The defense industry and its contribution to victory.

The Great Victory in that bloody war could not have come had the army and navy not had powerful and effective weaponry, and in sufficient amounts. It was a practical test of the effectiveness of State decisions in the running the country's economy as a whole and its defense industrial complex as its principal component in particular. The credit for this should go, above all, to the defense sectors of industry. The present article is concerned with the general analysis of the evolution and development of the defense industrial complex during the prewar years, the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, and in the postwar period.

The Beginnings of Victory

"We are 50 to 100 years behind the advanced capitalist countries. We have to cover this distance within a space of a decade. Either we do it or we will be crushed." This was how J. Stalin formulated the country's economic development strategy in 1931.

This assessment was not at all an exaggeration. As is known, before the (1917) Revolution, Russia was very far behind the advanced states in the production of arms and ammunition. This is why the period between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when Russia, in W. Churchill's expression, emerged from a "bast shoe" country into an industrial power, is one of the most significant stages in modern history. Experience shows that, in so doing, the country chose the most rational course of industrialization--i.e., via the advancement of the defense industry, especially since the military threats at the time required its rapid development. As a result, the demand for advanced military technology expedited the development of defense production. At that time, the defense industry became a real "engine" not only for industry but also for the country's economy as a whole.

The circumstance in which the defense industry was built and developed left their imprint on all the events of the country's pre-war history, especially since the defense sector gradually emerged as a vast branch of industry that, according to some estimates, accounted for 9 percent to 10 percent of GDP in the late 1920s-early 1930s and up to 30 percent by the late 1930s.

For their part, the high economic growth rates made it possible to put forward increasingly complex and challenging tasks whose fulfillment stimulated the further development of the defense sectors of industry. That helped put in place an effective mechanism for the reproduction of not only advanced technology but also of scientific, design, and engineering cadres.

The war was preceded by the Third Five-Year Plan period (1938 through 1942) that was built on the successfully fulfilled previous plans. This period saw a rapid creation of new research centers and design bureaus with 2,900 new plants, factories, electric power stations, mines, ore fields, and other industrial installations put into operation, including such industry giants as the Novosibirsk V.P. Chkalov Aviation Production Association (at that time known as Plant #153), Uralmash, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, etc. At the same time, the vast Siberian expanses were being developed intensively; three-quarters of all new blast furnaces were built in the east of the country; metallurgical plants were built in the Trans-Baykal and Ural region and on the Amur; major non-ferrous metallurgic enterprises in Central Asia; heavy industry plants in the Far East, as well as motor assembly and tube rolling enterprises and hydro electric power stations. All of that was geared directly toward the defense industry.

As a result of the amalgamation of existing plants and the building of new ones, the defense industry became a major economic sector. Whereas annual production growth in industry as a whole was on average 13 percent, in the defense sectors of industry it was 39 percent. The most dynamic and intensively developing sectors in the prewar period was the aviation industry, whose aggregate output accounted for more than 40 percent of the gross defense industry product.

Not surprisingly, intensive development of the defense sectors of industry required the establishment of special administration and management agencies. Under the December 4, 1925 resolution of the VSNKh (#164), the Military-Industrial Directorate and the Military Industry Production Association (Voyenprom) were created on the basis of industrial mobilization and demobilization and military procurement committees, designed to exercise general supervision of the military industry. Then, in the mid-1930s, the People's Commissariat for the Defense Industry was established which was subsequently, under the January 11, 1939 decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, divided up into five separate commissariats. Furthermore, the People's Commissariat for the Machine Building Industry spun off the People's Commissariat for Medium Machine Building supervising all tank building enterprises.

Thus, after a series of reorganizations, the Soviet military industry entered the Great Patriotic War with branch commissariats whose enterprises, in the prewar period, created many new weapons for the future victory.

It is also important to note that the development of industry as a whole and of its defense segment in particular was to a very large extent predicated on the advancement of scientific research, the effective organization of R & D programs, and the practical application of scientific achievements. The nationwide science administration and management centers at that time were concentrated at the USSR Academy of Sciences, the All-Union Committee for Higher School under the USSR Council of People's Commissars, branch commissariats, the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan), and the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Education (Narkompros). The state highly valued the work done by scientists and designers who created weapon systems that became legendary during the war: Under the January 2 and October 28, 1940 edicts by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, defense industry workers V.A. Degtyarev, F.V. Tokarev, V.G. Shpitalnyy, I.I. Ivanov, M. Ya. Krupchatnikov, and V.G. Grabin were awarded the titles of Hero of Socialist Labor.

The intensive development of the defense industry made it possible to raise new contingents of the Armed Forces, whose numerical strength in the 1939-1941 period grew 2.8 times. Thus, 125 new divisions were formed.

The picture of the measures implemented in the interest of enhancing the Soviet military might shortly before the war would be incomplete without taking into account the fact that defense industry development and production targets at the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) were set by special military control agencies responsible for arms development. Their role steadily increased at all stages of Russian history, especially amid an aggravation in the military-political situation and the intensive development of the domestic defense industrial complex. On November 28, 1929, the USSR Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) issued Order #372/84, establishing the Statute on the Office of the Chief of Armaments. As of that moment, measures concerning the development of arms and military equipment in the Soviet Army and Navy acquired a systemic, comprehensive character. As for the role of administration and control in the prewar period, it is important to note its systemic character since the intensive development of science and technology precipitated the creation of a large number of new models and types of weapons and military equipment, the best of which were to be chosen for series production. A good case in point is the development of aviation. Thus, in 1940 alone, more than 10 prototype fighters were built and tested, only three of those being deemed the most successful--the I-26, the I-200, and the I-301 which laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of fighter aviation. In the course of testing, they were improved and then renamed Yak-1, LaGG-3, and MiG-3, and put into series production at several plants simultaneously, even without the final adjustment and fine tuning.

It is noteworthy that the newly created weapon systems were often tested in real combat operations--e.g., in Spain and during the Finnish campaign, where the most advanced weapon models were used. At the same time, there was effective feedback, allowing for an expeditious improvement and modernization of those models.

Summing up the development of the defense sectors of industry in the prewar years, it is essential to note the following. First, new models of weapon systems, which subsequently became the glory of Soviet arms during the Great Patriotic War, were not accepted for service with the Red Army until the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, while their creation was the result of a consistent build-up of the country's scientific and technical and production and technological capabilities. Second, prewar experience showed that even with clear-cut guidelines for the development of basic weapon systems in other countries, new-generation weapons can only be created in an evolutionary way--i.e., by consistently accumulating the needed design and production experience. Third, intensification of the process of creating new generations of arms and military equipment and their rapid replacement in the troops also had a negative side, specifically the fact that there was not enough time for effective tactics to evolve for their operational employment. Fourth, the extremely well coordinated and synchronized efforts by arms procurement and contracting agencies, people's commissariats and main administrations, design bureaus and production plants as well as initiative and search for unconventional solutions in developing new models of weapons predetermined the intensive development of arms and military equipment with a new constellation of brilliant designers emerging whose names are still borne by modern weapon systems today.

The Defense Industry during the War Years

Above all it is necessary to note that despite the tragic situation that had evolved during the initial period of the war, the system of State administration and control preserved its viability. That was a key to the future victory in so far as it ensured an effective coordination of all aspects of the country's life in the interest of turning it into a single military camp.

The war encompassed all spheres of State activity, while its conduct required tremendous outlays. Thus, whereas in the 19th century, 8 percent to 14 percent of national income was spent on military needs during war years, in World War I this share increased to 50 percent, and during World War II, up to 60 percent. The level of militarization in the Soviet Union can be gleaned from, among other things, the fact that in the 1940-1942 period, the share of industrial output allotted to military needs grew from 26 percent to 68 percent; the share of agricultural output, from 9 percent to 24 percent, while the share of transport used for defense purposes grew from 16 percent to 61 percent.

What is especially important is that the country began to be put on a war footing already a week after the outbreak of the war. On June 29, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars issued a directive presenting a program of action in the conditions of war. At the same time, an extraordinary and plenipotentiary agency was formed in the USSR--the State Defense Committee (GKO). It decided on all political and economic matters and was vested with the fullest possible powers. The GKO was headed up by J. Stalin who, in his radio address on July 3, called on the people to resist the Nazi aggression. In his speech, the slogan "Everything for the front, everything for the victory" was first formulated. This slogan became a constant motto for all those working in the hinterland, in the defense sectors of industry.

In July 1941, the Supreme High Command (VGK) was established, which decided on all war matters, including the administration of the defense industry. Meanwhile, the defense industry administration and management system did not undergo any substantial structural or cadre changes, which enabled it quickly to adapt to the changing conditions of military production and at the same time both to organize and increase the production of arms and military equipment and to evacuate major enterprises.

Due to the loss of substantial tracts of territory, where a considerable part of industrial and agricultural output was produced, the national economy ended up in an extremely difficult situation. Until the end of 1941 industrial output continued to decline with the volume of gross industrial output shrinking 1.9 times from June through December. Industrial enterprises in the country's western parts were either seized by the enemy or were in the process of being evacuated to the east or were dumped on an empty field in the new areas to which they were moved, while it was necessary to provide the fronts with all the necessary weapons and equipment within the shortest possible time.

Thanks to excellent organization and the heroic labor of ordinary Soviet people, already by late 1942, the military industrial capacities that had been lost were not only restored but in effect surpassed their pre-war levels. Thus, 20 new electric furnaces and nine rolling mills were put into operation in the eastern parts of the country with the Chelyabinsk and the Kirovo-Chepetsk heat and electric power stations and the Karaganda state regional electric power station brought on line. Military output was growing at an especially right rate: Compared to 1940, it increased by more than five times in the Ural region, nine times in the Volga region, and 27 times in Western Siberia. The demand for arms and military equipment was quite substantial. The Red Army was losing approximately 9 percent of guns a month, while the aircraft and tank fleet had to be replaced every five months. And that need was effectively being met.

In the course of the war, scientific and research activity also intensified with a special thrust being placed on the fulfillment of specific tasks related to the creation of new weapon systems. The specifics of R & D organization during the Great Patriotic War were manifested in two mutually complementary trends. The first was the strengthening of centralized administration of scientific activity and the second was a certain measure of independence of R & D administration. The centralized R & D planning system provided effective leverage for putting scientific research activity on a war footing, subordinating it to the needs of the military and the wartime economy.

It is noteworthy that even in the most difficult war years, scientific and research teams were working hard to lay the groundwork for the future. The work continued to create jet engines, a lot of effort was being deployed in the sphere of nuclear energy, and so forth, which, immediately after the war, gave a head start to the State's technological development.

The achievements made by Soviet scientists were used not only in industry but also in exercising military command and control. Thus, in planning supplies, in preparing and conducting the Battle of Stalingrad, the target specific programming methodology with linear programming was used (L. V. Kantorovich subsequently won the Nobel Prize for that project).

An invaluable contribution to the development of Soviet arms and ammunition was made by the fundamental works and practical activity by Soviet scientists: e.g., A.A. Blagonravov, E.A. Berkalov, D.A. Ventsel, I.P. Grave, N.F. Drozdov, Ya.B. Zeldovich, E.O. Paton, M.E. Serebryakov, K.K. Snitko, Yu.B. Khariton, S.A. Khristianovich, and others.

During the four years of the war, the Soviet defense industry produced a total of 19.75 million small arms and light weapons, 490,000 guns of all calibers, 136,000 aircraft, 102,500 tanks, and more than 8 million tonnes of ammunition, which enabled it to surpass the enemy in arms and military equipment.

At the same time, the war economy showed a very high efficacy. Within the space of just three years--from May 1942 through until May 1945--labor productivity in industry as a whole increased by 43 percent and 2.2 times in the defense sectors of industry--to a very large extent due to the introduction of new technologies and a better labor organization. Thanks to the efforts by workers in the defense sectors of industry the provision of arms and military equipment to the troops increased markedly: Whereas in the operations of 1942 and 1943 there were an average of 180 to 200 guns and mortars, 14 to 17 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 13 to 20 aircraft per rifle division, in 1944 there were 200 to 245, 14 to 35, and 22 to 46, respectively. At the same time, as labor productivity increased, arms production costs were reduced: In 1944, production costs of all types of military products were on average halved, as compared to 1940.

Thus, the Great Victory was achieved very much due to the high capacity and viability of the defense industry, while a brief analysis of its performance during this period points to a number of conclusions that are important for modern science and practice. First, a decisive role in the effective operation of the defense industry during the war period was played by the viability of the State and military command and control system: the ability of the organizational structures themselves to exercise effective command and control as well as their flexibility in an extremely difficult situation; the creation of new emergency command and control agencies (the State Defense Committee, the Supreme High Command, etc.) did not result in the dismantling or breakdown of the existing defense industry administration and management system or the replacement of industry leaders, but only enhanced its performance. Second, the country's mobilization preparation was carried out in a timely and well thought through manner, which manifested itself not only in the elaboration of corresponding plans but also in the implementation of specific measures to create State reserves and move industrial enterprises to the eastern parts of the country, thus preventing a sharp decline in the degree of technical equipment in the Red Army amid the huge losses of arms and military equipment during the initial period of the war. Third, the defense industry manifested its principal quality--its systemic nature, when each cell of the system (in this case a defense enterprise) oftentimes operated independently but with a clear understanding of the ultimate goal. Fourth, the defense industry's ability to flexibly respond to the actual demands of the troops as well as to the shortfalls identified in the course of the operation and combat employment of arms and military equipment, which made it possible to promptly modernize and upgrade the basic weapon models, adapting them to combat conditions to the maximum degree possible. Fifth, the continual scientific activity provided the design bureaus and industrial enterprises with constant theoretical support and R & D innovations; science was brought maximally close to production, practice, and the evaluation and analysis of the experience in the practical employment of arms and military equipment. Sixth, during the war, the evolutionary development of the majority of weapon models was effectively completed since as a result of their intensive modernization, virtually the entire contemporary design and technological capability was tapped to the full. Seventh, the constant build-up of the scientific and technological basis not only in fields directly related to the creation of weapon systems but also in other fields (medicine, biology, quantum physics, etc.) enabled the Soviet Union, even amid a prolonged war, to keep pace with scientific-technical progress.

Development of the Defense Industry in the Postwar Period

The victory over Nazism was not only a military but also an economic victory since already in 1948-1949, the country managed to achieve prewar volumes of industrial output.

As soon as the devastating war became history, the State Planning Committee, within a very short time span, prepared a five year plan for the reconstruction and development of the Soviet national economy, which assigned an important role to the defense industry as part of nationwide conversion programs.

Even so, the work on creating new weapon models never stopped, despite the ongoing conversion of the defense production.

During the postwar five year plan periods--1946 through 1950 and 1951 through 1955--the thrust was once again placed on the development of heavy industry and the production of basically new types of weapon systems, which was necessitated by the aggravating foreign political situation, above all the United States' acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Whereas before the Great Patriotic War, the intensive development of the Soviet defense industry failed to impress Nazi Germany or to deter its aggressive designs and ambitions, in the 1950s the Soviet Union's steadily growing military might could not be ignored. This to a very large degree averted the mounting threat of a possible aggression against the country at the time.

The postwar development of arms and military equipment was greatly influenced by the work that had been accomplished during the prewar years as well as during the Great Patriotic War. This refers above all to the progress that was made in nuclear engineering and jet engine building. These two areas were a key to the evolution not only of means but also forms and methods of warfare. Nuclear engineering made it possible, already in 1949, to test the first Soviet nuclear bomb and in 1953, the world's first thermonuclear device. Civil nuclear engineering was also developing intensively: In 1954, the world's first nuclear power station was put into operation in the town of Obninsk. The development of jet engine building technology brought about jet aviation but most importantly the creation of ballistic missiles.

The synergetic effect of the development of these two fields brought about the creation of nuclear missiles--weapons that to date remain the main deterrence against possible aggression. Intensive development of nuclear missiles, jet aviation, nuclear submarines, space systems, and other types of weapons facilitated the advance of associated branches of science and technology, which on the whole ensured the steady technological development of our industry and the country as a whole.

It was thanks to its defense industry that the Soviet Union became the world's first country to launch an earth orbiting satellite (sputnik), opening an era of manned space flights, setting a large number of world records in aviation, and making other achievements that became the glory of our Motherland.

As far as organizational aspects are concerned, it is important to note that the weapons development administration system was becoming increasingly effective. Further modernization of arms and military equipment, their growing complexity and production costs, and the development of multi-target weapon systems necessitated the use of project- and target-specific planning methods. Resolution #433-157 by the USSR Council of Ministers (June 10, 1969), On Further Improvement of Planning the Development of Arms and Military Equipment, envisioned the transition from planning AME development by specific types to integrated long-term plans and 10-years armament programs, including AME development, delivery and servicing, as well as capital construction of military installations based on the optimal adjustment of the needs of the Armed Forces to the amount of funds provided for these purposes.

As of that moment, the development of the defense industrial complex was firmly linked with the organization and development of the Armed Forces. Defense industry enterprises were set long-term, increasingly complex, often challenging tasks. As these tasks were implemented, the scientific-technical and production-technological capabilities were steadily growing since defense production was far ahead of other sectors of industry. The application of this approach was facilitated by the large volume of defense contracts, necessitated by the need to fulfill a broad range of military-strategic tasks and objectives as well as a substantial level of AME export to many countries in the world. As a result, the considerable resource outlays were recouped many times over by the scientific and technical achievements, many of which were widely applied in the civilian sectors of industry. This is why the defense industry was, and still to a very large extent is, the most high-tech sector of the Russian national economy.

Today there is no need to dwell on the contemporary problems of the defense industry: They are very well known. It should only be noted that it is in a certain way at the crossroads, while the experience of its evolution and development during the Great Patriotic War could still help us to restore the country's former military might, especially given that the present conditions substantially change the character of warfare that consists essentially in an all-round use of scientific and technological achievements in various spheres, which blurs the boundary between the civilian and military spheres of the economy. In other words, the connection between scientific and technological progress and the military sphere is becoming increasingly close and multidimensional (see Figure).

The Figure shows the principal landmarks in the evolution and development of the defense industrial complex as a result of scientific-technical achievements in the intellectual and production sphere, in science, organization, and so forth. This includes the practical realization in AME technology of the fundamental laws of the so called classical physics and chemistry; translation into reality of the achievements of nuclear physics and new construction materials; the broad introduction in AME systems of micro-electric technology and high capacity computerized systems; rapid development of information technology, miniaturization, robotization, artificial intelligence, and other high technologies. The forms and methods of warfare are evolving accordingly.

At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that said evolution, which was absolutely objective, occurred amid the need to deal with complex international problems and domestic tasks. These include: in the 1920s, the need to preserve the remaining industry; in the 1930s, the imminent military threat; in the 1940s, the fast flowing military situation; in the 1950s, the danger of getting hopelessly behind other countries in the development of advanced weapon systems; in the 1960s through the 1980s, the arms race; in the 1990s, the consequences of the drastic changes that had occurred in the country. None of that allowed the country to work out, without undue rush, a strategy for the development of the defense industry from systemic positions, ensuring its economic viability and balanced development.

Summing up the aforementioned, the following needs to be noted.

* First, in the course of its evolution and development, the defense industrial complex went through several stages of centralization and decentralization, at all times demonstrating the ability to function under different administration and command and control conditions and to ensure the fulfillment of a broad range of constantly changing tasks.

* Second, the evolution of the defense industrial complex was accompanied by the development of arms procurement agencies which always served as a viable link between the Armed Forces and the defense industry. Today, following the defense industry's transition to a free market economy, the AME contracting system is also being transferred to a new economic footing with economic management methods being increasingly used.

* Third, having been on the cutting edge of scientific and technical progress throughout the 20th century, the defense industrial complex ensured the reproduction of advanced technologies that were applied not only in the military but also in the civilian sectors of industry. Because the defense industrial complex is to date the most high-tech sector of Russia's industry, it can still be the engine of Russia's new-look economy in the 21st century.

Army Gen. A.M. MOSKOVSKIY

Weapons Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Deputy Defense Minister of the Russian Federation

The Evolution and Development of Arms in the 20th Century

1940s            1950s-1960s       1970s-1980s         since the 1980s

Evolution of Forms and Methods of Warfare
Increases in     Creation of new   Expansion of the    Emergence of
the firepower    branches of       sphere of warfare,  new forms of
and              service,          including space;    warfare
maneuverability  capability for    integrated use of   (information
of large         intercontinental  weapons             warfare)
combined         military
formations and   operations
units

Development of Arms and Military Equipment (AME)
Modernization    Emergence of      Emergence of AME    Development of
of first-        nuclear missile   systems of          precision guided
generation       weapons,          national            weapons, intell-
weaponry         creation of       importance (air     ectualization
                 second-           defense, missile    of weaponry,
                 generation AME    and space defense,  creation of
                                   etc.), creation of  generation fourth
                                   third generation    AME
                                   AME

Dynamics of Scientific and Technological Progress
Practical        Practical         Practical           Development of
application of   application of    application of the  information
fundamental      the achievements  achievements of     technologies,
laws of physics  of nuclear        microelectronics,   microminiatur-
and chemistry    physics,          the emergence of    ization,
in AME           creation of new   high capacity       robotization,
production       construction      computer systems    etc.
technology       materials