The Taliban Phenomenon - Part 4 - Conclusions.

The Taliban movement has collapsed. Its leaders are on the run, some within Afghanistan and some in neighbouring Pakistan. The US air strikes since October 2001 have pulverised much of the Taliban's infrastructure, and the associated facilities of its ally Osama Bin Ladin. The opposition Northern Alliance (NA), a patchwork of conflicting interests united only in their desire to get rid of the Taliban, is now the most powerful political force on the ground in Afghanistan.

What happens next in the country will depend to a great extent on the compromises the NA leaders are prepared to make among themselves, with the remaining factions consisting of various Pashtun tribal leaders and warlords divided into the Cyprus and Peshawar groups, and with the royalist group of former King Zahir Shah (a Durrani Pashtun). Meeting at Koenigswinter outside Bonn since Nov. 26, under the guidance of the UN and with backing from the US, representatives of these four factions appeared to be prepared to make the necessary compromises (see following pages).

There is little or no chance that the movement will survive in any noticeable political form. Public opinion in northern and western Afghanistan shifted against the Taliban almost as soon as they took over these areas dominated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. The Pashtuns in much of the rest of Afghanistan only tolerated the Taliban to the extent they bought an end to anarchy, but their harsh codes alienated these populations soon thereafter as well.

Most world governments have rejected the idea of a "moderate" Taliban having some role in a future Afghan government. But it is almost certain that some ethnic Pashtun leaders who have in the past six years been linked to the Taliban will find a role for themselves in the broad-based government proposed to be installed in Kabul. Some of these leaders had shifted to the side of the Taliban only in order to secure their interests, not out of religious fervour. Thus when they decided that the Taliban were on the way out, they were equally quick to switch sides once again. Indeed, the rapid collapse of the Taliban in many villages has been attributed to this factor.

The attitude of the external players is critical to what comes after the Taliban in Afghanistan. Conflicting interests have been the main cause of the continuous bloodshed in Afghanistan for over two decades, with the parties involved being the US, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India. The rise of the Taliban, and their control over an estimated 90% of Afghan territory between 1994 and 2001, reflected the "victory" of Pakistani and Saudi interests, to the exclusion of almost everyone else.

However, in creating and supporting the expansion in Afghanistan of such a movement, Pakistan and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia had failed to accurately assess the potential for a backlash. According to observers, the Pakistani judgement that all neighbouring countries - mainly Russia, Iran and India - would simply accept that the Taliban were there to stay was flawed as events since 1996 have shown; these three countries supported the NA for years with limited military, financial and medical aid. Another Pakistani misjudgement, the observers say, was to assume that its friends and allies - the US and China, for example - would eventually accept the Taliban as the best option for Afghanistan. This proved wrong as well, because eventually the US, Russia, India and Iran ended up on the same side - essentially facilitating the NA's capture of Kabul.

Now the emphasis of the world at large, including that of the Pakistani leadership, is for the creation of a broad-based government in Afghanistan. There is comprehensive support for such a plan, but each of the countries' understanding of what is meant by a broad-based government is quite different; the objective on the part of each of Afghanistan's neighbouring countries is the same as it always was, i.e. to set up in Kabul a government that would promote the neighbour's influence and interest.

The only difference this time is that the US and its western allies are strongly behind the idea of a broad-based government, which may only satisfy the interested parties partially. A key factor, therefore, behind the future stability of Afghanistan is the duration of the American physical presence in and over Afghanistan.