The armed conflict: counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations.

The main distinguishing features of modern armed conflicts are as follows: the local (cluster like) character of combat operations; the absence of a continuous frontage as a line of confrontation between the sides to the conflict; the absence of direct contact (engagement) between the sides' troops; the blurry boundaries between the front line and the rear lines; continuous overt and covert operations, and action on the "front is everywhere" principle. All of this significantly complicates counterinsurgency and counterterrorist actions.

Analysis of combat operation in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and in Chechnya shows that illegal armed formations (IAF) produced many unpleasant surprises for Soviet/Russian troops which in many cases proved to be insufficiently prepared for counterinsurgency, including counter sniper action. The use of modern wheeled all-terrain vehicles enabled the adversary to carry out surprise raids and deadly attacks, immediately retreating or redeploying to other positions. As far as Soviet/Russian forces were concerned, they proved incapable of taking effective action against fire ambushes that were laid for both individual groups of servicemen (vehicles) and large convoys which sustained unjustifiably high losses in men and materiel. Mines and explosive obstacles that the adversary laid in the most unexpected places were a real scourge for federal troops. Mine warfare and surprise raids kept personnel in constant suspense not only in the performance of combat missions but also at rest. There was practically no lull there. Even at a time when there were no large scale operations, troops sustained substantial losses from terrorist and raiding attacks.

During the combat operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya, counterinsurgency tactics developed along the following lines: group (team) methods of the preparation and conduct of reconnaissance in force, assault and commando operations in mountainous terrain, population centers, forests, urban areas, and flat land terrain, in the course of raiding action and bypassing movement; improving the tactics of combat action groups (comprised of two or three servicemen) in sealing off and wiping out small commando (insurgent) groups; methods of focal and selective engagement of enemy forces, combat employment of mobile groups and counterinsurgent units, manning checkpoints in protecting communication lines, and conducting in-depth reconnaissance; implementing camouflage, concealment and deception measures, and providing all round technical and logistic support for mixed (combined) arms units.

At the same time, the events in Budennovsk (1995) and Kizlyar (1990) highlighted a whole number of problems in the organization and conduct of operations against large commando (raiding) detachments, penetrating areas controlled by federal forces and staging surprise attacks against vital installations and facilities. The principal problem was the lack of coordination between various agencies and the absence of a single command and control center for all forces employed in counter terrorist operations.

This has to be reiterated as 10 years after the aforementioned events, little has been done to work out regulations, ordinances, guidelines and instructions on joint actions by formations (units) of the Ground Troops, the Interior Troops of the Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD), the Border Service of the FSB (Federal Security Service), the MChS (Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters), and territorial defense and counterterrorism forces. A well organized system to prevent and stop insurgent and terrorist actions in the course of armed conflicts, based both on the rules of international law and national laws, has yet to be created. The existing documents are vague and mainly rhetorical, not providing any specific indications or guidelines as to how armed formations should act in a particular situation on the ground, how to ensure the unity of command in conducting a special counterterrorist operation, how to achieve effective interaction and coordination of action by mixed arms units and formations, but most important, how to organize special training programs for them.

New field manuals and special regulations should provide theoretical foundations for the combat employment and interaction of combined-arms formations and units of the Interior Troops, the FSB Border Service, and territorial defense forces in a special countersabotage and counterterrorist operation; provide a description of the character and content of such an operation; and offer recommendations to commanders and headquarters staffs of units and formations of mixed-agency structures in combating sabotage and terrorist actions in conducting reconnaissance, raiding, blocking, and assault operations in different circumstances and different terrain conditions (flatland, mountains, population centers, urban areas, forests, at night time, in summer, winter, etc.).

The complexity and uniqueness of a specific situation on the ground; the unconventionality of tasks set to mixed arms formations in conflict areas; and the originality of methods and modes of action that they take are the main distinguishing features of their combat employment in armed conflicts, in countering sabotage and terrorist acts. So field manuals, regulations and instructions should clearly define the role, place, tasks and methods of action by a specific type of military formations in preparing and conducting a special counter-sabotage or counter-terrorist operation.

For example, combined-arms units (subunits) in a special operation can be tasked with protecting important (vital) installations, logistic bases, and communication lines; preventing surprise raids; taking counter ambush and sniper action; searching out sabotage and terrorist groups; providing security for motor convoys; patrolling missions and assault action in urban areas. In their deployment (basing) areas, units (subunits) can station guard elements, screening forces, lookout and patrol posts, concealed surveillance posts, and security details.

Here it is especially important to ensure the tactical independence of small subunits, including their firepower. After all, a motorized rifle platoon will often have to perform an independent mission: man a checkpoint, a reconnaissance or a lookout post, a guard or screening force, or act as part of an assault group. In many instances, a motorized rifle (tank) company will have to act out of contact with the main forces. As for a motorized rifle (tank) battalion, it is a basic tactical element. It is used as a basis for packaging bypassing, raiding, and assault detachments, mobile groups and tactical air assault forces.

Small mobile groups (mortar, machinegun, flame-throwing crews; machine-gunners; a group of snipers or sappers, etc.) will be playing an increasing role in combating sabotage and terrorist formations. If necessary, mobile groups can be reinforced with a tank, an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) or an artillery (mortar) battery. The inclusion of snipers into a mobile group is necessary to combat snipers as part of sabotage and terrorist formations, to quickly engage opportunity targets (machine-gunners, grenade launchers, sappers), prevent the penetration of commandos (raiders) into a military installation, protect obstacles, and provide coverage to field engineers. Infantry fighting vehicles or combat reconnaissance vehicles attached to mobile action groups should be equipped with an automated complex of technical reconnaissance facilities, both fixed and off-vehicle.

Reconnaissance subunits should have special combat reconnaissance vehicles (recce vehicles) built on light off-road trucks. They should be able to determine the coordinates (location) of sabotage and terrorist groups whenever they go on the air, in the entire range of the electromagnetic spectrum--optical, optical-electronic, thermal, acoustic, magnetometric, and radio-electronic. Such a recce vehicle should be provided with an engine noise suppressor/filter and have an extra fuel and ammunition supply. It can be armed with an automatic gun, a coaxial machine gun, anti-tank guided rockets with a range of 1.5 km to 2 km, and tactical reconnaissance means: a radar with an effective range of up to 10 km to 15 km, a laser range finder with a range of up to 10 km, and a thermal imaging device with an observation range of up to 4 km.

Mobile action groups should be equipped with reinforced communication systems--shortwave radios with a weight (on the company level) of not more than 2 kg to 2.5 kg. FM (UHF) radios should weigh 1 kg to 1.5 kg and have a range of up to 30 km. Scouts should be provided with FM (UHF) radios with a range of up to 3 km to 5 km and a weight of not more than 0.3 kg.

Technical (instrumental) reconnaissance means should be standardized (interoperable) search, interception, direction finding and technical analysis systems, using state of the art computing technology in information processing. Furthermore, in countering sabotage and terrorist formations, in certain cases it will be necessary to package mobile EW groups, comprised of a short-wave jamming platoon and an aviation FM (UHF) communication jamming platoon. The EW group should be equipped with interceptors of digital cellular systems and paging communication systems, satellite communication systems and communications intercept recording systems.

Current models of small arms and light weapons, rockets, missiles, grenade launchers, mines and explosive devices for mobile action groups also need modernization and upgrading. For example, 12.7 mm sniper rifles with a range of up to 2 km will make it possible to effectively engage enemy troops at distances ensuring a sniper's survival. Small arms and light weapons should have add-on muzzle noise and flame suppressors.

Units and subunits of the MVD Interior Troops play a leading role in countering sabotage and terrorism in an armed conflict. In the counter terrorist operation in Chechnya (1999-2000), in interaction with combined-arms formations and units, they performed the following missions: took part in special operations to destroy illegal armed formations; ensured public order in restricted zones; accompanied and protected transport convoys with military cargo, personnel and materiel; enforced the curfew; conducted search operations to determine the location of illegal armed formations; and conducted reconnaissance of fire ambushes laid by militants, as well as of mines and explosive obstacles.

Interior Troops in special operations searched for saboteurs and terrorists in restricted and unrestricted zones (population centers), carried out raiding action, surrounded and destroyed militants, and protected sensitive installations. Searches in a restricted area were conducted with sufficient forces and assets using fixed and mobile checkpoints, concealed surveillance posts, and screening and security forces along the possible lines of movement by sabotage and terrorist groups. The search for enemy forces in an unrestricted area was conducted by blocking off all approach routes with subsequent combing and mopping up operations.

Raiding action by mobile search groups proved highly effective, covering extensive areas. This method was used when there were not enough assets to block an area. In that case a strong reserve was formed to deal with unscheduled (impromptu) tasks.

One important task of the MVD Interior Troops was curfew enforcement and protection of sensitive installations, which was ensured by patrolling, provision of armed details, the establishment of checkpoints and security outposts, and the use of mobile armored groups and helicopter borne rapid response units. Armed details and checkpoints ensured access and entry regulations and procedures, restricted the movement of transport, and conducted the search of such transport facilities. In a special operation to search and destroy sabotage and terrorist formations, units (subunits) of the MVD Interior Troops had a special force configuration, comprised of blocking, search, encirclement, security, defense, escort, fire delivery and mobile action detachments (groups). Their service (combat) capabilities were characterized by the following operational and tactical indicators: the area of operation in an emergency zone, the number of installations under their protection, and the number of security, patrol, and screening posts and checkpoints.

In an armed conflict in a border area, the FSB Border Service Troops take an active part in combating sabotage and terrorist formations. Their main objective is to prevent the penetration of foreign mercenaries and the supply of arms, military equipment and materiel to reinforce illegal armed formations and to counter sabotage and terrorism in border areas. Should the crime situation aggravate border troops are put on higher alert status; if necessary, they search for saboteurs and carry out other operations and actions. In conducting a special operation, border guard units interact with combined-arms formations and units of the MVD Interior Troops (direct, line of vision, electronic, fire support, tactical, operational and special interaction).

One important combat function of FSB Border Service units (formations) is combat alert duty--i.e., a high intensity use of forces and assets with an increased density of the deployment of forces and assets on a wide frontage and in-depth. In search operations, a Border Service unit (detachment) can conduct reconnaissance action within the section of the state border under its protection or within its area of responsibility.

Territorial defense agencies are also employed to combat sabotage and terrorist formations. Priority here is given to reinforcing all forms of reconnaissance; clarifying the procedure for the interaction of troops, forces and assets; additional coordination and synchronization of their efforts in fulfilling the tasks of destroying sabotage and terrorist groups; and clarifying the procedure for information exchange and warning, interaction and identification signals. Units and subunits detailed from a military district to combat sabotage and terrorist groups take positions and organize them according to plan, and establish a security and fortification system.

Military district forces as well as units (combined units) of various branches of service ensure the protection of military installations that were not protected in peacetime, above all elements of vital services. Units and subunits detailed to perform this function are, within the established time limits, placed under the command of the security chiefs of said installations who direct them to take prepared positions (or prepare new positions), areas and sectors of defense, and establish obstacles around them. Special priority is given to installations that can be vulnerable to sabotage (terrorist) attacks.

Forces and assets designed to counter the enemy's sabotage and terrorist groups are put on alert. Areas of possible action by such groups are placed under special surveillance. In territorial defense zones, these groups are typically engaged by forces and assets made available for this mission from a military district, MVD formations, FSB Border Service troops, and mobile search and mopping up detachments.

As soon as there is evidence of sabotage or terrorist activity, preplanned operational, search and assault operations are carried out with the aim to search out, block and destroy them. In an area of possible sabotage or terrorist action, sensitive installations and communication lines are placed under reinforced protection and defense with the commanders of security units (subunits), formations and agencies of a military district and other troops, as well as local authorities duly informed about the imminent danger.

Border Troops conduct reconnaissance to establish the composition of enemy forces and identify the lines (areas) of their action; prevent the penetration of sabotage (commando) groups and bandit formations from abroad; counter covert agent intelligence, sabotage and terrorist activity in their area of responsibility; and implement access and entry regulations and procedures and filtration measures.

Territorial defense agencies and MVD Interior Troops reinforce the protection of assigned installations; effectively engage sabotage and terrorist groups and illegal armed formations; in interaction with FSB agencies, conduct special operations, implement access and entry regulations and procedures, and other measures established under emergency rule regulations; enforce public order and security; provide traffic control and regulating service, and ensure the stable operation of vital communication services.

FSB agencies notify the military command and ruling authorities about the location of sabotage and terrorist groups, supervise the implementation of tightened protection and security measures at sensitive installations, and combat subversive elements in their area of responsibility.

MChS formations are used to develop positions and prepare field fortifications for protection and security units and build obstacles.

Organization of information and psychological warfare, especially on the tactical level, is still an outstanding problem. This is due above all to the shortage of assets in combined-arms formations. Today, this function in a combined-arms unit is entrusted to intelligence agencies that have one PA (loudspeaker) system. There are no print facilities available for this purpose. Printed material on the tactical level can be disseminated mainly with artillery shells.

In this context, the Soviet experience in the organization of information and psychological warfare in Afghanistan is noteworthy. In 1981, Guide-lines on Political Work among Enemy Combatants and Civilians were approved, laying the groundwork for information and psychological warfare (IPW). T/O IPW positions were established: in the army, a special propaganda section (six officers); in the division, a special propaganda officer/instructor; in the regiment, deputy regiment commander for liaison with civilians. T/O propaganda and agitation units were set up in regiments and divisions that conducted "propaganda raids" along the main communication lines abutting Soviet military positions.

Command and control of those agencies was decentralized since units of the 40th Army in Afghanistan were dispersed throughout the country. So unit commanders often acted independently, based on the prevailing situation on the ground. Organization of command and control of propaganda operations was entrusted mainly to the division staff as well as to deputy regiment commanders for liaison with civilians (noncombatants). At that time, a considerable advance was made in information and psychological warfare operations, which had a positive effect on military action.

Based on the available experience, the following recommendations on the organization of information and psychological warfare in a combined-arms unit can be made. It should be based on commander's decision and order by a superior staff, taking into account the national-psychological specifics of the local population (noncombatants) and combatants. Combined-arms unit commander formulates the objective, main tasks and principal targets of psychological warfare and sets tasks for IPW organization and planning which is directly controlled by a unit deputy commander. Proceeding from the tasks set by the unit commander and superior staff, he issues orders to the intelligence chief, sets time frames for the development of planning documents, and approves draft IPW materials in a foreign language.

One major component of planning IPW activities is the organization of interaction which includes synchronization of efforts and activities by staff subdivisions and chiefs of arms and branches of service. The areas of coordination are as follows:

* with the special operations unit: the procedure for putting IPW subunits on alert; areas of their deployment; the time, routes and procedures for the employment of forces and assets; the time frame and sequence of the fulfillment of tasks; combat orders on psychological warfare; and concealment and deception measures.

* with the EW service: the time frame and procedure for detailing EW assets for psychological warfare operations and the time for ending jamming on IPW radio frequencies;

* with the signals service: technical maintenance and support for PA systems; the time frame and procedure for making available additional facilities for IPW activities; and procedure for the delivery of IPW materials;

* with the artillery headquarters staff: organization of the distribution of leaflets, the time frame and procedure for the distribution of IPW leaflets in a designated area.

The bulk of IPW planning and organization activities is currently entrusted to a combined-arms unit's intelligence service. It is the view of the present authors that this function should be transferred to the unit deputy commander for indoctrination and propaganda, as was the case during the Great Patriotic War (WW II). He should have control over all IPW forces and assets with uniform tasks and objectives.

To conduct effective IWP activities, a combined-arms unit should have an essential minimum of technical equipment: printing and duplication facilities, dissemination equipment, PA systems, mobile broadcasting stations, special communication equipment, and film recording and duplication facilities.

It should be noted that IPW assets can play an important role in misleading and deceiving an adversary. For example, during the combat operations in Chechnya in April 1995, a PA system for two days imitated the movement of tanks near the town of Argun. As a result, the militants abandoned their prepared positions and retreated to the foothills.

In conclusion, it should be said that the experience in countering sabotage and terrorist activities during the combat operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya requires in-depth study and generalization. The present authors agree with Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov (see: Antiterroristicheskaya deyatelnost VS RF) (1) about the pressing need for developing a national concept for countering terrorism, identifying specific terrorist threats, and making appropriate amendments to the Constitution, the Military Doctrine, and the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation on this issue.

NOTE:

1. Voennaia mysl', No. 9, 2003, p. 47.

Maj. Gen. I.N. VOROBYOV (Ret.)

Doctor of Military Sciences, professor

Col. V.A. KISELEV

Doctor of Military Sciences, professor