The Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

THE CASE can and has been made that the foreign policy of the Bush Administration differs little from that of its predecessor. Only the rhetoric has changed, it has been claimed, and even some of that is falling back into old patterns--with regard to North Korea, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and what to do about Ba'athi Iraq. [1] Remaining differences of rhetoric, it is said, mask essential continuity. The Bush Administration carries a more unilateralist tone over a range of issues--the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, proposals to verify the 1972 Biological Weapons Treaty and control the flow of small arms--but it is not clear that the Clinton Administration was really more eager to press ahead on such matters, or that a Gore Administration would have been. Even on missile defense and the ABM teaty, the differences between Clinton and Bush may end up being quite minor when all is said and done.

One could argue the general case for the persistence of policy either way, but in one specific area there is a clear difference, and not just a rhetorical one. It concerns policy toward China.

When President Bush took office, he telephoned every major world leader but Chinese President Jiang Zemin. The Bush Administration then reportedly set about revising the SIOP (Strategic Integrated Operating Plan) to target more U.S. nuclear missiles against China. It has given serious consideration to prioritizing preparation for conventional war in East Asia against China and has promoted enhanced strategic cooperation with India and Japan. It has encouraged Japan to loosen its restraints on a more active regional military presence and it has proposed development with U.S. allies South Korea, Japan and Australia of a "regional" dialogue. It has also stressed cooperation with Russia on missile defense seemingly at the expense of China. It has defined the "no foreign-made products" stricture for the U.S. military to mean essentially no Chinese-made products and curtailed Pentagon contacts with the Chinese military. It has reversed a twenty-year U.S. policy by agreeing to sell submarines to Taiwan. It has also allowed high-profile visits to the United States by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and the Dalai Lama. Withal, the administration has not appointed a specialist on China to any senior position in the government.

Such a confrontational posture toward China cannot be explained as a response to the downing of a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane and the detention of its crew for eleven days. The trend predates the incident and, despite Secretary of State Colin Powell's constructive visit to Beijing in July, has continued since. Rather, the explanation seems to lie in the administration's sympathy for Taiwan, its dour assessment of Chinese intentions and the prospect, in its view, of heightened instability in the Taiwan Strait. There is more than just talk going on: the administration is pursuing broad coordination with Taiwan's military to enable cooperation in a possible war with China, that coordination being an objective of many Republican defense and foreign policy specialists and members of Congress since 1996.

This is a well-intended but misguided effort. Such cooperation will not make Taiwan more secure, the United States more effective militarily or the deterrence of war more assured. Should the Bush Administration nevertheless continue this policy, it will eventually elicit mainland opposition because it threatens to reverse the essence of the post-1979 U.S.-China strategic understanding on Taiwan. It is worth emphasizing the core of that understanding from the Chinese point of view, to which many American analysts have somehow become oblivious.

From the days of the Korean War until 1979, Taiwan loomed in Beijing's eyes as a kind of American "Cuba." In other words, Beijing believed that the U.S. presence on Taiwan enabled the United States to threaten China's borders directly, just as the United States believed that the Soviet presence in Cuba threatened U.S. security from the early 1960s to the end of the Cold War. Indeed, in 1954 Washington and Taipei signed the U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, which led to the U.S. deployment of advanced aircraft and nuclear-capable missiles on the island. But in 1979, when Washington normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing, it agreed to terminate the 1954 treaty with Taiwan and to withdraw its military presence from the island, thus satisfying China's demand that the United States cease using Taiwan to threaten Chinese security.

If Chinese leaders believe, in their bedrock strategic realism, that the United States is out to reverse the 1979 understanding, they have a full menu of riposte at their disposal. They can engage in nerve-wracking saber-rattling in the Taiwan Strait in order to heighten regional tension and political and economic instability on Taiwan. They can reduce cooperation on the Korean peninsula and renew missile proliferation to Pakistan and the Middle East. They can also impose costly sanctions against major U.S. export industries dependent on the Chinese market, such as Boeing.

In the face of such potential trouble, the Bush Administration seems to believe that if it firmly wields U.S. power, it can command Chinese accommodation to U.S. policy initiatives. But this repeats the old mistakes of several new entrants to the White House. The Carter, Reagan and Clinton Administrations (but not the first Bush Administration) each made the same error and encountered a level of Chinese resistance that required them to move back to the policy of their predecessors. Each discovered, too, that their predecessor's policy was compatible with U.S. interests in both defending Taiwan and cooperating with China.

The Bush Administration should maintain essential policy continuity with its predecessors simply because there is no good reason for any other course. There is, in effect, a firm triangle of military deterrence and political dissuasion at work: China is deterred from the use of force against Taiwan so long as American power and interests are engaged there and Taiwan does not declare independence; Taiwan is deterred from declaring independence due to credible Chinese threats to use limited but politically significant force in the face of any such declaration; and the United States is--or ought to be--dissuaded from tampering with this situation because it enables Washington to defend Taiwan, deal with China as necessary and prudent on a range of issues, and minimize the possibility of war through miscalculation. Moreover, the effective deterrence and mutual interests in stability that are characteristic of this triangle are conditions bound to last well into the 21st century.

Why China Wants Peace with Taiwan

CHINA HAS three sets of interests in Taiwan--concerning security, nationalism and domestic politics--each of which provides a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to exercise influence over the Taiwan issue. Together, these interests ensure that the mainland would be prepared to use force to reverse seriously unwelcome trends in Taiwan's international role.

China's security interest in the Taiwan issue reflects the concern of all states for secure borders. Located eighty miles from the Chinese coast, Taiwan's enduring strategic importance to China is obvious. Should any great power establish a strategic presence on Taiwan, it could use the island to challenge Chinese coastal security. This is not just a theoretical matter as far as the Chinese leadership is concerned. Japan occupied Taiwan (then called Formosa in the English-speaking world) from 1895 until 1945. The United States was ensconced militarily on Taiwan from at least 1954 until the U.S.-China agreement to normalize diplomatic relations in January 1979.

Since 1979 the United States has continued to sell advanced weaponry to Taiwan, but this commercial relationship has not enabled the U.S. military to use the island to challenge directly Chinese security. China opposes these sales, but its key strategic interest--excluding a great power strategic presence on Taiwan--is now satisfied by the status quo, thus minimizing its strategic interest in war.

Chinese nationalism demands that both the international community and Taiwan acknowledge that Taiwan is part of China, and therefore that it not declare sovereign status in international politics. While this demand is longstanding, it has taken on added energy in recent years as the domestic political significance of Chinese nationalism has grown. Now that the Chinese Communist Party leadership no longer enjoys ideological legitimacy, is infamous for corruption, represses dissent, and cannot ensure economic stability for much of its population, it depends on its nationalist credentials for political ballast. Taiwan's declaration of independence would challenge party legitimacy, especially since it would be interpreted as U.S. "imperialist" intervention in Chinese domestic affairs.

The combination of China's strategic, nationalist and political imperatives creates the latent instability associated with the Taiwan issue. Should Taiwan declare independence, the mainland would most likely use force and possibly go to war to compel Taiwan to reverse its position. This seemed increasingly likely during the 1990s, when Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan's first democratically elected leader, moved Taiwan toward a declaration of independence. His July 1999 announcement of Taiwan's "special state-to-state" relationship with the mainland came close to crossing the line of a declaration of sovereignty, but it did not. Since then, despite the election in March 2000 of the proindependence candidate Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan has retreated from Lee's provocative stance. In his May 20, 2000 inauguration speech, Chen declared that Taiwan would not declare independence, would not change Taiwan's constitution to incorporate the "state-to-state" formulation, would not change the name of Taiwan, and would not hold a popul ar referendum on Taiwan's international status. He has not reversed this policy, so that mainland interest in continued recognition by Taiwan that it is part of China is met.

China will not forsake its demand for unification, but because its foremost strategic and nationalistic objectives are met, this is no more than a demand for face. Thus, in the absence of Taiwan's declaration of independence China can be deterred from using force. Taiwan's purchase of 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage 2000 jets and its domestic production of the Chingkuo fighter nearly guarantee it air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, denying the mainland the ability to sustain offensive operations against it. The mainland still lacks the amphibious capabilities required to occupy Taiwan against the island's coastal defenses. Taiwan's assets alone could enable it to frustrate a mainland effort to occupy the island. [2] But deterrence of a more limited but nonetheless punishing and coercive mainland use of force depends on Taiwan's longstanding strategic relationship with the United States.

The United States can inflict a rapid and punishing attack against Chinese forces while emerging from war with minimal casualties. Despite recent acquisitions of Russian military aircraft, destroyers and submarines, China's air force and navy are dominated by 1960s generation hardware. Although China has already received approximately 75 Russian Su-27 fighter jets and has agreed to purchase Su-30 ground attack aircraft, the PLA's difficulty in operating and main taming Russian jets diminishes their role in the cross-strait balance of power. The Russian Sovremmny-class destroyer is a highly capable vessel, especially when equipped with Russian Sunburn missiles, but China cannot defend the Sovremmny, and its limited stand-off range poses only a minimal threat to U.S. forces. The Russian Kilo-class attack submarine is a very capable submarine, but it is also very complex and difficult to operate.

China's military also lacks sophisticated information technologies. It possesses minimal beyond-visual-range targeting. In December 1995 China did not discover that the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz was transiting the Taiwan Strait, and in March 1996 it could not locate the U.S. carrier Independence when it deployed 200 miles from China's coast. China's theater missiles lack terminal guidance systems and thus cannot hit moving targets beyond visual range, including U.S. warships. Although China has been modernizing its information technologies, in the eight years between the Gulf War and the war in Kosovo the technology gap between China and the United States widened, thus increasing China's vulnerability to U.S. forces.

Chinese officers are mindful of their military deficiencies. Their studies of the Gulf War and the war in Yugoslavia underscore the U.S. ability to use naval superiority and conventional high-technology precision-guided weapons to deter coastal adversaries and inflict devastating damage from off-shore platforms. [3] PLA researchers and the high command understand that in decisive information technologies China is woefully backward and that its inferiority will persist well into the 2lst century. There is no false optimism in the PLA that it could survive a war with the United States. [4]

Military defeat by the United States would not only weaken China vis-a-vis the United States but would also dramatically reverse China's position in the regional balance of power. China would lose its current advantages with regard to Russia, with implications for border security in Central Asia and Northeast Asia. Similarly, Japanese and Indian power would pose greater challenges to Chinese security in the aftermath of a U.S.-China conflict. A weakened China might also face security challenges from foreign-supported disaffected minorities on its borders and Tibetan independence activists. Indeed, Chinese territorial integrity depends on its avoiding war with the United States.

The strategic costs to China of a war with the United States are only part of the deterrence equation. China also possesses vital economic interests in stable relations with the United States. War would end China's quest for modernization by severely constraining its access to U.S. markets, capital and technology, and by requiring China to place its economy on permanent war-time footing. The resultant economic reversal would derail China's quest for "comprehensive national power" and great power status. Serious economic instability would also destabilize China's political system on account of the resulting unemployment in key sectors of the economy and the breakdown of social order. Both would probably impose insurmountable challenges to party leadership. Moreover, defeat in a war with the United States over Taiwan would impose devastating nationalist humiliation on the Chinese Communist Party. In all, the survival of the party depends on preventing a Sino-American war.

But sure knowledge of defeat in war will not deter Chinese leaders from attacking Taiwan unless they are convinced that the United States will in fact intervene. Is the United States credible? The short answer is "yes." Chinese government analysts understand that domestic politics contributes to the likelihood of U.S. intervention, and domestic political opposition toward China and political support for Taiwan in the United States have not been higher since the late 1960s. Moreover, the post-Cold War increases in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have strengthened the U.S. commitment to defend the island. Chinese leaders also acknowledge that the March 1996 deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers near Taiwan strongly coupled the U.S. commitment to Taiwan with its commitment to its allies in East Asia. Since then, Chinese leaders have assumed that a war with Taiwan means a war with the United States. [5]

PLA assessments of U.S. military capabilities also contribute to the credibility of U.S. deterrence. Some blustering Chinese PLA authors take heart in the reputed U.S. inability to suffer casualties and argue that China can risk the use of force against Taiwan because it can abort U.S. intervention by sinking a destroyer for example. Such bluster sells many books in China, but it does not reflect mainstream PLA analysis. Chinese military leaders have criticized these ultra-nationalistic authors and their unrealistic analyses. Faced with the prospect of war with a superior power, professional PLA analysts do study asymmetric warfare. But their writings suggest that the potential value of such strategies is in enhancing China's ability to cope with war against a superior force once fighting begins, not in giving China a deterrent capability against the United States and thus the confidence to risk war with Taiwan.

Moreover, PLA analysts emphasize the critical importance of superior warfighting capabilities in making deterrence threats credible. Indeed, they do not discuss asymmetric warfare against an adversary possessing vastly superior C41 technologies, wartime implementation of asymmetric strategies, and the risk of eliciting overwhelming retaliatory strikes and rapid defeat should deterrence fail. In order to deter, it is necessary to be able to win, not merely to sink a single ship. In this context, the PLA also understands that the United States possesses overwhelming "escalation dominance", so that China lacks the capability to deter U.S. escalation at any level of conflict. [6]

At the highest level, too, China's limited strategic nuclear capability provides little comfort to Chinese planners. U.S. escalation dominance puts the onus of initiating a nuclear war on China, which would subject it to devastating U.S. nuclear retaliation. But Chinese military leaders have little confidence that China can even launch a nuclear first strike against the United States. China's military literature dwells on the vulnerability of the PLA's few long-range missiles, reflecting concern that the long and overt preparation time prior to launch would elicit a preemptive U.S. attack. China thus lacks confidence that it can use the threat of a nuclear attack to deter U.S. intervention. [7] Also, because U.S. deterrence of China relies on conventional weapons rather than on nuclear forces, the PLA's strategic analysts argue that it is far more credible than U.S. Cold War deterrence of the Soviet Union. [8]

There can never be total confidence that deterrence will work. Yet U.S. deterrence of any actual Chinese use of force against Taiwan--outside of a Taiwan declaration of independence--is highly stable. Overwhelming U.S. superiority means that the strategic, economic and political costs to China of U.S. military intervention would be astronomical. U.S. conventional superiority and its strong political commitment to Taiwan mean that the credibility of the U.S. threat to intervene is very high. In an insecure world, the U.S. deterrent posture in the Taiwan Strait is an unusually secure one.

Why Taiwan Will Not Declare Independence

WHILE the United States deters China from using force so long as Taiwan does not declare independence, China deters Taiwan from declaring independence. Thus, following Lee Teng-hui's 1995 visit to the United States and the simultaneous increased momentum of Taiwan's independence movement, the mainland increased the deployment of M-9/DF-15 surface-to-surface missiles in Fujian province. The M-9 lacks terminal guidance capabilities and, thus, precision targeting, as well as significant destructive capability. Nonetheless, it can create havoc in Taiwan's economic and political systems. Mainland military writings emphasize the deterrent role of random missile attacks against a shifting selection of targets on Taiwan. [9] And there is no defense against Chinese missiles, for an effective missile defense capability is many years off. Moreover, even should such technology be deployed, Chinese deployment of additional missiles could saturate and overwhelm it.

China plans a similar deterrent role for its conventional military forces. The mainland does not need to be able to carry out a strategically effective air assault or a tight naval blockade against Taiwan for the threat of such actions to deter Taiwanese political ambition. Chinese leaders understand that such actions can have a devastating psychological effect on Taiwan's economy and undermine the island's relations with its major trading partners. The mere threat to use them against a declaration of independence, bolstered by large-scale military exercises and deployment, is therefore a powerful deterrent, and low-level wartime implementation could coerce Taiwan to accept early defeat. [10]

Complementing China's missile deployments and its limited air and naval capabilities is the credibility of its threats. Taiwan's leadership knows that China's failure to respond to a declaration of independence would challenge its international reputation, affecting border security and independence movements around its periphery. In March 1996, despite the risk of U.S. intervention, the PLA launched M-9 missiles into coastal waters within the vicinity of Kaohsiung, Taiwan's major port city, to underscore its will to oppose moves toward independence. These actions were very risky, but they enhanced China's credibility in using force to oppose Taiwan's independence.

Taiwan's interest in preserving the political status quo reflects more than PRC military deterrence. Taiwan's economic prosperity depends increasingly on cross-strait stability. As China's economy has continued to grow and Taiwan's labor costs have increased, Taiwan's economy has become more integrated into the Chinese economy. Its high-technology industries have begun to move offshore to China, so that its export-led economy and future economic growth are increasingly dependent on a stable political relationship with the mainland. Moreover, since late 2000 Taiwan has experienced a significant economic downturn. Unemployment is higher than ever before, the stock market has lost nearly 50 percent of its value, and the New Taiwan dollar reached a 32-month low in early June. The result of Chinese growth and Taiwan's relative decline is that business confidence on Taiwan has reached a five-year low and business elites increasingly recognize China as their long-term hope for continued profits. Consequently, Taiwa n's business elite pressures political leaders to keep relations with China becalmed. As these trends continue, especially after Taiwan and China enter the World Trade Organization, Taiwan's ongoing incorporation into the mainland economy and its economic dependence on it will discourage provocations from Taipei.

Taiwan also has critical political stakes in cross-strait stability. Its democracy is young and fragile and has yet to develop a tradition of cooperation across party lines. Its society continues to suffer from a deep fissure reflecting conflict between those born on the mainland and arrived after 1945 and those born in Taiwan. This fissure has contributed to intense partisan politics which, in turn, have undermined Chen Shui-bian's ability to develop a coherent economic recovery policy. They have also undermined voter confidence in Taiwan's ability to contend with mainland pressure. [11] It is far from clear, therefore, that Taiwan's democracy could long survive intensified mainland-Taiwan conflict.

Taiwan clearly retains an ambition for sovereignty and the associated membership in the United Nations and other international organizations. But, similar to Beijing's demand for unification, this is a demand for face, not a vital interest. U.S. intervention could defeat a Chinese offensive, but Taiwan would nonetheless lose all that is worth defending--its very impressive strategic, economic and political successes. Taiwan's satisfaction with a very favorable status quo and the great risk in challenging Chinese interests combine virtually to guarantee that there will be no declaration of independence--and this is not to speak of U.S. opposition to such an initiative. This reality is reflected in both Taiwan's public opinion polls and in the outcome of the 2000 presidential campaign. Since 1997, support for independence has never exceeded ten percent in government-sponsored opinion polls; the norm is less than six percent. Thus, pro-independence candidates risk appearing reckless should they call for a decla ration of independence. Although Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential campaign, he was the beneficiary of a three-way race in which the candidates opposed to independence divided the anti-Chen vote. That he polled less than 40 percent of the vote reflected in part voter apprehension over his prior support for independence.

Beijing's interest in Taiwan's continued formal acceptance that it is part of China is therefore not as much at risk today as seemed to be the case two or three years ago. For the first time in many years, it is confident that "time is on China's side." This is reflected in reduced expectations that China will have to go to war to arrest a trend toward Taiwan independence. Indeed, China has retreated from the February 2000 Taiwan White Paper threat to use force if Taiwan resists unification negotiations "indefinitely." Foreign ministry officials no longer raise this condition; when pressed, they respond that "indefinitely" is a "long time." Thus, while China is deterred from initiating a major war, Taiwan is deterred from doing that which would elicit China's use of force in the first place.

The U.S. Stake

THE U.S. AIM in cross-strait relations ought to be to reinforce these offsetting strictures and to make sure that its well-intended efforts to prepare for war do not destabilize a constructive status quo and unnecessarily set back U.S.-China relations. This should not be too difficult.

One advantage in achieving this aim is the fact that the United States does not possess inherently vital security or political interests in Taiwan's strategic role in international politics. U.S. security would not be affected by either China's unification or Taiwan's independence. Thus, every U.S. administration since that of Richard Nixon has declared that the United States does not favor any particular outcome of the mainland-Taiwan conflict, only that it be resolved peacefully. This interest enables the United States to be content with a situation in which neither Taiwan nor China is fully satisfied with the status quo but both prefer peace to war.

What, then, should the United States do, and what should it avoid doing? First, the United States must continue its effort to maintain the capability and the credibility to deter Chinese use of force against Taiwan. In other words, the United States must hold up its end of the triangle of deterrence and dissuasion. Useful in this regard would be U.S. research and acquisitions strategies that maintain Chinese doubts that asymmetric strategies are enough to deter U.S. intervention. Such efforts should seek to protect the U.S. regional presence through the enhancement of C41 capabilities. U.S. defense planners should also consider how forward deployed arsenal ships can complement the role of aircraft carriers in deterrence, insofar as greater reliance on precision munitions and reduced exposure of U.S. soldiers to attack will enhance the credibility of the U.S. threat to intervene.

But the United States should not abandon its policy of ambiguity regarding intervention in a mainland-Taiwan conflict. Abandoning he present ambiguity would not enhance deterrence or stability, but it would impose a cost on the United States. President Bush got it right on April 25 when he said that Washington would do what it takes to help Taiwan defend itself; but also that the United States opposes a declaration of independence.

Ending ambiguity by clearly stating that the United States would not defend Taiwan in the event of a declaration of independence may clarify the U.S. posture, but it would not make deterrence of such a declaration any more effective. Taiwan is deterred by the credibility of PRC retaliatory threats, regardless of U.S. policy, because the United States cannot defend Taiwan against Chinese missiles or from the economic and political costs of even a limited war. Moreover, clear opposition to Taiwan's independence would be politically controversial in the United States, undermining the fragile domestic consensus on Taiwan policy and making it even more difficult for the White House to cooperate with China.

But neither should Washington abandon ambiguity by threatening intervention against the mainland's use of force under all circumstances. China cannot be deterred in the unlikely event of a Taiwan declaration of independence and it is already deterred from challenging the status quo by U.S. capabilities and commitments. Additional clarity would not enhance deterrence or cross-strait stability. But an unconditional U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan would undermine the U.S. ability to cooperate with China. It would affect mainland assessment of U.S. intentions, creating greater suspicion of the United States and reduced interest in cooperation.

Above all, the United States should not exaggerate the fragility of the cross-strait political or military balance. Stable deterrence across the Taiwan strait means that Washington can refrain from destabilizing initiatives intended to prepare for war and enhance Taiwan's security. The U.S.-mainland balance enables the United States to limit arms sales to Taiwan without undermining Taiwan's security. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan contribute only marginally to deterrence or to Taiwan's security. What really deters the mainland is not Taiwan's military but the U.S. military. Thus, with the important exception of ensuring Taiwan's air superiority, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are not a major factor in the security equation. This is especially the case concerning the transfer of theater missile defense technologies to Taiwan. Rather than seek a panacea in an uncertain technology, the United States should have confidence in the strength of its overall deterrent capability and, thus, avoid unnecessary, provocative and de stabilizing arms and technology transfers.

Similarly, enhanced U.S.-Taiwan defense planning and coordination will neither aid deterrence nor affect the outcome of a war. Overwhelming U.S. superiority deters unprovoked Chinese use of force. It also enables the United States to incur minimal casualties, so that the Pentagon would prefer to fight a war over Taiwan alone. Washington would demand that Taiwan's forces stand down, sparing the United States the need to manage the complexity of cooperating with Taiwan's relatively ineffective military and risking casualties from friendly fire in a very tight theater. On the other hand, determined U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation will eventually elicit costly mainland opposition. Despite recent U.S. efforts to alleviate the stress in U.S.-China relations and China's evident interest in minimizing U.S.-China tensions, Chinese civilian and military leaders appear to be increasingly concerned over the direction U.S.-Taiwan defense ties.

AS STURDY as the status quo in cross-strait relations is, it can be disrupted by unwise diplomacy that threatens the status of the 1979 U.S.-China strategic understanding. The policy changes emerging in the new administration have the potential to harm the interests of both the United States and Taiwan. Such policies will increase suspicion of the United States in Beijing and strengthen the hands of politicians who oppose Chinese cooperation with the United States.

That would be unfortunate. U.S. interest in cooperation with China is not limited to managing the Taiwan issue and avoiding war. U.S.-China cooperation contributes to stability on the Korean peninsula by enhancing Chinese incentives to constrain North Korean ballistic missile proliferation and nuclear weapons development, and by encouraging Pyongyang to pursue dialogue and peaceful unification with Seoul. It also contributes to stability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf by encouraging China not to proliferate weapons and delivery systems to regional antagonists. It enables the United States to take advantage of China's market to enhance U.S. economic growth and the competitiveness of key U.S. industries. And it enables the United States to encourage political reform in China through economic, cultural and educational exchanges. Increased tension over Taiwan jeopardizes all of these interests without contributing to stability. Moreover, the greatest cost of conflict would be borne by Taiwan. Its securi ty, prosperity and democracy would all be at risk should U.S.-China relations deteriorate seriously.

Rather than repeat the mistakes and subsequent retrenchments of past administrations, the Bush Administration should adopt the novel course of maintaining continuity with the China policy of its predecessors. It is still not too late.

Robert S. Ross is professor of political science at Boston College, an associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, and co-editor of Reexamining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

(1.) Andrew J. Bacevich, "Different Drummers, Same Drum", The National Interest (Summer 2001).

(2.) See Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan", International Security (Fall 2000).

(3.) See, for example, Liu Yijian, Zhi Haiquan yu Haijun Zhanlue ("Command of the sea and strategic employment of naval forces") (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000), pp. 103, 120-1, 144-5,147-9.

(4.) Zhang Wannian, Dangdai Shijie Junshi yu Zhongguo Guofang ("Contemporary world military affairs and Chinese national defense") (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1999), pp. 150-1. Also see Zhu Xiaoli, Junshi Geming Wenti de Yanjiu ("A study on the revolution in military affairs") (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000), pp. 171-8, 185-91.

(5.) Shi Yinhong, "Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce he Taiwan Wenti de Weilai" ("U.S. policy toward China and the future of the Taiwan issue"), Zhanlue yu Guanli ("Strategy and management"), No. 6 (2000); Ye Zicheng, "Zhan yu He, Jiaogei Taiwan Dangju Xuan" ("War and peace, give the choice to the Taiwan authorities"), Huanqiu Shibao, October 22, 1999; author's interviews with Chinese government policy analysts.

(6.) Jiang Leizhu, Xiandai yi Lie Sheng You Zhanlue ("Modern strategy of pitting the inferior against the superior") (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 180-92; Chen Zhou, Xiandai Jubu Zhanzheng Lilun Yanjiu ("A study of modern local war theories") (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 149-56.

(7.) Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyi Xue ("Science of campaigns") (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000), pp. 162, 168-72.

(8.) Yao Yunzhu, Zhanhou Meiguo Weishe Lilun yu Zhengce ("Postwar U.S. deterrence theory and policy") (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1998), pp. 162, 168-72; Wang Qiming and Chen Feng, Daying Gaojishu Fubu Zhanzheng: Junguan Bixu Shouce ("Winning high-technology local war: A handbook of required readings for military officials") (Beijing: Military Friendship Literature Press, 1997), pp. 40 5-7.

(9.) Wang and Zhang, eds., Zhanyi Xue, pp. 252-3.

(10.) Wang and Zhang, eds., Zhanyi Xue, pp. 409-10; Wang Wenrong, Zhanlue Xue ("Science of strategy") (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999), pp. 252-3.

(11.) See the line chart of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Committee on polling from February 1997 to March 2001, New York Times, July 8, 2001; Far Eastern Economic Review, July 12, 2001, p. 48, and August 2, 2001, pp. 19-21.