The Soviet Army: 1918 to the present.

The Soviet Army: 1918 to the present

ON THE EVE of the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, an open letter on "Western Interests and the Arms Talks" appeared in the Washington Post. Co-signed by over seventy distinguished European writers, academics, politicians, and retired members of the military--including General Sir John Hackett, Ambassador Jean Laloy, Vladimir Bukovsky, and Jean-Marie Benoist --the letter voiced the concern that an INF agreement not linked to substantial reductions in the Soviet Union's conventional- and chemical-warfare arsenals would jeopardize the safety of the West:

Far from enhancing Western security we believe it would shift the military balance in favor of the Warsaw Pact, assisting the cause of the Soviet Union in seeking to induce political changes in the West favorable to its interests. At the same time the proposed accord would diminish any incentive for the Soviet Union to make fundamental changes to its domestic and foreign policies. . . .

(For a copy of this letter and further information, write Helen Tucker, 14B Albert Bridge Road, London SW11 4PY, England.)

There is no question that the Warsaw Pact enjoys a lead in conventional forces in Europe. According to the latest edition of The Military Blanace, compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Warsaw Pact forces outnumber NATO forces right down the line: troops, 6.3 million to 5.1 million; reserves, 8.2 million to 6.3 million; tanks, 52,000 to 22,200; artillery pieces, 37,000 to 11,100; armed helicopters, 1,630 to 780; combat aircraft, 7,963 to 3,889. But numbers alone do not necessarily indicate the potential capability of a given power. Military philosophy, organization and training, and types of equipment must also be considered. Given the on-going debate over the West's security in light of the INF treaty, the latest book by Albert and Joan Seaton, The Soviet Army: 1918 to the Present (New American Library, $19.95), is most timely. Since his retirement from the British Army, Colonel Seaton has written a number of highly regarded works, in which he has evaluated the combat effectiveness of the Red Army. Intended for the general reader, this volume gives a precise account of the development of the Soviet ground forces, their military and political organization, training, tactics, and weaponry.

According to the Seatons, the Soviet army is an updated imitation of the German forces that won such remarkable victories in the Low Countries and France in 1940, and the Soviet Union during the summers of 1941 and 1942. The Wehrmacht's key to success, developed by Heinz Guderian and Ludwig Beck before the outbreak of the war, was a war of movement, combining air power with tank spearheads and motorized infantry.

Over the past forty years, the Soviet army has grown into a fully armored and mechanized force "with the potential for strategic and tactical mobility the like of which has not been seen anywhere in the world." As we approach the end of the 1980s, the USSR fields the largest and best-equipped tank and armored infantry forces in the world. A lesson well learned from World War II is that success on the battlefield depends on controlling tactical airspace. In recent years, the Soviets have reorganized their tactical air forces, which in most instances are under the overall direction of military-district ground commanders. Although some Soviet planes and crew may not be the equal of their U.S. and NATO counterparts in quality, the Soviets have a vast numerical advantage.

The authors do not portray Soviet soldiers as supermen. The Soviet commanders have to deal with a multiethnic army, some of whose components may not be the most reliable. They are faced with a severe shortage of long-service senior noncommissioned officers. Training is not as thorough as in the British or even the U.S. Army. And Soviet officers have an inherent reluctance to show initiative and accept responsibility. Soviet military units actually have two leaders: the military commander and the political officer (zampolit), who is the senior partner in the duumvirate and monitors every action taken by the military commander.

Banishing nuclear weapons from the battlefield would scarcely enhance Western security. For, as the authors remind us,

The Soviet Union preaches peace but its policies are aggressive and its aims are expansionist. . . . The Soviet ground forces are admirably suited to fast-moving warfare without nuclear weapons, even a non-nuclear general or world war. And this could be undertaken with no change in equipment, organization, or training methods. . . . The Soviet Union is armed to the teeth, and its leaders would have little compunction in putting its great preponderance of air, armored, and naval forces to use in the furtherance of its political and territorial expansion if it could safely do so.

The Soviet Army is essential reading for anyone wanting to know the kind of army that confronts the West. Policy-makers should be required to digest this volume before they bargain away the nuclear weapons that have thus far kept that army at bay.