The ideal warrior.

Defending against formidable invaders during many centuries of its history, Russia won outstanding victories in the final analysis thanks to the superiority of its soldiers. This was in graphic evidence during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 culminating in the Great Victory of 1945. In present day combat operations, too, success is largely determined by high standards of the warfighters who employ sophisticated and powerful weapons. Such warfighters are not born, they are painstakingly and purposefully molded by a country's leadership, people and armed forces. The accepted ideal of soldier comes to play an enormous role here.

As a tool of ideology, the "ideal" category possesses tremendous power in getting to know and transforming the social reality. Our military ideology does not unfortunately use this category--mostly because it has not been studied sufficiently enough, is hard to apply, and because of the absence of methodological and methodic experience in practical development of the ideal armed forces, soldier and officer.

Vladimir Dahl defines "ideal" in his dictionary of the Russian language as "a mental model of perfection in something of whatever kind; a prototype; a dream specimen or model." (1) The Sociological Encyclopedia defines "ideal" as "an ideal image having a normative character; in public life, a perfect, reference form of a phenomenon or a process; the highest and final objective of activities, ambitions and orientations that determines the subject's way of thinking and activity." (2)

Let us point out some of ideal's traits. They are the image, or the reflection of objects of the real world in human conscience, sensual reflection (for example, an artistic image in art) or mental reflection (categories of science, ideology). But this is not a merely contemplative (mirror) reflection, but an imaginatively processed reflection in accordance with man's wish to change the object. The ideal warrior is the required, desirable development of his quality and abilities that are yet to be achieved. This ideal is different in the conceptions of different sociopolitical subjects, or it is an element of their ideologies, whereas its implementation is not so much a matter of technique as an ideological-political matter expressing the vital interests of society, a social group or a party.

An ideal does not reflect the image of a prospective warrior in a fragmentary manner but in a holistic manner, as a system (a complex) of qualities (social-demographic, sociopolitical, cultural-ideological, military-occupational, morale and combat, and other qualities), their relations and interaction; the requisite conditions and facilities, phases, programs, criteria and implementation factors. Ideally, the warrior is regarded as being inalienable from his weapons and equipment, in unity of the material and spiritual forces.

A realistic, rather than a farfetched ideal of warrior, derives from three sources: the experience, the deeds and aspects of heroic warriors of the past; those new things that emerge in the qualities of the finest warriors of today, as well as from futurological projections of the development of their capabilities with regard to future conditions and requirements. The specific contents of this ideal is determined by the evolving historical conditions, the contents of war and warfare, the state's policy and military objectives.

The ideal's leading role is objectively determined by the establishment of aims by people. "The spider performs operations reminiscent of those performed by the weaver, and the bee puts to shame some of the human architects when it constructs its cells of wax. But even the worst of architects differs from the bee right from the start in that, before building a cell of wax, he has constructed it in his head. At the end of this labor process, the result is obtained which at the start of this process was already in the man's imagination, that is to say, ideally." (3) Becoming firmly established in the mind as a goal, the ideal acquires some kind of power, it begins to control people, to direct and regulate their activities.

The ideal warrior adopted by the state should become a norm and become embodied in mandatory instructions written into guideline documents, service manuals, regulations, directives and orders of the day, and be featured in addresses made by persons in authority. It will then get the status of a general guideline, objective, task and program of the organizational development of the armed forces, training and indoctrination of the personnel, the internal imperative, a criterion against which to estimate the upgrading of the warrior's skills.

The dire need for developing without delay the ideal of soldier for today's Russia has been caused by the following. First, the growing military threats, the aspirations of many countries to "revolutionize the human factor of war" and even achieve absolute superiority of their fighting men (the U.S. Future Warrior 2025 project, the PRC's plans to have fighters not inferior to Western professionals). (4) The American military concept points out: It is now as important to train a soldier as to have an aircraft carrier or a Stealth bomber. (5) Second, the backwardness of Russia's military today and the loss of its many valuable qualities of the preceding generations, the negative tendencies in its sociopolitical and combat-related evolution. Many academics point them out and speak of the ugly depoliticization, an in-depth degeneration of genuine military people, their refusal to fight a war, being unprepared for war; masses of military officers becoming narrow-minded officials of a new type; the general drop in the ability for military feats; preferring comfortable and unhurried living, etc. (6) Finally, it is very hard to shape an ideal warrior concept for Russia because of the radical changes of living conditions in the country, the change of the sociopolitical and economic system, its policy and ideology, the type of the armed forces and the type of soldier. The past ideals have been rejected while no new ideals have emerged and this generates uncertainty in the military policy.

Outstanding thinkers, politicians and generals have been trying to develop the ideal of a warrior from the earliest times. The ancient Greek philosopher Plato (5th-4th centuries B.C.) said that a good warrior is remarkable for great diligence, acute senses, courage, masterly use of weapons, superior ability to fight and win; "he should be philosophical (have an inquiring mind)," in other words, he should have a broad outlook and a creative cast of mind. (7) The philosopher and soldier Xenophon said that an ideal warrior is molded by an equally ideal system of training and education. He also turned his hand to developing theories and programs of "public and personal indoctrination in accordance with the ideal." (8) Instructive in this regard are also the ideas and experience of Aristotle. (9) The heroic characters from the historical accounts, classical literature and poetry have at all times played a major part in molding the ideal of warrior.

In Russia, Peter the Great, G. Potemkin, A. Suvorov, M. Kutuzov, among others, were trying to develop the ideal of soldier and implement it for their own purposes. A. Suvorov made an especially great contribution summing up all that was most valuable in military history and developing a genuinely innovative ideal and a system of molding the "finest soldier"--a "wonder soldier" who was not deterred by any obstacles in his path to victory, whose military valor surpassed all that was known in the West and the East. In his Science of Victory and in his two letters of instruction, he painted the image of a genuine hero--the ideal which proved his own lodestar. (10) As a living example for the Russian military, he had the right to call upon his posterity to emulate him--"to be true to your country to the last gasp, avoid luxury, idleness and self-interest, seek glory via truth and virtue." (11)

In Soviet times, M. Frunze, S. Gusev, A. Snesarev, K. Voroshilov, among others, made a big and fruitful contribution to developing the ideal of soldier. This ideal, whose foundations were developed in the mid-1920s, indicated what the Soviet soldier had to become from the viewpoint of its sociopolitical aspect, material and technical equipment, proficiency in the field, and morale so as not only to measure up to the finest world standards but even surpass them as the country was being developed.

Of fundamental nature were the directive to develop soldier-citizens who were to be politically aware, devoted to the new system, highly cultured, ardent patriots and internationalists abiding by the noble moral standards, selfless and heroic, highest military occupational specialty rating, equipped with the finest weapons which they use skillfully; to train ordinary soldiers to become excellent specialists of the NCO standard. The acting on this directive produced soldier who won in the Great Patriotic War, reliable defenders of the country and the allied nations, protectors of universal peace.

The molding of an ideal warrior to match the spirit of the new times calls for studying international experience in this field.

Many believe that the U.S. military embody the highest ideal. This view became widespread in the wake of the U.S. campaigns against the Taliban (2001) and Iraq (2003) which are being estimated as prototypes of military conflicts of the future and which have thrown the new combat qualities and morale of the American military in sharp relief. The Americans are enthusiastic about this: Our soldiers are unmatched under fire on the battlefield; they are endowed with magic force, nearly the same way as the genie of Aladdin's magic lamp; in Iraq, they weren't simply centurions, they were a new-type centurions: they fear no potential adversary. (12)

They seem to have reached the top. But Americans concentrate on the future and are developing an ideal soldier for 25, 50 or even 100 years ahead. (13) What we have is a new revolutionary advance in military affairs, armed forces and their personnel, raising them to a level absolutely unattainable for others. On the drawing board are further three revolutions in a bid to achieve "exclusive technical superiority of weapons; optimization of military costs; upgrading control of the personnel to attain exceptionally high morale of American soldiers. It is being stressed that in all these things, people matter most, that the armed forces' efficiency increasingly depends on the quality and readiness of soldiers equipped with the world's finest technology and management. The revolution in personnel command and control includes the selection of personnel, training and drills and the retention of personnel policy. (14)

Analysis of diverse sources makes it possible to visualize the ideal soldier that the United States intends to make a reality over several decades. Here are some of his features. The soldier will be molded out of the "human material" of the finest quality. The armed forces will not be made up of those expelled from schools somewhere in the backwoods, but of the finest, bright, highly motivated and patriotic young Americans. (15) The armed forces will encourage training for every member of the personnel at colleges, higher schools and universities (using distance learning facilities for those based in other countries or out at sea).

The future soldier of the USA is perceived as one with a deeper realization of the superiority of the values of American society, more politicized and ideologized, confident of the righteousness and irreproachable ethic principles of U.S. armed forces actions, regarding service and military duty more important than own person, prepared to risk own life for American interests, ideas and faith, seeking to look for and destroy enemies, take part in combat and win. The soldier's activities should be "highly motivated" materially, but above all morally and ethically. He and members of his family should be provided for in such a way as to be fully satisfied with conditions of life because on this depend the armed forces' high operational readiness.

Military professionalism of such soldier, combat proficiency, proficiency acquired in exercises that offer an unprecedented level of combat reality, that is to say, his warfighting qualities should become much higher compared to those existing today. Professionalism earned through hard work is believed to be a very fragile asset, it cannot be acquired once and for all, and it knows no bounds. Therefore, in order to move forward, there needs to be a "continual revolution" in training and indoctrination. We should do much more to develop the human potential in the armed forces, they believe in the USA.

Not to be passed over is the organizational-methodological aspect of developing the ideal of U.S. soldier. The development of the ideal of "versatile soldier" is the job of a specially established center which makes wide use of simulation, forecasting and "idealization," academic conferences and publishes special materials. This work has as its objective to realize in the very near future a scientifically substantiated ideal of soldier free of the shortcomings found in today's soldiers. For example, the war in Iraq once again revealed a "too strong susceptibility" of the soldiers to casualties, their wish to get back home after the end of combat operations, evading the functions of a force of occupiers, a lack of readiness to take part in transforming the life of "a liberated country." But we should stress that the main point in developing a new ideal of soldier in the U.S. is not to overcome persisting drawbacks but the future objectives linked to a new security policy and the evolution of the military.

Few people in the West today judge of contract soldiers based on the premise that if you are paid well, awarded, provided with conditions to master your military occupation and study, prepare for life after the military, you should not ask why and for what you fight, you should instead regard war chosen by the government as your own instead of discoursing and doubting. The idea is that the soldier is supposed to understand, share and selflessly uphold the state's policy and ideology.

The development and implementation of the new ideal of soldier involves serious problem related to the process of democratization of society and professionalization of the armed forces.

The armed forces are justly regarded as one of the organizations obliged to simultaneously fill the demands of two sides--society and the military, which are not infrequently opposite. Not only do the above sides change but also does the balance between the two--temporarily during war and on a long-term basis under the impact of fundamental tendencies of social development.

Democratization of society brings about certain objective processes which cannot be reversed, for example, the closer approximation to civilian standards of the status and rights, rules and norms of activities, style and way of life of military people, a greater number of women and civilian personnel in the armed forces, the inclusion of the armed forces and its personnel in market-driven relations--the "monetization" of their contacts with the government. All this "erodes" many principles of the old military culture. Military people are growing more civilian-like, that is to say, they are shedding some of the valuable old qualities, the military-sacrificial principle which forms the basis of the soldier's primary ability--to fight and conquer.

The contradictory impact on the state of morale and aggressiveness, especially the ability to fight and conquer, is being made by the growing professionalization of the armed forces, the replacement of conscripts with contract soldiers and a steep increase in material incentives for the job performance by military personnel as compared to ethical incentives. The Russian and international experience shows that the majority of contract soldiers are primarily motivated by highly paid jobs, prospects of saving money for the future, getting a better education and learning skills needed in civilian life rather than by the lofty idea of civilian duty and readiness to risk their life in the war. Such soldiers take pains to learn military skills, they are disciplined, active in training and rational in military operations, but in situations of mortal risk they may fail in their duty out of their own considerations.

Someone has correctly observed: You serve for money but not die for it, and this tells on the course of combat, especially when casualties begin to mount rapidly. (16) Today, the USA has, for example, a sharp decline in the number of young people who want to serve in the forces and who terminate their contracts early fearing the prospect of ending up in Afghanistan or Iraq, and they do it despite a big raise in pay. We should also keep in mind the experience of mercenary armies of the distant past where money was all-important and discipline in combat, transfer from one army into another, etc. depended on the size of pay.

Recognizing the superiority of professionals over conscripts as regards combat proficiency, the West realistically estimates the challenges professionalism poses to the traditional military spirit, and the weaker points of new "post-traditional military ethics." (17) Revealing in this respect is the greater attention being paid to the families of military personnel as the most important factor contributing to the operational readiness of the armed forces.

Ideally, the soldier should be as mobile as possible, prepared for sudden long-distance redeployment, protracted participation in combat operations, peacekeeping operations and exercises in remote areas and abroad. Unlike conscripts, a considerable number (between 30 percent and 40 percent) of contract soldiers are married. Long separation, the prospect of losing the loved ones and family wellbeing are hard on the soldiers and their families. It is believed that despite all patriotism, contract soldiers constantly face the choice between the duty to the country and responsibility for their families. Therefore, giving every support to the families of soldiers and reduction of casualties among them is emerging as the most important task of the government and command. The effectiveness of solving it has a direct bearing on the soldiers' combat performance.

This is not to say that we in Russia are doing nothing to develop the ideal of future soldier. Our conceptual documents note, among the armed forces development priorities, the need to increase scientific and human potentials which are at the base of the ongoing reform of the systems of social security of members of the military and of their indoctrination and psychological training, etc. They formulate the starting point plainly enough: The main problem of the Armed Forces is people. The documents also provide an insight into some of the "parameters" which ideally should be formulated (up to 2020-2025); developed intellect, consummate professionalism, the ability to effectively conduct combat actions, undaunted courage, patriotism, discipline, devotion to the finest military traditions, psychological stability, among others. There have been positive attempts to formulate the ideal of contract soldier. Of special interest in this regard are the opinions of the commanders of three airborne combined units published in Krasnaia zvezda on Nov. 17, 2004. Account is being taken of the growing part of the RF Armed Forces in protecting national and global security, the international aspect of their activities, their participation in peacekeeping, policing, humanitarian and other operations requiring specialized skills.

At the same time, the formulation of the ideal of modern Russian soldier is hampered by the somewhat fragmentary and too general formulation of the very objective, the fact that many world outlook related, ideological and military-science problems have not been sufficiently studied, as well as the absence of requisite organizational arrangements for this work.

The documents, it is apparent, underestimate the political and ideological aspects of the substance of ideal which are generally gaining in strength, as was shown above. Politicization is especially stressed in the socialist countries. China, for example, believes that it is politicization that is going to give the nation general superiority in military power as it develops along economic and technological lines. These countries see the source of spiritual superiority in the ideas of defending the country, peace and security, the waging of exclusively retaliatory defensive, just wars against aggressors, preserving the integrity and sovereignty of the state and the building of a new society. They attach paramount importance in the indoctrination of the military personnel to "political adequacy," devotion to socialism, Deng Xiaoping's ideas on military matters, immunity to sociopolitical degeneration, developed sense of patriotism and collectivism, aspiration for "revolutionary heroism," commitment to noble morals and discipline, psychological stability, etc. (18)

It is harder to develop such stability in Russian soldiers due to the general economic, sociopolitical, ideological, moral and psychological situation in the country. It should be pointed out that most of those who join the armed forces represent the strata worst hit by liberal reforms, they have a weak civil awareness and there is ideological chaos in their minds and perceptions. Whereas it was a top priority in Soviet times to shape political conscience in soldiers in the course of indoctrination, now the very terms "political consciousness," "ideological conviction" and "political education" have been done away with, and training in state and government has been introduced which pays inadmissible scant attention to studying internal, external and military policy of Russia and other countries. It is no mere chance that there prevail among military people political indifference, aversion to politics, mercenary spirit, etc. In the absence of an ideological and political core, our soldier can quite likely end up weaker than others.

To mold a soldier with the highest fighting spirit there needs to be a neatly developed set of ideological-political, legislative, economic, educational and other measures that would improve not only the economic wellbeing but also the status, morale and generate an inspired attitude to military service. It would be advisable to include in the Constitution the provision that regards the protection of Fatherland among the most important functions of the state, the provisions on the "sacredness" and "honorable nature" of military duty, the responsibility of government bodies for the organization, guidance and indoctrination of the Armed Forces--the provisions that were part of the USSR Constitution and are missing from the one we have today.

The development of the ideal of soldier depends in large measure on solutions to a range of military-ethical and world-outlook problems. This first of all applies to such fundamental notions determining attitudes to military service as Motherland, its protection, patriotism, military duty and so on, which are now being radically reinterpreted, which can be seen in many encyclopedias, including the Military Encyclopedia.

The "motherland" ("fatherland") category in the not too distant past was defined as a political, social and cultural environment where a people lives and works; a country where a person was born and whose citizen he is, a historically established territory, that is to say, this category reflected solely the objective aspect of the person's bond with the country. A special stress was laid on importance of the progressive nature of its social and political system. (19) Now this notion comes to also include the individual's attitude to the country where he was born and where he lives, his personal sense of it as such. Motherland is the country, "the belonging to which they (citizens) perceive as the necessary condition of their wellbeing." (20) This is true in certain measure. The underestimation of this aspect in the USSR's home policy in the 1970s and 1980s finally sparked disaffection around the country, caused the people to increasingly regard it "not as the true fatherland," and later, after the predatory privatization and a succession of varied unplanned and hard to understand "perestroikas" and "reforms" people grew indifferent to its future en masse.

At the same time, playing up the subjective aspect leads to a mercenary approach to Motherland, to seeing it as a land (country) where living for the individual is good today and which he or she will supposedly selflessly defend so as not to lose the good things they are provided with. (21) I think there is more truth in the following idea: "A patriot does not spare his life defending their land, even if at the given moment injustice prevails in it. This was so on the ice of Lake Peipus, in Moscow in 1612, at Borodino in 1812 and near Moscow in 1941. This will be so in the future." (22)

Although the historical parallels in the latter formula are precarious, the subjective approach to motherland in it is rightly regarded more complex than a mere reaction to wellbeing or the absence thereof. A genuine soldier ranks freedom and independence of his country above the other exceptionally important transient factors. Indeed, as long as the country exists and is protected, the possibility is there to eliminate instances of injustice, otherwise welfare of the nation will vanish together with the country. Therefore, profoundly mistaken and dangerous is an approach according to which the modern Russian soldier has nothing to defend because all of the country's main resources belong to the oligarchs.

It would be at the same time wrong and extremely precarious to ignore the fact that the Russian soldier's attitude to military service has come to directly depend on his economic conditions. The time of mass enthusiasm primarily on an ideological basis is past. People have become extremely calculating, and the system of government encourages this in every way. Experience shows, and scholars confirm: Patriotism is not inherited genetically, or almost objectively, as was believed until recently. It results from a complex process of socialization, (23) including education and self-education. The lack of patriotism in those who are in power, their cosmopolitanism can play a fatal part by promoting general mercantilism and indifference to Motherland.

What should be ideally the world outlook of the Russian soldier? It is infrequently believed that a religious outlook (24) is an option preferable to the Soviet view of the world, because it supposedly best conforms to military service, the most hazardous type of activities. Religious education is often regarded as almost as mandatory and is now being actually offered to all members of the military. (25)

The military, as an element of our secular society, cannot be religious. It is important to take into account the fact that about 50 percent of soldiers are non-believers, and nearly half of them are atheists. They, too, have the right to their own world outlook. The policy to install religion in the armed forces as a cure for all their ills sometimes advocated officially would contradict the general tendency of strengthening secular moral and intellectual values in modern societies. Faith is a private affair of soldiers, and the duty of the military is to safeguard their right to religious practices, consolidate the unity of believers and non-believers to benefit the common cause. Imbalances in intellectual and ethical development, underestimating or the absolutizing of both national religious and secular cultures are as perilous as in the material sphere.

Today it is hard to forecast an evolution in the sociopolitical, world-outlook and ethical makeup of our soldier because they depend on the country's social and political system, policy and ideology. Although markedly stable, the qualitative changes in the Armed Forces' social foundation have not eliminated the uncertainty of long-range expectations.

Whether the country's remaking will increasingly follow the Western model, or it will follow its own national distinctive road, whether it will build a socially just and united society or a pro-capitalist liberal society, what sort of internal and external policy will the country adhere to--all these things are not clear enough and make us consider various options of the spiritual aspect of ideal armed forces and their soldier.

New secular and religious ideals of Russian soldier formulated by private individuals have been in evidence today--liberal-democratic national-conservative, clerical-orthodox, pro-Western and of some other kinds. Let us take the ideal of soldier put forward and substantiated in detail by the well-known geopolitician A. Dugin. He suggests that we go back to the "full-value approach to soldier" formulated in the distant past. According to this approach, soldiers should be a distinctive caste formed of specially selected individuals who are "soldiers to the marrow" militarily inclined from birth (genetically), who perceive the eternal principles of military culture and ethics as their own. The main characteristic of the soldier should be an aggressive male expansion. He should be notable for exceptional will, passionate energy, determination, selflessness; love for running risks; preferring honors, fame and things spiritual to things material, to personal wellbeing, comforts, quiet living and so on. In battle, he is a "formidable deity," terrible and deadly to the enemies.

A soldier, according to this approach, is a political creature, professionally and daily operating with large-scale geopolitical and social realities, having a deep understanding of politics which is even superior to that of politicians.

Hence his natural expansion into politics, the social sphere, the state's ideology, the area of decision making and planning, as well as his right to correcting the top authorities when they retreat from national interests, observance of territorial integrity and geopolitical situation of the country. He is the most consistent patriot, guardian of the state and the nation, society, the security system, he has no right to tolerate despotism and degeneration at the top if these things should take place. For the revival of genuine soldiers, it is necessary to scout for and foster "new military people who are free from the senile hypnosis of 'generals in slippers' and they should be instructed by 'a semiclosed military society in the nature of an order.'" The fostering of new soldiers--daring and aggressive, intelligent and independent, capable of standing their ground, fearlessly telling off destructive elements whoever they are--is of utmost importance for strengthening the military. (26)

This ideal includes some of the most important qualities that should be present in the soldier of the future, but most of these ideals appear in threadbare clothes of the distant past. They take no account of the changes in social development and the military which, thanks to the advances in science and technology, is now one of the most complex types of activities that requires a developed intellect.

The social basis underlying the development of an ideal and the molding of soldier is the quality of "human material" society provides the military with. The body of persons subject to military conscription during the last 10-15 years is anything but disturbing. The prime reason is a general decline in the quality of life of most people around the country. For example, according to the human development index (which takes into account health, education and per capita real income of the population) accepted by the United Nations, Russia has sunk from the 26th to the 63rd position in the world; about 40 percent of its people live on the poverty line. (27) Although 60 percent to 75 percent of our armed forces' woes of recent times are attributed to the low quality of the human factor, (28) the task of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces, and first of all for the officer corps--the leading component of the armed forces--by selecting the best representatives of Russian society, has not even been set. Since the military is equipped with systems of highly sophisticated and powerful operational and strategic weapons, this condition poses a real threat to national security, causes daily direct economic losses (from bad accidents, ineffective use and wrecking the equipment and so on).

In the meantime, as weapons and military equipment are growing increasingly sophisticated and war is turning into a more and more complex, intellectual and dynamic process, there is a need for a substantially higher level of training, intellect, technical culture, occupational training of soldiers and a much greater application of their energies and capabilities. As for handling advanced military technology and weapons, this can only be trusted to soldiers with appropriate training--at least secondary technical training--and soldiers able to quickly add to their knowledge, improve their proficiency and ability to convert to new jobs.

To sum up, the molding of a new ideal of Russian soldier is an important task of military ideologists, scientists and practitioners. This is an uphill task, but only this can produce a warfighter who wins battles, a real rather than virtual protector of Motherland and of Russia's interests around the world.

There are a number of problems to be solved to speed up the development of the ideal of Russian soldier of the future. As for the Ministry of Defense, this effort should be spearheaded by one of the defense minister's deputies. It is advisable to set up within the Ministry of Defense a special agency to work closely on the above problem. It should first of all consist in summing up the international and Russian experience in the field, developing methods, methodology and techniques. It is important to hold regular constructive discussions and conferences and publish methodological materials, to add this problem on the list of the most important areas of research and involve in the effort a broad range of war veterans, etc.

NOTES:

1. V.N. Dahl, Tolkovyy slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo yazyka, Vol. 2, Russkiy yazyk Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p. 8.

2. Sotsiologicheskaya entsiklopediya, in 2 volumes, Vol. 1, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2003, pp. 333-334.

3. K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, 2nd edition, Vol. 23, p. 189.

4. E. Carter, W. Perry, Preventivnaya oborona. Novaya strategiya bezopasnosti SShA. Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2003, pp. 199-216; Natsional'naya oborona Kitaya v 2002 g., Beijing, 2002, pp. 8-9.

5. Krasnaya zvezda, Feb. 11, 2005.

6. A. Dugin, Filosofiya voyny, Moscow, 2004, pp. 121, 136, 137 ff.

7. Plato, "Politika ili gosudarstvo," in: Works, Part 3, St. Petersburg, 1863, p. 201.

8. Xenophon, The Cyropaedia, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1997 (in Russian); Ye. Razin, Istoriya voennogo iskusstva, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1955, p. 194 ff.

9. Schahermayr, Aleksandr Makedonskiy, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1984, pp. 46-99.

10. Nauka pobezhdat'. Vek XVIII, Molodaya gvardiya Publishers, Moscow, 1984, pp. 562-565.

11. Ibid., p. 494.

12. Wesley K. Clark, Kak pobedit' v sovremennoy voyne, Moscow, 2004, pp. 196-200.

13. Ibid., p. 232.

14. E. Carter, W. Perry, op. cit., pp. 200-203.

15. P. Colin, Na puti k amerikanskoi mechte, Mir Publishers, Moscow, 2002, p. 494.

16. N. Yefimov, "Globalizatsiya: voennyy aspect," Svobodnaia mysl', No. 7, 2004.

17. Voennye i obshchestvo v zapadnoy i vostochnoy Evrope. Sravnitelnoye issledovaniye, Nauchnaya kniga Publishers, Moscow, 2000, pp. 9-97.

18. Natsionalnaya oborona Kitaya v 2002 godu, Press-kantselyariya Gossoveta KNR, Beijing, 2002, pp. 25, 28.

19. Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediya, Vol. 6, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 159.

20. Voennaia entsiklopediya, Vol. 6, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 2002, p. 186.

21. A. Shchelokov, "Rodina-mat' ili machekha," Nezavisimoe voennoe obozreniye, No. 47 (402), 2004, p. 4.

22. O. Fomichev, "Yadernyi shchit nashey nezavisimosti," Krasnaya zvezda, Jan. 12, 2005.

23. Voennaia entsiklopediya, Vol. 6, p. 186.

24. Voennaia mysl', No. 4, 2004, p. 72; Krasnaya zvezda, Nov. 25 and Dec. 24, 2003, etc.

25. Voennaia mysl', No. 1, 2005, p. 39; No. 2, 2005, pp. 37-48, ff.

26. A. Dugin, Filosofiya voyny, Moscow, 2004, pp. 126-143.

27. Bezopasnost Evrazii, No. 1 (15), 2004, p. 19.

28. Krasnaia zvezda, Apr. 30, 2005.

Lt. Gen. of Aviation V.V. SEREBRYANNIKOV (Ret.)

Doctor of Philosophy