The Strategic Aspect - Peace Opponents Have Limited Capabilities.

The small minority in the GCC states who oppose the peace process are in a tight corner. Ideologically, their ability to motivate public opinion is decreasing as the focus of attention is turning to issues that relate to economic prosperity, globalisation, socio-economic liberalisation, etc.

Issues which they have hitherto used to oppose the peace process are also losing their attraction. For example, the Palestinian cause is no longer appealing because the Palestinians themselves, led by Arafat, have entered into various kinds of agreements with Israel. Syria too has joined the bandwagon and it appears as though Damascus will succeed in getting back the Golan Heights, with Israel to pullout from south Lebanon as well. This, in effect, means the return of most Arab territories captured by the state of Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967.

Those Islamic militants whose rhetoric has focused on taking back the territories by force will be without a fallback position when the territories are returned. The most extreme militants, who call for the eradication of the state of Israel, will find no support for their position as they did during the Cold War era. The only issue with enough emotional appeal to public opinion is the question of Jerusalem. This is also the toughest aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian talks. Yet, in this case too, a final settlement may be found involving some compromises. There is speculation that the Palestinians will settle for building their capital in a suburb of Jerusalem known as Abu Dis. In fact, construction is already underway in the area for a facility that is being referred to as a "conference centre", but looks very much like a new parliament building. If the Jerusalem issue is settled with a compromise accepted by the Palestinians and key regional governments, the bases for opposition will be completely eliminated.

Observers say that only then will the "real motives" of the Islamists be exposed completely, i.e. that their objective is simply to gain political power and set up a system which fits their religious or ideological orientations. That would result in a further, and perhaps irreversible weakening of their position, as none of the governments in the region would tolerate any opposition (a) which has the aim of overthrowing the existing ruling superstructure, and (b) without any ideological line that has support from the general public.

Such a situation would leave the Islamists with two options: (1) adapt their political platforms and try to work within the mainstream, or (2) turn towards overtly violent means as a way of achieving their goals. The first option may be feasible in the GCC to some extent, as in the case of Kuwait which has a considerable presence of Islamists in the National Assembly. Some of them have been openly critical of Israel in recent years, especially during the Netanyahu era. The Shura councils in the other GCC countries also have members who could be regarded as having radical Islamist views in some areas, but these have more to do with socio-economic issues than with the peace process.

The second option, taking the route of violence, is virtually impossible for the Islamists. If the Islamic radicals choose that option - in an environment where the peace process is progressing - it would imply failure to achieve their own objectives and signify the end of the movements that take this path. There is no way that the small community of radical Islamists in these countries can hope to take on the internal security forces in the area and expect to survive. Either they will disappear into prisons or into exile, as has already happened during the early and mid-1990s to many leading radicals.

The security services in the GCC countries are extremely well funded, trained and capable. The leaderships in the region have long been aware that the threat to stability is greater from internal sources than from external forces. Security services throughout the region spare no effort to detect and suppress what are regarded as subversive activities. If necessary, the get the assistance of their main Western allies, especially the US which has the capability needed to track militants wherever they may be worldwide.

One good example is the case of Osama Bin Ladin, the exiled former Saudi national who is now a hero to many Islamic radicals and who is now receiving asylum from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Despite the close relationship between key GCC states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE to the Taliban, they have both put strong pressure on the regime to turn Bin Ladin over to the US for prosecution. On Nov. 2, 1998, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan Ibn Abdel Aziz bluntly warned during a visit to Washington: "I cannot speak for another country... However, my personal view is his continuing to be there is not in the interest of Afghanistan... Bin Laden is not a Saudi citizen. He was stripped of his citizenship because he was considered a traitor to his country and to his faith, which is Islam. "And therefore if Taliban hands him over to face justice whether in the United States or anywhere else we believe justice should take its course". Saudi Arabia and the UAE are two of only three countries, the other being Pakistan, which recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan.