The brave new world of disaster relief operations.

Defence forces have had to become more and more adaptable as the world's security environment has changed. Whereas until recently troops from Nato countries had to spend the overwhelming amount of their time and effort on practicing to be the anticipated Soviet/Warsaw Pace invasion of Western Europe, they now have to train to meet a wider variety of roles, missions and threats.

While armed forces have always had one eye on the need to be available for 'conventional' disaster relief, there is suddenly a requirement to be prepared to deal with a new form of disaster relief on a massive scale due to the terrorism element. The altered roles and missions can be seen in one of Nato's most recent defence reviews, as published in the United Kingdom in December 2003:

<<Defence has also played an important role in supporting the civil authorities in responding to a range of civil contingencies. The availability of a pool of highly trained service personnel, combined with expertise in crisis management, planning and command and control, has seen the armed forces deployed to support civil authorities during the fuel dispute, foot and mouth outbreaks, flooding and most recently on Operation Fresco during the fire services' pay dispute.>>

<<This approach is reflected in our support for the proposed solidarity clause in the draft new European Treaty which provides that the Union will mobilise all the instruments at its disposal (including the military resources made available by member states) in response to the request of a member state that has fallen victim to a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster ...>>

These two statements are ones that are seen in different forms elsewhere in many ministries of defence, a recognition of the need for more and more military flexibility. Although unconventional disaster relief could be seen as having been on the scope of military planners, there is more and more of a stress on unconventional disaster relief, along the lines of the aftermath of the events of 'nine-eleven' (9/11). As such, it is a valid undertaking to try to examine the two forms of disaster separately, although there will be areas which are common to both.

Interoperation with Civil

If there is a general contradiction, then it is this: for the vast majority of humanitarian or disaster relief missions and roles, there is little specific military equipment to go with the operation. The key is how defence forces use what they have in their normal stores, and how they operate with local civil authorities and agencies. And in many cases, it would be viewed as counter-productive for soldiers sailors and airmen to spend too much time preparing for secondary roles such as disaster relief, as their main roles and missions provide more than enough training and experience that can be carried over into secondary roles.

One example of this statement comes from Britain's foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001. When--eventually--the armed forces were called upon, they deployed with their standard equipment such as Land Rovers and utility trucks. But the key to dealing with the outbreak was moving slaughtered cattle and sheep to vast disposal pits in different parts of the country. Some of these pits measured over the size of eight football pitches and were filled with hundreds of thousands of carcasses. Although there could have been a case to call up Royal Engineers to dig the pits, and to call upon the trucks of the Royal Logistic Corps to move the carcasses, there was little need. In the centre of the foot and mouth outbreak, north-west England, there were both contractors with the earth-moving machinery necessary to dig the large pits, and the haulage firms with the lorries that could undertake the animal carcass transport--in fact many of the dump trucks that could be contracted were larger and more mobile cross-country than the variants that the British Army had. Although there could have been a case to use military communications to manage and control the situation, the solution selected by the local commander, Brigadier Alex Birtwhistle, was simple: he sent a junior officer to a local shop to buy a dozen pay-as-you-go mobile telephones with consecutive numbers. To service the data handling requirement, personal laptop computers were augmented with a handful bought from local shops, and then tied in via the internet, both fixed line and mobile. The point here is that next to none of the equipment needed and actually used was either Mil-Spec or specially designed for the task--it was available on the local market.

And what if the Internet is not available? Here again, civilian applications may come in handy. For example, Sagem has developed a satellite link system called the Tangara 2400. A satellite up and downlink terminal is itself connected to the Tagara to which Wi-Fi-equipped computers can link up within a range of one kilometre. This system is currently being tested in co-operation with France Telecom and Eutelsat in the heart of rural France, an area that has whole sections that are currently deprived of ADSL service.

This is not just a situation that applies to western, developed countries. Even in less well-developed countries, the vast proportion of equipment needed to deal with a disaster outbreak will be locally available. Two examples might illustrate this, both of them earthquakes, one in Algeria in 2003, the other in eastern Iran in late 2003. In both cases the key equipment for dealing with the immediate aftermath was not kit flown in by western relief agencies or other militaries--it was equipment that could be found on the local economy. Even in eastern Iran there are earth-moving machines and an ample supply of key tools--jemmy bars, spades, pick axes, wheelbarrows--and this is common throughout the most of the world. In a situation such as an earthquake, the key is the response to the event by survivors over the first twelve hours or so--after that time, the chances of survival fall away greatly. The problem stems from the fact that in many cases, it will take at least twelve hours to get equipment and personnel from overseas into place. In the case of the Iranian Barn earthquake, the hundreds of western exports who arrived to aid in the recovery operation added little to increase the number of people rescued.

Crew-consuming Platforms

Disaster relief roles provide a challenge for planners: in effect by their very nature they go against all of the major assumptions that dominate planning for combat operations. Whereas the drive towards digitisation and network-centric warfare emphasises the use of technology both to reduce the threats to deployed personnel and the actual number of personnel needed for a given mission, the opposite is true for conventional disaster relief. In the majority of relief missions, the best thing that an armed force can provide is a host of well-trained, flexible and intelligent manpower. The requirement for bodies on the ground to deal with disrupted infrastructure, and to then cope with casualties and survivors can perhaps be best seen from one small example: the Caribbean island of Montserrat, where the volcano that dominates the island catastrophically exploded in 1997. The Royal Navy had a guard ship in the region, a modern Type 23 frigate, in spite of the fact that she carried a crew of around 160 to 180, the numbers proved to be insufficient to simultaneously run the ship, provide enough personnel in the way of shore parties to help evacuate local residents and deal with other onshore emergencies.

A larger Type 42 destroyer with a crew complement closer to 300 was then tasked to the region, as the larger crew could generate more of the shore parties that most conventional disaster missions require. The same issues applied to the floods that hit Central Europe in the late 1990s, as well as in the Czech Republic in 2002. Dealing with rising floodwaters is not a task that responds well to electronic technology--it needs bodies handling sandbags, both filling them and then placing them in position. This might not be a high tech complement, but hundreds or thousands of troops doing this has been the best response to numerous floods all over the world, and will continue to be the case in the future.

As described earlier for the British foot and mouth outbreak, even in an area such as communications, it is far from certain that armed forces, especially foreign armed forces, will be able to add to communications in a conventional disaster relief scenario. Satellite communications is now so widespread that most relief agencies possess the technology, and news crews are also well equipped to provide information. Only in the most underdeveloped or remote areas would foreign armed forces be able to add significantly to the communications net. Again, in many cases there will be sufficient local communications capability to manage co-ordination and rear liaison tasks. And any missing links can be connected with readily available satellite communications. This would not have been the case ten years or so ago. But with the commercialisation of satellite communications and the development of lightweight transmission equipment with low power requirements, this is no longer a Mil-Spec technology--the market is being driven more and more by civilian demands. Indeed, commercial satellites have become so efficient that insecure satellite communications played an important role as an essential command tool for US forces operating in Iraq in 2003--the commander of the 1st US Marine Division transmitted most of his command tasks via an Iridium handset.

The Real Help

For conventional relief missions, the one area where armed forces can add massive capability is in what the military would call 'tactical transport'. The Galtur avalanche in Austria in 1999 buried much of the ski resort and killed over a dozen people, That winter it snowed very heavily in the Alps, and the avalanche risk was large. However, the Galtur event was larger than one could have predicted. The village was cut off by road--it took days to clear a path; the bad weather meant that the daylight-only capable Agusta Bell AB206 and Alouette III helicopters were incapable of helping to move manpower into the village to aid rescue operations. It was the all-weather aircraft, such as US Army UH-60 Blackhawks and a handful of German Army CH-53 Sea Stallions, that provided the initial airlift that allowed support to reach Galtur. As a result of the Galtur incident, the Austrian Government accelerated the procurement of new support helicopters, which had been postponed for several years, as they had not been deemed necessary. Within a year, nine UH-60 Blackhawks were purchased to rectify the shortcomings of the other helicopters.

A similar situation was seen in Mozambique in 1999, when severe rainfall lead to widespread flooding. High waters swept away bridges, cutting communications across Mozambique. Key to the rescue of stranded people and the delivery of aid to those cut-off, but not in danger, was the supply of support helicopters--Pumas and Oryx--from neighbouring South Africa, but also from countries such as France and the United Kingdom. This is an area where militaries can add immeasurably to the task. Although there are more and more civilian helicopters in use, the vast proportion of these are of the light and light-medium passenger type. What is needed for conventional disaster relief are medium to medium/large support helicopters that have large, box-like cabins as well as the capability to undersling large loads. There are few roles for such aircraft in the commercial world, but are exactly what is needed in the military arena--so it is natural that armed forces can provide significant capability in these operations.

Likewise, although there are many aircraft available for hire for cargo transport, there are far fewer that can undertake very-short field operations, or for air drop of supplies. But trying to find an air force that doesn't have either C-130 Hercules, or An-12 Cub aircraft is difficult, to put it mildly. Although in continents such as Africa ex-military tactical transporters are more common, the knowledge to undertake air delivery of equipment and relief supplies might not match the desires. In a situation such as the Ethiopia famine of the mid-1980s, trying to deliver aid over a million square kilometres, with only 3000 km of paved roads is far from an easy task. The ability to air deliver food, shelter and other supplies to isolated villages and encampments is often vital for the survival of people who have escaped the worst effects of a flood, drought or earthquake.

The impact of the need to consider disaster relief is most clearly seen on the design and development of various ships. For instance, the Royal Navy's two planned aircraft carriers will include the capability to support disaster relief, in practically any role, but especially if used exclusively as helicopter carriers--both designs by BAE Systems and Thales stressed this capability. In addition, the planned second French aircraft carrier, the PA02, will also support a subsidiary mission for humanitarian operations. The same tendency applies to most of the recent amphibious assault ships procured by European nations for which the secondary role of disaster relief alongside the primary one of carriage and delivery of marines and their equipment has been emphasised. This has been especially true of the Dutch Schelde Yard design for a modular assault ship procured by the navies of Spain and the Netherlands, as well as for the Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary programme for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in the United Kingdom. As the Defence Procurement Agency says about the programme, "The LSD(A)s may operate autonomously as supply ships. In addition to their war-fighting role, the LSD(A)s will be suited to disaster relief and other humanitarian missions." The advantage of such platforms is that not only can they embark troops, but also forward supplies, as well as the means of delivery--helicopters, landing craft, hovercraft. Add to this their ability to act as communications hubs in remote coastal areas, command centres (most amphibious ships have this facility) and even as floating hospitals. Moreover, they do not need to rely on local supplies and support in an area where the infrastructure might be limited.

Surveillance Equipment

Another area where military equipment and capabilities can be used to help in conventional disaster relief is in surveillance. One example would be the use of Royal Air Force Canberra recce/surveillance aircraft over the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late 1990s. The civil war, conflicts between factions in the Congo as well as outside forces from Rwanda and Uganda among others, had led to a growing famine. The worst factor was that no one was quite sure how many refugees from the fighting, or sufferers from the famine there were, thereby making the evaluation of the required supplies almost impossible. As a result, a Canberra was deployed to take high-resolution photos of the areas that were suspected to be the worst affected. This solution provided a much more accurate picture of the situation and the relevant data was passed to relief agencies. Key photos were also retained to act as the basis for planning by a joint British-French team which produced plans for an airborne assault by paratroops into the eastern border area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to allow a safe haven to be set up. The idea of a protected zone within which refugees could gather and then receive food, clean water, shelter and medical help was one that had been pioneered by British and American forces in Kurdistan in north Iraq in the winter of 1991. Royal Marines and US Marines were deployed by helicopter into Kurdistan where they established a cordon against the resurgent Iraqi armed forces. With the security of the zone assured, civil aid agencies could join in delivering aid, much of which was supported by fixed-and rotary wing aircraft. Plans are afoot to use drones in a similar role to that seen in the Congo incident: to be able to spot survivors over a wide area in the case of earthquakes, famines or floods. But to date, there are no examples of actual tasking in such a manner.

New Roles and Missions

The post-9/ll environment has seen a greater emphasis on how armed forces might help with regards to unconventional disasters specifically terrorist attacks. While the American view of this area might differ with regard to the scale of an incident, it is worth pointing out that most European countries have had experience of terrorist attacks in built-up areas. In France there were bomb attacks on the Paris Metro system placed by Algerian terrorists in the late 1990s, the United Kingdom has faced serious and sophisticated terror attacks from the Irish Republican Army ever since the early 1970s until the late 1990s, while Spain has had to deal with the Basque terrorist group Eta. But the sheer size of the 9/11 attack has focused minds to a degree that has forced new plans to be implemented. Major cities such as Paris and London have seen exercises with a view to simulating attacks on the transport system involving either conventional explosives or chemical weapons. While these exercises have seen leadership functions remain within the civilian (as in Britain), or para-military agencies (in France), both instances have revealed roles that could be fulfilled by the military Key missions are actually quite unglamorous in many cases: manning of cordons around an incident area and providing manpower to help clear debris and/or casualties. However, some of the more advanced plans highlighting a deeper involvement of the military in terror incident control have cropped up in the United Kingdom, where the reserve Territorial Army will he re-organised to provide teams of around 500 troops--called Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces--who can be called upon to help deal with terror incidents. If there is a problem with the plans it is that many of the part-time soldiers in the units are also being called up to undertake service in Iraq, leaving a capability hole in the country.

NBC Equipment

Again, as with conventional disaster events, the key equipment that armed forces would bring to unconventional disaster events is pretty much that which it would have in stores already With the threat around the world from weapons of mass destruction, most far-sighted armed forces have ensured that their stores have enough protective NBC suits, respirators, detection systems and ancillaries for all of these. Whereas a police district in a major capital city might have, at most, a few hundred hand-held chemical detection devices, each army battalion/regiment might well have more on hand. The creation of chemical recce units in armed forces--mainly using German-designed and built Fuchs vehicles, is also a capability that can be called into play for major unconventional disaster events. The British Joint NBC Regiment is on standby to provide area contamination recce should London fall victim to a chemical, biological or radiation attack, and in American exercises to test readiness similar equipment has also been devised.

One certain NBC response option is provided by Met.Chem of the Czech Republic, who has developed a rapid NBC response vehicle.

What ought to help armed forces be of more use in providing assistance at an unconventional disaster event is that, by-and-large, they will have more training and familiarity with the equipment and protective clothing than most police forces and ambulance crews. Probably only fire fighters will have as much experience operating in cumbersome protective suits and masks as armed forces. Opportunities to undertake training in dealing with disaster events are, naturally, going to be limited for civil agencies, while armed forces can take the time to undertake exercise with troops wearing protective clothes for hours and even days at a time. Perversely, despite the end of the Cold War, the need to have troops skilled in operating in NBC environments has risen rather than fallen.

As with conventional disasters, the best things that the military can provide will tend to be things such as helicopters and surveillance assets. Although helicopters are more and more available for police and para-military forces these tend to be light birds, with little load capability and restricted personnel space. When heavy items need to be ferried between an incident scene and a hospital, larger military support helicopters can add immeasurably to the options. If a terror attack has inflicted a considerable number of casualties, then the chances are that the nearest hospitals would be overloaded. This would then put at a premium the ferrying of the most heavily injured casualties to hospitals further away from the scene of an incident and once again, helicopters would be instrumental in arranging for treatment in that first vital hour. The role of air mobility can be even greater if an event--or multiple events--have disrupted the transportation network. either under-or above ground.

Command: Key Role

Where the role of the military comes into its own in both conventional and unconventional disaster relief are in the areas of command, control and management. As one European on-scene observer commented, "Armies have to train to operate in the chaos of military operations. They have to make sense of very confused situations, and take decisions this is the perfect training for [unconventional] disaster relief." The training and operational experience of military commanders makes them ideal for the confused nature of any disaster--yet it is strange that in most cases in developed societies, armed forces will tend to take a back seat to their civilian counterparts in the police or fire services. The situation can also have a different dynamic if there are para-military forces available, such as France's Gendarmerie, or Italy's Carabinieri to add to the equation. Though in effect an unconventional disaster scenario is one for which a para-military force is almost purpose-designed. One where a need for forces that have a different set of skills from normal police exists. One can even assume that if the risks of terrorist attack on major population centres are rising, para-military forces are then likely to become more military, and less civil in their outlook, orientation and training.

But the military principles of command and control tend to be mirrored in many continental European disaster management configurations. The key, based on military experience of all-arms operations, is to have an all-embracing command and control system that links police, para-military organisations, fire service and medical units. This type system is in place in France for such key points as the Channel Tunnel, as well as Paris--a situation not mirrored in the UK.

As so many departments are likely to be affected by a terrorist incident, the issue of cross-ministry co-ordination is far from a trivial one. So far, it has only been the USA that has grasped this nettle, creating the Department of Homeland Security to co-ordinate the agencies that work towards national internal security--but it is likely that other countries will follow the lead if major terrorist incidents affect European countries. The issue has been raised as a possible election topic in the UK, and in France, a greater emphasis on how unconventional disaster events are dealt with is leading to studies about how co-operation between the various agencies can be maximised.

Unfortunately, in many countries, there are still too many turf wars and budgets to protect to allow for clear lines of command to be established, and it seems inevitable that should another 9/11-style event occur, there will still be battles between agencies as to who has the lead responsibility. This has been one of the lessons that have come out of 9/11 in recent testimony as part of the investigation into the events of that day. In this respect, it is strange that in western countries, the military's role in disaster relief is always second behind that of civil agencies such as police and fire brigades--the principle of primacy of the civil authorities tends to take precedence. In many countries the problem remains where industrial politics dictate that fire brigades refuse to share control centres with police or ambulance units, and as a result, there can be delays in passing information between the various services. Pressure is being brought to bear to rectify this, but various sides threaten to take industrial action if they are somehow forced to co-operate--not quite the ideal situation to deal with unconventional disaster threats.