach autobahns and then shed the tracks and become king of the road"--that, according to V. Rezun, was the objective behind the Soviet leadership's decision to develop these tanks. He assures us that "autobahn" tanks were built until June 21, 1941 (p. 183).

The real picture. In the mid-1930s, especially in the course of the civil war in Spain, it became clear that BT-type tanks with armor only providing protection against bullets, had outlived their usefulness since they were vulnerable to AT artillery shells. Development of a new tracked and wheeled tank, the A-20, with reinforced armor began. In September 1939, for technical and tactical considerations, it was decided to abandon the development and production of tracked and wheeled tanks. Priority was given to a purely tracked tank, the T-34. The A-20 tank never went into series production! So, two years before V. Rezun's predicted Soviet aggression, the Red Army abandons its purportedly most powerful weapon system--a tracked and wheeled "aggressor tank." Yet for some reason V. Rezun pays no attention to this.

Third, "the Soviet Union was the only country in the world that was mass producing amphibious tanks. In a defensive war, a tank has nowhere to float so when Hitler began Operation Barbarossa, Soviet amphibious tanks had to be scrapped owing to their unsuitability for defensive warfare."

The real picture. From 1931 until 1938, the Soviet Union was producing light [malyye] amphibious tanks, the T-37 and the T-38, and as of 1940, a light [legkiy] amphibious tank, the T-40. Those tanks were designed exclusively for reconnaissance missions and had only anti-bullet armor and were armed with machine-guns. Reconnaissance is needed at all times: on the march, in a staging area, in the defensive, in the offensive, and even in retreat. Not to understand this and to suggest that reconnaissance tanks were designed only for the offensive is to show obvious incompetence.

Fourth, "in firepower, the I-16 was superior to Messerschmidt-109E and had almost three times the firepower of the Spitfire-1" (p. 32).

The real picture. The I-16 had four 7.62-mm machine-guns while its maximum speed was 462 km/h; the Me-109 had two 7.9-mm machine-guns and three 20-mm guns with a maximum speed of 570 km/h; the Spitfire-1 had six 7.7-mm machine-guns while its maximum speed reached 594 km/h.

Fifth, the Il-2 ground attack plane is an aggressor aircraft since its main function is to attack airfields (p. 33).

The real picture. "Ground attack aviation," says the Sovetskaya Voennaia Entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), "is a combat air component tasked with engaging point and mobile ground (naval surface) targets from low and extremely low altitude, primarily at tactical and close-in operational depth of the enemy's force dispositions." In pre-war field manuals and regulations, the role of ground attack aviation, and therefore of the Il-2 aircraft, did not basically differ from the aforesaid. So the author misrepresents the Il-2's principal function. Of course the Il-2 could be used to attack airfields (airfields adjacent to the front). Everything depended on the specific situation on the ground and the tasks assigned to the Air Force. Yet assertions of the "it could have done and therefore it is an aggressor" kind do not stand up to criticism. It should be added here that a massive strike against airfields can be delivered even by a victim to aggression by way of retaliation.

Sixth, "Soviet generals dreamed of sending not only hundreds of thousands of paratroopers to Western Europe ... but also possibly thousands of tanks" (p. 121). Oleg Antonov created a flying tank. It flew in 1942. "Control surface and rudder drives were connected to the tank's gun. The tank crew steered the machine ... by turning the turret and elevating the gun tube." O. Antonov was late in developing the flying tank by the beginning of the war, so they proved unnecessary (p. 121).

The real picture. The passage about hundreds of thousands of paratroops (on page 123 their number rises to a whole 1 million!) points to elementary ignorance. The largest air-borne operations of World War II are characterized by the following airborne force levels: By 1942, the Red Army had more than 10,000 servicemen near Vyazma; in taking control of the island of Crete, the Nazi forces had 23,500; the allies forces in the Normandy operation had about 35,000 and in crossing the Rhine, more than 17,000. Even the aggregate number of all paratroops used in the war is nowhere near V. Rezun's "hundreds of thousands." As for his description of the flying tank steering procedure ("by turning the turret and elevating the gun tube"), it sounds, rather, like non-science fiction. A person who has some idea about aircraft steering knows that at low altitudes with bad air turbulence or, say, in landing, a pilot has to make a great deal of precise moves with the steering wheel (stick) and pedals to keep the aircraft in the right position. Steering an air plane by turning the tank turret and gun tube is absurd. The pilot will just not "feel" the plane. And what about controlling the ailerons (control surfaces used to control the rolling movements of an airplane)? The author simply forgot about them.

On page 121 he cites a Western expert, S. Salog but for some reason ignores the memoirs of S.N. Anokhin, a prominent Soviet test pilot, where he describes this first, and only, flight in a flying tank and explains why the project was abandoned immediately after the unsuccessful flight. Incidentally, the idea of a flying tank--one of the many ideas that never materialized--was borne in the course of the war. To say that O. Antonov, contrary to the wishes of the military top brass, was late in developing the tank by the beginning of the war is a juggling of facts, typical of V. Rezun.

V. Rezun's Revelations in the Sphere of Military Art

From a purely military and methodological point of view, V. Rezun's book is written in a confused and chaotic manner. It would take dozens of pages to straighten out the wild mixture of tactical, operational, technical, military-economic, political, ideological, military-historical, strategic, and other issues. In analyzing some of the book's sections, we would have to parse each sentence! So let us choose just a few examples characterizing the level of the author's knowledge in the field of organizational force development and the military art.

Thus, in a bid to prove the Soviet Union's aggressive plans with regard to Nazi Germany, V. Rezun puts forward one of this principal arguments, namely the deployment, in May-June 1941, of large Red Army forces from internal military districts to the west. Having devoted about 20 pages to the subject at hand, he misses, as if by accident, the chronology of a number of important preceding events.

Meanwhile, the facts point to the following:

-- the Wehrmacht's purposeful preparations for attacking the Soviet Union began nine (!) months before considerable Red Army forces were deployed to western military districts; movement forward and deployment of Wehrmacht's offensive forces, designed to attack the Soviet Union, began four (!) months before additional Red Army forces began to be deployed to the west;

-- Red Army actions to reinforce the Western force grouping cannot possibly be interpreted as preventive measures: those, without a doubt, were in response to the Nazi preparations for aggression;

-- Hitler's statements in January 1941 concerning the non-existent threat of Soviet attack on Germany show once again that, in preparing the aggression, Germany was guided by its own strategic objectives, not by the fear of Soviet attack.

This failure to take into account the actual sequence of the sides' strategic decisions or the timing of the basic military-strategic activities is an unpardonable mistake for an analyst claiming to possess military specialist knowledge.

V. Rezun lays it on thick, telling the reader about the Red Army's plans to attain air superiority (p. 24). He asserts that such an operation is only possible with surprise attack in peacetime and necessarily by massive strikes on airfields. Because the Soviet military leadership indeed saw air superiority as a major prerequisite to successful combat action by ground and naval forces (true, just like military leaders of all modern armies), V. Rezun ascribes to it the intention to stage a perfidious attack.

Next he reasons: "Triandafillov elevated the military art to the level of exact sciences. He developed formulas for the mathematical computation of offensive operations by million-strong armies to a great operational depth. These formulas are as exquisite as geometry theorems. Triandafillov proposed formulas for all stages of an offensive operation" (p. 58). Later on, in the same page, he writes: "But Communists 'forget' that before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ... Soviet headquarters had worked out mathematics based plans for a Sovietization of Europe."

Indeed, V.K. Triandafillov was a major military theorist, but he never devised formulas in V. Rezun's interpretation. It seems that party leaders of the 1930s-1940s did not use mathematical computations to plan "Sovietization" either.

It is quite possible to accept V. Rezun's considerations concerning the possibility and necessity of Soviet strategic defense. Yet even here he cannot do without a primitive piece of military-theoretical fiction. This concerns reasons for the dismantling of the "Stalin line" (p. 104).

V. Rezun: "This is why the line was dismantled ... it prevented Soviet troops from secretly amassing near the German borders ... and it hindered the supply of the Red Army with millions of tonnes of ammunition, foodstuffs, and fuel. In peacetime there were quite enough passages between fortified areas ... but in the course of a war ..." (p. 104).

Was that really the case? V. Rezun is mistaken: Fortified areas did not cut through a single railway line, a single highway, a single country road, or a single bridge. Wherever possible, specially assigned and prepared subunits were ready to close or demolish them at the approach of an advancing enemy force. This is the ABC of a well organized defense. Furthermore, could the 13 fortified areas, built across a distance of approximately 1,600 kilometers, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea area, in the event of a war, have really "squeezed" the transport flow within the relatively narrow corridors? The answer is obvious.

V. Rezun: "Communist historians use up hundreds of thousands of tonnes of paper on their historical books, but not a single of their books explains why Stalin, in 1941, created 10 airborne corps" (p. 117).

Here V. Rezun is clearly being disingenuous. Five airborne corps began to be formed two months before the outbreak of the war (he says so himself). The difficult situation that had evolved in the first days of the war forced the Soviet military command to commit those corps as rifle infantry formations. In August 1941, they were transferred to the reserves of the Supreme High Command (VGK), under the sole command of the Airborne Force commander in chief. In the fall of 1942, those corps were reorganized as airborne divisions. This, Mr. Rezun, is the whole truth about the alleged 10 airborne corps. It only requires conscientious reading, and not "hundreds of thousands of tonnes of paper," but just one and a half pages in Sovetskaya Voennaia Entsiklopediya.

In Chapter 16, V. Rezun tries to prove that the Red Army was ready for a preemptive strike, citing the powerful combat composition of armies deployed in the country's western military districts. There is no question that those armies were designed mainly for offensive operations. Here is just a brief quotation from the memoirs by Marshal G.K. Zhukov: "As a result, shortly before the outbreak of the war, of the generally considerable number of combined units deployed in border districts--170 divisions and two brigades--19 divisions were staffed to a level of 5,000 to 6,000 servicemen; seven cavalry divisions on average 6,000 servicemen, and 144 divisions had a numerical strength of 8,000 to 9,000 each. In interior districts, the majority of divisions were also understaffed while many rifle divisions were only in the formation stages or just embarking on combat training programs."

Add here the fact that the T/O numerical strength of a Red Army rifle division at the time was 14,500 servicemen. A comparison of this figure against the aforementioned shows the extent to which the Red Army was ready for a preventive strike in the summer of 1941.

V. Rezun: "Armies are formations that are way too large to be maintained in peacetime ... In 1939, the Soviet Union started forming armies in its European part ..." After cessation of combat operations and "liberation" marches, not a single army was disbanded. That was without a precedent in Soviet history. Prior to that, armies were formed in wartime and only for war" (pp. 137-179).

In reality, the main reason for creating armies is to enhance the effectiveness of command and control. When the number of combined units (brigades, divisions or corps) on theater of operations--be it in peacetime or in wartime--did not allow for flexible command and control from a single command and control center, the Ground Forces (later on also the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces) were divided up into armies. V. Rezun misleads the reader by rigidly linking the existence of armies to the state of war or peace. As for the author's assertion that none of our armies was disbanded after the summer of 1940, it is just ridiculous. Hitler's troops conquer Europe, the battle is on for Britain, and the subsequent course of events arouses serious concern. Should, in this situation, the Soviet Union disband the large operational formations it has just created?

V. Rezun: "Why Stalin Deployed the Fronts" (p. 296).

The sheer title of Chapter 28 misleads the reader unversed in the intricacies of military terminology since the term "deployment" implies complete readiness of troops to accomplish combat missions assigned to them. Yet in fact the trouble was exactly that by the beginning of the war the fronts were not on the state of combat alert, the troops were not brought into designated areas, the bulk of aviation was not dispersed or put on airborne alert in advance while combined unit and unit commanders were not issued battle orders in a timely manner and did not organize their interaction.

V. Rezun: "By deploying, in February 1941, front command and control stations, the Soviet Union effectively entered into a war against Germany although it had made no official declaration to that effect" (p. 271).

In reality, putting the troops and their command and control systems on a higher alert status has never and under no circumstances been regarded as initiation of hostilities. It should be noted in this context that in the course of various training exercises and war games in peacetime the troops of all armies have always deployed combat command and control elements, which does not at all mean their "de facto entering into war."

Next V. Rezun, contradicting himself, notes that before the war, a giant command and control station was prepared on the Volga, in the Zhiguli rocks, for the country's top leadership.

The question is, if the Soviet Union was preparing a preventive strike and decisive offensive action, why then did the top leadership need a command and control center in Zhiguli--that is to say, 1,800 kilometers away from the state border, in the first place? In the event of a successful offensive operation, the country's leadership could well have stayed in Moscow. It would not even have been necessary to go to underground command and control stations or to impose a blackout. They could have quietly continued to work in their regular peacetime offices: After all, German J-88 bombers had a maximum range of about 900 kilometers. This is yet another inconsistency in the "military specialist's" logic.

The Ledokol author's handling of source material deserves special attention. He used extensive military and military-historical literature, citing memoirs, reference books, and specialist journals. The list of literature (which, incidentally, is erroneously called a list of references) does not include a single German source. Yet it would be logical to assume that representatives of the opposite side would have been ready to confirm Goebbels' and Rezun's theory about the Wehrmacht's forced attack on the Soviet Union. But no.

Here is the diary of Col. Gen. Halder, chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces. In his prewar entries we find a recurring conclusion to the effect that the Red Army is not expected to deliver a preventive strike. It needs to be stressed that Halder did not write a book of memoirs. He recorded facts and assessments of the day! If Halder's diary can be regarded as obligatory literature for Ledokol's subject matter, I would describe the reminiscences of General Field Marshal Manstein as recommended literature. Manstein puts forward the following point of view: In June 1941, the Red Army grouping was so extended in depth that it was not fit for offensive but only for defensive action. Yet, if need be and with sufficient time, the Red Army could have formed an offensive force grouping.

So, we come to the conclusion that Rezun uses in his book only those source materials that can to some extent or other confirm his own theses. But even here he uses them only superficially, sometimes simply passing a lie for the truth. Here are just a few examples:

Page 125. By way an epigraph to Chapter 14, V. Rezun cites the RKKA Field Manual (1939): "The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will be the most offensive of all offensive armies ever known in history." The fact, however, is that this sentence opens with the words: "If the enemy imposes a war upon us ..." What is this--an accidental mistake?

Page 131. "Marshal Zhukov's book contains a map of the disposition of naval bases in the first half of 1941." Then, based on this map, the author harshly criticizes the "intrigues and underhand plotting by the Soviet military command." The fact, however, is that there is no such map in Zhukov's book!

There are plenty of such "mistakes" in the Ledokol.

Pages 173-174. Using circumstantial evidence and free-wheeling speculation, V. Rezun asserts that in his speech of May 5, 1941, in honor of the graduates of military academies, Stalin did not warn Red Army commanders about the danger of attack against the Soviet Union. "Stalin envisioned a war against Germany without a German attack on the Soviet Union but with some different scenario for the beginning of the war." The reader is led to believe that Stalin oriented his military commanders toward a preemptive strike by the Red Army.

What are the facts? Stalin's speech referred to above was not so long ago retrieved from the archives. Its text can be found in, e.g., L. Bezymenskiy's book, Gitler i Stalin pered skhvatkoy (Hitler and Stalin before the Battle). Analysis of said document leads to the conclusion that V. Rezun's speculation and assertions are absolutely groundless.

Pages 315-316. V. Rezun quotes Soviet Fleet Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov: "One thing is clear to me: I.V. Stalin not only did not rule out the possibility of war with Hitler's Germany but, quite the contrary, saw this war ... as inevitable. I.V. Stalin conducted war preparations--extensive and comprehensive--proceeding from the time frame that he had set himself. Hitler upset those calculations." For a whole one and a half pages V. Rezun plays around with the quotation, coming to the following conclusion: "In other words, Stalin was preparing to strike first--that is to say, to commit an act of aggression against Germany." (?!) It is worth noting that this approach is quite typical of V. Rezun who offers a purely subjective interpretation of quotations, facts, and events. Behind the veil of verbosity and diversionary departures from the subject at hand, it is oftentimes difficult for the reader to understand what the truth is.

In closing, the following should be said. Soviet history is rich in events requiring in-depth analysis and in some instances a critical review. A researcher who raises such questions assumes a great intellectual, political, and moral responsibility. In addition to a deep understanding of the subject of study, he should possess an analytical mind and elementary decency. In his book Ledokol, Viktor Rezun has shown none of these qualities.

NOTES:

1. G. Frster, O. Groehler, "Der zweite Weltkrieg," Dokumente, Militerverlag der DDR, 1972; G. Frster, N. Paulus, Abriss der Geschichte der Panzerwaffe, Militerverlag der DDR, 1977; Flugzeugtypen der Welt, Bechtermnz Verlag, 1977; Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Band 2 und 3, Dietz Verlag, 1966; Sebastian Haffner, Anmerkungen zu Hitler, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999; F. Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Tgliche Aufzeichnungen der Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942, Band 2, Kohlhammer Verlag, 1963; H.A. Jakobson, Der zweite Weltkrieg. Grundzege in Dokumenten, Fischer, 1965; E. Manstein, Verlorene Siege, Bernhard und Graefe Verlag, 2000; A. Seywald, Die Presse der sozialen Bewegungen 1918-1933, Klartext Verlag; V. Anfilov, "Novaya versiya i realnost," Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 7, 1999; I.Kh. Bagramyan, Tak nachinalas voyna, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1971; L. Bezymenskiy, Gitler i Stalin pered skhvatkoy, Veche Publishers, Moscow, 2000; M. Gareyev, "Pravda i lozh o nachale voyny," NVO, June 22, 2000; G.K. Zhukov, Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya, Izd-vo APN, Moscow, 1969; Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1967-1980; A. Kvashnin, M. Gareyev, "Sem urokov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny," NVO, April 28, 2000; M.N. Kozhevnikov, Komandovaniye i shtab VVS Sovetskoy Armii v Velikuyu Otechestvennuyu voynu, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1977; K.A. Meretskov, Na zluzhbe narodu, Izd-vo politicheskoy literatury, Moscow, 1970; K.S. Moskalenko, Na yugo-zapadnom napravlenii 1943-1945. Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1972; M.I. Meltyukhov, Upushchenny shans Stalina, Veche Publishers, Moscow, 2002; Sovetskaya Voennaia Entsiklopediya, Voenizdat Publishers, 1976-1986.

2. Here and hereinafter quoted from: V. Suvorov, Ledokol. Kto nachal Vtoruyu mirovuyu voynu? Moscow, 1992, 352 pp.

GDR National People's Army Col. Karl HARMS (Ret.)

Doctor of Military Sciences