The Sinai Battle and the Bullets of the Media=.

President Muhammad Morsi was able to end the era of the two-headed state. Hence, in a sudden strike, he responded to the coup that toppled the People's Assembly (parliament) in which the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed a majority via a "civil coup," thus marking the end of the grip of the military over the Egyptian state. And while this major confrontation with the symbols of the military institution from the generation that fought the June and October wars ended in silence to the beat of the bullets exchanged with the armed men and terrorists in Sinai, many among the Egyptians still fear for the country's stability, seeing how the bullet of unemployment and the economic problems are much more powerful.

And if one were to ask about the media mayhem which is encouraging the spread of rumors and speculations, in order to make the Egyptians lose hope in salvation, the answer would be: Seek the "deep state," and the confrontation with the media, art and creativity is still at its beginning. Still, this does not acquit the new regime from the possible perpetration of violations against the media outlets and communication channels. What is certain at the same time is that a wide faction that does not share the MB's inclination, is concerned about the insistence on shaking the Egyptians' confidence in the state - not the regime - by undermining the purpose of the democratic process and the ballot boxes which await them once again before the end of the year to select the new parliament. The latter will definitely face an intimidation campaign, to prevent them from repeating the experience of the MB-led council. This will allow the prevalence of instigation to boycott the elections, to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood group from controlling all the powers, after President Morsi was able to regain his executive authority in full from the military's court. He thus relieved Field Marshal Tantawi with a "safe exit" that grants him judicial immunity, and was himself relieved of the grip of the military council in order to restructure it, while awaiting the drafting of the constitution and the staging of the parliamentary elections.

And while the question surrounding the boldness of the swift decisions adopted by Morsi to rearrange the military home and change its command - thus putting an end to the stage of the silent and exposed conflict with Tantawi and the military council - quickly disappears in the face of the Sinai confrontation and the launching of the media war, Washington is the one that volunteered to promote the doubts via an implicit agreement which preceded Morsi's swift blow. However, this does not eliminate the American administration's possible disgruntlement about the rounds - with unknown consequences - between the presidency and the military. Therefore, it sought reassurances about the instatement of a period of calm in Egypt, so that Obama's administration can tend to the Syrian earthquake and the scenarios of war with Iran.

At this level, American Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's insistence on praising new Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdul Fattah al-Sissi for "taking Egypt's obligations under the Camp David treaty with Israel seriously" and committing "to preventing the Sinai from becoming a staging area for militants" was not aimless. The same goes for American Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey who praised Morsi's interest in security in Sinai. This American position conveys Washington's and Israel's "concerns" over the fate of the agreement under the MB mandate, at a time when the group is firstly trying to strengthen its influence, while aware of the need to reinstate security and save Egypt from an economic collapse which might place the Brotherhood in confrontation with a hunger revolution.

For its part, the Egyptian military institution with its "young" command should hasten Sinai's cleansing from the armed men and the Takfiris, in which case Morsi will also grow stronger, while the MB will try to gain further popular support in preparation for the battle of the parliamentary elections in three or four months. And although the liberal and leftist powers are still standing in the face of the MB, the latter is wagering on the absence of any organized political power capable of preventing it from getting the largest share in the People's Assembly.

On the other hand, the Egyptians' disgruntlement vis-Ea-vis the turmoil and its cost which is affecting their livelihood, seems to be pushing toward further retreat for the voices opposing the Muslim Brotherhood, at least on the street, without this meaning full surrender to the prevalence of the group over society, the economy and politics. And when the role of the street retreats, the media becomes the only arena for the conflict.

There is no arguing about the fact that Morsi has become stronger, whether he benefitted from the Turkish model or the Sinai wrath which followed the killing of Egyptian soldiers in Rafah. And regardless of the plans of the "deep state" that is submerged by the state apparatuses and whether or not it was behind the instigation of a lawyer to appeal the president's decision to annul the revised constitutional declaration drawn up by Field Marshal Tantawi, loud voices in the media - some of which are fair and others unfair - will simply not reward Morsi.

Hence, the best confrontation means would be to lie in wait for the MB's mistakes in order to shake the confidence of the man behind the swift strike, after he promised the Egyptians he would be a president for all.

The battle with the media is still at its beginning and might be much fiercer than the confrontation with the Takfiris and the armed gangs.

2012 Media Communications Group

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