The appointment of Lieutenant-General Squires the role of MajorGeneral Sir Carl Jess in the conflict between the military board and the government.

Introduction

The 1930s was a challenging period for the Australian Army and the Military Board. The impact of the Great Depression saw the Army suffer huge reductions in personnel, and until the late 1930s, little effort was made to re-equip or modernize the Army. Political expediency combined with a parsimonious attitude towards defence by the Scullin Labour Government since it abandoned Universal Training in 1930, an approach continued by the Lyons Government when it took office in 1932, left the Army in a position where budget cuts had denied the Army the ability to defend Australia and its interests from attack.

By early 1935, two outstanding officers had been appointed to the Military Board--John Lavarack as Chief of the General Staff [CGS), and Sir Cart Jess, as Adjutant-General. Both men had forceful personalities which were to lead to a conflict between the Board and two successive Defence Ministers (Parkhill & Thorby), and the newly appointed Secretary of the Defence Department, Frederick Shedden. It was this perceived lack of co-operation during a period in which the threat of a European conflict appeared increasingly likely, that led the Lyons Government in 1938 to appoint a British general--E K Squires as Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces.

In his recent book The Australian Army, Albert Palazzo dismisses this crisis thus: `in June 1938 the government finally appointed a new Inspector-General. The government chose to overlook Lavarack for the position, and instead selected a British officer, Lt-Gen Ernest K Squires' (p. 123). The crisis that arose within the senior ranks of the Staff Corps, and particularly the Military Board, from that appointment, deserves greater attention from historians, and is the subject of today's paper.

Major-General John D Lavarack (1885-1952). When he was appointed as CGS In April 1935, Lavarack was a colonel in the Permanent Forces. Upon his appointment Lavarack superseded more senior officers including Sir Carl Jess, who had been Adjutant-General since late 1934. Lt-Col Lavarack had attended the Imperial Defence College in 1928, along with Shedden and Lt-Col Squires. Lavarack, although seen as having an `egotistic and patronising manner', was also recognised as possessing `conspicuous ability'. Unfortunately, in 1930, in his capacity as Director of Military Operations & Intelligence, he had written a caustic rebuttal of a paper presented by Shedden, in which Shedden advocated a defence strategy that relied on the protection of the Royal Navy and the yet to be completed naval base at Singapore, as Shedden predicted only small raids upon the Australian coastline. Lavarack argued that Australia could be subjected to attack by Japan, and a strategy that relied on the protection of the Royal Navy was flawed. Such views which were vindicated a mere decade later, and the forceful manner in which Lavarack expressed his opinions both to Shedden and the Defence Ministers, marginalised Lavarack and the Military Board from effective input to the Government on some defence issues.

Major-General Sir Carl Jess (1894-1948). The son of a German immigrant, Jess was a career soldier who had as his mentors two senior Great War generals--Sir John Monash and Lord Birdwood. Regarded as a brilliant staff officer and administrator, Jess had ended the war as a brigadier-general [GOC 10 Brigade], having risen to that rank from that of lieutenant in less than ten years, and in 1919 took over from Monash as Director of Demobilization and Commandant of AIF HQ in England. Loved by his soldiers when he commanded the 7th Battalion, Jess nonetheless possessed a pugnacious and autocratic manner which at times during his earlier career, had placed him at odds with the Military Board. After being knighted as a reward for his role in organising the 1934 Victorian Centenary, Jess was appointed as Second Member of the Military Board in December 1934. Five months later, he was overlooked when Lavarack, his junior in rank and service was appointed. Governments, using the familiar excuse of financial restraint, did not give Jess; and other senior officers the opportunity to improve their knowledge of high level policy and planning through overseas secondments and visits.

Ministers of Defence. Politicians to hold this portfolio during the mid-late 1930s included Sir Archdale Parkhill [October 1934-November 1937], Harold Thorby [November 1937-November 1938], and Brigadier Geoffrey Street [November 1938-November 1939]. Parkhill was regarded as having `neither the necessary experience nor the required technical knowledge to formulate an effective Australian defence policy'. Parkhill had clashed with the Military Board in 1936 over an article in The Bulletin of 22 July 1936, in which the Government's handling of defence was harshly criticised. This incident led Parkhill to suspect that leaks to the press may have come from the Board. Harold Thorby was the Minister who took the initial brunt of the Parliamentary and public outcry about the appointment of Squires during 1938, but in November that year he was replaced by Brigadier Street, MC, who had served at Gallipoli, and after the war continued to serve in the militia, being promoted to brigadier in 1938.

Frederick Shedden (1893-1971)--Secretary of the Department of Defence. When Frederick Shedden took over as Secretary upon the retirement of M L Shepherd in November 1937, it heralded a new force in defence politics and administration. Shedden was a brilliant administrator who was also a confirmed Imperialist. Such views had already brought him into conflict with Lavarack, and during the late 1930s, the Military Board and Shedden became increasingly distant from each other. It was due to Shedden's influence, some might suggest scheming, that Prime Minister Lyons finally agreed after periodic urging by Shedden, to the appointment of a British officer to the lapsed post of Inspector-General [held by General Sir Harry Chauvel until his retirement In 1930]. Shedden exerted great influence over his political `masters', and in 1936 advised Parkhill that it `is undesirable that the Army should have access to information relating to the other services which may prove a embarrassment to the minister and the Government'. During that same year Shedden also persuaded Parkhill to withdraw his recommendation for Lavarack to be elevated to a CB.

Lieutenant-General Kenneth Squires (1882-1940). Educated at Eton, Squires was a career officer in the Indian Army, who had fought as a Royal Engineer major in the Great War, but had subsequently held a series of highly responsible appointments. The 56 year old Squires who had been serving as Director of Staff Duties at the War Office since 1936, was duly offered and accepted the post of Inspector-General by the Australian Government. He was promoted to lieutenant-general simultaneously with his appointment as Inspector-General.

A New Inspector-General

In November and December 1937, the Military Board and the Staff Corps were rocked by a series of critical articles written by Major-General H Gordon Bennett, a militia officer who had commanded the 6th Battalion and the 3rd Brigade during the Great War. The political furore that ensured, almost led to Bennett being court-martialled, an approach favoured by Jess and the Military Board, who were disturbed by the bitter attack on the Staff Corps. However, by late January 1938, a compromise solution was reached, with most senior officers accepting that Bennett's career appeared to have been seriously damaged. The Bennett affair merely added to the Government's growing disaffection with the Military Board, and by April 1938, it had become generally known that the Lyon's Government was going to appoint a British general to the post of Inspector-General, a post left vacant since the retirement of Chauvel. The Government came under sustained attack from the Labour opposition when it was revealed that the Military Board had not been consulted about the appointment, and during one Parliamentary debate, Senator Charles Brand, a brigadier-general from the Great War, claimed that "the appointment would be an insult to the capable Australian generals still on the active list." In defending its decision, the Government claimed that Australian officers had `been out of touch with modern developments', but if that was the case, it was entirely due to the Government's reluctance to finance overseas visits by senior officers. Political attacks upon the appointment of Squires accelerated in September 1938, when it was revealed that he was to receive a salary double to that received by his Australian contemporaries!

Despite the political outcry and widespread public condemnation of the appointment, the Government stuck by its decision, and Squires was given the task of writing reports on the Australian Army, and providing recommendations for change. By December 1938, Squires had completed his first report and handed It to the Minister. Squires recommended the formation of the existing seven Military Districts into four commands. A key recommendation of his report was the formation of a regular infantry brigade, but although initially accepted by the Government, this recommendation was not proceeded with. In January 1939, Shedden forwarded a copy of the report to the Military Board seeking their comments. Although not in agreement with all aspects of the report, the Board gave its qualified approval. However, the simmering antagonism between the Military Board and the Government was soon to re-appear.

The Government's `hidden agenda Squires as CGS

In April 1939, General Jess heard rumours that the Government intended to appoint Squires as CGS. The so-called `imperial cringe factor' which saw the need to appoint British officers to senior military posts in the Australian forces, was alive and well, and strongly supported by

the new Prime Minister, Robert Menzies. In February 1940, a British officer Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett was appointed as Chief of the Air Staff, and from 1937-1941, Admiral Colvin of the Royal Navy served as Chief of the Naval Staff. This meant that at various times between 1939 and 1940, all three service chiefs were British officers.

Jess as Adjutant-General was responsible for the administration of the army, and was so alarmed by the recent appointment of Squires as Inspector-General, and the rumours regarding the post of CGS, that he sought the views of the Judge Advocate-General, Bowie-Wilson, regarding the legality of the Squires' appointment. On 26 April 1939, Jess wrote to Brigadier Street, voicing his concerns about the legality of Squires as Inspector-General, quoting the Defence Act, Sections 8(1), 4 and 14. The essence of Jess, argument was that as Squires was not a member of the Permanent Forces, he could only have been appointed as a local lieutenant-general in the militia. If that interpretation was correct, Squires could not be appointed as a Member of the Military Board or as CGSuntil existing regulations wore amended.

The Legal Arguments

Coincidental to these legal arguments, came news that the Government was sending Lavarack to England in order to update himself on the deteriorating situation in Europe. Fearing that the rumours regarding Squires' elevation to CGS would now be realised with Lavarack conveniently out of the country, Jess sought a format legal opinion from the Judge Advocate-General. The Military Board was now faced with a challenge to its authority, and on 9 May 1939, Jess sent a copy of the flies to Lavarack who was about to leave the country on board the SS Otranto, so that he would be fully aware of the legal developments.

From the Government's point of view, the departure of Lavarack provided two benefits--it removed an outspoken critic of the Government's defence policy, and also provided the opportunity to install Squires as Acting CGS. The machinations between the Government and Shedden would provide ample scope to historians seeking to explore conspiracy theories. The Government now announced that Squires would be Acting CGS during the absence of Major-General Lavarack. With relationships between the Military Board and the Government at its lowest ebb for many years, Jess at last received Bowie-Wilson's legal opinion. Like Jess, Bowie-Wilson also held very strong views about the Squires' appointment., and argued that: `I have no doubt that it is illegal to appoint Lieutenant-General Squires--or any other British officer--to the position of Inspector-General of the Forces under the present Defence Act.'

On 12 May 1939, Jess forwarded Bowie-Wilson's opinion to Street in his capacity as Minister for Defence. Rather than expose the Government to further public scrutiny regarding Squires, Jess suggested to Street that `in the interests of the service that the matter should be kept as secret as possible'. Jess even avoided showing the explosive legal opinion to his fellow Board Members. By his actions in seeking the Judge Advocate-General's opinion regarding the legality of the Government's actions, and then going directly to the Minister rather than through Shedden, Jess placed his own career in jeopardy.

Street now sought his own legal advice, and the Solicitor-General conveniently assured him that the Government's actions were quite legal. This approval permitted Street to confirm Squires' appointment. Bowie-Wilson was outraged when he found that his legal opinion had been rejected by the Government. He wrote to Jess seeking a copy of the dissenting opinion, adding `in fairness to myself, I think I am entitled to see the reasons given for disagreeing with my opinion. Street responded to Jess with a hand-written note in which he agreed to send Bowie-Wilson a copy of the opinion, and also agreed to keep the correspondence secret as had earlier been suggested by Jess.

Replacing Old Guard

Thus ended a crisis which had occupied the attention of the Military Board, the Minister, and no doubt Shedden, for some months. As a result of Squires' recommendations, on 11 August 1939, the Government announced the retirement of the two remaining Members of the Military Board, Major-Generals Jess and Phillips [QMG], together with a long list of other senior officers to be placed on the Reserve of Officers. In his absence, Lavarack was confirmed, albeit temporarily, as CGS. The well known aviator and politician, Sir Thomas White declared that `At a time like the present with the world situation full of dangerous possibilities, it might be legitimately asked whether such steps are well advised. A drastic change in Military Board personnel seemed a strange move at such a season.' Jess of course challenged the new appointments, and in particular that of Brigadier Charles Miles, the Commandant at RMC Duntroon, who was of the same age as Jess, and whose military and administrative experience was much less than that of Jess.

The final irony was that the officer appointed to replace Jess as Adjutant-General, was Colonel E K Smart whose daughter was later to marry Jess' younger son John [later Liberal MP). However, Jess was reprieved by the outbreak of war a couple of weeks later. His retirement was cancelled and he was appointed as Chairman of the Manpower Planning Committee, with the rank of lieutenant-general, but he was denied the active command he sought Lavarack was sidelined into the post of GOC Southern Command, and on 13 October 1939, the Government appointed Squires as CGS, and Blamey as GOC 6th Division, A1F. It was not until April 1940, that Lavarack was given the opportunity to demonstrate his capabilities as GOC 7th Division, AIF.

Summary

The pre-war period had been a difficult one for the Military Board, having been exposed to public condemnation as a result of the Gordon Bennett articles in the press in 1937, and then the appointment of General Squires in the following year. The prickly relationship between the Military Board and successive Defence Ministers, played into the hands of Shedden as Secretary of the Department of Defence. Although charged with administering and maintaining the Australian Army, a decade of reduced budgets, and a near sighted vision of future defence needs by Governments, placed the Board in an impossible position. Opportunities to influence defence policy dissipated due to the uneasy relationship between Lavarack and Shedden.

The appointment of Squires was an attempt by Shedden and the Government to circumvent a critical Military Board and seek ideas from a fresh `untainted' source. This paper has briefly covered the turmoil created by civilian and political intrusion into the administration of the Army, and the problems which arose largely from the clash of personal egos during a period in which the Government, Military Board and the Department of Defence should have been working to a common goal, that of the defence of Australia. Whether or not intrusion by civilian defence bureaucrats into the areas of military planning and defence policy, prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 was appropriate, remains a matter of debate. Interestingly, a recent article by Brigadier Wallace in the Defender, in which he claims that `the frustration of serving in a structure that subordinates professional military advice to amateur civilian opinion should not be underestimated', suggest that such problems remain today!

Further reading:

R Austin. A Soldier's Soldier The Life of Lt-Gen Sir Carl Jess. Slouch Hat Publications, McCrae, 2001.

D Homer. Defence Supremo Allen the Unwin St Leonards, 2000.

Brig J Wallace. `Reforming Defence', Defender, Winter 2002.