The combat employment of missile forces and artillery in difficult terrain conditions.

The effectiveness of the combat employment of troops (forces) is to a very large degree predicated on the physico geographic (terrain) conditions in the area of combat operations. These conditions are a major prerequisite to an objective assessment of the capabilities of the Missile Forces and Artillery (MFA) in effectively engaging the enemy and the development of realistic plans for the combat employment of MFA formations in operations (combat actions).

The Siberian Military District has diverse and difficult physico geographic (terrain) conditions. Thus, the Western Siberian region has a severe climate: The terrain is swampy and covered by taiga. In the south of the district there are mountains: the Altay (1,800 to 4,500 m); the Western Sayany (1,700 to 3,100 m); and the Kuznetskiy Alatau (1,200 to 2,100 m). The climate is sharply continental, a feature that increases from west to east. In the central part of the district, winter is cold and long (six to seven months), while in the south, it is milder (five to five and a half months). The central part of the district has forest terrain and the southern part, forest and steppe terrain. The large rivers (the Ob, the Enisey, the Irtysh) freeze in October-November, opening after the breakup of ice in the second half of April-early June. Throughout the year, trafficability of the existing roads is limited insignificantly. Almost all West Siberian terrain is difficult or impassable off roads for all types of transport.

Buryatia and Irkutsk Oblast have difficult and diverse terrain, vegetation and soil, and harsh climatic conditions. The valleys of the rivers flowing to Lake Baikal are deep and narrow, cutting into the mountains (have the form of canyons). The absolute mountain heights increase from north to south from 500 m to 1,800 m with the maximum height of 2,999 m. There are seven mountainous passes 500 m to 10 km wide. The climate is moderately or sharply continental, characterized by a long winter season (lasting for more than five months), large absolute air temperature amplitudes, high pressure and rapid changes in the weather conditions in spring and fall. Climate formation is greatly impacted by a deep water body--Lake Baikal (water mass, 23,000 cubic km). Vegetation is located in the taiga zone (mountainous-taiga landform) with sections of steppe and forest-steppe in the southern part. Large rivers (the Angara, the Lena, the Nizhnyaya Tunguska, the Selenga) freeze in October-November and open in May-early June. There are three water bodies (Irkutsk, Bratsk, and Ust Ilimsk) the destruction of whose dams can cause heavy flooding. The ground in the upper sections of the ridges complicates engineering work.

The territory of Chita Oblast has a peculiar landform, including mountains, plateaus, and intermountain basins. Its greater part features vast hard-of-access mountainous and taiga terrain. It is only the mountainous-steppe areas of the Transbaikal region to the south of the Transsiberian Railway that are relatively accessible. Mountain heights, from 1,000 m to 1,800 m; the maximum height, 2,519 m. There are two mountain passes from 200 m to 10 km wide. The climate is sharply continental with a long winter season, large daily and seasonal fluctuations of the air temperature, and low precipitation. Vegetation, from forest to steppe with distinct altitudinal zonality. Large rivers (the Ingoda, the Onon, the Shilka, the Argun, and the Amur) freeze in October-November and open up in late April-May. In summer, freshets of considerable magnitude are possible. The soil in the region is detritus loamy and detritus sandy with underlying rock and stone strata that in places come out to the surface.

Proceeding from the aforementioned, the main terrain related specifics of the combat employment of missile forces and artillery will be as follows.

First, in forming MFA units, it is necessary to plan in detail the regrouping (forward movement and deployment) of large combined units and military units, taking into account the barrier lines, bypassing routes, and the throughput capacity of the existing roads. For example, putting one tunnel on the Transsiberian Railway out of operation can necessitate further movement under one's own power. Due to a limited number of routes along which a substantial number of troops can move forward simultaneously, special attention needs to be given to the organization of the traffic control and regulating service.

In mountainous forest terrain, artillery firing positions and missile position areas can be chosen and prepared only along the roads, in or near population centers. The promptness and timeliness of maneuver by a MFA unit in the course of combat action will be affected by a poorly developed road network. Furthermore, the selection occupation of firing positions along roads and in population centers will make it much easier for the enemy to identify their location and determine their coordinates.

Second, in organizing effective engagement of enemy forces in the Transbaikal region, where the border areas are mainly flat steppe, wide use will be made of direct and semi-direct artillery fire, ensuring effective engagement on the enemy's forward edge with a minimum expenditure of ammunition. Under favorable conditions, creation of fire pockets in fulfilling combat tasks from closed fire positions will be quite effective. With rocket artillery fire delivered to medium range, the probability of fire pockets being created is 90 percent to 100 percent.

Substantial daily air temperature fluctuations and therefore shell temperature fluctuations will necessitate a continuous adjustment of input data for artillery fire and the creation of a larger number of check points, which will affect the accuracy of artillery fire and the element of surprise. On the whole, meteorological and ballistic artillery support will acquire a special importance.

Third, hilly and mountainous terrain with considerable "dead" space in the greater part of the district will prevent artillery reconnaissance assets from obtaining sufficient data to ensure effective artillery fire, especially long range fire, which will limit the use of long range artillery systems. At the same time, sound ranging will practically not be able to ensure the sufficient accuracy of coordinates for intensive artillery fire in the course of a combat operation; aerial reconnaissance will not ensure the prompt presentation of data for missile forces and long range artillery (it takes at least four hours to process aerial imagery), while the determination of the coordinates of highly mobile targets will be almost impossible. Unfortunately, low temperatures in winter time will on the whole have a negative impact on the performance of artillery reconnaissance unit personnel as well as the operation of arms and military equipment.

Fourth, steppe and forest-steppe terrain complicates the masking and camouflage of MFA force disposition and concealment of their maneuver.

In steppe areas, exercises were conducted to rehearse the creation of a smoke screen with time fuse shells, covering subunits from air strikes, and smoke screening the enemy's possible observation posts in order to compensate for the lack of natural shelter and provide the essential conditions for troops to accomplish covert maneuver. This helps reduce losses from artillery fire conducted from covert fire positions and rocket launches.

Fifth, the absence of natural cover in border areas and the scarcity of improvised material for the provision of shelters for personnel, arms and military equipment make it necessary to give greater attention to engineer support for MFA combat employment. Severe climatic conditions in winter (minus 30 to minus 35 C) and the absence of snow cover in the Transbaikal region will considerably affect the volume and time required for the engineer organization of artillery fire positions and missile launch positions. Experience in training exercises shows that it takes between five and seven days to organize battery fire positions by drilling boreholes and loosening the ground by blasting. In order to reduce the time, it would be expedient to use thermo-drilling equipment, powered by exhaust fumes from a working motor vehicle engine. Tests of prototype models show that a gun crew can thus prepare a gun trench by blasting within a space of nine to 11 hours. Unfortunately, thermo-drilling equipment has not been adopted for regular service.

Sixth, the district's border areas have rather a poorly developed geodetic network, which impairs the accuracy and duration of topographic survey of artillery fire positions, command and observation posts, artillery reconnaissance positions, and especially positions for artillery assets deploying from in-depth positions. The topographic maps of many areas have not been updated for a very long time, which greatly complicates terrain orientation and topogeodetic work.

The problems considered in the present article do not exhaust all specifics of MFA employment theory and practice. They can only serve as a starting point, a base for further study and the introduction of new MFA methods of operation under difficult terrain conditions.

Maj. Gen, F.L. NIKITCHENKO

Commander, Missile Forces and Artillery, the Siberian Military District

Col. V.D. EDRYSHEV

Chief of staff, Missile Forces and Artillery, the Siberian Military District

Col. S.N. MIRONOV

Chief of operations staff, Missile Forces and Artillery, the Siberian Military District