The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics.

Perceptions vary as to how to achieve global environmental balance. The dominant view is that nation states will meet the challenge through a set of incremental steps whereby individual states unite in a system of collective management. This review elaborates on the counternotion forwarded by the authors of a new book that governments are too paralyzed by numerous conflicts of interest to create an effective system of collective management. The authors instead demonstrate the emergence of a complex social dynamic in global policy making, and they conclude with observations about how this new dynamic may be altering the existing world order.

I. INTRODUCTION

There is a growing awareness in all quarters of the need for comprehensive international environmental policies. Depletion of the rain forests, acid rain, global warming--the list of worries grows daily. Just as the number of environmental concerns grow, so does the vastness of each individual problem. Depletion of the rain forests, for example, may once have been thought to be a regional problem of only a select group of third-world nations. However, it has clearly come to threaten us all, as evidenced by the resulting decrease in the planet's oxygen levels and the eradication of countless plant and animal species. "Globalization" has become the environmental banner of the 1990s for nations and social movements alike. But where does "globalization" take us? How do we install effective international environmental policies, and what barriers stand in our way?

The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics(1) tackles these expansive issues from a refreshing and unique perspective. The book's thirteen essays by twelve authors aggressively challenge the dominant notion that states will meet these challenges in the same "business-as-usual" manner in which they handle all other problems (a view the authors consider grossly simplistic). As it tackles this dominant notion, the book does an excellent job of rising above the "self-help guide" approach that so many books on the same topic have adopted.(2) On the contrary, the authors insist that there are simply too many international players, each with too many divergent motives, for any such self-help recommendations to be useful. They argue instead that, as the world becomes increasingly interconnected,(3) the process of struggling to create and implement global environmental policies is causing a fundamental change in the structure of international environmental politics. This fundamental change they term the global ecological interdependence (GEI) dynamic.(4) The book flushes out this dynamic with examples of past and present environmental management policies from various countries.

To this end, the book breaks up naturally into three sections. Section one, The State and Global Ecological Interdependence, consists of four essays that paint a bleak picture of the notion that states will be able to come together and form comprehensive global environmental policies. A number of real-world examples are effectively used to illustrate the point that such attempts usually fail, and that success, even when it does occur, is limited. The states, inability to reach solutions lays the groundwork for section two, Constructing the Global Environment: Global Ecological Interdependence and Political Contestation. This section, the most developed and insightful in the book, tracks the rise of nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) and their role in the GEI dynamic and develops the more interesting and subtle nuances of the GEI dynamic. The book concludes with section three, Global Ecological Interdependence and the Future of World Politics, which includes two essays that give very brief and speculative analyses of where the GEI dynamic might ultimately take us. Unfortunately, this section is so speculative and brief that it appears more like a tacked-on addition than the completion of the book's analysis. Still, the section does manage to achieve some measure of closure.

II. THE STATE AND GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL INTERDEPENDENCE

The first of the book's three sections begins the analysis of the GEI dynamic by focusing on the nation state system. The authors correctly observe that there has been a general global consensus that the problems of effective environmental management fall ultimately within the states, domain.(5) At a fundamental level, this seems intuitive because the purpose of the states is to protect the well-being of their citizens, and environmental management furthers this purpose. Additionally, only states have the power necessary to bind their citizens to agreements and regulations that further environmental policy objectives. States are perceived as "both the locus of causes and consequences and as the level at which appropriate policy responses must take place."(6) The authors note, though, that the recent performance of the states in finding solutions to environmental concerns has not been ideal. The question then becomes whether the states will rise to the challenge on their own over time or if something beyond them must intervene.

There is a large body of support for the argument that states will eventually be able to overcome the perils of global environmental management through a process of "collective management."(7) This position does not argue for a global state, but advocates the idea that as environmental concerns grow, states will enter into more and more international environmental agreements.(8) Over time, these agreements will weave together to form an expansive global environmental policy "blanket" of sorts.(9) Support for this position comes from the fact that there has been a significant increase in the number of negotiated international agreements since the 1970s.(10) These agreements have also become more inclusive, covering larger geographical areas and becoming more prevention-oriented rather than response-oriented.(11) Karen Litfin notes that many states have taken responsive steps to combat environmental problems:

Consider, for instance, Japan's whaling practices; or policy shifts by the U.K.,

and later the U.S., on acid rain controls; or, more recently, Brazil's efforts to

slow deforestation. In each case, a nation that was slow to enact certain policies

was persuaded, at least in part, by pressures from abroad to modify its

practices.(12)

But is that enough? No doubt, many people believe that it is; however, the authors make a good argument that it probably is not. They assert that there are more forces at work in these situations than the majority's argument acknowledges--forces that may render state "collective management" unachievable.(13)

The foundation of this argument rests on the glaring observation that the dramatic increase in the number of new environmental agreements around the world has not improved the condition of the global environment.(14) In fact, just the opposite is true: the number of environmental problems is growing.(15) Often this is the case because agreements are not effectively enforced.(16) But this begs the question of why they are not enforced. It is here that the GEI dynamic comes in. The authors explain that as states come together to address their larger common environmental concerns, they invariably must generalize issues and move away from smaller, more specific (and often conflicting) concerns.(17) These smaller concerns can come either from smaller states or from smaller NGOs or communities within a state. Ronnie Lipschutz and Ken Conca describe the result as a tension between the "micro- and macrolevel structures," creating the concurrent but conflicting forces of "centralization and fragmentation."(18) Because there are so many actors in states in so many locations with so many conflicting expectations and concerns, no state can move toward one set of objectives (centralization) without invariably moving away from other sets of objectives (fragmentation). Lipschutz and Conca believe this dynamic makes the creation of effective environmental policy a very challenging task and explains why so many environmental policies that are implemented ultimately turn out to be unsuccessful.(19)

The authors observe that, though states may have the power to overcome these smaller groups at the time of the agreement, the smaller groups remain intact and continue to exert pressure (economically and politically) to overcome centralization.(20) When there are a large number of fragmented groups, their combined energies can be considerable. This, combined with the fact that the state is often unable to maintain the momentum it had at the time of the agreement formation, creates a scenario where the fragmentary forces manage to decentralize the state and prevent enforcement of the agreement. Ironically, the trend toward conceptualizing environmental problems in global terms--a force that motivates states to centralize their environmental policies--triggers the fragmentation counterforce that prevents those policies from being effective. This is an interesting notion that Lipschutz and Conca (as well as other authors) do an excellent job of conveying to the reader.(21)

The authors further argue that, despite the increase in the number of international environmental agreements, states will probably never implement or enforce enough global policies because those policies are often perceived as threats to higher state priorities.(22) For states to adopt a global agenda, they must relinquish some of their own agendas.(23) This acts as a "constraint on their ability to pursue unilateral action or `opt out of the game' in the name of self-interest."(24) The abdication of self-interest and independence is not a course of action that states will enter into lightly. States have traditional notions of sovereignty that include concepts of national security, economic growth, and technological development.(25) They are not inclined to give up power in any of these areas.(26) Therefore, argue the authors, the more international agreements invade these areas, the. less likely states will be to honor the agreements.(27)

But the globalization of environmental management increasingly puts states in the role of having to abandon these traditional notions to follow a centralizing international policy. This is not to say, according to the authors, that centralization does not occur; the complex social dynamic of centralization and fragmentation (and recentralization and refragmentation) is an integral part of all international relationships. However, it is to say--as widespread environmental pollution and mismanagement will confirm--that states still value these traditional notions more than they value the implementation of comprehensive global policies. Even when states do enter into global environmental agreements, they tend to structure those agreements in a "business-as-usual" type of pattern so that they do not materially infringe on these traditional notions of sovereignty. Conca calls this state behavior the "tendency toward restructuring (in the sense of reproducing), rather than restructuring (in the sense of fundamentally altering), the modern, sovereign, capitalist features of the current world order."(28) Conca concludes that this force results in hollow agreements that yield little or no benefit.

Despite the states, flaws, all of the authors in the first section conclude that, while states cannot effectively resolve global environmental problems, they must be part of any possible solution: the state system must be "augmented rather than replaced."(29) Deudney believes that the state system will survive because no alternate form of community currently exists that could replace it. In his words, nothing else creates the "psychic pageant of nationalism . . . [with its] flags, parades, heroes, `hallowed grounds,' sagas of suffering and triumph [that] generate ready-made and broadly accessible community."(30) In contrast, the international cosmopolitan world culture is "thin and lifeless."(31) For Deudney this means that any global environmental policy that is to succeed must come from the states but must be supplemented by other actors(32) (the topic of section two).

The logic of section one is alluring because it starts with readily acceptable premises. Have states attempted to deal with environmental concerns? Are they having difficulty doing so effectively? Do they (and smaller actors within them) have traditional objectives that conflict with those concerns? It hardly seems revolutionary to answer all of these questions affirmatively. And the process of answering leads into the authors, analysis of what is at work behind all of those affirmative statements. The four essays in this section thus manage to form a surprisingly solid foundation for the book's subsequent development of the GEI dynamic and will provide most readers with the feeling that they are on firm footing heading into the second section.

III. CONSTRUCTING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND POLITICAL CONTESTATION

Section two, the heart of the book, addresses how NGOs and other social and scientific movements have risen to address the failure of the states and, in the process, have become an integral part of the GEI dynamic. All of the essays in this section smack of a certain sincerity, probably because they uniformly address what the role of NGOs in the GEI dynamic is rather than what it should be (again, avoiding the pitfalls of a se]f-help guide). The authors note that because of growing public concern about environmental problems, local and national NGOs have increased in number dramatically both in developed and developing countries.(33) These groups have also increased their legitimacy and political clout by networking on an international scale.(34) Globalization has helped them frame environmental concerns more expansively and generate extracommunity support for local environmental causes. According to the authors, if global environmental rescue is going to happen at all, it is likely to be the result of NGOs exerting pressure to "challenge the principles of sovereignty and territorial exclusivity that define the nation-state system."(35)

It is not the state that is going to bring about its own radical change, but the NGOs. This conclusion is another good example of the powerful reasoning of most of the essays in this book. They first present a relatively benign assumption (here, that states have strong reasons for not effecting change), and then explore and develop the repercussions of that assumption on an international scale. The macroanalysis that results from this series of assumptions and developments is quite powerful.

The authors argue that, by pushing states to adopt international environmental policies that go against their sovereign "gut reactions," NGOs increase the chances of effecting a global rescue in a number of ways. The most obvious way is that NGOs sometimes succeed in persuading a state to enter into and adequately enforce a sound environmental policy. Though this has happened before, Lipschutz and Conca point out that it is hardly the norm and therefore cannot be relied upon without more.(36) Another way, put forth by Gerlach in perhaps the most novel and intriguing essay of the book,(37) is that NGOs usually succeed in generating public debate by discovering and addressing environmental problems. According to Gerlach, this has two beneficial effects.

The first is that debate raises public awareness of environmental concerns, which makes the public more responsive to the efforts of NGOs and more likely to financially and politically support them.(38) The more NGOs grow in power, the more they advance what Milbrath calls their "new environmental paradigm" and use it to replace the "dominant social paradigm" of the states.(39) In this sense, Gerlach says that NGOs are just like states: they tend to reproduce their own structures (that is, restructure(40)) as they grow and address new problems. Therefore, if they continue to grow in size and political power they will continue to reproduce the same global, environment-friendly structures that are lacking in the states. Gerlach hypothesizes that NGOs may then be able to modify or even replace the "dominant social paradigm" as it now stands.

Gerlach believes that the second benefit of public debate is that the debate process creates increasingly complex (and increasingly effective) solutions to environmental problems.(41) As stated before, the process of environmental policy making operates within a dynamic of conflicting centralizing and fragmenting forces.(42) This dynamic not only operates at the state level but also at the individual level. However, people, like states, do not want a trade-off; they simply want solutions to their problems. As Gerlach puts it, "people will seek to have both freedom and order, the benefits of decentralization and centralization" in the resolution of local environmental problems.(43) In their attempt to have both, and in the ensuing debate about how to achieve both, people construct progressively more complex solutions. Gerlach says that this debate serves a useful function because it "educates people to change, and enculturates them to make the new ideas part of their design for living."(44) In other words, the length and complexity of the process impresses upon people the need to find a solution and accept it, even if it is not favorable to all of their interests.(45) The increasing complexity also helps ensure that smaller groups feel that their concerns are being addressed rather than suffocated by the larger, general concerns. This makes smaller groups less likely to work to overthrow the majority's ultimate solution (that is, less likely to work for decentralization).(46) Gerlach's ideas are attractive because they transcend the more rigid and simplistic notion that individuals are static in nature, with only one set of fixed objectives toward which they uniformly move. They do not. Instead, individuals, like social movements, have extremely complex collections of goals, expectations, and understandings that fluidly interact with each other and the outside world. This is the individual social dynamic at work, and to impose a static structure on this dynamic is to fail to recognize all of the possibilities that it presents. In this sense, the rigid notion that Gerlach successfully rejects for the individual is identical to the rigid "collective management" notion that the book rejects for the states. The result is that Gerlach's microargument becomes a significant pillar in the book's macroargument.

While noting the success of NGOs, the authors stress that their success over the dominant social paradigm is not assured. The authors address a number of forces that stand in the way of NGOs successfully effecting a paradigm change in the states. According to Ann Hawkins, one problem is that, just as states cannot move toward global objectives without moving away from some local objectives, so NGOs, too, are restricted as they attempt to become more global.(47) The globalization of environmental concerns can be beneficial to local NGOs and international NGOs by creating in them a sense of common purpose.(48) A problem arises, though, because "[w]hile such a strategy allows disparate actors to share a common rhetoric, practice and implementation often lead to the disintegration of the consensus."(49) Hawkins argues that this limits the effectiveness of global networking.

Another negative aspect of globalizing environmental concerns is that the more global the concern, the less effectively NGOs will be able to rally public support around it. The less public interest there is, the smaller the public debate will be (meaning less support for NGOs and less complex solution construction).(50) Steve Breyman argues that the public will only be concerned about a global problem if it is one that impacts directly and visibly on their lives.(51) The authors point out that framing environmental problems in such simultaneously global and local terms is difficult and presents a considerable challenge to NGOs.

IV. Global Ecological Interdependence and the Future of World Politics

The third and final section of the book concludes the development of the GEI dynamic by theorizing as to what type of "deep structure" changes it might bring to the environmental movement and world politics.(52) The authors paint two different scenarios: one of "transformation" and one of "reproduction."(53)

The first scenario, developed in a lofty and unpersuasive essay by Daniel Deudney, depicts the notion that the GEI dynamic may be bringing about the evolution of a "green culture."(54) Deudney argues that this culture may eventually build enough of a unified international community (that is, one that is substantively rich enough) to replace the community provided by the states.(55) He reaches this conclusion by drawing comparisons between "green culture" and the religious and state systems around which communities are presently built.(56) He notes that green culture is not just an extension of international cosmopolitanism (in which the only common goal of the members is a desire for all communities to work together).(57) Instead, green culture is what Deudney calls a "credible cosmology"--an encompassing view of the world that does not clash with modern science. He further argues that green culture goes beyond pure science because it offers a spiritual and moral system and the accompanying sacred places and rituals.(58) Unfortunately, the essay fails to evoke much of the reader's interest, instead coming across as something of a stray bullet in the book's overall analysis. The heart of the problem is that Deudney attempts to conclude a book about the lack of easy answers with a hypothetical easy answer. Just like the notion that states will achieve collective management, the notion that all individuals will come together to do the same strikes the reader as an untenable hypothesis; it is a clearer message than can be derived from the jumble of the book's arguments about the GEI dynamic. As a result, the analogies that Deudney draws to support the green culture premise appear clever but weak.

The second essay, by Ken Conca,(59) is more successful in maintaining the tone of the book. Instead of arguing that the state system is likely to be overthrown, Conca concludes that the existing state system will probably survive (as section one of the book concluded), but that states will be required to implement effective environmental policies in order to further their own traditional sovereign objectives.(60) As he puts it, the world order will attempt to "steer the course of capitalist expansion rather than overturn it."(61) The issue for Conca is therefore less a question of change in environmental policy than a change in the nature of sovereignty itself.(62) He says that the state objectives of national security, economic growth, and technological development are likely to remain in place, but states will eventually reach a point where none of these ends will be achievable if environmental destruction continues to escalate.(63) Therefore, the states will cause some level of change and integrate environmental balance into their concepts of state sovereignty as a necessary cost of doing business.(64) Conca's essay concludes the book nicely, drawing upon conclusions and observations of the previous authors so as to make his correctures about the future appear less speculative.

V. Conclusion

The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics is a refreshing analysis of a topic of growing concern. The richness of the issues and the comprehensive treatment of those issues by the authors is, for the most part, impressive. The authors make it clear early on that it is not their objective to synthesize all of the actors, forces, and theories discussed within the book into a comprehensive or confident picture of where the world is headed. If anything, the opposite is true. An emerging dynamic, termed the GEI dynamic, is addressed and analyzed to show just how many countervailing actors and forces are at work in any environmental issue. The authors are careful to point out that this dynamic "represents one strand in a thread of developments having to do with politics, culture, identity, growth, and mobility that, taken together, are changing world order and world politics."(65) They are even hesitant to conclude that "global rescue" will occur at all. This adept mode of analysis leaves the readers feeling neither coddled nor traumatized, though perhaps a little uneasy. The authors would argue that the alternative, however, would hinder rather than serve readers for two reasons. First, any reassurances of environmental progress would be illusions, and they would negate the authors, arguments about the complexity and fluidity of international social and political dynamics. More importantly, though, such reassurances would fail to empower readers to effect environmental change. By leaving readers more educated and more wary about global environmental management, the authors have added fuel to the fire of the public debate to spur the creation of more complex (and theoretically more successful) environmental solutions. (1) The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics 327 (Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Ken Conca eds., 1993) [hereinafter The State and Social Power]. (2) The "self-help guide" structure usually identifies a myriad of problems and suggests a small collection of solutions that can be undertaken (or must be undertaken, depending on the tone of the book) to solve those problems. This structure is particularly unpersuasive when dealing with complex social and political issues because the solutions are virtually always premised on large and unrealistic assumptions. (3) Daniel Deudney sums up the global environmental situation well when he writes:

With the further intensification and globalization of industrialism, the domestic

sphere has now become planetary in scope .... The global environmental crisis is at

its core a "domestic" phenomenon, but one occurring at an unprecedentedly large

scale. It is about global-scale household management, about disequilibria in the system

of production, consumption, and reproduction. If global communications and

transportation has created a "global village" of shared images and consciousness,

then the global environmental crisis reveals the existence of a "global household."

Attending to the global environmental crisis thus promises to domesticate the relationship

between independent political communities, to create "domestic" politics on

a global scale. The term "domestic" is appropriate to describe a world political order

produced by large-scale earth keeping activities because these activities will break

down the distinction between the "domestic" world of "internal" or intrastate affairs,

and the world of "foreign" interstate relations. Daniel Deudney, Global Environmental Rescue and the Emergence of World Domestic Politics, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 280, 283-84. (4) Ken Conca & Ronnie D. Lipschutz, A Tale of Two Forests, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 1, 9. (5) Ponnie D. Lipschutz & Ken Conca, The State and Global Ecological Interdependence, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 19, 19. (6) Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Ken Conca, The Implications of Global Ecological Interdependence, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 327, 328. (7) Id. at 332. (8) See Ken Conca, Environmental Change and the Deep Structure of World Politics, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 306, 310; Lipschutz & Conca, supra note 6, at 332. (9) Lipschutz & Conca, supra note 6, at 332. (10) See Karen Litfin, Ecoregimes: Playing Tug of War with the Nation-State, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 94, 103. (11) Id. An observer recently counted approximately 150 multilateral environmental agreements and 500 bilateral agreements. Id. at 96. (12) Id. at 107. (13) Lipschutz & Conca, supra note 6, at 334. Lipschutz and Conca argue that even the current successes of some states do not contradict this conclusion:

[T]he state system has thus far shown a certain adaptability in the construction of

some fairly narrow and limited environmental regimes. In particular, the regime

designed to manage ozone depletion seems well on its way to functioning effectively,

and is often cited as a model for other agreements. But an agreement to phase out a

single family of chemicals, for which substitutes are increasingly available, is a weak

test at best. Most of the phenomena that make up the global-change litany are far

more complex in terms of sources, effects, and linkages to social systems of global

extent. Id. (14) See Litfin, supra note 10, at 110. (15) Id. (16) Id. at 109. Litfin writes, "Although substantial research has been done on compliance with international agreements concerning arms control, trade, and human rights, there is almost no work on compliance with international environmental accords." Id. (17) Lipschutz & Conca, supra note 6, at 330-31. (18) Id. at 337. (19) Id. (20) Id. (21) Id. at 332. Jessie Ribot provides an example of a country unable to enforce the terms of its environmental policies with his analysis of charcoal market regulation in Senegal. Senegal bowed to pressure from international and national environmental groups and implemented a policy whereby a quota system was set up to limit the production of charcoal--a process that was causing relatively large damage to the Senegalese forests. Ribot notes that every year a quota is set under the terms of the policy, and that every year production exceeds this quota Even worse, the discrepancy between what should be mined and what actually is mined has been growing over time, due to the pressures of powerful politicians and wealthy charcoal producers. Ribot concludes that "[i]n this struggle, incomplete jurisdiction of the state, integration of market and state interests, and the dynamics of social relations and institutions, render the state unable to manage." Jesse C. Ribot, Market-State Relations and Environmental Policy: Limits of State Capacity in Senegal, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 24, 30. (22) Lipschutz & Conca, Global Ecological Interdependence and the Future of World Politics, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 275, 276. (23) Id. (24) Id. (25) Deudney, supra note 3, at 287. (26) Along these lines, Deudney writes that "states will resist the creation of a complementary regime that looks like the nucleus of a world state. States fear that once power of sufficient magnitude has been aggregated by any trans-state or interstate institution, they would not be able to check its evolution into a world state." Id. at 288. (27) Commenting on nuclear material management, Deudney states that

creating a comprehensive control regime for nuclear materials probably depends

upon the degree to which states perceive the nuclear question to be distinct from

their traditional role of defending territory by making war. Tangling up environmental

restoration with the issues of "national security" . . . could make the creation of substantial

environmental regimes a difficult--perhaps impossible--undertaking. Id. at 287-88. (28) Conca, supra note 8, at 310. (29) Deudney, supra note 3, at 288. (30) Id. at 292. (31) Id. at 293. (32) Id. (33) Ann Hawkins, Contested Ground: International Environmentalism and Global Climate Change, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 221, 226. (34) Id. at 240. (35) Litfin, supra note 10, at 111. Luther Gerlach comments:

[NGOs] are often the major force to push a subject into public debate and then to

push the debate from a narrow technical argument to a broad and penetrating deliberation 

about many factors that can be connected to the subject ....

It is this process of widening the subject area--of escalating deliberations to

include issues and concerns well beyond initial frameworks--that perhaps most frustrates

officials in government .... Luther P. Gerlach, Negotiating Ecological Interdependence Through Societal Debate: The Minnesota Drought, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 185, 193 (footnote omitted). (36) Lipschutz & Conca, supra note 6, at 334. (37) Gerlach, supra note 35. (38) See steve Breyman, Knowledge as Power: Ecology Movements and Global Environmental Problems, in The State and Social Power, supra note 1, at 124, 128-29. (39) See Lester Milbrath, Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New Society 131 (1984). Milbrath suggests that the "dominant social paradigm" is one of economic productivity and growth, while the "new environmental paradigm" is one of pure democracy and environmental balance. Id. (40) See supra note 28 and accompanying text. (41 Gerlach, supra note 35, at 196. (42) See supra note 18 and accompanying text. (43) Gerlach, supra note 35, at 188. (44) Id. at 196. (45) Id. at 214. Gerlach observes, "Change through debate is change that is hesitant and uneven, but persistent." Id. (46) Id. at 196. (47) Hawkins, supra note 33, at 231. (48) Id. (49) Id. at 242. (50) See supra notes 4446 and accompanying text. (51) Breyman, supra note 38, at 138-39. Breyman concludes: There may be no sustained mass mobilizations . . . until the effects of global environmental problems encroach on people's lives in the way of a new missile or power plant in their communities .... Anti-nuclear-power movements and anti-nuclear-weapons movements have shown the paramount importance of a tangible evil; there is no substitute for something hard and shiny like a missile or a nuclear generating plant to rally people. Id. (52) See Conca, supra note 8, at 306. (53) Lipschutz & Conca, supra note 6, at 340. (54) Deudney, supra note 3, at 293-94. (55) Id. (56) Id. at 294. (57) Id. at 300. (58) Id. at 294. Deudney writes, The cliche of the environmental movement, that the great wonders of nature constitute the "cathedrals and sanctuaries" of nature, captures an important feature of the emergent green culture. The parallel is further strengthened by the realization that increasing numbers of people are making what amount to pilgrimages to great seats of nature all over the planet, and that this type of "tourism has much in common with the religious pilgrimages of medieval Christians or contemporary Muslims. Id. at 295. (59) Conca, supra note 8. (60) Id. at 306-17. (61) Id. at 311. (62) Id. at 308. (63) Id. at 306-17. (64) Id. at 321. (65) Lipschutz & Conca, supra note 6, at 341.

Matthew Werner (*) Student, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College, J.D. expected 1996; B.A. Psychology 1991, Reed College.