The US Is Shaping A New Order In The Greater Middle East - Part 2 - "Rogue" States.

The second phase in the new order envisaged for the Middle East by the US is the targeting of "rogue states". The countries originally listed in the so-called "axis of evil" by US President George W. Bush Jr were Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The first rogue regime has been ousted, although Iraq itself is far from stable. Iran is the only remaining candidate from the Middle East. Others falling into the category of rogue states - judging from the comments of US government officials and the media - include Syria, Libya and Sudan. But the degree of American focus on these countries varies depending on the threat perception, the strategic issues related to isolating and ousting a regime, the economic implications for the region and the world, etc.

Iran is the primary focus at present, in view of concerns about its growing nuclear capabilities, among other things. Tehran has been manoeuvring carefully in order not to become a target, but the way things will play out would depend considerably on internal developments within the country. Gradually, the case against Syria is being built up as well. The pressure on the regime in Damascus to democratise and to withdraw its troops from Lebanon is increasing. Libya is trying hard to slip out of the circle of rogues and become "at least tolerated, if not liked". By striking deals with the US and Britain over the Lockerbie bombing and with France over the UTA bombing, it is managing to improve its position - but not by much. Interestingly, Sudan has shown sufficient co-operation in the American war against terror to fall into a much less vulnerable category as far as punitive action is concerned (see following pages).

There are two schools of thought as to when the second phase will begin in earnest, i.e. when direct steps to remove the regimes in question would commence. One school of thought believes that nothing will happen until the situation in Iraq and/or Afghanistan are fully stabilised. According to this line of thinking, the Bush administration is well aware that its credibility is sinking over the question of apparently non-existent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Public opinion is gradually consolidating against the deployment in Iraq, and will not accept another war - especially if the rationale offered is that a military assault is necessary to remove WMD capabilities.

The second school of thought is that, regardless of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US will pursue its broad strategic agenda in the Middle East. This line of thinking assumes that the Bush administration is committed to a new order in the Middle East in a way that transcends (or co-opts) electoral considerations in the coming year. It is also assumed that the disillusionment being felt by sections of the American public at present over the conflict in Iraq will be replaced by support for the administration's policies in the event of another terrorist strike on the US mainland or American interests overseas, and that public opinion can also to some extent be moulded by appropriate media management at the right time.

So far, the US effort to re-order the Middle East has been a mixed success. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are systematic but small scale attacks against US forces and their allies. The death toll is not on a scale to cause an uproar in the US yet, but the steady trickle of casualties in high profile suicide strikes - all covered round the clock by the American media - will eventually require an explanation from the presidency. It is becoming evident that although American troops are deployed in huge numbers across Iraq, and despite the technological superiority demonstrated in the quick victory in April-May 2003, the country still harbours enough Saddam loyalists and opponents of the US to kill American soldiers on a daily basis. Suicide bombers and guerrilla fighters are threatening US forces on a daily basis.

The way in which the US government is pursuing its military campaigns and its diplomacy suggests that the second school of thought is prevalent, at least so far. There is growing recognition that full stabilisation in either Iraq or Afghanistan is not likely to happen any time soon and that the US and its coalition partners would have to tolerate a low intensity campaign by their opponents for the foreseeable future. The costs of the war for those resisting the US presence are minimal, especially as they are prepared to go to the extent of sacrificing their lives to attain their objectives.

On the other hand, contrary to expectations among Iraq's neighbours that American troops will leave if there are enough body-bags sent back to the US, Washington's conservative and neo-conservative leadership appears determined to stay as long as it takes to make Iraq a success - if not in democratic terms, at least in terms of economic prosperity. While there has been criticism of the way the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's ouster has been managed, there are no calls to "bring the troops back home" - at least not yet in terms of mass public demand for such action. Rather, the administration has decided to increase its ground troop presence in the country.

It is important to note that the cases of Iraq and each of Iran and Syria are inter-linked. The way in which the US fares in Iraq will directly reflect on its future dealings with Iran and Syria. For its part, Washington is well aware that each of Iraq's neighbours has its own agenda for Iraq and none of their concerns are similar to those of the US. Most observers believe the US will not tolerate interference aimed at undermining the stabilisation of Iraq, and will go to the extent of militarily attacking those seen as responsible; a precision strike on Syria or Iran, for instance, can easily be executed.

Such a move will not have many negative implications from the domestic political angle for the Bush administration. Most Americans see both Syria, with its support for Palestinian rejectionist group, and Iran with its nuclear programme as being on the wrong side of the war against terrorism. This will then force whichever country is attacked to make a choice between going to war and toning down its efforts to undermine the US efforts to stabilise Iraq. This is a choice which neither Iran nor Syria wants to make because the outcome for their regimes is not in question, and it is would be irrelevant to them whether or not the US succeeds in stabilising either a post-theocratic Iran or a post-Baathist Iraq.