The dangers of relativism.

In her column "Either/Or?" (July 15), Cathleen Kaveny argues against what she calls "dualistic views of the world" to which she says we Americans are attracted. She seems to believe that when a person or a group believes very strongly in the correctness of its own position and regards the view of those with whom they disagree as definitely incorrect, they are exhibiting a form of intolerance. Kaveny sees this "duality" as unfortunate. There is something about her position that I find disturbing.

There are matters on which people of good will may differ, such as the morality of a particular war or who might be the better of two presidential candidates. But what about the world view of a Hitler or a Stalin? Should we show tolerance for the view of a Nazi who advocated the genocide of an entire people or of a Communist who endorsed a totalitarian government in which all religious practice was forbidden by law?

In regard to abortion, can one who firmly believes that life begins at conception grant equal respectability to the view of those who advocate abortion at any stage of pregnancy for any reason? In the 1850s, could an abolitionist grant equal respectability to the view of a slaveholder? Kaveny's position seems to be a thinly disguised defense of moral relativism--the belief that there is no absolute right or absolute wrong and that we should not condemn the belief of others regardless of how strongly we might abhor their views.

JAMES P. WARD

Claymont, Del.

THE AUTHOR REPLIES:

Does opposing metaphysical and moral dualism mean embracing moral relativism? Absolutely not. St. Augustine, an implacable opponent of dualism, was no moral relativist. I think that Mr. Ward and I would agree that good moral analysis requires numerous careful distinctions. Take, for example, his case of slavery. I believe that the proposition "it is inconsistent with human dignity for one human being to 'own' another human being" holds true always and everywhere. So the moral propositions advocated by the abolitionist and the slaveholder are not equivalent in truth value. But our analysis should not end there. First, sometimes people advocate morally wrong positions for morally good motives. For example, some people opposed the end of slavery because they feared what would become of the former slaves economically and socially. Such people were wrong in their opposition to the end of slavery, but right to fear for the well-being of the former slaves, as later events demonstrated. Abolitionists would have done well to listen to the fears of some of their opponents. Furthermore, sometimes people who advocate the morally right position are blind to the injustices that they themselves bring about. Northerners may have opposed slavery, but that does not mean that their treatment of African Americans was not deeply objectionable on other grounds. Finally, sometimes people are not culpable for believing morally incorrect positions. We do not demonize St. Paul because he did not recognize the universal moral truth about slavery. In short, mainstream Catholic moral theology has always recognized that proclaiming moral truth does not mean denying moral complexity.

CATHLEEN KAVENY