The War Against Terrorism - A New Survey.

Editor's Note: The World Trade Centre twin tower and Pentagon attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have been portrayed repeatedly by leaders in the US and among their allies as symbolising the beginning of a new era. President George Bush Jr. has frequently referred to a "war against terrorism", even referring to the coming campaign against the Islamic militant Osama Bin Ladin as a "crusade" (only to retract it later). From a strategic perspective, such a war would have dramatic implications for the Middle East and its periphery, including the Afghanistan/Pakistan zone.

APS will examine these and related issues as they develop in the confrontation between Washington on one side and Bin Ladin and the forces that harbour him on the other, in a three-part series from September to December 2001. Fast moving developments, such as an expected US strike against key areas in Afghanistan, will be covered in the survey. The three parts will be as follows:

Part 1 - Overview & Geo-Political Theatre Of Conflict

Part 2 - The First Phase Of The Confrontation - The Short Term

Part 3 - The Second Phase Of The Confrontation - The Long Term

This survey will parallel with that on the Taliban Phenomenon which has been started in RIM. As mentioned by APS before the Sept. 11 attacks (see the latest edition of RIM), the Taliban is "heading on a collision course with the West, and many non-Muslim countries of the East". What happens in Afghanistan in the coming months will have a significant impact on the way the war against terrorism proceeds in the following years.

Part 1 - Overview & Geo-Political Theatre Of Conflict:

The attacks on the WTC, coming in the first year of the third millennium and of the 21st century, mark a turning point in history. It demonstrated how the greatest superpower in the world, by far more powerful than any of its rivals, could be humbled by a group of people prepared to give up their lives in order to inflict maximum damage on their perceived enemy.

The attackers have not claimed responsibility, adding another dimension to a unique 21st century strategic dilemma: how to deal with an enemy one cannot conclusively identify, an enemy which does not formally represent a state, and one which does not have any worthwhile assets to target militarily?

It is assumed globally, both among non-Muslim and Muslim countries, that the hijackers of the planes that crashed into the WTC and the Pentagon are Islamists. The response to the attacks has two dimensions: popular reaction and the response of states. At the popular level, in the West (including Australia and New Zealand), the reaction has been one of anger directed against Muslims and other minorities. The response at the state level has been more nuanced. Few countries have echoed the tough rhetoric of the US; although Britain came close, there are influential commentators there who have urged caution.

There is growing evidence of a sharpening rift between public opinion in the West and in the Muslim World. Observers believe this could prove to be dangerous in the coming years, especially if there is no "satisfactory" (in American and European eyes) closure to the question of who committed the WTC/Pentagon attacks and an answer in the form of retribution. Already there are signs of open anti-Islamic tendencies in the West in a way not seen before. And in Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East and Pakistan, anti-Western rhetoric has been a staple for years in mosques and to a lesser extent in the media; this will intensify.

Some observers believe it is a reaffirmation of the "clash of civilisations" thesis, put forward by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington in recent years. Others say that, in fact, the attacks on the WTC and the American response signifies a return to a "cold war type" global environment where the world is divided into two camps: those who support terror activities and those who do not. However, no one says anymore that the threat from Islamic militancy is exaggerated. What the attacks in New York and Washington demonstrated above all is that there are people, still in the shadows, who

(a) are prepared to plan patiently and meticulously for a highly complex operation such as this one over a long period of time, and see it through to completion;

(b) have the financial capabilities to provide the required funding, and the expertise to move around money, men and material across the world; and

(c) have the charisma and ideological confidence to convince not a couple of impoverished and hopeless individuals, but up to nineteen educated, relatively well-off and otherwise normal young men to kill themselves for a particular cause; and

(d) have the capability to do all this without being detected, by using techniques and tactics that are not normally known outside the realms of state security and intelligence agencies.

These realities indicate that such an operation could not have been conducted without the active backstage involvement - or at least covert guidance and assistance - of a state or a powerful state agency acting on its own. There have been hints that Iraq could have been involved, with US media reports of an Iraqi intelligence officer having met with one of the hijackers in Europe some months ago.

There have also been suggestions that Iran may be involved, but such speculation has not surfaced much in recent days given the level of empathy shown by the Iranians towards the Americans following the incident - and given the vigorous way in which President Mohammed Khatami criticised the attacks, with backing from virtually all shades of opinion in the theocratic state (see this week's News Service).