The Taliban Phenomenon - Arab Fighters Amid The Taliban.

For years it has been known that a large contingent of Arab fighters - among others ranging from Bosnians to Xinjiang Uighurs - have been fighting alongside the Taliban against the opposition Northern Alliance (NA). These were men who, like Bin Ladin, originally fought alongside the Afghans in the anti-Soviet Jihad during the 1980s, and others who joined subsequently after having been attracted by the Taliban ideology. This ideology is based on an amalgamation of the ancient Pashtun code of Pashtunwali, the Wahhabi sectarian doctrine exported from Saudi Arabia and the Deobandi ideology based on the teachings of the madrassa (religious school) known as Dar ul Uloom Deoband - located in India but with its radically oriented theologians at present mainly in Pakistan.

Over the years, because of their financial clout - backed by donations from the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states and Bin Ladin's fortunes - the Arab fighters have assumed a disproportionate influence over the Taliban leadership. Indeed, many observers have pointed out in recent months that it is the Arab group which increasingly sets the Taliban agenda - with their influence having compounded since Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and Bin Ladin consecrated their alliance through marriage of each other's daughter.

It is important to note that many of these fighters had congregated in Afghanistan because they had nowhere else to go. In their Arab homelands, the security forces had engaged in very tough crackdowns against Islamic extremism through the 1990s. By the late 1990s, the noose had begun tightening in Europe as well.

Thus in the second half of the 1990s, many of these fighters had moved into Afghanistan via Pakistan - where the military intelligence establishment was at the time strengthening the Taliban in the hope that this would give Islamabad "strategic depth" against India, keep a friendly regime in power in Afghanistan, give strategic trade and political access to Central Asia, and give a deniable base for militants operating in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir.

By the middle of this year, it was estimated that between 8,000 and 12,000 foreigners were fighting in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban. These fighters had become closely integrated into the military organisation of the Taliban. In total, it is judged that the foreigners formed around between 20 and 25% of the fighters fielded by the Taliban against the NA in offensive operations. Indeed, for the Taliban, these foreign units had become an indispensable part of their battle forces.

Consequently, this gave the foreign movements operating in Afghanistan greater autonomy and political leverage within Afghanistan. Among the foreigners in the country, Pakistanis have from the beginning (i.e. 1994 when the Taliban burst upon the scene) constituted the greatest proportion of combatants. 'Jane's Defence Weekly' of July 18, 2001 had estimated that "Pakistanis make up some 5,000 -7,000, or over half, the foreign presence conducting military operations across much of Afghanistan, most notably on fronts north of Kabul and in northeastern Afghanistan".

Arab recruits to the Taliban ranks were by then estimated as being the second largest foreign contingent in Afghanistan, with their numbers increasing steadily since early 2000, according to both UN and UF sources. Some 2,000 Arab combatants, all apparently affiliated to and financed by Bin Ladin, were by mid-2001 believed to be active in support of the Taliban. This was approximately double the number of Arabs estimated in 1997-98 to have been in Afghanistan. According to reports from the NA, the Arab troops are recognised as the most aggressive fighters in Taliban ranks.

Some reports even said that there were up to 3,000 Arabs fighters in the country. Since Operation Enduring Freedom began in October, reports in various media have indicated that a growing number of Arabs and other Muslims have been going to Afghanistan to fight against the US - with Pakistan serving as the main transit point. There have even been reports of British Muslims being killed on the front lines; Britain has, for its part, warned that any Briton who fights on the side of the Taliban could be prosecuted for treason on his return home - because fighting with the Taliban mean fighting against British forces in Afghanistan.

By the middle of 2001, the presence of Arab mujahedin and civilians was noticeable in the southern cities of Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar - the latter two being known as Taliban strongholds. Some reports in the Pakistani media had indicated that, after the US assault began, Arab fighters had taken control of key infrastructure points in cities such as Kandahar (the airport, for example). While these reports remain unconfirmed, there are indications that the behaviour of Arab fighters in some areas has triggered resentment among the Afghans.

The Arab fighters had also set up military bases in Afghanistan, some of which doubled as training facilities. It has been reported that, by 2000, bases had been built up at Darunta and Ghaziabad, both located near the eastern city of Jalalabad; Naghloo Dam near Sarobi; Kunduz; and Kandahar Airport. Reports have also hinted that training camps were opened in the western part of Herat province, i.e. close to the Iranian border with Afghanistan.

One notorious camp was at Rishkhor, which has been "closed" and "relocated" on different occasions. This camp has received particular attention from the US, which had pressured Pakistan to get the Taliban to close the camp down because of the blatant way in which it operated. Arab instructors and recruits were based at Rishkhor, which in the late 1990s had developed into the biggest training camp in Afghanistan with, according to 'Jane's Defence Weekly', facilities for more than 1,000 recruits and courses in small arms, support weaponry, demolition, and escape and evasion.

The camp was briefly closed down in mid-2000, but it has been placed off-limits by the Taliban once again, and is apparently being used to train either Afghan Taliban fighters or foreign combatants. There have also been reports that the camp was "relocated". In any event, none of the overground Arab camps in Afghanistan are likely to have survived the US bombing campaign. The US has also been specifically targeting Arab units placed on the frontlines against the NA, so the death toll among Arab fighters from waves of bombing is expected to be relatively high - at least among those who stayed back to fight.