The academy of Military Sciences in 2001-2005: achievements and problems.

On December 17, 2005, a general meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences was held at the Cultural Center of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. It was attended by senior personnel of the Defense Ministry, the General Staff, and other "power structures," representatives of the country's leading military colleges and universities, as well as state and government officials, public and political figures, and members of the Academy. This issue of MT carries the highlights of the report by General of the Army M.A. Gareev, president of the Academy; and the presentation by Admiral V.V. Masorin, commander in chief of the Russian Navy.

Results

The Academy was founded more than 10 years ago, and today we are in effect evaluating our performance in the past several years of the 21st century. During this time the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) was fulfilling the tasks that were set to it under the Russian President's Edict No. 173, dated February 20, 1995 and the defense minister's 1997 directive, and working in accordance with the Academy's approved plans.

It should be noted that unfortunately there is still much unjustified criticism of public academies. Not so long ago, writing in the Nezavisimaia gazeta daily (Nov. 9, 2005), A.V. Yurevich, D.Sc., called into question the rationale behind such academies, stating that "today, practically any person can create his own academy." Despite all of this, we have every reason to say that the creation of the Academy of Military Sciences was well justified. In this connection, it would be appropriate to recall that its co-founders were 10 authoritative scientific organizations in the Russian Federation. It was established under an edict of the president of the Russian Federation. Generally speaking, the creation of pubic scientific organizations is the dictate of the times.

There is a growing realization in the world, including in Russia, that science should not be a sub-structure subordinated to the state and controlled by it, but an independent social partner of the state and an independent community expanding knowledge and developing new technologies. In his state of the nation address to the Federal Assembly, President V.V. Putin stressed that it is necessary to finance not science in general, but specific scientific research projects. We can and should work to ensure that the state increase funding for science, but at the same time we need to understand that in the prevailing economic situation this is only possible on a rather limited scale. Meanwhile, without steady, sustained development of science and technology, Russia will not be able to revive and take a worthy position in the world.

In light of the aforementioned, there are basically two ways of overcoming this situation.

First, by improving and enhancing the effectiveness of scientific and research activity by the Russian Academy of Sciences, universities, and other state scientific and research establishments.

Second, whether some people may like this or not, the interests of the state, society and science itself require the provision of effective incentives to public scientific organizations and individual scientists and researchers who for some reason or other are not part of the state scientific structure. These two lines of work should not be opposed to each other, but should complement each other.

The Russian Academy of Sciences offers its membership only to the country's outstanding scientists, while even the majority of D.Sc. degree holders and professors are not Academy members. Yet even these scientists should have an opportunity to pool their efforts and cooperate. This problem is especially acute in the defense related sectors of industry and science. The Russian Academy of Sciences does not have a specific department or subdivision that is designed to deal with defense and related problems. Without the Academy of Military Sciences, there will be no one to address these problems. At the same time, today, like never before, there is a pressing need for a more economical and effective solution to defense related problems.

The Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, the Academy of Military Sciences, the Academy of Social and Humanitarian Sciences, the Rocket and Artillery Academy, the Engineering Academy, and some other academies emerged in response to this objective need with the aim of better tapping the resources of a broader range of scientists and researchers in various fields.

Of course, this sphere has its own share of problems to deal with. For example, certain public academies grant membership to persons who do not even have advanced degrees. But such liberties must not cast a shadow on all academies. For instance, membership at the Academy of Military Sciences is only open to D.Sc. degree holders. Following the recommendation of the Russian State Duma, we recommended all AMS members not to call themselves "academicians" but "AMS members" or "AMS corresponding members." Any new undertaking can devalue or discredit a basically sound and reasonable idea. Yet this is no reason to besmirch or "prohibit" the sheer idea of creating public scientific organizations.

So, instead of "prohibiting" and persecuting public scientific associations, it is necessary to create such regulations and rules for their registration and activity that would prevent all sorts of abuses and the devaluation of the traditional academic titles and degrees, including such a highly respected title as "academician."

We consider it necessary that the Ministry of Justice, together with the Russian Academy of Sciences and representatives of public academies, work out some general requirements for the status of such public associations as academies. At the same time, it is quite obvious that when all is said and done, the standing and prestige of any academy, including the Academy of Military Sciences, will hinge on their performance and the specific results that they achieve.

Very much here is predicated on the degree to which the high military command and the leadership of other "power agencies" will tap AMS experience and knowledge in the field, including its R & D projects. There are some positive examples to this effect: Our advice is often sought; we are invited to take part in the work of the State Duma Defense Committee and the Defense and Security Committee of the Federation Council; we receive regular assignments and are regularly consulted by Gen. of the Army Yu.N. Baluevskiy, chief of the General Staff; Gen. of the Army A.M. Moskovskiy, deputy defense minister for arms procurements; Col. Gen. A.S. Skvortsov, deputy chief of the General Staff; Col. Gen. Gerasimov, head of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the RF Armed Forces; and A.A. Koltyukov, director of the Institute of Military History. Not so long ago, the AMS Council had a meeting with General of the Army N.A. Pankov, who spoke about plans to reform the military personnel training system. For our part, we offered out comments and proposals. The annual meeting of the Academy's Naval Department was attended by Admiral V.V. Masorin, commander in chief of the Russian Navy. In his scientific endeavors, Col. Gen. N.Ye. Solovtsev constantly relies on the Peter the Great Academy, as well as veterans of the Strategic Missile Forces. A remarkable example of a harmonious combination of science and practice has been shown by Col. Gen. L.S. Maltsev, the defense minister of the Republic of Belarus; and Gen. A.A. Pavlovskiy, the chairman of the Belarus State Border Protection Committee, which has a highly positive effect on military force development. Furthermore, it seems that this is not exactly a matter of free choice. Presidential Edict No. 173 (on the establishment of the Academy of Military Sciences) said in part: "In dealing with defense related problems, federal executive agencies should tap the resources of the Academy of Military Sciences." We are not trying to impose ourselves on anyone, but the presidential edict strongly recommends such cooperation.

It is therefore regrettable that certain political and scientific figures are concerned not about how to stimulate the development of science, expand and deepen scientific research, tapping the country's scientific potentialities, but about their titles and prestige even though this is also important.

There were several basic considerations behind the need to establish the Academy of Military Sciences.

First, on the one hand, due to fundamental changes in the geopolitical situation, Russia had a pressing need to deal with many new problems of defense organization and the conversion of the defense industry; on the other, some scientific research organizations began to close (in a number of CIS countries, there were none); a large number of military scientists and specialists had quit the defense complex and the Armed Forces, and Russia's scientific and military-technical capability as a whole began to decline. In order to preserve that capability, it was vital to unite and get them involved in scientific and research activity.

Second, until now, military scientific and military technical activity has been conducted mainly through state controlled agencies, their monopoly position not being conducive to healthy competition.

The establishment of the AMS helped organize systemic research programs encompassing the entire spectrum of military knowledge, including basic principles of warfare and defense security, military science and the military aspects of social, natural and technical sciences. It is especially important that the creation of the Academy of Military Sciences helps the evolution and development of independent scientific schools, and the democratization of military scientific activity.

Still, there are scientific organizations that are jealous of the new academy. Their concern is up to a certain point understandable in so far as it challenges their monopoly, while some of them are simply not prepared to work in a competitive environment amid a contest of scientific ideas. Some government agencies have certain misgivings about alternative scientific projects. Amid the identity of thought and likemindedness, it is of course easier to maintain any views. But we know what that led to in the past.

Established under an edict by the RF president and operating on a public basis, the AMS has the status as a state scientific organization, uniting the efforts of scientists and researchers in the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters (MChS), and other defense, security and intelligence related agencies, as well as the military industrial complex. Its activity helps to expand and deepen the scope of defense related research; tap an additional force of military scientists, veterans and commanders; fulfill research tasks more economically, without state subsidies, and provide an opportunity to make objective, independent judgments, and make alternative proposals on current defense related problems.

Just like other public academies, the AMS also deals with certain social problems. Many researchers work under contract with the State Duma, the Federation Council, and other state and government agencies, bringing revenues to the country in the form of taxes and deductions while not receiving any funding from the state. The employment of the most experienced and skilled researchers helps fulfill scientific tasks more effectively.

The AMS is comprised of six divisions in Moscow and 12 regional divisions--in St. Petersburg, Smolensk, Nizhniy Novgorod, the Volga Region (Saratov), Tver, the Northern Caucasus, Belarus, Bashkiria, Udmurtia, Siberia, Novosibirsk, and Kaliningrad.

Today, the AMS has 584 full members, 270 corresponding members, 38 honorary members, and 1,254 professors, 68 percent of them retired generals, admirals and officers, and 32 percent being in active military service.

During the past six years, the Academy has carried out 120 large scale research projects on contract with the Security Council, the Federation Council, the State Duma, the RF government, and the Defense Ministry, and other defense and security related government agencies; has published 65 theoretical works and more than 250 research papers. It has made expert appraisals and reviews, and provided detailed proposals on 75 draft federal laws.

Academy members have taken an active part in parliamentary hearings and scientific conferences on defense and security matters.

Main efforts were focused on analyzing threats to Russia, not least from NATO's expansion; studying ways of averting wars and armed conflicts; analyzing national security problems; forecasting prospects for the development of new weapons and military equipment; looking for more economical and effective solutions to defense related problems; studying the nature of warfare; and developing theoretical foundations of the military doctrine and military reform.

We are actively involved in the work of the Scientific Council under the RF Security Council and the Federation Council. During the past several years, we have presented to the Scientific Council the following reports: on more economical and effective ways of ensuring the country's defense security, enhancing the role of political, diplomatic, economic, informational and other non-military factors in strengthening the country's security; on measures to develop the country's scientific and research capability; on reviewing the state policy of the Russian Federation in the sphere of force organization and development until 2010; on the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the country's national security; on developing an integrated data bank on weapons, and proposals on integrating the logistic and combat support services.

Based on the results of the military scientific conference at the AMS in 2004, detailed reports were presented to the defense minister and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces on ways of streamlining command and control of the Armed Forces in local wars and armed conflicts, developing effective forms and methods of personnel training by taking into account prospects for the evolution of the military sphere, and upgrading the manpower acquisition system in the army and the navy.

An international conference on ABM problems and strategic stability was held following the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Academy members took an active part in the preparation and conduct of a military history conference at the General Staff of the Armed Forces, dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where some important conclusions were made concerning the maintenance of the combat readiness of the Armed Forces in the present conditions.

The AMS initiated a military scientific conference, jointly with senior command personnel of the Armed Forces, devoted to the 60th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Under the supervision of Adm. A.I. Sorokin, a new edition of Volume 1 of the Memory Book of those who fell in the Great Patriotic War was prepared.

At an enlarged session of its Academic Council in 2003, the AMS analyzed the lessons of the war in Iraq. Our conclusions from the lessons of that war and our proposals were published in Voennaia mysl' (Military Thought), Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, and Voenno-promyshlennyy kuryer. Academy members base their research not only on the study of documents and literature, but also on their participation in military exercises and other practical activities.

In line with the presidential edict, the AMS has been involved in international military scientific cooperation programs, especially with the CIS countries. An AMS division was opened in the Republic of Belarus. There were meetings with MoD delegations from Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and China on military scientific matters. Joint scientific conferences were held with the Institute of Defense Studies of the Republic of Korea.

During the period under review, the AMS has on the whole successfully fulfilled its plans and programs.

Our scientific research projects have been conducted in close interaction with the universities and scientific research organizations of the Defense Ministry and other defense and security related agencies, and the Russian Academy of Sciences. AMS members have published over 1,200 articles in various newspapers and journals, especially Krasnaya zvezda, Voennaia mysl', Voenno-storicheskii zhurnal, Voenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, and Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye.

Pursuant to the decision by the RF Defense Ministry Board, last year, the work to streamline the entire scientific and military historic research effort in the Armed Forces continued under the supervision of Col. Gen. A.S. Skvortsov and Lt. Gen. V.P. Volodin, chairman of the General Staff Military Scientific Committee. The AMS took an active part in this effort. But not all proposals were taken into account; supervision of the military historical research effort turned out to be extremely fragmented and dispersed (the military scientific research coordination agency, the Institute of Military History, the archival service, and the Memorial Center are subordinated to different officials), which has had a rather negative impact on the effectiveness of this work as a whole.

The AMS has also carried out a number of other research projects.

AMS Divisions

The performance of AMS divisions was evaluated at their respective general meetings. I will only make a brief overview.

Division 1, headed by Yu.A. Kirshin, has put forward some new ideas concerning the formulation of the state's military policy amid the uncertainties of the emerging new world order, political activities by state and government agencies, and peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world.

These include: sources and causes of modern wars, armed conflicts, and extremist and terrorist acts; geopolitical and geo-economic factors and security threats to Russia; the correlation of economic and political factors in an armed standoff (confrontation) today; and the role of nuclear weapons in resolving armed conflicts. One important dimension of these problems is psychological support for the effort to ensure stable command and control in extreme situations (a research team working on these problems is led by P.A. Korchemnyy, D.Sc. (Psych.), a member of the AMS).

Division researchers have developed a methodology for dealing with problems of averting armed conflicts and exercising effective command and control amid financial and other constraints, based on new approaches toward defense organization and development.

Matters related to the military science theory have been actively addressed by a team of researches led by V.D. Ryabchuk, D.Sc. (Mil.); and I.N. Vorobyov, D.Sc. (Mil.).

A promising methodology has been developed to study intellectual and information related aspects of command and control activity.

Substantial results have been achieved in developing a procedure for the military economic analysis of force organization and development. These include: identification of factors in military-economic performance; substantiation and practical application of the treasury based system of military budget implementation; the use of competitions (tenders) in addressing military economic problems; forecasting military economic indicators in defense organization; developing effective procedure to optimize the resolution of military economic problems, etc. Methodologies and procedures for military budget planning, based on the project specific principle, have been approved and adopted by state financial agencies and the Audit Chamber.

Much work is in hand on military legal issues, in particular legislative support for a new manpower acquisition system in the Armed Forces and the military personnel training and education system. A special research program, supervised by Yu.A. Kirshin, an AMS member, is aimed at developing the theoretical foundations of Russia's military doctrine.

Especially impressive results have been achieved by Petr Antonovich Korchemnyy, Mikhail Shakhov and Aleksandr Shakhov, Aleksandr Ivanovich Ponarov, Sergey Filippovich Vikulov, and Nikolay Ivanovich Kuznetsov. A team of researchers under the supervision of Col. Gen. V. V. Vorobyov has prepared a fundamental work on the history of the military-financial science, and its current problems.

Division 2, headed by V.A. Sapozhinskiy, has focused its main efforts on studying the methods of combat employment of mixed arms formations and large combined units, taking into account the specifics of modern warfare. In a situation where it has been proposed that not only strategic but also front and army operations be abandoned, the forms of combat action in local wars, armed conflicts and anti-terrorist operations are a highly relevant issue. Division 2 has produced seven theoretical works, conducted several scientific conferences, and published more than 20 articles on these issues.

A substantial contribution to the development of tactics used by combinedarms units in fighting illegal armed formations has been made by AMS members V.A. Kiselev, P.A. Dulnev, I.N. Vorobyov, S.A. Batyushkin, and V.I. Orlyanskiy, corresponding member Ye.A. Bryuzgin, and Professors V.A. Borodiy and F.P. Dragomerestkiy.

Counterterrorism is another important area of research. Military terrorism and raiding, hit and run action in combat service support areas have at all times been an essential form of impacting on the opposing side in operations (battles, engagements) of any form and on any scale. Participation of combined arms formations, units, and subunits in antiterrorist operations is nothing new. As for involving Defense Ministry forces in counter terrorist operations in peacetime (e.g., in the Northern Caucasus), we have to start from scratch here, both in theory and in practice. This especially applies to the employment of purely military units in dealing with individual terrorist acts against civilians, economic sabotage, and so forth.

In this respect, the work conducted by Section 3 (directed by AMS member A.P. Kolesnichenko) to develop mathematical models of modern combat operations is especially relevant.

One high priority area has been the study of problems related to the participation of Air Force groups and large combined units of Military Space Forces in combined-arms operations, especially in armed conflicts and peacekeeping operations. This led to the creation of a new section, designed to study the specifics of using the air/space sphere in the interest of a combined-arms operation (battle). It was headed by AMS Professor A.N. Barsukov, chief of the Yu.A. Gagarin Air Force Academy. Section 6, directed by AMS member A.P. Platonov, has been actively and productively working on forms and methods of military personnel training and indoctrination. Their proposals are given serious consideration not only by the MoD Military Training and Indoctrination Directorate, but also the relevant structures of the Russian State Duma.

Division 3, led by Col. Gen. V.V. Korobushin, has maintained its leading positions on R & D projects commissioned by the Defense Ministry, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the RF Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, and a number of design organizations in the interest of the RF Armed Forces, also providing expert appraisal of major scientific research programs carried out by other organizations for the Defense Ministry.

During the period under review, Division 3, in cooperation with the Center for the Study of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence (director V.I. Kovalev), the Scientific Research Institute of Command and Control, Information Technology, and Modeling Problems (B.V. Tarasov), and the Institute of Geo-information Studies (V.G. Yelyushkin), has carried out 80 R & D projects as a principal contractor and taken part in 150 R & D projects as a sub-contractor. Recommendations have been provided on the following major matters: forms and methods of strategic deterrence of large scale aggression against the Russian Federation; the optimal numerical strength of the Armed Forces, responding to the level of military threats to the Russian Federation, the modernization of the military command and control system, and the development of the reserve combat command and control system for strategic nuclear forces; operational-strategic principles for the development of programs and plans for force organization and military equipment; appraisal of proposals by the defense related sectors of industry on the creation of modern types of arms and military equipment; ensuring the survivability and operational effectiveness of command and control facilities; development of methodologies, procedures and mathematical models for substantiating the volume of state defense orders (contracts) and the state armament program; reforming the military training system and upgrading scientific research programs at the Defense Ministry on the application of new technologies; and streamlining the manpower acquisition system in the Armed Forces.

In 2005, the Scientific Council of the RF Security Council held three sessions of its military security section on the system of state and military command and control in the Russian Federation and military reform in the world's leading states.

A session of the Scientific Council Presidium, in July 2005, raised the question about the need to review the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

Col. Gen. V.V. Korobushin, together with military experts from the United States, took part in appraising a proposed scenario for the outbreak of a possible nuclear war. The scenario put the main emphasis on the U.S. ABM capability to engage and destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles launched against the United States.

The division has published a book entitled Osnovnye kategorii, ponyatiya i terminy voennoy nauki i sistemy znaniy o voyne i oboronnoy bezopasnosti (Basic Categories, Concepts and Terms of the Military Science and the System of Knowledge about Warfare and the Defense Security), sending complimentary copies of the book to military units, colleges and universities, and scientific research organizations under the jurisdiction of the RF Defense Ministry. The importance of this work hinges on the fact that the existing system of categories of military theories was in need of reviewing as the role of the strategic nuclear forces in deterring military threats had increased considerably, requiring a radical revision of the role, place and correlation of attack, information, command and control, and support components of the armament system in future warfare.

B.P. Gruzdev, V.I. Kovalev, B.V. Tarasov, and I.M. Golushko, as well as Gen. I.Yu. Bykov and Gen. B.V. Simonenko of the Medical Corps, have made an especially valuable and creative contribution to the overall effort by Division 3.

Division 4 (military history), led by AMS member V.A. Kulikov, took part in the preparation and conduct of a military historical conference devoted to the 60th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, as well as a number of international conferences.

A documentary film, A Prologue to the Great Patriotic War: Myths and Facts, was made that was twice aired on Russian national television as well as abroad.

Among the works published by staff members of Division 4, the following could be singled out:

* a collective study, Gosudarstvo Rossiyskoye i ego istoria (The Russian State and Its History) (coordinated and directed by Prof. V.V. Rybnikov), offering a new perspective on certain historical periods of nation-state building in Russia. The RF Education Ministry recommended the study as a textbook for higher educational establishments;

* the monograph Rossiya (SSSR) v lokalnykh voynakh i vooruzhennykh konfliktakh (Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts), ed. by A.V. Usikov.

Division veterans A.G. Kharkov, G.F. Shilov, V.A. Kulikov, and V.A. Semidetko contributed material to the Pobeda [Victory] Russian organizing committee preparing [history] textbooks for secondary schools. Appraisal was provided on 20 Russian history textbooks (D.N. Filippovykh, A.P. Volkov, V.N. Voronov, A.P. Izmaylov, and A.T. Stepanishchev).

It is also important to mention the following works:

* the monograph Istoriya oruzhiya i vooruzheniya narodov i gosudarstv s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney, by Prof. V.A. Kulikov;

* the textbook Otechestvennaya istoria, developed by Prof. A.P. Volkov, D.N. Filippovykh, AMS corresponding member A.T. Stepanishchev, Prof. Ye.Ye. Boychuk, Prof. A.F. Maklachkov, Prof. S.V. Galdobin;

* a collection of documents, Deyatelnost sovetskikh voennykh komendatur po likvidatsii posledstviy voyny i organizatsii mirnoy zhizni v sovetskoy zone okkupatsii Germanii. 1945-1949, ed. by AMS member V.V. Zakharov;

* a collective work, Sovetskiye i amerikanskiye vooruzhennye sily i ikh nemetskiye soyuzniki v Karibskom krizise, ed. by AMS member D.N. Filippovykh and Dr. Matias Uhl, published in Germany.

Staff members of the AMS Military History Department have actively engaged in historical research and the promotion of military history, participating in many international, regional and national conferences on problems of general and military history, military archives, and military museums in Russia and abroad.

Generally, we are now going through a crisis in the field of military history. There are calls for the Suvorov military school to be scrapped and the Gatchina school of Emperor Pavel I to be restored. Despite the recent celebration of the 60th anniversary of Victory in World War II, there are continuing attempts to besmirch the great Victory and falsify military history. Suffice it to recall Shtrafbat (Penal Battalion, a film), V. Pravdyuk's assertions about the war history, G. Svanidze's latest "documentary" about G.K. Zhukov, and statements to the effect that the Soviet Union unleashed World War II and suffered a defeat in it. The apparently patriotic but essentially biased, skewed approach toward certain historical events, and the desire to justify the pre-war reality is also grist for somebody else's mill. For example, it is being alleged that those who say that the TASS statement dated June 14, 1941 was mistaken or those who speak about the Nazis' surprise attack on the Soviet Union speak against Stalin, although it is known that Stalin was the first to say about this surprise attack.

Our historians are doing their best to counter these abominations, but we still lack in promptness and persuasiveness. One reason for this is that veterans and honest historians have only a limited access to the mass media and are faced with considerable difficulties in getting their military history works published. Despite all this, we must not retreat but step up our efforts to expose lies and tell the truth about the war. We must act together, and on a broad frontage.

Division 6 (national security and geopolitics) is headed by Maj. Gen. A.A. Prokhozhev, D.Sc. (Econ.). In the course of the Academy's evolution, it became clear that there were a number of scientific research areas that had an interdisciplinary character. They are closely linked with military science as such, but are developing in the associated fields of military organization and national security. That was how this division was established. It unites military and civilian researchers studying the current problems of economic, international, foreign, and internal political security.

The principal forms of research and scientific activity are:

* expert appraisal of draft regulations relating to ensuring national security and the relevant decisions that are made by supreme bodies of state governance and administration;

* conducting of scientific research into the problems of ensuring national security and geopolitics;

* publication of works and research papers by AMS members in AMS division collections; and

* training of top research personnel, retraining and advanced training programs in the specialty "national security."

Alongside the sections on geopolitics, international relations, information security and military economics, the division has a Spetsnaz [Special Forces] section (headed by B.Ye. Breslavskiy) which actively studies the basic principles of the employment of special task forces in fighting terrorism. A separate team of researchers work on the medical and biological aspects of security.

Staff members of the naval department headed by Adm. I.M. Kapitanets, with active participation and support from Adm. V.N. Kuroedov, took an active part in drafting the Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation, as well as a number of other fundamental documents formulating the state's maritime policy.

The following works and research papers are especially noteworthy:

* Voyna na more, Voenno morskaya nauka i sovremmennost by I.M. Kapitanets;

* Osnovy sistemnogo analiza morskikh problem obespecheniya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti by V.P. Sinetskiy;

* Osnovy sistemologii i natsionalnoy bezopasnosti by V.F. Dorogin and E.G. Shevelev;

* Osnovnye napravleniya morskoy deyatelnosti v Dalnevostochnom regione by A.V. Ulyanov; and

* Rossiya i Mirovoy okean na poroge XXI veka by B.N. Makeev.

The naval science also gives high priority to the study of such problems as the forms of employment of naval forces in future wars, including methods of conducting air/space operations.

In their conclusions, division researchers draw special attention to the fact that the fate of the Russian Navy, which is currently going through an extremely difficult period, hinges on the country's political leadership.

Regional divisions are an essential component and generator of new ideas and their realization. Today they account for nearly one-half of all AMS members. In 2005, the AMS incorporated the Kaliningrad Regional Division of the Academy of Military History. Regional research programs successfully combine the study of problems on the national and the regional level.

The St. Petersburg Division (director, Rear Adm. V.N. Potapov) has developed programs and a methodological apparatus for the conduct of a viable naval policy.

The Tver Regional Division (Maj. Gen. S.V. Yagolnikov) and the Volga Regional Division (Maj. Gen. M.S. Voronov) have worked out region specific recommendations on ensuring economic, military, demographic, environmental, and other types of security, presenting them to the Bashkortostan, Volga Vyatka, Omsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Saratov regional authorities. Research conducted by our scientists at the Volga Division, who have developed methods and procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons, have received international recognition.

Practically all regional divisions also address education and indoctrination related aspects of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces. Here, it is especially important to note the Northern Caucasus Division (chairman, Yu.N. Ponomarev), the Novosibirsk Division (chairman, V.A. Yusupov), and the Belarusian Division (chairman, N.P. Shekhovtsov) that have developed a coherent system of indoctrination and educational activities to prepare young men for military service.

Our regional divisions traditionally give high priority to military history research. The majority of divisions have the relevant sections that study and discuss many problems of Russia's military history, making the relevant conclusions and recommendations. The topics include regional history, the Civil War, the Great Patriotic War, the White Guards Movement, prisoners of war, combat losses, and regional impacts on combat operations.

In the past five years, regional divisions have awarded 89 D.Sc. and 370 Cand.Sc. degrees. Various aspects of scientific research activity are covered in specialist and periodical publications: Practically each regional division has its own journal. Unfortunately, sometimes they reprint materials that were first published 20 or even 30 years ago and fail to respond adequately or at all to all sorts of publications that distort the facts about the major operations of the Great Patriotic War. It is essential to ensure that our publications effectively respond to current needs, helping to overcome negative developments, and promote the truth about the war.

The AMS Dissertations Council is doing a very good job. Gen. of the Army V.N. Lobov conducts active and fruitful research.

I would like to make a special mention of the contribution made by the honorary members of the Academy such as Gen. of the Army V.L. Govorov, Marshal O.S. Losik (Armor), Fleet Adm. A.I. Sorokin, and Marshal V.M. Mikhalkin (Artillery).

In order to provide better incentives to research, the AMS, jointly with the Military Insurance Company, has established the Suvorov, Svechin and Khrulev Prizes that are awarded every year to the best researchers in the field.

On the whole, I believe that despite a number of shortfalls, the AMS Presidium has lived up to expectations.

Basic Research Conclusions

I consider it essential to draw your attention to the following ideas and conclusions arising from our research programs.

AMS research has shown that one of the most economical and effective ways of dealing with defense tasks is a broader use and a more rational balance of military and non-military means. They boil down to the following.

As is known, political, economic, ideological, and other non-military forms of action (confrontation) have occurred throughout mankind's entire history. Yet compared with the past, the importance and share of non-military means have grown considerably. In the context of globalization, political, diplomatic, economic, and information forms of warfare have become more target specific and coordinated, while their scale and effectiveness have grown, as evidenced by the events of the 1990s in Russia, Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

In this connection, it is not enough just to recognize the value and importance of non-military forms of action in upholding national interests. This requires effective and well coordinated response, high-level decisions, and high responsibility for averting and neutralizing threats or conflicts by political and diplomatic means.

Taking this into account, it would expedient to:

First, hold a special session of the RF Security Council to consider possible ways of maintaining Russia's national interests and ensuring its security by relying more actively and widely on the use of political, diplomatic, economic, informational and other non-military means, seeing this as a major precondition to ensuring the country's security in an effective and economical way, also factoring in the drastic, far reaching changes that have occurred in the international situation.

Second, it is advisable to single out threats arising from the long-term policy of certain international forces and powers aimed to destroy Russia's independence, encroach on its economic and other interests, undermine it from within, isolate it, make territorial claims on it, support separatism, terrorism, internal conflicts, and use them for interfering in Russia's internal affairs, suppress the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of RF citizens and compatriots in other countries, as well as other actions infringing on Russia's national interests, duly recording these threats in the National Security Concept, the Law on National Defense, and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

While strongly upholding Russia's national interests, it is advisable to do everything to avert confrontation with other countries both in the West and in the East. Yet, in making concessions and compromises in international cooperation, it is essential to push for something from the opposite side in return for these concessions, at the same time formalizing mutual arrangements by signing the relevant agreements so as to avoid the Gorbachev era mistakes such as NATO expansion, Germany, and so on and so forth. As V.V. Putin aptly noted, in the past several decades, Russia has given too much, so now it is time to get something back.

It is desirable to deeply analyze potential threats to Russia's national interests and on this basis to thoroughly plan and deploy well coordinated efforts in the political, diplomatic, economic, information, technological, psychological, and other spheres. All of these actions and measures, conducted by the Foreign Ministry, the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Federal Security Agency (FSB), foreign trade, intelligence, counter intelligence, and other agencies, should be coordinated and supervised by the RF Security Council and the RF government.

The secretary and staff of the Security Council should focus their main efforts on coordinating the activities of various agencies and departments in ensuring the country's security by non-military methods. Coordination of the efforts of Russia's entire military organization should be entrusted to the defense minister.

It is also essential to enhance the role of the Russian government in addressing major defense issues and in exercising effective supervision and control. Without strengthening the government's coordinating role it is impossible to ensure defense security in a balanced and economical manner. In this connection, last year we put forward a proposal that the defense minister should be deputy prime minister and deputy supreme commander not only in wartime but also in peacetime.

The first part of our proposal was fulfilled in 2005. But since the entire control over the country's security, intelligence and defense agencies is concentrated in the president's hands, the defense minister should also be a deputy supreme commander. The government should include the relevant defense directorates coordinating the activity of all defense related agencies, implementing mobilization programs, and preparing the country's population to defend their Motherland. All of these directorates should be subordinated to the deputy prime minister [defense minister]. It is expedient to restore the Defense Industry Ministry, entrusting it with coordinating functions, but excluding its former economic functions. The creation of a military-industrial commission will not be able to resolve the problem.

There is also a need for systemic research on problems concerning other than military means of warfare and effective personnel training in the use of all forms of warfare. In order to train state cadres to deal with matters of national security and defense, it would be expedient to create a special department at the Military Academy of the General Staff or the Academy of Civil Service where foremost officers from government agencies, the Defense Ministry, and other security and intelligence agencies would undergo the relevant training. The existing training programs at the General Academy cannot effectively fulfill this task.

Third, the problems of information and intellectual security, the preservation and development of culture, including the history of the Russian state, are beginning to take center stage.

Information and information technology (IT) is becoming an increasingly effectively weapon, while mastering this weapon is a high priority task in ensuring not only intellectual but also national security in its entirety. Russia, however, does not have a state body to coordinate the information activity of various agencies taking into account all of its aspects and specifics.

This necessitates the creation of a separate, independent directorate as part of the Presidential Staff or the Russian Government that would be entrusted with coordinating information activity on a countrywide level--from intellectual security, the development of a national idea and shaping Russia's favorable image abroad to countering all types of subversive activity, including the ideological support and organization of "color," "velvet" and other sorts of revolutions.

Fourth, the main prerequisite to averting all threats and to reliably ensuring Russia's national security is sustained economic development as a basis for the successful outcome of any confrontation through the use of both non-military and military means. During this period of transition, it is necessary to subordinate the country's entire internal and foreign policy as well as its national security to the interests of its economic development.

The present economic course, however, cannot ensure Russia's national interests in the long term. At any rate, it is impossible to provide the Army and the Navy with modern weapon systems. Therefore there is a pressing need to invest in new high tech sectors of industry, stimulate domestic production and effective demand, and pursue an active state investment policy. The stabilization fund should not be kept "against a rainy day," but should be used to avert such a day in the first place.

When the country's defense is at stake, it should be ensured not only with regard to military but to a broad range of other threats, not least the threat of international terrorism, using not only military but also political, diplomatic, economic, and information means to address this task. These forms of action also require more substantial economic and financial support.

Fifth, new forms of economic, information, and psychological confrontation have a considerable impact and to a very large degree modify the character of warfare, as well as the general orientation of the organizational development of the Armed Forces and other troops.

First of all, it is necessary to decide what military and defense tasks the Armed Forces and other troops should be organized and prepared to address. In light of the aforementioned, a top priority for the Russian Armed Forces and other troops is their readiness to perform combat missions in local wars, armed conflicts, and anti-terrorist operations. Yet in certain circumstances, a large-scale regional war cannot be entirely ruled out, and it is vital to ensure the mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces for such wars.

With an extremely unfavorable balance of forces in all strategic sectors, nuclear weapons remain the most important and the most reliable strategic means of deterring external aggression and ensuring Russia's defense and security. In this context, we do not support the proposal that Russia's nuclear arsenal and its command and control system should be placed under foreign control.

At the same time, given the new nature of threats, nuclear weapons should not be treated as "absolute." The idea that "as long as it has nuclear weapons, Russia's security is guaranteed" does not fully measure up to new reality. These weapons cannot be universal; they cannot be used in conflict situations to neutralize economic or information threats or to counter subversion.

In this context, it is important to give sufficient priority to the development of general-purpose forces-the Air Force, the Navy, and the Ground Forces.

In order to ensure the country reliable defense in the present conditions, alongside the strategic nuclear forces, high priority should be given to creating a unified national air defense system. This necessitates not the restoration of the Air Defense Forces as an independent branch of service, as it is sometimes proposed, but the creation of a unified Aerospace Space Defense system by integrating all assets of the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces, the Missile Defense Forces and the ASAT Defense Forces. As the enemy's military space forces will be launching missiles hundreds and thousands of kilometers away, priority should be given to creating air and antiaircraft complexes, capable of intercepting enemy missiles at distant approaches to our installations and facilities. Only this can ensure the country's reliable defense and security.

It is high time to objectively evaluate the decisive importance not only of the initial period of war but also of the first strategic strike. It is well known how hard put the Soviet Army was within the first few months of the Great Patriotic War in 1941. In modern conditions, as shown by the wars in the Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia, it is impossible to counter the first massive strike only by relying on retaliatory action. So, just as in fighting terrorism, there is a need for more proactive and if necessary, also preemptive action.

In the situation where strategic tasks are fulfilled through the joint efforts of different branches of service while operation planning is conducted not by the particular branches and arms of service but on the basis of strategic tasks that are addressed through joint efforts, the General Staff and the main commands of the branches of service should act not as separate entities but as an integrated body exercising strategic command and control of the Armed Forces, directed by the Supreme High Command (VGK) Headquarters.

One high priority task in the field of force development is the provision of the Armed Forces with new types of weapons. Certain steps have been taken recently to reorganize the defense related sectors of industry. But we have yet to achieve a massive concentration of scientific research assets, financial, material and technical resources to make a breakthrough in such spheres as the elemental base and cutting edge technology for creating state of the art communication, detection, aiming, automated command and control, EW, IT and precision guided weapon systems.

There is a pressing need for a concentration of scientific, research, and financial resources on the same scale as in the period immediately after the war, when nuclear missile weapons were created.

Finally, in reforming Russia's entire military organization, it is important to take into account the human factor, to the maximum degree possible. To this end, all state and government agencies and mainstream political parties will need to work hard to overcome the negative attitudes that exist in society with regard to military service and the defense of our Motherland.

Such are some of our proposals concerning a more effective employment and balance of military and non-military means in the interest of enhancing Russia's defense and security.

Alongside certain achievements, there have also been some shortfalls in the AMS's performance. As mentioned earlier, if we do not have new ideas and thoughts, we will fall by the wayside, outside the boundaries of mainstream science. If it was suggested that the performance of hunters in the taiga be evaluated through the number of shots fired, that would only make them laugh. Yet in the scientific sphere, we continue making the number of R & D projects and other activities an end in itself. Unfortunately, this is true not only for our Academy. Generally, the standards set for the quality of books, articles and other publications have been declining recently.

Another serious shortfall is the gap between the subjects of research and the actual problems of force organization and ensuring defense security. This is in part due to the fact that oftentimes journalists are trusted more than military veteran researchers who have been working in a particular field all their life.

Unfortunately, we still do not work hard enough to introduce advanced technology or impact on the practical resolution of many issues related to the country's national security and defense, force organization and development, and personnel training. We need to show more persistence and perseverance in upholding our scientific positions, making our conclusions and proposals more convincing, forceful and topical, especially with regard to such important matters as the character of warfare in the future.

Today, a new description of war is invented almost every day-"network," "net-centric," "asymmetric," "3D," "IT," "stand-off," and so on and so forth. Each of these characteristics is probably legitimate and quite relevant. But they do not disclose the essence of future warfare. It is also naive to think that IT and network warfare appeared only yesterday.

Neither Suvorov nor Napoleon could do without information about the enemy and its troops. But of course the scale and technology of information warfare (IW) have changed. At all times, all criminal, underground, and subversive organizations have been based on the network principle. Corruption among commanders or government officials, be it in the form of an outright bribe or a bonus, which has penetrated all power structures has existed from time immemorial. It is simply that the rampant degradation of society and the individual today, coupled with increased financial resources, offers more opportunities for this.

The conclusion that all threats to Russia originate from within the country is absolutely untenable. These frivolous allegations are being made to foment national strife within the country. As a matter of fact, all the principal threats, not least in the Caucasus, originate outside Russia.

Nor does the so called theory of sixth generation wars, put forward by V.I. Slip-chenko and other new wave "experts," provide an answer to the question about the character of future wars. Alongside certain rational elements, it contains too much scholasticism and impracticality. Books about "sixth generation wars" are published and distributed by the Ford Foundation. I asked a U.S. military attache why these books were not translated into English and distributed in NATO member states. He said they had no use for such books. Meanwhile, they are being imposed on us and other CIS countries. Clausewitz or Svechin did not know how it was possible to talk about future wars while ignoring the past or the present. Yet what we are seeing today is people who have had no experience in a war or armed conflict and who have not participated in a single military exercise, suddenly proclaim themselves "major experts on future wars."

Of course conservatism is dangerous, and in the interest of stimulating scientific thought, any bold, innovative idea should be thoroughly studied and supported. This does not, however, mean that all fantastic ideas should be embraced. An objective, critical approach is called for here. Meanwhile, the majority of such books and articles are marked by a peremptory style of presentation and categorical judgment without any attempt to substantiate or prove anything.

You can judge for yourselves. A generally accepted division of the military art into periods has been established both in Russian military history and throughout the world. But now it has been rejected without any explanation or substantiation, and replaced with the theory of six generations of wars, based on just one factor--the evolution of arms. This theory is arbitrary and illogical.

The division of wars into periods totally ignores sociopolitical factors, as well as changes in the "human factor." For example, it is known that in the 18th-the first half of the 19th century, far reaching changes in methods of warfare occurred above all due to the revolutionary creativity of the masses in France and the recruitment principle of manpower acquisition in the Russian army. Today, it is impossible to reduce the entire warfare only to economic destruction, whereupon the opposing side must necessarily surrender.

The inclusion of utterly different types of war--World War I and World War II--into the fourth generation of wars arouses serious doubts. The interpretation of the fifth generation of wars, linked to nuclear weapons, and especially the exclusion of these weapons from the arsenal of sixth generation wars, appears rather dubious and controversial.

The advocates of the sixth generation war theory propose completely abandoning nuclear weapons already now. For Russia today, however, this would be tantamount to suicide. Nor is China or other countries likely to give up on these weapons. How, then, can the sixth generation war theory be built in isolation from stern reality?

Next, the question is raised about the decisive role of air space assets and precision guided weapons. There is an obvious need for detection and early warning systems based on new principles; long range anti-missile systems, and so on. All of this is well known, and no one will object to this.

Yet the following question remains unanswered: How are these weapons going to appear in the foreseeable future, and in sufficient numbers, given the present condition of the defense industry, if we began to lag behind the leading industrial nations back in the Soviet era? Russian President V.V. Putin and Defense Minister S.B. Ivanov set the task of creating a modern aerospace defense system and precision guided weapons. But this will take some time. Until this has happened, it is impossible right now to abandon general-purpose forces and the Ground Troops or, as the "experts of future wars" propose, incorporate the latter into the Border Troops. Historical experience shows that it is extremely dangerous to exaggerate one type of weapons at the expense of all others. Furthermore, it is being claimed that ground forces and especially tanks and infantry are useless and that an adversary today will not even use missiles to hit them: Apparently they will just scatter in panic.

Even in the future, if we have sufficient amounts of precision guided weapons (incidentally, they will also be provided to ground troops), given the vastness of Russia's territory, without ground troops it will be impossible not only to organize the country's credible defense but also to ensure the security of the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces, the Navy, and other branches of service equipped with precision guided weapons. Moreover, it will even be impossible to ensure the country's integrity. In addition, although the latest war in Iraq has shown the great role of precision guided weapons and the vulnerability of active radio detection and ranging technology, it has also demonstrated that aviation, cruise missiles, and other types of precision guided weapon systems alone cannot guarantee victory in a war. This was shown by the Iraq war in 1991. After the 2003 war, more than 35 countries have been involved in the occupation of Iraq, while the United States, far from reducing its ground forces, is actually increasing them--from 36 to 48 brigades.

Ever since firearms appeared, the stand-off range of warfare has been constantly growing. Yet in the future, it will oftentimes be advantageous to impose on an adversary something that he tries to avoid at any price--specifically, bold, decisive non-standoff forms of action. Or let us take the idea that all existing branches and arms of service be abolished and divided into two parts: offensive strategic forces and defensive strategic forces. Yet there are no specific proposals as to how these forces should be organized, how all of this should be done on the practical level. For example, how to separate such offensive and defensive assets as bomber and fighter aviation; in the Navy, offensive and support assets; how to separate artillery or infantry from reconnaissance, engineer, technical, and logistic combat service support assets and divide them into offensive and defensive?

None of these questions have been answered. There are only groundless, unsubstantiated assertions.

Today, when IW has become a popular topic, information activity oftentimes becomes an end in itself with little or no discrimination being made between information and disinformation.

Unfortunately, it is not only specially sponsored publications of a certain kind but also our military journals that often contend that future wars will necessarily be "unilateral," where the victim of aggression is doomed to defeat. This approach leads to doom, the sense of hopelessness, and the idea that any resistance to a technologically advanced adversary is futile. This is not only untenable from a scientific point of view, but also dangerous for morale and indoctrination. Foreign militaries should be assessed objectively and realistically with all of their strong and weak points. But books and other publications that only try to intimidate their own military, while offering no ways of countering an adversary's superiority and standing up to an aggressor are utterly worthless. In this respect, our new field manuals need reviewing.

Tasks

The AMS Presidium has drafted a plan for the Academy's activities in 2006. It should be used as a basis for working out the relevant plans in divisions and sections, as well as the personal plans for each Academy member.

The content and orientation of the Academy's work is dictated by reality and the objective needs of ensuring the country's defense and security in the present conditions.

The first and foremost task is to scientifically evaluate the possible scenarios of international developments amid the ongoing globalization of economic, sociopolitical, technological, and information processes, as well as scenarios for Russia, its role in the new lineup of forces in the world, the threats that it could face, and how to respond to these threats. The answer to these questions is crucial for the orientation of Russia's military policy, military strategy, force development, and military doctrine.

In the prevailing situation with common threats arising both for NATO countries and for Russia, which can only be countered effectively through joint efforts, there is a pressing need for a certain level of interoperability and compatibility of their military doctrines. This should be taken into account in drafting Russia's new military doctrine.

As mentioned earlier, the principal, paramount question, which is crucial for all aspects of force development and organization, is: What kind of war and what kind of defense tasks should Russia be prepared to deal with in the future?

General of the Army M.A. GAREEV

President, the Academy of Military Sciences