The Taliban Phenomenon - Implications For US Allies.

The Sept. 11 attacks have had a devastating impact upon the allies of the US in the Middle East. Firstly, it rendered almost meaningless all their efforts during the 1990s to crush militancy. Regional experts on militancy have no doubt that, with the single act of bringing down the Twin Towers, Bin Ladin has managed to motivate a new generation of radicals. The inevitable American response, i.e. the bombing of Afghanistan, is adding fuel to the fire. Public opinion throughout the Middle East, while generally critical of the killing of civilians, remains ambivalent about the targeting of Bin Ladin on the one hand and tends to sympathise with his stated aims.

This has put the allies of the US in the region, i.e. the ruling superstructures in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco etc., in a very difficult position from a domestic political perspective. If they give open-ended support to Washington, like the Bush administration is demanding, then they would increase their own alienation from the general public. Hence Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Washington's closest allies in the Arab World, have tempered their backing with cautionary statements and have refused to get directly involved. In the case of Saudi Arabia, there have even been rumours of a split at the top level of the royal family, with King Fahd and his full brothers reportedly preferring a policy of more open support to the US than wanted by Crown Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdel Aziz.

Newspapers in the Gulf and in Egypt have been printing a significant amount of anti-American articles, repeatedly demanding an end to the "double standards" of the US, its unconditional support for Israel and its refusal to understand the Arab struggle against "Israeli terrorism". These sentiments are echoed in Internet forums and chat-rooms where participants include people from countries allied to the US.

Concern about public opinion is also the reason why Middle Eastern leaders and officials have called for a halt to the bombing campaign during the Ramadan period. Washington has rebuffed these requests, so far - pointing out that the holy fasting season has not prevented Muslim armies from fighting each other in the past. Moreover, hardliners in Washington see the attempt to halt bombing during Ramadan as a devious tactic aimed at hobbling its attack on the Taliban, which would surely make use of the opportunity to recover from the setbacks inflicted through the bombing.

This does not mean that Washington is ignoring the repercussions among its allies of the hunt for Bin Ladin. During his recent visit to Riyadh, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that the Saudis were worried about the "secondary effects" of Operation Enduring Freedom, especially if it ended up ousting the Taliban and killing or capturing Bin Ladin. But Washington has made it clear that it cannot and will not scale down their hunt for Bin Ladin in order to satisfy the sensitivities of their allies.

On the other hand, if the US allies do not support Washington as the Bush administration wishes, the US may itself turn on them after Phase One of the war against terrorism - focusing on Afghanistan - is over (for a more detailed examination of Phases One and Two of the war against terrorism, see the currently ongoing survey in Strategic Balance in the Middle East). In the American press, there have been strong criticisms of the way both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have responded to US appeals for help in the war against terror. Apart from pointing out the fact that most of the alleged hijackers were Saudis and Egyptians, newspapers have been calling on the US government to apply pressure on these regimes to apply large-scale social and political reform on everything from the political system to education.

One example is a critique of Riyadh in an article by Thomas Friedmann in 'The New York Times' of Oct. 30. He says: "...simple tolerance of other faiths is precisely what Saudi Arabia has not been teaching. If the Saudis cannot or will not do that, then we must conclude that the Saudi ruling family is not really on our side, and we should move quickly to lessen our dependence upon it".

Things can only get worse if, after Phase One, the US moves on to target other "rogue" states that are regarded as supporting terrorism. First on the list seems to be Iraq, with several top officials having mentioned it in the context of Phase Two operations very soon after the Sept. 11 attacks. But the clearest statement of intent came on Nov. 7 from Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking in Kuwait after a meeting with Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah Al Hamad Al Sabah. Powell said: "We must end Osama bin Ladin's terrorist threat to the world, and deal with the Taliban regime, who has given them haven... And nations such as Iraq, which have tried to pursue weapons of mass destruction, should not think that we will not be concerned about these activities, and will not turn our attention to them".

Results of an opinion poll by Zogby International revealed on Nov. 7 showed that 80% of Americans believed that launching military strikes against Iraq and removing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power would be an effective move in the war against terrorism. The problem is that such a move would require direct Arab support, unlike the case in the campaign against Afghanistan. Then Riyadh and others allied to the US would find themselves forced to make a difficult choice. The decision they make will determine exactly how the allies of the US fare in Phase Two of the American war against terror.