The day the planes "all fell into the sea": Darwin Raid 54-2 May 1943.

Any mention of Spitfires at Darwin usually brings the sort of stupid response, "Oh yes, didn't they get the hell beaten out of them by the Japs" or "they all fell into the sea out of petrol or something." (1) This is about the measure of appreciation of the efforts of some [95] young pilots, very few of them really experienced as hardened fighter pilots, a few with a little experience of fighter operations and the others totally unblooded, who were sent to defend the North-western Area of Australia against a fanatical and well-equipped enemy. (2)

Clive Caldwell, Wing Leader and later commander of 1 Fighter Wing, wrote these words in 1994, shortly before his death. 60 years on, he was still disappointed that the efforts of 1 Fighter Wing in the North-western Area were largely unappreciated, and that the events of one day in particular were so sadly misrepresented. The 54th Japanese Raid over mainland Australia resulted in the deaths of two pilots and one pilot who remained missing for fifteen days; 14 Spitfires lost or damaged; misleading communiques from MacArthur's headquarters; dismay for the Australian public; an official report; and a change in fighter techniques. Raid 54 was, in the words of the Official Historian, "eventful". (3) This was the day the planes "all fell into the sea".

In this article, I will look at the reasons behind 1 Fighter Wing's failure to mount an effective defence against the Japanese during Raid 54. I will also look at the raid's aftermath.

Early in 1943, 1 Fighter Wing, comprising 54 Squadron RAF and 452 and 457 Squadrons RAAF, moved to Darwin to take over the defence of the area from 76 and 77 Squadrons RAAF, which had in turn taken over from the USAAF 49th Fighter Group. Although there had been some Japanese reconnaissance flights, there had only been two raids since the Wing arrived, with the last occurring six weeks previously on 15 March 1943.

Sunday 2 May dawned clear and bright, with only a breath of wind. Early that morning, a formation of Japanese bombers and their escorting fighters took off from Penfui airfield, near Koepang in Dutch Timor. They were led by Lieutenant-Commander Suzuki Minoru and their objective was to bomb Darwin airfield.

38 Radar Station on Bathurst Island recorded the first plots of enemy aircraft at 9.26 am, and almost immediately alerted 5 Fighter Sector Control. As those first plots were very weak, it was initially though that a single, or very few aircraft, were on their way. The plots soon became clearer and it was realised that a heavy formation was approaching. The Wing was ordered to scramble. Thirtythree Spitfires took off: ten from 54 Squadron; 11 from 457 Squadron; and 12 from 452 Squadron. The whole Wing was ordered to rendezvous at 10,000 feet above Hughes airfield, and rendezvous was effected after about 20 minutes. Wing Commander Caldwell was Wing Leader.

After rendezvous, the Controller advised Caldwell that a formation of 20-plus bombers, escorted by a large number of fighters, was approaching from WNW at approximately 20,000 feet, and confirmed that the target was Darwin. The Wing then turned starboard and climbed rapidly into the sun towards Darwin. When the Wing had attained a height of 22,000 feet, the Controller informed Caldwell that the enemy bombers were near Point Charles, and were now at about 25,000 feet. The Japanese fighters were above the bombers, but the Controller was unable to determine their height. Caldwell turned the Wing to port and continued to climb rapidly with the sun to starboard, with Darwin below on the port beam. When the Wing was about ten miles NE of Darwin, at 26,000 feet, the enemy bomber formation was sighted passing West Point at ten o'clock to the Wing and above. Caldwell gave the "tally-ho". The bombers crossed the harbour and Caldwell saw the escorting fighters above the bombers. The Wing had attained 27,000 feet by this stage, but was still not in a position to attack advantageously. Caldwell advised the Controller of this. He then decided to continue climbing for height, letting the bombers continue on their way. He would then attack them on their way out.

Whilst the Spitfires continued their climb into the sun, the anti-aircraft defences commenced firing. The first rounds were fired at 10.12 and the gun crews were stood down at 10.21, with no hits. The bombers were above the RAAF aerodrome at Darwin when they commenced bombing at 10.15. The Japanese fighter escort was at 31,000 feet, and the bombers were at 26,000 feet. The Spitfire Wing had attained only 30,000 feet.

The bombers dropped approximately 100 bombs, with not much physical damage resulting. One Army soldier was injured. (4) After bomb release, the Japanese turned right. The Spitfire Wing levelled out at 32,500 feet. It had now attained its maximum advantage and turned west, moving to intercept the enemy as they crossed the coast on their way out. The Wing was in a sound formation, with squadrons sections abreast, and the Wing in squadrons abreast. But then, 54 Squadron lost position and dropped astern. As the enemy crossed the coast just east of Point Blaze, 452 and 457 squadrons were in an excellent position to attack. Despite being ordered to by Caldwell, 54 did not close the gap, was some considerable distance behind, and still not in a position to be in the co-ordinated attack that Caldwell had planned. Eight minutes elapsed before 54 Squadron came into position. Once this happened, the attack commenced. 54 Squadron was instructed to attack the fighter cover, 457 was to attack the bombers, and 452 were to follow 457, keeping their tails clear during their attack on the Japanese bombers, engaging as many fighters as possible, and also coveting 457's withdrawal back up on the sunward side.

The battle was fought keenly by the Spitfire pilots and the engagement lasted twenty minutes. From a Japanese perspective, the raid was a success. The Japanese claimed twenty-one shot down and four probables. No losses were acknowledged. The fighters were successful in protecting the bombers, and the bombers reached their target. Although major damage was not done, nuisance value was certainly created. In his "Appreciation of Factors Governing Results", Caldwell, giving credit where it was due, stated that:

   The enemy fighters ... did an excellent escort job and were well
   and determinedly flown, supporting each other in a manner generally
   suggestive of experienced and practiced pilots used to working
   together. Their deflection shooting was good on the average.

From the Wing's perspective, the engagement was not a success. Caldwell considered that his plan was initiated successfully, but, despite the Wing's advantage of sun, height and speed, results were not up to expectations. 54 Squadron engaged only nine enemy fighters, four of 457's aircraft did not penetrate to the bombers, and although 452 engaged, they were fiercely engaged by the Japanese fighters. Some 452 pilots, however, did penetrate to the bombers. Ultimately, and despite Japanese records to the contrary, the Wing claimed one bomber destroyed and one damaged. Five fighters were claimed destroyed and eleven fighters were claimed as probables and damaged. To counter this, fourteen Spitfires were destroyed or damaged, and two Spitfire pilots were killed. It should be noted, however, that only three aircraft losses could be directly attributed to enemy action. I will now discuss why the engagement did not prove satisfactory for the Wing.

In his report, Caldwell noted a number of factors which mitigated against the Wing's success. I have already mentioned Caldwell's assessment of the Japanese pilots as a factor, but in addition to this, Caldwell listed armament failure and technical faults; the lack of experience of a number of the pilots; the tactics used; and lack of fuel.

Although thirty-three pilots were scrambled, only twenty-nine engaged. Mechanical problems were apparent almost immediately, with two pilots returning to base shortly after takeoff and two crash-landing before engagement. In addition, a number of pilots experienced mechanical problems that only manifested once the air battle commenced. Two pilots bailed out during the engagement and two pilots were lost at sea after the air battle, cause unknown. Aircraft problems were not the only reasons why the Spitfire Wing was not overly successful that day. Almost from the beginning, problems with Spitfire weaponry were apparent. Of the 29 pilots who engaged, 16 experienced weaponry problems of some description.

In his "Appreciation of the Factors Governing Results", Caldwell noted that of the 95 pilots on strength for the Wing, only 37 had had fighter combat experience prior to coming to the area. Of these, he considered that only half a dozen could be classed as "experienced", and that only three pilots, including himself, had experience against escorted bombers. When the decision was first made to bring the Spitfire squadrons to Australia from England, they were hailed as being experienced. 54 Squadron had a long and noble history, and both 457 and 452 Squadrons had flown in offensive operations over France and Belgium. But all was not as it seemed. A large number of 54 Squadron's pilots had been posted before the squadron came to Australia. 452 Squadron had been "resting" on the Isle of Man since March 1942. Some of its most experienced pilots had been posted and returned to Australia to help form the Australian Kittyhawk squadrons. In June 1942, the three Squadrons boarded the Stirling Castle and arrived in Australia on 13 August, with only six of the promised Spitfires. Whilst the Wing prepared to move north, the pilots spent time becoming familiar with the Spitfires and working together on squadron and wing exercises. When the Wing arrived in the North-western Area in late January 1943, many of the pilots had been out of operations for up to ten months.

After Raid 54, assessments were made of the defensive experience of those pilots involved in the air battle. These assessments were done on a squadron basis and differ from Caldwell's assessment in the number of experienced pilots, but they clearly indicate the dearth of defensive experience, which Caldwell had also highlighted. 54 Squadron had scrambled ten pilots, and of these, only Squadron Leader Gibbs was assessed as being highly experienced.

457 Squadron scrambled 12 pilots, and of these, six were considered highly experienced. Eleven pilots scrambled for 452 Squadron. Of these, six were considered to be highly experienced, including Caldwell and Flying Officer Goldsmith, who were both aces. Squadron Leader Macdonald had had no experience and was flying into combat with 452 Squadron for the first time that day. Only 13 of the 33 pilots who scrambled were considered to be highly experienced. Eight had no experience in defensive operations. It should be noted that a number of experienced pilots were not available to fly that day because they were either on leave or on official business. These included the regular flight commanders of both 54 and 457 Squadrons and Flying Officer Bisley, another ace of the Malta campaign.

One fighter technique favoured by the Allied pilots with experience from North Africa and Europe, was dog fighting. Pilots such as Caldwell, Goldsmith and Bisley had gained considerable skill and success with this against the Germans. Dog fighting was practiced at the operational training units and the Spitfire pilots also included dog fighting in their practice flights between the raids. But as for dog fighting against the Zero, the Spitfire had its limitations, as did every other Western fighter design.

The Spitfire was superior to the Zero in most instances, but it was less manoeuvrable at low speeds. Taking advantage of the Zero's manoeuvrability advantage at lower speeds, Zero pilots favoured dog fighting. Early in the piece, it became known that dog fighting with Zeros was unwise. There had already been evidence from RAAF and American experience that dog fighting was not a successful tactic to use against the Japanese. Indeed, the 49th Fighter Group developed the more successful dive-pass system of attack, whereby height was gained, and a high speed attack was carried out, after which the pilot was to break away by diving or spiralling out of attacking range, and then climb again for another high speed attack.

The Australians, however, treated the American assessments as suspect to a certain degree. Caldwell, for instance, considered that

   some of the reports were so imaginative that the pilot making them
   had obviously forgotten that it was a piston engined, winged
   aircraft flown by a human about which he wrote and endowed them with
   the qualities of a humming-bird. (5)

At this stage, the Spitfire pilots were not overly practiced in the dive-pass tactic. During Raid 52, Caldwell and his pilots were briefed to carry out climbs, dives and turns at various speeds, and to engage with Zeroes for the specific purpose of checking the comparative handling qualities of the two types of aircraft. But despite Caldwell's remit of climbs, dives and turns, the repeated dive-pass attack could not be used to great advantage by the Spitfire pilots during the Raid 52 defence because Caldwell was concerned about shortage of fuel. During Raid 53, Squadron Leader Thorold-Smith started the defence by climbing for height but problems arose when two pilots from his section dropped back with oxygen problems and 54 Squadron did not fly the battle formation they had trained to do. Thorold-Smith was shot down and no one took over as leader. All aircraft then operated independently and dog fighting broke out. Some success did result, with six bombers and two fighters shot down. Unfortunately, however, to counter this success, the bombers did get through to the oil tanks and four Spitfires were lost.

Dog fighting may have come easily for the Spitfire pilots, but the Japanese favoured dog fighting. Indeed, during the Raid 54 air battle, one pilot reported seeing "two Zekes engaged in a sham dog fight apparently as a decoy", and a number of Spitfire pilots broke off from the dive attack quite quickly in order to engage in dog fighting.

Although some success came of the independent actions, the piece-meal method of attack of 15 March was criticised. In his "Appreciation", Caldwell reinforced the importance of attaining the maximum advantage through height and speed. Accordingly, for Raid 54, he was ordered to hold for a coordinated attack after obtaining maximum advantage. Caldwell did so, and the dive-pass attack method was initiated again. In doing this, many of the pilots attained speeds of about 400 miles per hour. I mentioned above that one reason why Caldwell delayed the co-ordinated attack was because 54 Squadron took eight minutes to move into position. Because of this delay, 54 Squadron had to carry out an almost vertical dive in order to bring the target into view. This method of attack was unfamiliar to the less experienced pilots and impacted on their aim when they opened fire. In addition, the excessive speed due to the almost vertical angle of attack did not allow for the easier deflection shot.

The final consideration that mitigated against success was lack of fuel. Dog fighting was well known to use up fuel quickly but the diving attack also used fuel rapidly, to the extent that engagements in the past had to be broken off due to fuel shortage. By waiting until the bombers were on their homeward course, and then waiting for 54 Squadron to get in position before attacking, the air battle took place far out over the sea, thus taking the Spitfires further from base. The Spitfire was originally designed as a short-range interceptor and droppable belly tanks were required to increase its range. But belly tanks were not fitted to the Wing's Spitfires, so fuel consumption was always going to be a concern. Within ten minutes of engaging, Caldwell warned all pilots to check their fuel and if short, to break away and head for home. He directed them to use low revs and advised the course. The warning was reinforced by Fighter Sector Control on a number of occasions after Caldwell's initial warning. Despite those warnings, five Spitfires were either destroyed or severely damaged due to lack of fuel. Two pilots misheard the homeward co-ordinates and were way off course when they force-landed after running out of fuel. Despite breaking off engagement because of low fuel supplies, seven pilots landed safely at base.

The problems that mitigated against success for the Wing were serious, and were certainly discussed in great depth over the succeeding days. However, the problems gained heightened significance from the way that they were reported, initially by General MacArthur's Headquarters, and then by the Australian media. It was the way in which the raid was reported that largely resulted in the misunderstandings that abounded about the day's events.

On 3 May, General MacArthur's Headquarters provided the press with Communique 386 which received almost as much interest as the raid itself. It briefly advised the details of the raid and defence, and concluded with the contentious statement: "Our own air losses were heavy". Headlines over the next few days included "Heavy Air Losses at Darwin", "The Air Reverse at Darwin"; "Spitfire Losses at Darwin"; and "Fierce Air Battle Over Darwin: Reverse Suffered by Spitfires". (6) As well as commenting on the air battle, the journalists paid considerable attention to the communique itself, with a number of accounts indicating that it was not the custom for GHQ to be so flank in revealing setbacks. In its editorial on 4 May, the Sydney Morning Herald acknowledged the "shock of surprise" at the announcement.

Overall, media reaction was quite harsh, and public confidence in the Spitfire defence was shaken. A bit of PR back-pedalling was required and by 5 May, the media had been offered a seemingly plausible excuse for the loss of so many Spitfires. That day's communique stated that "heavy weather has seriously interfered with all the air activities to the north for the last fortnight." (7) The Argus reported that "The bulk of our Spitfire losses ... were caused not by enemy action, but by a freak of bad weather which caught our planes after the action had been broken off." The Sydney Morning Herald noted that General MacArthur's Headquarters had revealed that the aircraft losses "were caused largely by a headwind which caught our fighters far out to sea." (8)

The day was fine with little wind. The meteorological report indicated little cloud and no current or impending bad weather. Surface winds ranged from 5 to 10 miles per hour and up to 20,000 feet was 15-25 miles per hour. Ken Fox, who flew with 452 Squadron on the day, later stated that "it was a perfect day; the weather had nothing to do with our losses." (9)

Air Commodore Bladin noted that the squadrons were not impressed with the news reports, and considered that the "alarmist tendency of the press and radio references was having a bad effect on the combat pilots." (10) He asked Air Vice-Marshal Bostock to correct the statements. On 12 May, the Minister for Air wrote to the Prime Minister concerning MacArthur's communique. Drakeford pointed out that the announcements were "quite inconsistent" with previous policy and drew Curtin's attention to the "undesirableness of disclosing such information to the enemy, and to the possible adverse reactions of such public announcements on combat generally."

Curtin consulted with MacArthur and advised Drakeford of MacArthur's observations. He stated that important information had not been revealed to the enemy. He also advised that MacArthur had acknowledged that a particular impression may have been gained from the way the losses had been reported, but ultimately, it was the truth. In direct contrast to the "bad weather" communiques, Curtin advised Drakeford that the policy of General Headquarters was to base the communiques on fact. Curtin finally (and high-mindedly) advised that "to follow any other course would do more to undermine the morale of the public and air personnel than to be as flank as possible ..."

The Advisory War Council sat on 13 May. Amongst other things, the Japanese raid was discussed, and in particular the aircraft losses. The Council decided that the Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Jones, should make a full report of the action. Jones flew to Darwin to gather information and submitted his report to the Advisory War Council on 3 June. (11)

In his report, Jones looked at the Wing's losses and dealt with Spitfire maintenance and ground organisation. He also addressed the issues of fuel consumption and the fault in the pitch changing mechanism of the propellers.

Jones found that the aircraft had been maintained in accordance with the maintenance schedules, and additional maintenance had been carried out where specific problems arose. He reported that "all equipment is, in fact, in first class condition." Jones found that engine failures were not due to faulty maintenance but to the relative inexperience of the pilots in handling such aircraft under combat conditions, and advised that the pilots had been told how to overcome this problem. As far as the ground organisation was concerned, Jones found that it was all working smoothly, with adequate warning of the raid, speedy scramble, and efficient fighter control.

On the problem of fuel consumption, Jones concluded that four of the pilots exceeded their safe range because of their "keenness and excitement in combat" and the "adverse wind." Despite meteorological evidence to the contrary, his blaming the "adverse wind" indicates that Jones was swayed by MacArthur's communique and subsequent media reports. Jones also concluded that Caldwell, in

   manoeuvring for a favourable position, held his attack rather too
   long which led to the Spitfires being drawn further away from their
   base. In this, the Wing Leader placed too much reliance on
   individual pilots who, for the most part, were in combat for the
   first time.

Jones' criticism of Caldwell was reiterated later in the report when he stated that

   the fact that a number of aircraft ran out of fuel can only be
   attributed to an error of judgment on the part of the Wing Leader,
   bearing in mind the inexperience of a number of his pilots.

In waiting for 54 Squadron to move into position, Caldwell did delay the attack, so, on the face of it, Jones' criticism of Caldwell's tactics may be justified. But if Caldwell ordered 457 Squadron to attack the bombers without 54 in position to engage the fighters, there may well have been more Spitfire casualties. Despite the delay in attacking and the subsequent problems with the angle of attack, 54 Squadron, even with its largely inexperienced pilots, was responsible for two destroyed fighters, a damaged bomber, one probable fighter and three damaged fighters; and no pilots or Spitfires from 457 Squadron were lost to the Japanese. But Jones' criticism in relation to the number of pilots who ran out of fuel is unjustified. Caldwell and fighter control warned the pilots to be watchful of their fuel situation, and to break off if necessary. But the Spitfire pilots were excited and I am not entirely sure that anything Caldwell could have said or done at the time would have made the seriousness of fuel consumption sink into the heads of his inexperienced pilots. In his additional comments on the raid, Squadron Leader Gibbs stated in relation to the three of his pilots who force landed due to fuel shortage, that:

   after having been warned by Fighter Sector and Winco, [they] have no
   excuse whatsoever, except that of excitement, and their desire to
   press home an attack on the enemy; in two cases their first combat.
   Complete realisation has, it is thought, now been inculcated both by
   their recent experience and their Squadron Commander's personal
   endeavour, that the petrol consumption almost trebles itself in
   combat.

Jones reported that belly tanks, although available, were not normally fitted as they reduced the rate of climb and impacted on handling qualities. He also noted that although two small tanks and one large tank were supplied with each aircraft, the supply was insufficient, as the tank had to be dropped before engagement commenced. Despite these problems, Jones had now ensured that 30-gallon tanks were to be carried on all occasions, and a further supply would be obtained. (12)

Some aspects of Jones' report should be taken with a grain of salt. For example, as Chief of Air Staff, Jones was responsible for determining maintenance regimes. So, asking Jones to comment on something within his own purview was like asking a criminal to judge whether or not he was guilty. In addition, Jones' criticism of Caldwell may not have been entirely objective. Jones may have still been smarting from Caldwell's recent rejection of the Boomerang as an effective interceptor fighter. Further aspects of Jones' report certainly require close examination, but I will just highlight them here. As well as having responsibility for maintenance, Jones was also responsible for the training that was carried out in operational training units. So, if the pilots were blamed because of their inexperience, perhaps we need to look at the training curriculum at the OTUs, for which Jones had responsibility, as much as the training that was carried out at Darwin, for which Caldwell as Wing Leader and Group Captain Walters as Officer Commanding 1 Fighter Wing would have been responsible. All squadrons were airborne by 9.45 and rendezvous took about 20 minutes. But could rendezvous have been speeded up if 54 Squadron had been located closer to the other two squadrons, rather than at RAAF Darwin? In not ensuring the use of the Spitfire belly tank, perhaps Jones should accept a measure of culpability as he was also responsible for aircraft and parts supply. Finally, it would be worth considering how much the Jones/Bostock feud was at play here. Given that Australia was making belly tanks for the US squadrons, is it possible that Jones was denying the use of the belly tank in order to interfere with the efficiency of Bostock's operations? There are a number of issues here and much of what I have highlighted is of course speculative, but I would say that closer examination is certainly required.

Jones rounded off his report by commenting that the morale of all personnel was good, and stated that "the lessons learned as a result of this combat will be of great value in future actions." (13) (12) And, indeed, lessons were learned. In his report on "Spitfire Versus Zeke Tactics", Group Captain Walters described the tactics to be used in combat with the Zero, reinforcing that the dive-pass attack method was to be used. He stated that "Each deliberate attack should be separate and undertaken only with the advantage of height." In capitals, he stated "DO NOT ATTEMPT TO REMAIN AND DOG FIGHT." (14) (13)

The Wing quickly assimilated the new tactics and on 20 June a successful wing defence was effected. Headlines such as "Japs Smashed Over Darwin: 12 Planes Down, 10 Crippled" and "Japanese Rout in Darwin Raid. Spitfires' Big Tally" did much to allay earlier concerns about the ability of the Spitfires to defend Australia. The Spitfire Wing was once again the darling of the Australian press, and public confidence was on the rise. (15)(14)

I opened this talk with a passage that indicated Caldwell's concern about the way in which the events of this day had been represented. In some ways, his concerns were valid. I have already mentioned MacArthur's communiqu6s and press commentary at the time, but the misrepresentations did not end there. In Air War Against Japan, first published in 1957, Official Historian George Odgers referred to the adverse wind on the way home as one of the factors resulting in low fuel supplies. This was reiterated in the 1968 reprint. In 1987, in his contentious article about the Spitfires in Australia entitled "Debacle", Vincent Adams-Winter wrote that "twenty three ... aircraft all came down in the sea after running out of fuel." In his 1988 autobiography, Air Marshal Sir George Jones provided details of his report into the raid and stated that the adverse wind had been a factor in the loss of aircraft through lack of fuel, and soundly lay the majority of blame at Caldwell's feet. (16) One of the more interesting comments comes from Flight Lieutenant Bob Foster of 54 Squadron who was not even there for Raid 54, as he was on leave. His comments on the raid indicate how easily incorrect information can be believed or remembered.

Foster had heard about the communique which led to the erroneous reports after the event, and commented years later that:

   everyone was a bit upset about it. Because it was badly worded. And
   I say, I don't think we were routed by the Japs at all. I'm sure
   that it was more the weather that was the cause of the trouble.
   (17)

A bit of bad reporting certainly went a long way. I hope that I have cleared away some of the misconceptions surrounding the day that the planes "all fell into the sea". As I have discussed, there were indeed problems associated with 1 Fighter Wing's defence during Raid 54. Jones may have been critical of Caldwell's leadership and concerns about the Wing's defence may have aired by the press, but, as I indicated above, in following the designated strategy, Caldwell put the Wing in the best position to allow for maximum success against the Japanese. Unfortunately, there were a number of factors at play that were not within his control.

I will conclude with the comments of someone who, like Caldwell, became an ace in two theatres. Despite the ensuing problems, Flying Officer Adrian Goldsmith DFC, DFM of 452 Squadron was confident that the tactics that had been used on 2 May 1943 were sound, and he ended his combat report by stating

   The strategical [sic] and tactical set-up for the wing, immediately
   prior to the attack, organised by Wing Commander Caldwell, was, in
   my opinion, 100 per cent perfect. In my experience I have never
   seen a more advantageous position for an intercepting force. The
   height and sun were absolutely in our favour and the fact that the
   interception was not a smashing success, seems to me to be entirely
   due to individual pilots' lack of initiative and to armament
   failures.

(1) For the most part, background information comes from George Odgers: Air War Against Japan 1943-1945. I also found Jim Grant's Spitfires Over Darwin 1943. No 1 Fighter Wing, Fred Woodgate's Lion and Swans and Operations Record Books invaluable resources for background details. Combat detail is drawn from intelligence and combat reports.

(2) Clive Caldwell, Forward: Jim Grant: Spitfires over Darwin 1943. No 1 Fighter Wing p.vii

(3) George Odgers. Air war against Japan 1943-1945 Australia in the War of 1939-45. Series 3 (Air) Volume 2 p.46

(4) The No 5 Fighter Sector, Darwin intelligence report stated that this person had been killed. 54 Squadron's diary indicated that the soldier had been slightly injured. The Australian War Memorial Roll of Honour Database indicates no Army deaths in the Darwin area on that day.

(5) Clive Caldwell, undated draft letter to Flying magazine c1953 (Papers of Mrs Jean Caldwell).

(6) The Sun (Sydney) 3 May 1943; The Sydney Morning Herald 4 May 1943, editorial, The Argus (Melbourne) 4 May 1943 and The Age (Melbourne) 4 May 1943

(7) Quoted in The Argus (Melbourne) 5 May 1943: "Weather hampers air activity"

(8) The Argus (Melbourne)5 May 1943 "Spitfires Caught in Storm"; The Sydney Morning Herald 5 May 1943

(9) Quoted in Grant p.69

(10) Quoted in Odgers p.49

(11) Except where referenced elsewhere, the chronology of the these three paragraphs is drawn from NAA A5954/69 524/2

(12) Above references from Jones' report from AA A5954/69 524/2 Enemy Air Raid on Darwin

(13) NAA: A5954/69, 524/2 Enemy Air Raid on Darwin for Jones' report.

(14) NAA: A1196, 1/501/505, Walters' report.

(15) The Sun (Sydney) "Japs Smashed Over Darwin: 12 Planes Down, 10 Crippled"; Sydney Morning Herald. "Japanese Rout in Darwin Raid. Spitfires' Big Tally"

(16) Odgers p.48. This also occurs in the 1968 reprint; Contact Vol 42. No 1 1987. This article elicited much response through letters and phone calls. Ultimately, the author had to apologise in writing for the errors of his article and the Journal issued an apology to Caldwell. [Contact Vol 43 No 1 1988]; Jones p102.

(17) Oral History Interview: Bob Foster NTRS 226, TS49. Conducted 1984