The Taliban Phenomenon - Part 3 - Implications For The Middle East.

The consolidation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in recent years led anti-terrorism experts to project the shift of Islamic militancy from the Middle East to the Afghanistan-Pakistan zone. It was also forecast that, with militancy spreading out of Afghanistan to Central and South Asia, it would have an impact on the Middle East in the coming years. The WTC/Pentagon attacks of Sept. 11 have speeded up the timeframe, and the impact of the Taliban's radical version of Islam on the Middle East has already begun to be felt. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which thought they had successfully combatted the upsurge of Islamic militancy in the 1990s, now look certain to be faced by another wave.

Much will depend on the outcome of Operation Enduring Freedom, launched by the Americans against the Taliban regime for refusing to hand over Osama Bin Ladin, whom the US considers as the mastermind behind the Sept. 11 attacks. In public perceptions in the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan, the war is not going very much in America's favour. After about one and a half months of sustained bombings, the US has little to show for it. Bin Ladin remains alive and defiant as ever. The Taliban remain in control of Kabul, and efforts to split the regime have failed. Key players involved in efforts to engineer a split have been betrayed and assassinated.

Meanwhile, the civilian death toll is increasing and all this is broadcast on the Arabic TV channel 'Al Jazeera', operating out of the emirate of Qatar. There is a growing sense among some countries in the Middle East that US armed forces may suffer the same fate as their Soviet counterparts did in the 1980s. Among the regimes in the Middle East, there is also concern about what may happen if the US gets bogged down in Afghanistan with the Taliban appearing as victors simply as a result of refusing to give up fighting. Then America's closest allies would be the ones most under threat, from domestic Islamists who would try to duplicate Taliban tactics in their home countries.

This is one of the main reasons why Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and others are hedging their bets on support for the American bombardment of Afghanistan. They do not want to be seen as too far from public sentiments that, despite being opposed to the extreme practices of the Taliban, are even more opposed to the approach of Washington.

Pressure is building up, however, on these countries from both the US and from the Islamists. Washington wants them to demonstrate greater support in word and deed, while the Islamist movements and the public in general have the opposite opinion. And as the American bombardment continues to target the Taliban frontlines, Arab fighters based in Afghanistan are trying their best to exfiltrate from the country - reportedly often paying as much as $30,000 per fighter to be smuggled out. It is virtually certain that those who succeed will eventually end up in various parts of the Arab World, and they will not give up their radical Islamist agenda. So ultimately the implications of the Taliban's ideology in the Middle East may well outlast the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.