The South China Sea disputes: implications of China's earlier territorial settlements.

Although final conclusions would be premature, the approach Beijing has adopted toward the South China Sea territorial disputes appears to follow the same tack taken in earlier disputes. Over the course of this particular dispute, China has used military force to occupy disputed territory, but at the same time Beijing has indicated a willingness to seek a peaceful settlement and has participated in conferences that have explored alternative solutions, including joint development of the region's natural resources. In the meantime, however, China is holding firm to its sovereignty claim and continues to develop its military capabilities.

While the PRC has occupied several islands in the Paracels (Xisha) since the 1970s, Beijing has stationed naval forces on Woody Island, the largest island in the group, since 1991; and Chinese officials have confirmed recent satellite reconnaissance that shows a 2,600-metre runway on the island.(1) Beijing also seeks to acquire an aircraft carrier and other capabilities that will enhance its ability to project force into the region. A recent government publication, Military Secrets, declared "it is a top priority for China to have air support for the possible battle in the Spratly Islands." Further, there is a report that an airstrip is under construction on one of the Beijing-occupied islands in the Spratlys.(2) Although the actual capability to project force into the region has not yet been fully realized, Beijing's intentions to acquire the capability are a significant development.

The military buildup in the South China Sea does not necessarily indicate that Beijing will use force to occupy more islands, but rather that Beijing seeks to enhance its military presence to augment its bargaining leverage in future negotiations. It can also be argued that China's behavior in the South China Sea case is similar to earlier cases, in that China shows no real willingness to move quickly to settle the dispute because strategic concerns are not sufficiently acute at this time. This two-track "hard/soft" policy toward the South China Sea disputes mirrors the pattern that evolved in earlier cases that were settled in the early 1960s, and in unsettled disputes such as with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, in which Beijing stridently asserted an unwillingness to negotiate, but as strategic considerations changed, quickly sought a compromise settlement. In previous cases, China also used military force, even while calling for a negotiated solution.

The influence of China's historical legacy and the impact it will have on any future settlement must be considered. In earlier settlements with smaller states such as Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Beijing demonstrated its desire to show "Chinese magnanimity" by making concessions to facilitate an agreement. China did not want to appear to be "caving in," but rather occupied a morally superior position by making necessary compromises so that a "mutually acceptable" settlement could be concluded. However, it is unclear to what degree China's approach to these earlier settlements was actually a function of Beijing's considerations of realpolitik and calculations of power at the time, or was rooted in China's tradition-bound political culture.

Finally, as in China's other territorial disputes, progress toward a settlement of the South China Sea disputes will be difficult to make until Beijing's "issues of principle" are first resolved. The little progress that has been achieved toward a settlement of the South China Sea disputes can, to a very large extent, be attributed to the resolution of the Cambodian issue. As Sino-Vietnamese relations improve, further progress likely will be made toward settling the territorial disputes with Hanoi. Given China's desire to firmly establish its role as a leader in the region, it is unlikely that Beijing will block a settlement if the other parties (Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei) are all willing to compromise, or participate in some kind of a joint development agreement while settlement of the sovereignty question is put off to the future. Premier Li Peng made this clear in August 1990 in Singapore when he announced that China was prepared to shelve the question of sovereignty and cooperate with other states in joint development.(3) At a 1991 workshop entitled "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea" hosted by Indonesia, participants from China endorsed peaceful settlement and joint development projects.(4)

GENESIS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

The South China Sea forms the geostrategic core of Southeast Asia. Until just a few years ago, the Russian Navy, with facilities in Vietnam, and the U.S. Navy, based in the Philippines, provided a stabilizing balance of power in the region. However, Russia and the U.S. have both withdrawn from the region, leaving China as the dominant naval force. Many states in the area fear that Beijing intends to establish the South China Sea as a "Chinese lake." Domination of the South China Sea "heartland" would give the Chinese great political, economic and military sway over the "rimland" states.

Although the South China Sea territorial disputes have a long history, their reemergence in the mid-1970s was a symptom of the changing balance of power associated with the end of the Vietnam war. This became clear during Sino-Vietnamese negotiations following their 1979 border war. Both sides often cited issues other than the territorial question as the root cause of the conflict; China made it clear that issues of "principle" such as an antihegemony agreement and Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia had to be considered before the territorial dispute could be negotiated.(5)

During the Vietnam conflict, Hanoi had not challenged Beijing's claim to sovereignty over the many island groups in the South China Sea. Following the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, however, Hanoi began to claim sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and occupied islands in the Spratly group which had been held by the Saigon regime. On May 12, 1977, Vietnam declared that its territorial waters included the Paracel and Spratly Islands and established an exclusive two-hundred-mile economic zone.(6) Beijing responded by reasserting its claim that the

Nansha [Spratly] Islands . . . have always been part of China's territory . . . . Any foreign country's armed invasion and occupation of any of the Nansha Islands or exploration and exploitation of oil and other resources in the Nansha Islands area constitute encroachment on China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and are impermissible. Any foreign country's claim to sovereignty over any of the Nansha Islands is illegal and null and void.(7)

In a secret meeting held in June 1977 with Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian challenged Vietnam's claims, pointing out that Vietnam had supported Beijing's claims as early as 1958 and as recently as 1974. Pham Van Dong rationalized Vietnam's earlier position by arguing that it was a "matter of necessity" to support China's claims during the war because of the need to "place resistance to United States imperialism above everything else" and Hanoi's previous position must be understood in the "context of the historical circumstances of the time." Li Xiannian argued that "war could not justify a different interpretation"; and furthermore, "there was no war going on in Vietnam when on September 14, 1958 Pham Van Dong . . . acknowledged in his note to Premier Zhou Enlai that the Xisha and Nansha Islands are Chinese territory." Li also pointed out that from China's perspective "the Nansha and Xisha Islands, over which there never was any issue, have now become a major subject of dispute in Sino-Vietnamese relations," because of Hanoi's actions.(8) As Sino-Vietnamese relations rapidly deteriorated, China grew increasingly rigid over the territorial question, accusing Hanoi of making "unreasonable claims."(9)

The Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute is rooted in the interpretation of the boundary treaty signed by the Qing court and France in 1887 that delimited both the land and sea boundary. Vietnam maintains that the treaty established a "complete borderline which has a historical basis in the age-old political life of the two nations, a solid international legal value, and all practical elements for recognition on the terrain." But at other times, Vietnam has said that the Sino-French convention is "too old and cumbersome to give guidance in defining" the boundary.(10) China's reservations about the treaty were not known until after the boundary dispute with Vietnam became public. China agrees that the Sino-French convention provides the basis for a negotiated settlement, but Beijing does not recognize the accord as a valid treaty, contending that even though China was not defeated by France in 1885, nevertheless, the "Qing Dynasty Government accepted France's humiliating conditions and signed an unequal treaty."(11)

Although the entire Sino-Vietnamese boundary was defined by the 1887 treaty, when analyzing the South China Sea disputes, it is helpful to isolate four separate issues - the land boundary, the delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin, the Paracel Islands located about 150 miles southwest of Hainan Island claimed by both China and Vietnam, and the Spratly Islands located approximately 700 miles south of the China mainland claimed entirely by China and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei (see map). The question of the South China Sea islands is further complicated by the fact that Taiwan also claims both groups of islands and actually occupies Taiping (Itu Aba) Island, the biggest island in the Spratly archipelago. Although natural resources are an important factor, strategic considerations are also at the heart of the conflict.

In the 1970s and 1980s, China adopted a very "hard" approach toward Vietnam and in 1971, at a time when Manila used military force in an attempt to displace Nationalist Chinese troops from Itu Aba (Taiping) Island, Beijing initially adopted a "hard" position toward the Philippines. But Beijing switched to a "soft" approach toward Manila in the mid 1970s, to facilitate rapprochement with the Philippines, even though by then Manila actually occupied several islands claimed by China.

In 1971, almost immediately following Manila's attempt to occupy islands in the Spratlys, Beijing responded indirectly in a speech during a reception for a North Korean delegation. The message was nevertheless clear:

The Nansha Islands and the Hsisha [Xisha] Islands have always been China's territory. The People's Republic of China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and absolutely allows no country to encroach upon this sovereignty right under whatever pretext and in whatever form. The Philippine government must immediately stop its encroachment upon China's territory and withdraw all its personnel from the Nansha Islands.(12)

However, when President Marcos traveled to Beijing to normalize diplomatic relations in June 1975, the islands dispute was sidestepped and, as in the case of Sino-Japanese rapprochement several years earlier, the territorial dispute was not allowed to interfere with a more important Chinese foreign policy objective - establishing a united front with Southeast Asian nations in the face of the growing Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.(13) This approach reflected Beijing's perception of the growing importance of the ASEAN states in the regional balance of power.

This "hard/soft" approach to the disputes is further illustrated by China's willingness to downplay the territorial dispute with the Philippines, but when Vietnamese leader Le Duan went to Beijing in September 1975, China asserted that its claim was "indisputable" and sovereignty was "non-negotiable."(14)

During the late 1970s and 1980s, China's approach to the dispute with Malaysia followed a pattern similar to that of the Philippines. After Malaysia made a claim to several islands in the Spratlys in 1979, Beijing only gave a very low-key response through diplomatic channels. Any public reference to the Sino-Malaysian dispute was not made until 1983, and even then it was made indirectly, couched in a general statement of China's claim to the entire Spratly Islands.(15)

MOVE TOWARD A MULTILATERAL SETTLEMENT

During the 1970s and 1980s, any move to resolve the South China Sea disputes was complicated by the Indochina conflict. Now in the wake of the cold war and the Cambodian settlement, the disputes are the most likely crucible of regional cooperation. Cambodia provided a common interest for China and the ASEAN states, but there is a perception that now with no common security threat, the territorial disputes could sour relations. A negotiated settlement of the disputes is even more important now because the lack of a security regime in Southeast Asia in the new post-cold war era is driving the region's states to continue arming themselves out of apprehension over the heightened potential for instability, increasing the potential for armed conflict over the islands if a peaceful resolution is not achieved. Any settlement will require multilateral negotiations and mutual accommodation, and in the 1990s this has become possible with the much improved political atmosphere in the region.

In August 1990, Prime Minister Li Peng raised the possibility of joint exploitation of South China Sea resources, but only if the sovereignty issue was shelved. While in Singapore, he said: "China is ready to join efforts . . . to develop [the Spratly] islands, while putting aside for the time being the question of sovereignty." Indonesia stepped forward as an honest broker and since 1990 has hosted a "Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea." China has insisted that the meetings be limited to an "exchange of views among scholars" and not official negotiations. At the workshop held in August 1993, a Chinese delegate reiterated Beijing's position that it was not prepared to enter into formal negotiations over the conflicting claims.(16)

At the Bandung workshop held in July 1991, Indonesia suggested including Japan, the U.S. and Russia, but Beijing opposed including outside powers, arguing that it would only complicate the situation. At this meeting, although all claimants agreed to halt independent development and renounced the use of force to settle the disputes, Beijing's subsequent actions have indicated a willingness to move unilaterally and prepare to use force if necessary to defend its claims.

In February 1992, before the third workshop, held from June 29 to July 2, 1992, China's National People's congress promulgated a "Law on Territorial Waters" that reasserted China's claims to "undisputed sovereignty" and authorized the use of military force to prevent other states from occupying the islands. The following May, Beijing signed a contract with an American company to explore for oil and gas and pledged the use of its navy to protect the company. In July 1993, China awarded a second contract to an American company to cooperate in the development of South China Sea oil fields.(17) China's unilateral moves were condemned by the other parties to the dispute.

But other states are also asserting their claims more aggressively.(18) In May 1993, Philippines President Fidel Ramos ordered the expansion of military facilities in the "Kalayaan Islands" to enable civilian and military planes to use the runway. President Ramos also contends that "no country should dominate the Spratly group. . . . Internationally recognized and guaranteed sea lanes cut across the area, making it to everyone's interest that no single power should exercise hegemony over the Spratlys."(19) Southeast Asian states are also taking measures to undercut China's claims. For example, the ASEAN states called for a name change of the South China Sea to eliminate "any connotation of Chinese ownership over that body of water."(20)

It remains to be seen if Beijing's recent behavior is a return to its earlier more aggressive approach to the South China Sea disputes, simply giving lip service to the idea of joint cooperation while strengthening its foothold on the islands, or a sincere commitment to renounce the use of force and unilateral development while preparing to use force if necessary to protect its strategic interests and ensure its stake in the development of the region's resources. In the words of one official Chinese publication, shelving the question of sovereignty and pursuing joint development of the regions resources "would be cosmetic without a stronger navy."(21)

ESTABLISHED PATTERNS IN EARLIER DISPUTES

The Spratly Islands dispute is unique in comparison with earlier territorial disputes and settlements in which China has been involved because it is truly a multilateral dispute and the others were all bilateral. This does complicate this dispute greatly, but a careful analysis of earlier disputes will nevertheless lend some insights into China's general behavior which may be useful in explaining Beijing's present behavior, and also may be helpful in anticipating Beijing's future behavior as the dispute unfolds.

Despite the fact that irredentist views are common among China's elite, the dynamics of the international system have forced the PRC to adopt realistic policies toward particular territorial disputes. Careful study leads to the conclusion that Beijing has been much more pragmatic in approaching territorial and boundary disputes than many assumed it would be. In the settlements that have been reached, China did not insist upon the far-reaching historical claims that it initially asserted. Although China has demonstrated that it considers military force an option, in most cases China has proved to be very pragmatic, willing to compromise to establish legitimate boundaries through peaceful negotiations. At times Beijing has even relinquished territory recognized as China's, but in light of historical developments and geographical realities, Beijing ceded the territory to another state's sovereignty.

Although one of the major stumbling blocks on the road to settlements was Beijing's far-reaching claims, Beijing was in fact willing to conclude boundary treaties based on realistic historical, geographic and security considerations. One conclusion to be drawn is that all Beijing expects is tacit recognition of China's earlier imperial greatness and subsequent victimization by foreign imperialism, but is more interested in stable and legitimate boundaries that facilitate achieving security objectives that are more important than realizing historical claims. If Beijing follows its established pattern in the South China Sea disputes, eventually compromise settlements are likely.

Beijing's obsession with its historical role in the region is illustrated by its initial approach to the South China Sea disputes. Painstaking efforts were made to document early historical accounts of Chinese expeditions to the islands and document historical artifacts that substantiated these claims.(22) China's claim to sovereignty is thus based upon prior discovery in a pre-seismic survey era. In other territorial disputes in the 1950s and 1960s, similar historical arguments put forward by Beijing caused a great deal of alarm over Chinese irredentism among China's neighbors. But eventually these historical claims were set aside and Beijing signed boundary agreements with Burma (1960), Nepal (1961), Mongolia (1962), Pakistan (1963) and Afghanistan (1963). China agreed to settle some of these boundary disputes only after prolonged delays, but agreements were eventually negotiated in conjunction with Beijing's attempts to improve bilateral relations in response to an unfavorable shift in the balance of power at the time. A dispute with Japan was shelved for similar reasons in 1978.

To understand the PRC's approach to boundary disputes, they must first be placed in the context of China's fundamental strategic considerations of national interest and other security concerns. China, like other states, engages in balancing behavior. Beijing's perception of threats does not, in Waltz's words, "correspond with any permanent moral quality," but is determined by shifts in the balance of power. Thus, in Beijing's view, the "placement of states affects their behavior and even colors their characters."(23) China's approach to a particular dispute is largely determined by the relationship or desired relationship with the other country involved. The PRC has demonstrated great flexibility in negotiating boundary settlements in an attempt to bolster amicable relations and maintain a favorable balance of power. Beijing's handling of its boundary disputes with Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Japan illustrate this pattern clearly.

For illustration, with regard to the South China Sea disputes, the most appropriate comparable case is the yet unsettled Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands located in the East China Sea. This territorial dispute surfaced when Japan gained control over the Senkaku Islands after the U.S.-Japan Okinawa reversion agreement. Beijing accused Japan of "remilitarization" and vowed that no "scheme to occupy and annex China's territory will ever succeed." But in September 1972, Tokyo and Beijing suddenly established diplomatic relations in the wake of President Nixon's overture to China. In preliminary negotiations, Beijing and Tokyo agreed to sidestep the fractious issue of sovereignty over the islands and normalize relations.(24) Because of the shift in the balance of power in East Asia taking place at the time, Beijing moderated its rigid position on the territorial issue. Beijing made it clear that China "absolutely will not permit" the territorial dispute to "sow discord in the friendly relations between the Chinese and Japanese people."(25) Because of a change in the perception of Japan's role in China's foreign policy, Japan's "wicked tactic" of "postponing resolution" had become a virtue; flexibility was completely acceptable in the pursuit of entente with a former enemy, Japan, in order to confront a former ally, the USSR, which had become the preeminent threat to China's security.

The Sino-Japanese joint communique on the normalization of relations called for the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty (PFT). Negotiations on a peace treaty began in late 1974, but ran into early difficulties over the territorial issue and China's insistence on the inclusion of an "antihegemony" clause - Beijing's code word for an anti-Soviet stance. After several years of impasse, in early 1978 it appeared that a breakthrough was near. A new government in Tokyo hinted that it was willing to accept an antihegemony clause if it were applied more broadly than just to the Soviet Union. However, conservative politicians in Tokyo also pressed the government to settle the Senkaku sovereignty issue before signing the PFT. But Beijing, with increasing anxiety over Soviet encirclement, again wanted to side-step the territorial dispute to avoid delay in concluding the PFT that would facilitate closer Sino-Japanese relations.

This forward movement in PFT negotiations was stalled in April when a flotilla of Chinese fishing boats appeared off the coast of the Senkaku Islands displaying banners that declared Chinese sovereignty over the islands. When challenged, the Chinese Foreign Ministry dismissed the incident as an "accident" and said China would prevent it from happening again. Beijing's primary concern was to keep the PFT negotiations on track while asserting Chinese sovereignty over the islands. Tokyo accepted Beijing's "official explanation," and PFT negotiations resumed in late July.

The Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship treaty was signed on August 9, 1978. No doubt the Senkaku issue was one of the most delicate issues, but was side-stepped so that the PFT could be concluded. More important for Beijing, an "antihegemony" clause was included in the final treaty. The inclusion of an antihegemony clause strengthened the political significance of the treaty as an anti-Soviet treaty. The significance of the treaty in Beijing's global security strategy is underlined by other factors as well: Sino-American negotiations for the normalization of relations were underway, agreement was reached in mid-December; Sino-Vietnamese relations were rapidly deteriorating and a border war erupted in February 1979. In retrospect, Beijing clearly anticipated the war with Vietnam and took steps to deter Moscow from assisting its Vietnamese ally by opening a second front along China's northern border and expanding the war - the treaty with Japan and normalization of relations with Washington accomplished this objective. The territorial dispute was subordinated to larger national security concerns and foreign policy goals.

Given the transformation in China's threat assessment during the 1970s, it is possible to explain China's handling of the Senkaku Islands dispute. The "entente" with Japan served as one cornerstone in Beijing's policy to counter Soviet attempts to establish domination in East Asia. Pressing China's claim to sovereignty would have risked delay or abortion of a higher foreign policy objective - building a united front against Soviet hegemony. The Chinese press made Beijing's calculation very clear: "[N] either side wants this problem to affect . . . signing of the peace treaty . . . . China has nothing to lose in negotiating and signing a peace treaty first and then negotiating and reaffirming Tiaoyutai [Diaoyu Islands] later."(26)

After years of calm around the islands, in late 1990 the dispute intensified when Tokyo became more aggressive in preventing Chinese fishermen and others from approaching the islands. Beijing accused Tokyo of "arrogance in claiming the islands as Japanese territory" and criticized Japan for "violating its promises to settle disputes peacefully." Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki signaled Japan's willingness not to press its claim by stating that Tokyo would "deal prudently with the issue." Subsequently, following quiet negotiations, in 1993 China and Japan reached an agreement that China would allow Japan to jointly develop resources in some of the areas adjacent to the Senkaku Islands if Tokyo would concede that the area was Chinese territory.(27)

The most recent developments in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku Islands can also be understood in the context of Beijing's larger strategic considerations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian-Japanese relations rapidly improved, and for a time it appeared that a settlement of the Russo-Japanese dispute over the Northern Territories was imminent. Given the fluid balance of power in the new post-cold war world and China's partial isolation following the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Beijing no doubt was scrambling to strengthen its ties with Japan and prevent their relationship from being eclipsed by a new Moscow-Tokyo axis.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

This review of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands case highlights the fairly consistent pattern of behavior Beijing adopted in earlier boundary disputes and settlements. What are the implications for China's approach toward the yet unsettled disputes in the South China Sea? Can an analysis of the South China Sea disputes based on the pattern established in earlier cases be useful in some way? I conclude that the cases are analogous and that the earlier period of time - the 1960s and 1970s - is heuristic. Certainly the systemic factors which determined Beijing's policy in the 1960s and 1970s have changed dramatically. How has this affected Beijing's threat perception? If Beijing no longer perceives an acute threat to its security serious enough to motivate it to negotiate a settlement of the present disputes and facilitate closer relations with potential allies, will Beijing be more likely to resort to the use of force?

From a different perspective, Marwyn Samuels has argued that China's interest in the South China Sea islands has waxed and waned, depending on Beijing's interest in becoming a sea power.(28) But the antithesis of this is to reverse causality and argue that China's long-term interest in the South China Sea islands is driving Beijing's efforts to become a maritime power so that it can effectively claim sovereignty over the area. For the past century, China has indicated its keen interest in the South China Sea, but only in recent years has the PRC achieved the economic and technological capabilities to deploy a navy and project force into the region. Despite the fact that Russia and the U.S. no longer dominate the South China Sea as they once did and China's relative strength in the region has increased dramatically, Beijing will continue its naval modernization. China's naval modernization was not initially motivated by strategic considerations during the cold war, but rather by the growing confidence of Beijing as a regional power, and even a global power, and the desire to fulfill this role militarily. Interests such as control over the South China Sea were more of a driving force in the Chinese naval buildup than the Soviet or American naval threats. China now can build a navy without the fear that this will provoke a response from Russia and the U.S.

I conclude that Beijing's more assertive approach to the South China Sea disputes in the 1990s reflects the complete disappearance of the Soviet factor in Southeast Asia and a dramatically reduced U.S. presence. This has created a situation in which Beijing can now more directly challenge the claims of the other parties to the dispute without too much concern that this will adversely affect the regional balance of power; in other words, the counterbalancing effect of the Soviet Union and United States in the 1970s and 1980s has disappeared, and Beijing is thus acting more confidently. But Beijing must consider how Japan will respond to the new situation. Because the South China Sea is Japan's "umbilical cord" and vital to its economic survival, Tokyo could be drawn into the regional power vacuum if Beijing does not guarantee free flow of resources through the area.

The Southeast Asian regional balance of power began to change in the early 1970s when the Nixon Doctrine initiated a gradual withdrawal of the United States from the region. This withdrawal culminated in the early 1990s with the U.S. exit from the Philippines. With the winding-down of the Cambodia issue and no threat to China from a Soviet Union-Vietnam alliance, Beijing may no longer feel as constrained by the strategic imperative of maintaining cooperative relations with the ASEAN states. These developments have resulted in a fundamental shift in the regional strategic balance and have put in flux what was a rather stable situation. The influence of this shift on the territorial disputes is further exacerbated by the islands' economic significance due to the resource potential in the surrounding waters. This was also clearly a factor in the Sino-Japanese dispute in the East China Sea. But this new situation has deeper roots. The 1974 Chinese move against the Paracels indicated the impact of the initial shift in the balance of power on the territorial dispute's volatility, and the 1988 confrontation with Vietnam in the Spratlys demonstrated the impact of the ongoing changes in the region on China's approach to settlement of the disputes. It also marked the beginning of a much more volatile situation involving virtually every member of ASEAN and China (including Taiwan).

The regional balance of power is in flux, and the states have predictably responded to this instability by enhancing their military capabilities to maintain the option to use force to strengthen their respective foothold in the disputed territory, and at the same time to deter other states from exercising this option or, if necessary, forcefully prevent them from doing so. The states in the region have shifted from a clear "threat-driven" calculation to an "uncertainty-based" one.

China has enhanced its military presence on the islands it occupies. China also seeks to enhance its ability to project force into the South China Sea. Beijing has received twenty-four advanced Russian SU-27 fighter aircraft, has forty-eight more on order, and has concluded an agreement to buy twenty-four MIG-31s while seeking an agreement for joint production of more in China.(29) These SU-27 fighters, operating from southern Chinese bases, currently have a "loiter time" of only several minutes over the Spratlys, but Beijing is apparently developing its aerial refueling capabilities. There are indications that Beijing received a U.S.made system from Iran and additional technology supplied by Israel, and China also signed an agreement with a British company to purchase air-to-air refueling equipment to be fitted to Chinese H-6 (Badger) bombers used as tankers to service A-5 ground attack aircraft.(30) When Beijing succeeds in deploying such a system, it will be capable of staying on station over the islands for a significantly longer time.

China also is in the process of developing a "new look Chinese fleet" with blue-water capabilities. Within military circles in China, many blame China's failure to develop the natural resources in the South China Sea on Beijing's inability to control the islands because of insufficient naval forces. China is negotiating with the Russian Pacific Fleet to purchase as many as two aircraft carriers, and a recent China News Agency publication called for an increase in the defense budget so that China could build an aircraft carrier to "secure oil resources in waters surrounding the disputed Nansha [Spratly] Islands." The PLA General Logistics Department has plans to develop three new naval bases along the east coast, with one located in Zhanjiang in southern Guangdong Province. China is also strengthening its special combat forces and marines, largely based in southern China. General Zhao Nanqi, former director of the PLA General Logistics Department and current director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, admitted that China "cannot yet totally safeguard the Nansha Islands"; the naval buildup is necessary to bolster Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea.(31)

China's rapid expansion of its military capabilities has alarmed Japan, which worries that Beijing may be attempting to convert the South China Sea into an "all China Sea," threatening the vital sea lanes which Japan depends on for energy imports and exports. At some point, Tokyo may feel drawn into the power vacuum out of the necessity to counterbalance China's growing influence and to protect the vital sea lanes in the area. This in turn would only further agitate the Southeast Asian states and encourage their military buildup.(32) The ASEAN states also are not merely standing by while China pushes ahead with its naval buildup.

Although Beijing's military buildup and more assertive behavior may cause alarm in other states, they do not necessarily indicate a shift from Beijing's more conciliatory approach adopted in earlier territorial settlements to an approach that relies more on military force and physical occupation. The pattern Beijing established in earlier settlements could very well be followed, and this will become clear if certain developments occur. If the past offers any insights into the future, we can assume that if a sufficientiy acute external threat emerges, China will use dispute settlement to reduce friction with other states and develop alliances to counter the perceived threat. Hypothetical instances of what would appear as an acute security threat to Beijing would be an ASEAN-Vietnam agreement, or even Vietnam becoming a member of ASEAN, for the purpose of cooperating to exclude Chinese influence and unilaterally moving forward with joint development of the South China Sea resources. The possibility of such an eventuality is demonstrated by a 1988 agreement between Manila and Hanoi to resolve their dispute peacefully, and a Kuala Lumpur-Hanoi agreement in 1992 to jointly develop areas where their claims overlap.(33)

A Japan-ASEAN alliance excluding China and Vietnam would exacerbate Beijing's apprehension over growing Japanese influence, and an attendant growth in Japan's military power may well cause Beijing to seek a multilateral solution to the disputes, to diminish the impetus among ASEAN states to seek closer ASEAN-Japan cooperation. China could also seek a final resolution of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute to enhance Sino-Japanese cooperation and decrease Tokyo's apprehension over Chinese intentions. A U.S. return to Southeast Asia would likely result in a Chinese counter-move, such as a quick settlement of the territorial dispute to reduce tensions and thereby reduce other states' incentive to seek greater U.S. presence and closer cooperation to prevent Chinese domination. In any case, my hypothesis supports the conclusion that China would try to prevent such anti-China coalitions by seeking settlements with one or several other parties to this particular dispute. These scenarios are of course hypothetical, but they do serve to illustrate various conditions under which China's approach to the South China Sea disputes could become more flexible and follow the pattern established in earlier boundary settlements.

Several developments in recent years support this conclusion. As Cambodia's domination of the regional agenda diminished, attention has increasingly turned to resolving the South China Sea disputes. Momentum was gained when Indonesia initiated the annual "Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea," beginning in 1990. After maintaining a very defiant position regarding its claim to the South China Sea throughout the 1970s and 1980s, China signaled its new flexibility while Li Peng was touring Southeast Asia in 1990. His Singapore statement that Beijing was willing to shelve the sovereignty question and move ahead with joint development contrasted sharply with Foreign Minister Huang Hua's 1977 statement that "when the time comes, . . . we [China] will retrieve those islands. There will be no need then to negotiate at all."(34) This clearly indicated China's shift from its earlier "hard" approach to a new "soft" approach. Whether Beijing adopts a "hard" approach or a "soft" approach greatly depends on the positions of other parties to the dispute. South Vietnam, and later Hanoi, both adopted very rigid stands against China; and in response, Beijing adopted a "hard" approach toward the boundary dispute. On the other hand, Beijing has taken a "soft" approach with the Philippines and Malaysia because they have not been so strident in their policies toward China.

China has not stood by quietly while Vietnam-ASEAN relations have improved over the last several years. In 1989, Beijing and Hanoi initiated the process of rapprochement by holding a series of high level discussions that culminated in the 1991 renormalization of relations. While in Singapore in 1990, Premier Li Peng held out the possibility of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations on the territorial questions and while in Hanoi in December 1992, agreement was reached to renew border talks. At the first round held in August 1993, both sides expressed optimism that some agreement was possible.(35) China's boundary treaty with Laos in 1991 could also be interpreted as a move by Beijing to diminish Hanoi's domination of Indochina.

While China is moving to improve relations with Vietnam, possibly to forestall the "ASEAN-ization" of Vietnam and avoid being left out of a newly emerging order in Southeast Asia, Beijing has also made it clear that it will only go so far to accommodate Hanoi. While China has made clear its willingness to cooperate in jointly developing resources around the Spratlys, a senior Chinese military official insisted that Beijing would not negotiate a similar joint development scheme with Hanoi for the Paracels, which China has controlled since 1974.(36)

If China's naval modernization continues and Beijing threatens to dominate the South China Sea, Japan may be prompted to break its policy of limiting its scope of naval operations. An unbridled Japanese military would alarm not only China, but all Southeast Asian states. Recently, Beijing moved to allay Tokyo's fears by being more forthcoming over the Senkaku Islands. The 1993 agreement on joint development around the islands is the first such agreement Beijing has actually concluded involving disputed territory, but it did so only after Japan conceded that these particular areas are within Chinese waters. No agreement was reached regarding the islands themselves.(37)

After actually occupying islands in the Spratlys in 1988, Beijing quickly moved to ensure its active participation in the discussions among concerned parties to prevent the conflict from hampering developing relations with the ASEAN states. The clear intent of Li Peng's 1990 statement of interest in jointly developing the area was to allay fears of China among ASEAN states. Beijing has been largely successful in this effort. Writing in 1990, B. A. Hamzah, recently appointed as the director-general of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs, asked: "Will the PRC continue to resort to arms as an instrument of national policy in pursuit of what others have long feared, a hegemonic scheme in the South China Sea?"(38) But now China has established normal relations with all ASEAN states and in 1993, following reports that China was building a military base in the Spratlys, Malaysian Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak said he was "confident [that] China's intention is not to affect or antagonize the interests of other nations" and that Beijing is still pursuing a peaceful resolution to the dispute?

Although China has made some missteps, it has facilitated confidence-building measures with ASEAN through participation in the unofficial workshops hosted by Indonesia and in a conference on marine science research in the Spratlys hosted by the Philippines. But so far, China has been unwilling to elevate such discussions to formal negotiations and is opposed to involving states outside the region.

A possible complicating factor in achieving any real solution to the Spratlys dispute is the involvement of both Beijing and Taipei. After briefly abandoning its foothold in the Spratlys following its retreat to Taiwan, the Nationalist government has occupied Itu Aba (Taiping) Island since 1956, the biggest island in the Spratly group. And at a government-sponsored "seminar" on the South China Sea held in Taipei in September 1993, a plan to enhance Taiwan's military and civilian presence in the region was announced. Preparations were initiated to increase sea patrols in the Spratlys, but there was no mention of such measures in the Paracels, which are controlled by Beijing. This was characterized as a "symbolic move" to signal the Southeast Asian states that Taiwan is "indispensable" in resolving the disputes, but did not challenge Beijing's position. Participants in the meeting agreed that Taipei and Beijing should exchange official documents jointly affirming Chinese sovereignty over the islands, and Taipei should sponsor cross-strait meetings on the issue.(40) A thorough analysis of this aspect of the South China Sea disputes is beyond the scope of this paper, but brief consideration of the tacit Beijing-Taipei "united front" regarding China's claims supports my thesis.

Both Beijing and Taipei have unfailingly responded to statements and actions taken by any other party to the dispute, but they have not challenged each others' claims and have avoided military conflict over islands the other country occupies. Taipei also did not criticize Beijing's use of force to wrest control of the Paracels and the Spratlys from Vietnam. In fact, Nationalist troops passively observed the PLA rout Vietnamese troops in the March 1988 battle, and the Taiwan defense minister indicated Taipei would, if necessary, help Beijing defend its position on the islands.(41) Cross-strait relations have improved dramatically in recent years, and in September 1990, a fishery agreement was negotiated that specifically mentioned cooperation in the Spratlys.

This Beijing-Taipei united front approach conforms with Beijing's behavior in earlier disputes. Beijing adopted a "soft" approach toward boundary disputes with its neighbors, as illustrated by the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands case, when larger strategic interests required the subordination of the boundary dispute to facilitate cooperation on more fundamental strategic interests. Beijing does not want to allow Southeast Asian states to use Mainland-Taiwan conflict over other issues to breach their unity on Chinese sovereignty claims over the entire South China Sea.

CONCLUSIONS

If the approach China took in earlier settlements is adopted in this case as well, Beijing's future behavior is predictable. The "hard/soft" pattern which China followed in territorial disputes with other states in the 1960s and 1970s appears to be emerging as the current dispute over the South China Sea unfolds. While Beijing has taken steps to strengthen its foothold in the area, enhance its military capabilities to project force into the region, and assert verbally a willingness to use force to defend its claims, it has also clearly indicated that shelving the sovereignty issue and negotiating a joint development regime is acceptable. This general pattern of behavior follows the approach established in earlier disputes and settlements.

If no developments occur that threaten Beijing's security interests in the South China Sea, the current status quo of no resolution/no confrontation could continue indefinitely. Beijing can be expected to continue to participate in the informal "workshops" and "seminars," but object to upgrading them to formal negotiations. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen expressed the view that official negotiations "might in fact heighten current tensions in the region," and therefore informal discussions should continue for the time being. However, ASEAN went ahead with steps at the official level by issuing a Spratly Declaration at the 1992 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting which called for military restraint and joint development while leaving open the question of sovereignty.(42) If the ASEAN states as a group, or in cooperation with Vietnam, progress toward some mode of formal cooperation for resource development, China should not be expected to remain on the sidelines as a bystander.

The particular characteristics of the South China Sea disputes also must be considered. Given China's behavior over the past five years toward South China Sea disputes, it is possible to conclude that a pattern of behavior particular to this multilateral dispute is emerging. Beijing appears willing to cooperate with the other states in joint development when China does not control the territory in question. Li Peng's Singapore statement and the Indonesian-sponsored workshops make this clear. However, if Beijing controls the disputed territory, it is unlikely to participate in any joint development scheme. Beijing has expressed willingness to cooperate in the Spratlys, where it controls only a few islands, but has refused any such cooperation in the Paracels where it has complete control. However, the recent agreement with Japan indicates China's willingness to cooperate in a joint development project if other parties first concede Chinese sovereignty over the disputed territory as Tokyo did in waters near the Senkaku Islands.

While any resolution of the South China Sea disputes is complicated by historical and legal questions, as in other territorial disputes, Beijing can be expected to behave pragmatically, especially if larger strategic concerns emerge. It may also eventually seek a compromise settlement, if necessary, to facilitate cooperation on more fundamental economic and security issues where military force has little or no utility.

Brigham Young University, Utah, U.S.A., September 1994

1 Japan Economic Newswire, July 25, 1993; Free China Journal (hereafter FCJ), August 27, 1993, p. 3.

2 Straits Times (December 1989); Japan Economic Newswire, May 19, 1993; UPI, July 14, 1993.

3 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), Daily Report: East Asia (August 13, 1990), p. 36; Nayan Chanda and Tai Ming Cheung, "Reef Knots," Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER) (August 30, 1990), p. 8.

4 Lee Lai To, "Security Issues of the South China Sea in the Post-Cambodian Era," presented at the third workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, June 28-July 2, 1992.

5 United Nations Document (S/14047). For a detailed review of the early history of the dispute see Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels, Spratlys, Pratas, Macclesfield Bank (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1976); Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York: Methuen, 1982); Chi-kin Lo, China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands (London: Routledge, 1989).

6 Pao-min Chang, 'The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute," Asia Pacific Community, no. 8 (Spring 1980), p. 144.

7 Peking Review, no. 25 (June 18, 1976), p. 4.

8 Beijing Review, no. 13 (March 30, 1979), pp. 17-22; United Nations Document (S/13255), p. 8, fn. d. See also Xisha chundao he Nansha chundao zigu yilai jiushi Zhongguo di lingtu [The Xisha and Nansha islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981).

9 See FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (March 21, 1978), pp. E22-23 (July 26, 1978), p. A9 (December 26, 1978), pp. A14-15.

10 United Nations Document (S/13234), (S/13318); Beijing Review, no. 21 (May 25, 1979), p. 20; Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute," p. 148.

11 Beijing Review, no. 21 (May 25, 1979), pp. 19-20.

12 New China News Agency, July 16, 1971.

13 For details of the Sino-Philippines handling of the territorial dispute in 1975, see Chi-kin Lo, China's Policy, pp. 148-49.

14 Ibid., pp. 38-39, 94.

15 Ibid., p. 156, and Beijing Review, no. 39 (September 26, 1983), p. 8.

16 FBIS, Daily Reports: East Asia (August 13, 1990), p. 36; Chanda and Cheung, "Reef Knots," p. 11, (July 4, 1991), p. 19; New Straits Times, August 13, 1990; FCJ, July 19, 1991, p. 1, July 2, 1992, p. 2; AP-DJ, August 24, 1993.

17 New York Times, June 18, 1992; FCJ, July 2, 1992, p. 2, July 7, 1992, p. 1; UPI, July 13, 1993.

18 FCJ, July 19, 1991, p. 1, September 13, 1991, p. 1, May 29, 1992, p. 2; FEER (July 4, 1991), p. 19.

19 UPI, May 16, 1993; AP, January 15, 1993.

20 Japan Economic Newswire,January 18, 1993.

21 Japan Economic Newswire, May 19, 1993.

22 See Xisha chundao.

23 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 127.

24 Peking Review, no. 21 (May 26, 1972), pp. 14-15; Besshi Yukio, "Nitchu kokko seijoka no seiji katei," Kokkusai seiji, vol. 66, no. 3 (1980), pp. 3-7.

25 Peking Review, no. 11 (March 17, 1972), p. 11.

26 FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (May 19, 1978), p. N2.

27 New York Times, October 31, 1990, p. A7; AP-DJ, September 10, 1993.

28 See Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea; David G. Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

29 New York Times, June 18, 1992; FCJ, July 2, 1992, p. 2,July 7, p. 1; David Jenkins, "The Arming of Asia - Chinese Emperors Said 'Tremble and Obey!'" The Sydney Morning Herald, March 1, 1993.

30 Jane's Defense Weekly (September 17, 1988), p. 603 (June 9, 1990), p. 1156; FEER (October 4, 1990), p. 8; Nayan Chanda, "China Acquires Sensitive Military Gear," Asian Wall Street Journal March 23, 1992, p. 2.

31 Japan Economic Newswire, December 23, 1992, January 12, 1993, May 19, 1993; UPI, January 27, 1993.

32 Japan Economic Newswire, December 22, 1992, December 17, 1992. See also Peter Forrest and Eric Morris, "Maritime Constabulary and Exclusive Economic Zones in the South China Sea: Some Strategic and Technical Considerations," in R. D. Hill, Norman G. Owen, and E. V. Roberts, eds., Fishing in Troubled Waters (Hong Kong: Centre for Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1991), p. 307.

33 "Five-handed Poker in the Spratlys," The Economist (May 21, 1988), p. 36; Straits Times, January 22, 1992.

34 The Truong Sa and Hoang Sa Archipelagoes and International Law (Hanoi: Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988), p. 21; see also Beijing Review, no. 21 (May 23-29 1988), p. 5.

35 FBIS, Daily Report: East Asia (August 13, 1990), p. 36; Reuters, August 24, 1993.

36 Chanda and Cheung, "Reef Knots," p. 11.

37 AP-DJ, September 10, 1993.

38 B. A. Hamzah, The Spratlies: What Can Be Done to Enhance Confidence (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies [ISIS] Malaysia, 1990), p. 13.

39 UPI, July 14, 1993.

40 FCJ, September 10, 1993, p. 2.

41 Shim Jae Hoon, "Blood Thicker than Politics: Taiwan Indicates a Military Preparedness to Back China," FEER (May 5, 1988), p. 26; "Five-handed Poker in the Spratlys," The Economist (May 21, 1988), p. 36.

42 Straits Times, July 22, 1993, July 23, 1992.