The Turkish model and democratization in the Middle East.

RECENTLY THE RELEVANCY OF THE Turkish experience in democratization to the process of political reform in the Arab world has become a focus of debate within the context of a renewed interest in the subject in general. While Turkey is promoted as a model for Islamic countries by some, others have argued that Turkey's experience is irrelevant to the issues of democratization in the Middle East. This article probes the question of whether Turkey has the assets, the will and the credibility to emerge as a soft power in the Middle East.

THE DEBATE ON TURKEY'S ROLE AS A "MODEL"

The push for political and economic reform in the Middle East has intensified in recent years. The change in the political strategy of the United States--at least at the discursive level--was largely responsible in pushing the issues of reform to the forefront. The adoption of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative in the G-8 Summit in June 2004 revealed a degree of consensus among the major extra-regional actors in achieving this objective. (1)

Within this context the United States began to point to Turkey as a "model" for the project of democratization in the Islamic world. The Turkey-as-a-model argument had in fact emerged after the end of the Cold War. Anthony Blinkmen, President Clinton's Special Assistant and Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council stated that "Turkey sits at the crossroads--or, if you prefer, atop the fault lines--of the world. Because of its place ... its history ... its size ... and strength, and most important, because of what it is--a nation of mainly Islamic faith that is secular, democratic, and modernizing--Turkey must be a leader and can be a role model for a large swath of the world." (2)

The notion of Turkey being a model for Islamic countries reemerged more forcefully after September 11. President George W. Bush, attending the Istanbul NATO Summit in June 2004, said "I appreciate very much the example that your country has set on how to be a Muslim country which embraces democracy, rule of law and freedom." He praised Turkey's record of development and recommended the country as a "model" for the rest of the Muslim world. (3)

Despite the references made to Turkey as a model for political reform in the Middle East, this argument has never been clearly elaborated on beyond stating that Turkey was an example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. This ambiguity, in fact, led to a debate in Turkey as to what all this meant for the country and whether the US was imposing a role on Turkey. In Particular, secular forces, including the secular establishment, remained skeptical of the model argument. Pointing to what they saw as less emphasis on secularism, which, from their perspective, is the most important element of the Turkish model, they expressed concerns as to whether this aimed at strengthening the role of Islam in Turkish politics. Therefore, US Secretary of State Colin Powell's reference to Turkey as an "Islamic Republic" in April 2004 reiterated this perception and provoked widespread criticism in Turkey. (4) Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer reacted to this characterization by stating that "Turkey is neither an Islamic republic, nor an example of moderate Islam." (5) There were also concerns as to what this model argument meant in terms of Turkey's regional identity. Some thought that such a role would situate Turkey in the Middle East, as opposed to Europe which Turkey has been trying to become a part of. (6)

Contrary to the above notion, several arguments have been developed in and outside of Turkey as to why the country could not be a model for political reform for the Islamic countries. These arguments are as follows: First, Turkey's experience in reform is unique and cannot be repeated elsewhere. The uniqueness of the Turkish case was largely explained by Turkey's secularism. However, other factors, such as the role of Ataturk, an imperial state tradition, and the absence of a colonial legacy, were also mentioned in contributing to Turkey's unique characteristics. (7) Second, problems in Turkey's democratization were cited in explaining why Turkey could not be a model. The difficulties Turkey has been facing in consolidating its democracy as well as the lack of domestic legitimacy, reflected in challenges in the 1990s by political Islamists and Kurdish nationalists. (8) Third, Turkey's traditional problems with the Middle East, particularly the Arab world, were perceived as an obstacle for Turkey's role as a model. It is claimed that the largely negative legacy of Ottoman rule, Turkey's secularism, its alliance with the West and relations with Israel have largely been criticized in the Middle East and thus vastly limit the acceptance of Turkey as a model. (9) Fourth, Turkey's historical ties with the West, particularly its institutional links were thought to make Turkey a unique case. (10) Thus, it is argued that Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later OECD), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) make Turkey unique in the Middle East. In addition, although the EU has historical ties with some of the countries in the region and has signed association agreements with several of them, it is not the same as having official status for membership in December 1999. That fact clearly makes Turkey a special case and, as many rightly pointed out, that stares has been important in the transformation of the country. (11) In short, critics of Turkey-as-a-model claim that the Turkish experience is sui generis and cannot be transplanted.

WHAT IS THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE?

The most important aspects of the Turkish experience that are relevant to the debate on political reform in the Middle East are secularism, democratization, and the importance of international factors in facilitating reform.

Secularism is in tact the most debated aspect of the so-called Turkish model. At the time of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the elite that founded the country made secularism an essential part of their modernity project. In fact, it is true that Turkey went farthest among the Islamic countries in adopting strict secularism. However, the way Turkish secularization is understood in the Arab world is somewhat skewed. Turkish secularism is generally viewed as an imposition by a small elite on a population that continues to remain Islamic. Some in the Arab world also considered Turkish secularism as anti-religion. Both of these premises are limited in understanding the process of secularization in Turkey.

The roots of secularism in Turkey can be traced back to the articulation of the relationship between the state (dawla) and religion (din) during the Ottoman Empire. In the Sunni Ottoman tradition the religious establishment was controlled and dominated by the state. (12) Furthermore, the Ottomans increasingly used non-religious law (orf) as opposed to the religious one (the Shari' a) and thus further contributed to de facto secularization of the political sphere. The process of secularization intensified through nineteenth century reforms, particularly as a result of the adoption of new civil codes structured like European ones and the reformation of the education system. After the war of independence the republican elite had the opportunity to implement more radical secularization policies. However, this time, except during a brief period of state consolidation in the 1930s, these radical secularization policies had to be adapted to the social and political realities. In fact, the rest of the republican history has become a history of this reconciliation, which, interestingly enough led to the indigenization of secularism in Turkey.

With the introduction of multi-party politics in 1946, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), the founder of the republic and the modernization project, did not refrain from using Islamic symbols and references in party discourse. The Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) that came to power in 1950 as a result of the first competitive elections also used Islamic discourse. Supported by largely conservative groups during its decade-long rule, it began to implement some policies that could be perceived as challenging secularism. After the 1980 coup, the military regime introduced the ideology of "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" into Turkish politics, which aimed to use religion as "the essence of culture and social control and should thus be fostered in the education system but not be politicized." (13) Thus, the military regime initiated compulsory religious courses in secondary education and the leaders of the coup increasingly made use of Islamic discourse. In sum the ideology of the 1980 coup was once again aimed at reinterpreting the relationship between the state and religion, which could in fact be characterized according to Birtek and Toprak as "neo-republicanism." (14) The instrumentalist use of Islam in secular Turkey demonstrated the pragmatist and flexible nature of the regime.

From 1970 onwards religiously oriented parties became part of the political system and participated in elections. The first such party, the National Order (Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP), was formed by Necmettin Erbakan in January 1970. The MNP explicitly criticized the secular nature of the republic and presented an alternative ideology to the secular conception of the modernity project. Since then, the ideology of political Islam has been represented in the Turkish political scene through successive parties under the leadership of Erbakan and his associates. When the MNP was banned, together with the socialist Turkish Workers Party, after the 1971 military intervention, another party, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) was formed on the same platform in October 1972. Throughout the 1970s and despite its limited share of votes, the MSP was able to wield extensive influence in the political system because of its participation in various coalition governments. The party developed an ideology called the "national view" (milli gorus), which emphasized a moral and just order. The MSP was critical of Turkey's Western orientation and its membership in Western institutions, calling instead for the establishment of and membership in their Islamic counterparts. The MSP was closed down by the military along with all the other political parties as a result of 1980 coup. Alter the transition to democracy, in July 1983 the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) was founded as a continuation of the MNP and MSP tradition. Nevertheless its influence in the political system remained limited throughout the 1980s largely due to the successes of the newly-established Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP). (15) ANAP under the leadership of its charismatic leader Turgut Ozal succeeded in dominating the politics of the 1980s.

However, the fortunes of the RP turned in the 1990s. It no longer relied on the support of the traditional conservative groups, but began to attract votes, especially from the urban poor. (16) It radicalized its discourse and framed itself as an anti-system party and got the protest votes in the turbulent 1990s. Successfully diversifying its constituency, the RP increased its votes and eventually emerged as the leader in the 1995 elections with 21.1 percent of the votes and coming to power in a coalition government.

Increasingly, the center-right parties have also used Islamic discourse and established institutional links with the tariqas (the religious brotherhoods). As Bayart argues, most of the tariqas, in fact, did not completely reject the republican modernization project, but put a "socially conservative interpretation on it." (17) All these characteristics of Turkish politics make "claims about total exclusivist policies of the regime unsustainable." (18)

Therefore, as long as the Islamic movements and parties did not aim to change the regime to an Islamic one and accept to play by the rules of the game, they were largely allowed to operate. Contrary to the common perception the Turkish state did opt for an integrationist strategy in its relations with political Islam to a great extent. Furthermore, as in many countries in the Middle East, the state at times used Islam as an instrument and perceived it as a panacea against other oppositional ideologies, particularly those of the left.

In return, the great bulk of the political Islamist parties and movements opted to work within the system. As Berna Turam demonstrated in her ethnographic study, most of the "contemporary Islamic forces in Turkey are neither inherently hostile nor confrontational to the secular republic" and "there has been a gradual transformation from hostile separation of the early republic and religion to a recent friendly compartmentalization between the two." (19) A nationwide survey conducted in late 1990s found that the majority of the Turks continued to be "practicing Muslims and devout believers" and yet "religious belief and practice is considered to be limited to private life and the idea of religious involvement in public life is not supported." (20) The survey demonstrated that 79 percent of those polled applauded secular reforms, while about 20 percent responded they would like a state based on Islamic or Shari' a law. The figure dropped, however, to around l0 percent when the respondents were presented with specifics such as the right of men to polygamy and the lack of women's equal rights to inherit or to initiate divorce.

The crisis emerged in this delicate relationship in the 1990s when political Islam seemed to increase its power. The consequences of economic liberalization policies, a series of economic crises and the inability of the political system to adapt to the changing political dynamics, led to increasing support of the marginal Islamist parties. The organizational capabilities of the Islamist parties further contributed to their popularity. Particularly, the March 1994 municipal elections and the December 1995 general elections witnessed the rise of the RP. In January 1996, the RP formed a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP) under the premiership of Erbakan. While in power, the RP was unsuccessful as a force for reconciliation in overcoming increasing polarization in society. Tension culminated in a February 1997 meeting of the National Security Council which gave the RP-True Path coalition government a list of measures to be implemented without delay, particularly aiming at clamping down on "reactionary Islam" (irtica). Continuing pressure by the military and other secular forces, including several civil society organizations, forced the resignation of the government on June 18. At that point, the one-year experience of the RP in power seemed to deepen the polarization in society and underline the increasing authoritarian nature of the regime. However, in retrospect the crisis did indeed open up the possibility of moderation for political Islam. The conflict in the 1990s not only "taught the Islamist politicians that secularism is a well-entrenched force in Turkish social and political" culture, (21) but also reminded them of the institutional limitations that exist in the system. Thus when the RP was closed down by the Constitutional Court, its successor the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) toned down its rhetoric and began to put some emphasis on issues of democracy and human rights. As Mecham argues "Virtue found its new voice as an opposition party by shifting from the old claim that Turkey was not religious enough to claim that Turkey was not democratic enough. Both charges attempted to frame the Turkish regime as illegitimate to some degree, but the charges of poor democracy sought to engage the secular democratic system on its own terms." (22)

This limited shift in the party's discourse was not enough for the reformists (yenilikciler) in the party who began to challenge the old guard mainly on the grounds of a lack of inner party democracy. When the FP was also closed down by the Constitutional Court as it was considered a continuation of the RP, the reformist used the opportunity to establish their own party, the Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) in August 2001. The AKP won a significant victory in the elections in December 2003 by getting 34.4 percent of the vote and 363 of 550 seats in parliament, enough to form a single party government. The party further consolidated its position by increasing its vote in the March 2004 municipal elections to 41.46 percent.

A large portion of the AKP's vote was seen as an act of protest against the existing political system, which had been tainted by corruption scandals and deadlock. In fact, Turkish voters not only ousted the coalition partners in the previous government, but all the parties that were represented in the parliament since none of them could pass the 10 percent national threshold. As a newly established political party, the AKP was able to frame itself as the new hope for fixing the country's economic, social and political problems. Furthermore, the successful transformation of its discourse brought the AKP support from the secularists, especially from those who were impressed by its promises to improve Turkey's relations with the EU. Despite its origins in the Turkish Islamist movement the AKP defined itself as a conservative democratic party, "similar to the Christian Democrat parties in Europe," as the AKP leaders liked to say. The AKP based its ideology on the acceptance of secularism and considered religion as a private matter. The leader of the party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emphasized the compatibility of being a devout Muslim and secular at the same time when he said "Before anything else, I'm a Muslim ... I have a responsibility to God, who created me, and I try to fulfill that responsibility, but I try now very much to keep this away from my political life, to keep it private ... A political party cannot have a religion, only individuals can ... religion is so supreme that it cannot be (politically) exploited or taken advantage of." (23)

The above discussion shows that the relationship between politics and Islam in Turkey is ',more complicated than expressed in the arguments of a distinct separation between a small secular elite imposing authoritarian secularism on an Islamic population. Similarly, the argument for the absence of a secular and liberal experience in the Middle East is also historically wrong. Most of the countries in the region were part of the Ottoman Empire and thus were influenced by the particular form of relations between politics and Islam that existed in the empire, and by further secularization through reforms. During the colonial era and in the immediate post-independence period, secularism, in most parts of the region became an important aspect of state formation. (24) In fact, even the more radical implementation of Turkish secularism was at that time accepted as a model by many Middle Eastern countries, most notably Iran and Tunisia. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim argued, "in several parts of the Middle East there were liberal traditions from the mid-19th to mid-20th centuries, including pluralistic multiparty systems, a free press and vibrant civil societies." This regional liberal tradition "is still part of the Arab collective memory." (25) It is true, however, that most of the countries in the region have witnessed the rise of political Islam since the late 1970s, which made the word "secularism" an insult. This is a relatively recent phenomenon and was largely due to the incapability of authoritarian regimes to transform themselves through political and economic reform. (26) The mostly secular regimes, reluctant to open up the political space for societal frustrations to be expressed, tried to deal with emergent Islamist opposition through repression. Secularism is thus associated with dictatorship, the violation of human rights and the abrogation of civil liberties. It is within that context that political Islam began to dominate the discourse and regarded secularism as the most dangerous challenge to Islam.

Thus, both the Turkish and other Middle Eastern experiences of the relationship between politics and religion are more complex than they may appear.

Democratization has become the most significant element of the Turkish model as it represented one of the few such examples in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general.

Turkey's political reform process goes back to the constitutionalist movement in the nineteenth century. The ideas of reform led to the adoption of a constitution in 1876 and the opening of the first parliament in 1877. The limitations on freedom of expression were relaxed and led to the proliferation of newspapers throughout the empire. In addition, the notions of legality, equality and individual rights became part of the political discourse and these issues were discussed openly in the new parliament. Although the period soon ended with the reinstitution of authoritarian rule, increasing unrest eventually compelled the sultan to reinstate the constitution and elections were held for a new parliament. Again many of the Middle Eastern countries went through the same process as part of the Ottoman Empire. (27)

However, during the state formation years of the 1920s and 1930s, The Turkish polity was characterized by increasingly authoritarian single-party rule. Unlike many of its counterparts in the region, Turkey was then able to make the transition from a single-party regime to a multi-party one in 1947, a process which culminated in the coming to power of the opposition Democratic Party in 1950. Competitive elections since, have been the rule in Turkish politics. This does not mean, however, that Turkey's democratization process was trouble-free. On the contrary, the consolidation of democracy has proved quite difficult and there have been military interventions ill 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. (28) Yet, unlike many developing countries, the military coups of 1960 and 1980 were short lived with relatively smooth transitions to civilian rule. In practice, Turkish democracy has oscillated between liberal and delegative democracy. (29) The 1961 Constitution was quite liberal in its provisions but the country was drawn into civil unrest between radical leftist and rightist forces within the Cold War context. Thus, the 1982 Constitution, prepared under the tutelage of the military regime highly limited individual and collective rights and aimed to protect the state.

Since the restoration of democracy in 1983 the Constitution has been amended, at times drastically, to eliminate the vestiges of authoritarianism. (30) Turkey's relations with the EU accelerated the process of reform and seven reform packages containing numerous "harmonization laws" have been adopted in 2002, 2003, and 2004. All these reforms led to the extension of fundamental rights and liberties and relaxed limitations on political, social and economic rights. Civil-military relations have also been redefined. Civilian membership in the National Security Council (NSC) increased and a civilian, a diplomat, replaced the military head of the Council. (31) As a result of such changes "the military prerogatives inherited from the previous military governments were eliminated from the constitutional and legal order to a large extent." (32)

As a result of reforms there has also been an improvement in human rights and minority rights. Within that context all legal impediments regarding the use of languages other than Turkish were lifted and education and broadcasting in all languages and dialects used by the Turkish population in daily life were allowed.

As Aydin and Keyman argue, "the main conclusion from the impasse of Turkish politics in the 1990s was the following. Democracy could not only open possibilities for the articulation of essentialist claims to identity, but could also, on the contrary, lead to strategies against essentialism, nationalism, religious communitarianism. What was most needed in Turkey as it approached the new millennium was the building of a democratic consensus between state and civil society." (33)

International influences have also been an important aspect of the Turkish experience of political reform. In fact, political reform in Turkey took place within the context of the interplay of domestic and international factors. Turkey's transition to multiparty politics in 1947 was a response to internal demands and changes as well as external transformations and incentives. On the one hand the changes in the international conjuncture favoring liberal ideas and the pressures on Turkey to transform the regime in a democratic way and be a member of the newly-established global organization, the United Nations, had an impact. The objective of the Turkish elite to make Turkey a part of the western state system made them more responsive to these pressures. On the other hand, growing domestic discontent, especially intensified during the war years and widespread among different sectors of the Turkish society, undermined the legitimacy of the single-party regime and forced it to open up the political space. (34)

Similarly, the intensification of the Turkish reform process in the last decade has been a response to both internal and external pressures. The second part of the 1980s was characterized by the proliferation of civil society organizations increasingly critical of the authoritarian policies of the state. This trend continued in the 1990s with some minor changes that were largely unable to transform the regime into a more democratic one. It was Turkey's hope for EU membership that eventually provided a clear impetus for reform and mobilized internal coalitions for that purpose. (35) In Particular, the European Council's decision to accept Turkey officially as a candidate country at its Helsinki Summit in December 1999 increased efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. (36)

Turkey has a long history with the EU. In July 1959 it applied for an associate membership into the European Economic Community (EEC) and was accepted in September 1963. This was seen as an extension of Turkey's policy of becoming part of the Western system of states. (37) The signing of the Association Agreement was in fact the beginning of a rocky relationship. The implementation of the second stage of the agreement proved difficult due to the problems originating from both the EEC and Turkey. Then the 1980 coup in Turkey resulted in a freeze in Turkey's relations with the Community. After the transition to democracy, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal applied, prematurely, in April 1987 for full membership in the European Community (EC). Supported by big business, Ozal perceived Turkey's EC membership as an essential part of its economic liberalization policies. He failed to appreciate the political and institutional transition the EC had gone through. In fact, in rejecting the application in December 1989 the EC mainly pointed to Turkey's shortcomings in democratization and human rights.

To give a new boost to the relationship, Turkey signed a customs union agreement in 1996 with the EU, which overall proved insignificant in furthering Turkey's aim for full membership in the Union. Relations hit a new low with the decision of the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 that excluded Turkey from the list of candidate countries and put it in a special category. The decision created enormous frustration in Turkey and damaged political relations. Despite problems in relations the continuation of Turkey's European perspective was an impetus for reform.

However, the real push for reform occurred when the Helsinki Summit officially accepted Turkey as a candidate for full membership. The EU then offered Turkey a pre-accession strategy designed to support the reforms necessary to prepare for membership. The Accession Partnership Document (APD) (38) approved by the EU Council in the Nice Summit in December 2000 identified short- and medium-term priorities and objectives. The APD also set up a monitoring mechanism to evaluate progress. In response, the Turkish government presented a National Program for Action (39) in March 2001 where it explained how Turkey intended to meet the objectives of the APD.

Since then Turkey has taken several steps to implement its commitments. The reforms started during the coalition government led by Bulent Ecevit. Despite the difficulties of reaching consensus in a three-party coalition and the existence of ultra-nationalist National Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) as a coalition partner, the government was able to adopt significant reform measures. In October 2001 the parliament passed a series of reforms such as reducing police powers of detention and easing curbs on human rights. It also lifted the ban on Kurdish language broadcasts (40) and increased civilian representation on the NSC. Parliament adopted a new Civil Code, which entered into force in January 2002, particularly aimed at improving freedom of association and assembly and introduced improvements in issues related to gender inequality. In February 2002 Parliament passed another reform package that introduced reforms to the penal code and anti-terrorism law. In August 2003 Parliament outlawed the death penalty and allowed instruction in languages other than Turkish to be legal. In responding to the reform process, the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 decided that "if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open negotiations without delay." Although this decision created some disappointment in Turkey as there was an expectation to get a decision to start negotiations, this did not deter the commitment to reform. In fact, after coming to power, the AKP has used its majority in the parliament to accelerate the reform process. (41) Through new "Harmonization Packages" and amendments to the Constitution, freedom of thought, expression and assembly have been enhanced while new measures were taken to prevent torture. Particularly important in the context of the Kurdish issue, private language teaching institutions were permitted to offer instruction in citizens' traditional dialects. The broadcasting in these dialectics was also allowed.

Finally, significant measures were taken to decrease the autonomous power of the military. The defense budget, which used to be determined by the Turkish military has come under parliamentary scrutiny. The ability of military courts to prosecute civilians ended during peacetime. Seats assigned to the military representatives in the National Broadcast Authority and Higher Education Council were eliminated. The most important modification was in the role and the institutional aspects of the National Security Council (NSC). The balance between the civilian and military members of the NSC shifted. Force commanders are no longer members of the Council and the institution itself is now headed by a civilian. Furthermore, executive powers of the General Secretariat of the NSC and the Council itself have also been curtailed: "Overall, the General Secretariat is now confined to a research and analytical role, having been stripped of executive prerogatives" whereas the NSC "has in effect been reconstituted as a solely consultative body, by eliminating its powers to monitor and enforce civilian governments' compliance with Council decisions. In short, at least in theoretical terms, the MGK no longer makes decisions, but only offers advice." (42)

The importance of the external element in Turkey's democratization process is clear. Democratization was partly a result of strong societal calls for the elimination of authoritarian policies. In addition to civil society organizations, strong associations, such as Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) played a significant role in this process. (43) The Turkey-EU process and the EU's political conditionality lent support to these domestic pressures, galvanized internal coalitions, and empowered the pro-reform members of the political and bureaucratic elite. Although it can be argued that Turkey's candidate status, the ultimate carrot in its relations with the EU, has provided a clear incentive to reform and thus sets Turkey apart from other cases in the Middle East, two observations are in order. First, in the case of eastern and central European countries there were strong incentives including a clear timetable for quick accession to the EU coupled with generous aid, credit and direct flows from the member states to the candidate countries. None of this existed in the Turkish case. Furthermore, although Turkey was given a membership status at the Helsinki Summit, the reality of membership remained less certain as the continuing debates in Europe attest regarding whether to give Turkey full membership or a special status. Second, one should not underestimate the role of the EU in the democratization process in the Middle East. The limited success of the Barcelona Process that was launched by the EU in 1995 can be explained by the EU's own reluctance to give Turkey membership status due to the need to protect its strategic and economic interests, rather than the failure of the democracy promotion agenda. (44)

TURKEY AS A SOFT POWER?

Can the Turkish experience be therefore a model? In other words can it serve as an example or standard for comparison? Or to take it further can Turkey act as a soft power to attract and persuade others to adopt political reform? (45) The answer to these questions requires an analysis of the Turkish experience through three elements: assets, will, and credibility.

The question of whether Turkey has the necessary assets to be a soft power has been analyzed above. The Turkish experience, in fact, goes beyond demonstrating the compatibility of Islam and democracy. It raises the issues as regards secularism and democratization. Although democracy does not necessarily require radical secularization, it necessitates some division between religion and state (46) as there are clear tensions in the dual claim that sovereignty belongs to God and to the people. In addition, how that relationship is crafted can be different in different contexts as the cases of existing liberal democracies in the world show. In the Middle East it may require the integration of Islamists, the main opposition force almost everywhere, if they subscribe "to democratic rules in a truly pluralistic political game" and a longer process of "development of Islamic values into policy contents to be processed through the liberal political form." (47) The Turkish model also shows that secularism is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy and thus underlines the importance of secularism within democracy. In fact, Turkey has increasingly become an example of this modus vivendi.

The AKP's coming to power has also become an asset for the Turkish model as it demonstrated the reconciliation of a party with Islamist roots with democracy and secularism. Thus the Turkish experience seems to lend support to the argument that the Islamic movements can be moderated through democracy. In short, since its foundation Turkey has made significant progress towards a reconciliation of its Islam with modernity and democracy and as such came to represent a model in the Islamic world.

Finally, the Turkish experience since the mid-1940s has underlined the importance of the dynamic relationship between internal and external factors in mobilizing for political reform.

However, having assets is not enough to be a soft power. There should be the will to act. Does Turkey have the will to capitalize on these assets? Does Turkey want to turn its assets into a soft power? Turkey has been generally reluctant to accept this role of a model in the discussion of political reform in the Middle East. Several Turkish officials have clearly stated that Turkey did not have such aspirations. As mentioned above the secularists have been particularly uneasy about the discussion of Turkey as a model within the framework of a Greater Middle East Iniative as they are skeptical as to whether this would mean the promotion of Islam in Turkish politics. The AKP government itself has officially stressed that Turkey did not want to be a model to anyone. Despite this rhetoric, both prime minister Erdogan and foreign minister Abdullah Gul have been consistent and willing to project the Turkish experience as an asset both to regional countries and the West.

According to Prime Minister Erdogan "the Turkish example demonstrates the invalidity of the exceptionalism paradigm ... Democracy is not particular to a specific group of societies. Democracy is universal and modern day requirement." (48) At the same time they reminded the Western world of its responsibilities "to establish a more just global order and seek harmony among civilizations" in addition, stressing the importance of "such principles as regional ownership, no imposition, consistency, and gradualism" in their quest to promote reform in the region. (49)

Erdogan and Gul also urge the Muslim world to stop blaming others and begin to tackle their problems. (50) Speaking at the Foreign Ministers meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in May 2003 in Tehran, Foreign Minister Gul called on the Muslim leaders to "first put our house in order." (51) In his speech at the World Economic Forum in Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Erdogan also stressed the importance of self-criticism in the Muslim world. His comments as to the necessity of gender equality received standing ovation from the women listening to him in the segregated hall.

   According to Erdogan,

   with its own stable and successful model of development, its
   place in the Western world, and its rich historical legacy and
   identity, Turkey will be a symbol of the harmony of cultures
   and civilizations in the 21 st century. Turkey will achieve this
   not merely through its economic and military power, but its
   ability to make contributions to the universally accepted
   values and facilitate their dissemination and interaction among
   various parts of the world.

      I do not claim, of course, that Turkey's experience is
   a model that can be implemented identically in all other
   Muslim societies. However, the Turkish experience does have
   a substance which can serve as a source of inspiration for
   other Muslim societies, other Muslim peoples. Muslim
   societies have to find their own solutions to their problems,
   and each country should determine for itself what is to be done
   as well as its method and speed. But the time to make that
   decision has come.

      We speak about this with all political leaders we
   meet, and we express this in all of the meetings we attend.
   Muslim societies cannot solve their problems by blaming
   outside forces because, first of all, we all have to accept our
   own responsibilities, and we also have to take upon ourselves
   that responsibility. On the other hand, Western countries need
   to be more sensitive toward societies they consider to be
   nonWestern, and have to rid themselves of unfair generalizations
   and historical prejudice. It is important in this context to note
   that developed nations have an obligation to act in recognition
   of the fact that possibilities and freedoms they see as right for
   their people are also basic human needs for other societies. (52)

Thus, it is clear that Turkey has the assets and the will to act as a soft power in the issue of political reform in the Middle East. However, in order to play this role, Turkey should also have credibility. Does Turkey have the credibility to be accepted as a soft power? Turkey was considered as a model in the Islamic world in the early twentieth century for it was the only successor state of the Ottoman Empire, which "succeeded in rebuffing the newly emerging international system, and in fashioning its own destiny." (53) Furthermore, its project of modernization, including secularization, also became a source of inspiration for many. However, due to the rewriting of history along nationalist lines, Cold War rivalries, and the rise of political Islam, Turkey lost its soft power. Turkey's lack of expertise in the Middle East further contributed to the emergence of an essentialist and simplistic analyses of the Turkish experience.

However, Arab views of Turkey have begun to evolve in a more positive way recently. (54) In Particular, the coming to power of the AKP, increasing external pressures for political reform and a deepening sense of crisis forced the Arab world to revisit Turkey in a more attentive way. Several Arab commentators began to perceive the "Turkish experiment," the democratic system that allowed the AKP to come to power and transform itself into a party that supports secularism, as "important and successful." (55) Thus, Turkish democracy was increasingly seen as genuine, not a facade. (56) At the Congress of Democrats from the Islamic world in Istanbul a former Yemeni foreign minister summed up this view: "It was a conscious choice to hold this meeting in Turkey. The (Turkish) Islamic movement embraced the secular state. This new experience in Turkey is a model for all Muslim countries." (57)

The Turkish experiment opened the way for the reintroduction of secularism into the debate about democracy. Radwan Masmoudi, president of the US-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), which has been sponsoring meetings with local civic groups in the region, argued that a "party with Islamic roots has come to power, but it now says it believes in secularism and that is compatible with Islam. Secular democrats in the countries involved insisted they never be called secularists, but liberals or nationalists. Turkey's Justice and Development Party could change that perception." (58)

In short, "Turkey has once more become an exporter of ideas in the region" over the past two years "despite the large weight of ideological, political, and even cultural reservations about Turkey that existed until recently in Arab official circles and among the political elite." (59)

Improvement of Turkey's relations with several regional countries, most significantly with Syria, the Turkish parliament's refusal to allow the US to station its troops on Turkish soil to open a second front against Iraq, and Erdogan's recent criticism of Israeli policies further increased Turkey's credibility. (60) Turkey's bold policies were taken as a sign of strength based on democracy. (61)

The election of a Turkish secretary general, Ekmelleddin Ihsanoglu, to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, was a sign of Turkey's improved standing among the governments of the Islamic world.

Finally, the Turkey-EU process has become an interesting case for many Arab reformers as well as a test case to see whether the EU would incorporate a Muslim country or refuse it because of cultural differences.

Despite the increasing credibility of Turkey as a soft power there remain two important challenges to the Turkish model. The first challenge concerns the ongoing experiment with the AKP government. The AKP has so far acted pragmatically and avoided crises. The continuing success of this experiment would be necessary for Turkey to project itself as a soft power. Similarly, the future of the Turkey-EU process will have an important bearing. Any crisis in this process will not only diminish the attraction of the Turkish experience, but more importantly could stall and even reverse Turkey's political reform process.

ENDNOTES

(1.) For a critical evaluation of the initiative see International Crisis Group, The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Inperiled at Birth, Brussels/Amman, Middle East and North Africa Briefing, June 7, 2004.

(2.) Address to the Washington Institute's Third Annual Turgut Ozal Memorial Lecture on Turkey and US-Turkish Relations, Policy Watch, at www.washingtonpolicyinstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1999/426ht

(3.) Hurriyet (Istanbul) June 28, 2004.

(4.) Powell's comments on Turkey being an Islamic republic were made during an interview on German television while discussing the part Shari'a law would play in the new Iraq. The Secretary of State said that Islamic law would form one of the foundations of the new regime in Iraq: "There will be an Islamic Republic in Iraq just like other Islamic Republics such as Turkey and Pakistan ... There is no reason why Islam cannot be together with democracy. Turkey is an Islamic country, why would there not be a democracy just like there is in Turkey at the same time." http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/264687

(5.) President Sezer was speaking at the opening session of the new legislative year in parliament. Turkish Daily News, October 2, 2004.

(6.) Nigar Goksel, "Thematic Priorities as the NATO Summit nears," ARI Position Paper, May 2004 cited in Steven Everts, An asset but not a model: Turkey, the EU and wider Middle East, Centre for European Reform Essays (October 2004) p. 7.

(7.) Turkey's uniqueness is the most widely shared view as to why Turkey cannot be a "model" for Islamic countries. See, for instance, Omer Taspinar, An Uneven Fit? The "Turkish Model" and the Arab World , The Brookings Project on US Policy Towards the Islamic World, Analysis Paper, Number 5, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy (August 2003).

(8.) Ibid, p. 7.

(9.) Ibid, pp. 9-13.

(10.) Everts, p. 7.

(11.) Ibid, p. 8.

(12.) This was in contrast to the Iranian Shiite tradition where the religious establishment remained parallel to and autonomous from the state due to its separate solidarity structures, financial resources, tasks and functions.

(13.) Richard Tapper, Islam in Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991).

(14.) Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of Rewriting Modernity," Praxis International, No. 13 (1993) p. 194.

(15.) In 1987 elections Welfare Party failed to pass the necessary national threshold of 10 percent and thus could not enter the parliament.

(16.) Haldun Gulalp, "Political Islam in Turkey: the rise and fall of the Refah Party," Muslim World, Vol. 99, No. 1, (1999)pp. 24-36.

(17.) Jean Francois Bayart, "Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A Toucquevillian Reading," in Ghassan Salame (ed.) Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994) p. 290.

(18.) Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tur, Turkey: Challenges of continuity and change (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005) p. 137.

(19.) Berna Turam, "The politics of engagement between Islam and the secular state: ambivalences of 'civil society'," The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 55, Issue 2 (2004), p. 277.

(20.) All Carkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, Religion Society, and Politics in Turkey (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2000).

(21.) Sencer Ayata, "Changes in Domestic Politics and the Foreign Policy Orientation of the Ak Party," in Lenore Martin and Dimitris Kerides (eds.) The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: The M1T Press, 2004), p. 248.

(22.) R. Quinn Mecham, "From the ashes of virtue, a promise of light: the transformation of political Islam in Turkey," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2004) p. 346.

(23.) Deborah Sontag, "The Erdogan Experiment," The New York Times, May 11, 2003.

(24.) For Arab secular thought and practice see Nazik Saba Yared, Secularism and the Arab World: 1850-1939 (London: Saqi Books, 2002) and also Favzi M. Najjar, "The debate on Islam and Secularism in Egypt," Arab Studies Quarterly (Spring 1998).

(25.) Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "A Dissident Asks: Can Bush Turn Words into Action," Washington Post, 23 November 2003, p. B03.

(26.) For the influence of electoral party politics on Islamist politicians in Turkey see Ayata, p. 249.

(27.) Iran also had its own constitutional monarchy experiment in 1905-1906.

(28.) Military interventions in 1960 and 1980 led to a direct military rule, whereas in 1971 the military imposed a civilian government and in 1997 acted as a pressure group in concert with secular groups in society to oust the government, in what some described as a post-modern coup.

(29.) For the argument for delegative democracy in Turkey see Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000) pp. 151-154.

(30.) Constitutional amendments were enacted in 1987, 1993, 1995, twice in 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2004. Ergun Ozbudun and Serap Yazici, Democratic Reforms in Turkey (1993-2004) (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, September 2004).

(31.) The NSC was established after the 1960 coup to make recommendations to the government on subjects related to national security. The 1982 Constitution adopted after the 1980 coup expanded the powers of the NSC.

(32.) Ozbudun and Yazici, p. 38.

(33.) Senem Aydin and Fuat Keyman, European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy, CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor, Working Paper, Issue 8 (August 2004) pp. 4-5, at www.ceps.be

(34.) For more on Turkey's transition to multi-party politics see Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: a case study in national development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993).

(35.) There is an extensive literature on the positive role that the EC played in the process of consolidation of democratic transitions in Greece, Portugal and Spain through enlargement. There is also a growing literature on the role of the EU in transitions to democracy in Eastern and Central Europe, although the account is mixed. For more on international dimensions of democratization see Lawrence Whitehead (ed) The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); G. Pridham, E. Herring and G. Stanford (eds) Building Democracy: The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994).

(36.) In 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council the EU decided on a common criteria for accession. As stated in Copenhagen, membership requires that the candidate country must meet the political (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities); economic (the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union has created); and administrative (the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its administrative structures, so that European Community legislation transposed into national legislation implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures) criteria.

(37.) William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2003) (London: Frank Cass, 2000) p. 175.

(38.) For a full text of the APD see Turkey: 2000 Accession Partnership Document at http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/apwithturkev.pdf

(39.) For a full text see Turkish National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis at http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/nationalprogram.html

(40.) The capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdish separatist organization, PKK, in February 1999 and the following unilateral ceasefire by the organization ended the 15-year military conflict which claimed 30,000 lives. This development increased the possibility of tackling the Kurdish issue through non-military means.

(41.) The AKP government has been an ardent supporter of Turkey's EU membership. This support can be seen largely as a pragmatic response to its constituencies' preferences. A post-election survey by Yihnaz Esmer showed that "most AKP voters favored EU accession even if they doubted that EU was sincere about the process." Cited in Soli Ozel, "After the Tsunami," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2003).

(42.) Barak Salmoni, "Turkey's Summer 2003 Legislative: EU Avalanche, Civil-Military Revolution, or Islamic Assertion?" Strategic Insights, Vol. 11, Issue 9 (September 2003).

(43.) Ziya Onis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2003) p. 19.

(44.) Richard Young, "The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous Strategy?" Democratization, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2002).

(45.) Soft power is defined as the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "The Decline of America's Soft Power," Foreign Affairs. May/June 2004.

(46.) There are different understandings of secularism in the Western world as well. Furthermore the secular ideal is contested and challenged everywhere and thus constantly debated and redefined. During the 1980s religious traditions around the world led to "de-privatization" of religions that formerly had retreated from the public sphere. Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

(47.) Roberto Aliboni and Laura Guazzone, "Democracy in the Arab countries and the West," Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 2004) p. 86.

(48.) "Democracy in the Middle East, Pluralism in Europe: Turkish View" Address at Harvard University, 30 January 2003, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/Harvard.htm

(49.) Burak Akcapar, Mensur Akgun, Meliha Altunisik, Ayse Kadioglu, The Debate on Democratization in the Broader Middle East and North Africa: A Civic Assessment from Turkey, Istanbul Paper No. 3, presented at the meeting on Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation, organized by The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, Istanbul, June 25-27, 2004, pp. 6-7.

(50.) Jeddah Economic Forum in Saudi Arabia.

(51.) Radikal (Istanbul) May 29, 2003.

(52.) Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom speech at the American Enterprise Institute, 29 January 2004 at http://www.aei.org

(53.) Philip Robins, "The Foreign Policy of Turkey," in R. Hinnebusch and A. Ehteshami (eds.) The Foreign Policies of the Middle East States (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p.317-318.

(54.) Graham Fuller argues that "Now that Turkey's profile is more sympathetic to Muslim states, its own domestic accomplishments are viewed with greater sympathy and respect thus facilitate Turkey's serving in part as a regional model" G. Fuller, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 61.

(55.) Jihad al-Zain, "The New Turkey and the Arab Political System," al Nahar, June 20, 2004.

(56.) Dar al Hayat August 23, 2004, at http://www.daralhayat.com

(57.) Aljazeera, April 13, 2004, at http://www.aljazeera.com

(58.) Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 2003.

(59.) Jihad al-Zain, ibid.

(60.) All these policies were interpreted in the Arab world largely in relation to the AKP government, although other actors in Turkish politics contributed to them. Thus the analysis of particular improvement in relations with Syria and the decision over the Iraq war still reflects the lack of understanding of Turkish politics.

(61.) Nader Fergany, " More Arab than the Arabs?" Al Ahram Weekly at http:/weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2004/694/op3htm

Meliha Benli Altunisik teaches at the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.