The Senior Fire Support Conference--We Have Work To Do.

This April, Field Artillerymen will come together to "level our bubbles" and discuss the key issues facing our branch as the Army moves forward with Transformation. The senior leaders of the Field Artillery and our Army will gather at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, on 25 to 27 April for the first Senior Fire Support Conference since April 1999.

To realize how significant the past two years have become to our Army's future, one need only look back to the previous fire support conference. Transformation was not discussed; in fact, it was only an idea in the mind of the future Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). No one could have predicted the significant shift in thinking that would come to characterize Army Transformation in the past 19 months. It follows, therefore, that the theme for this year's conference is "The Field Artillery in Transformation," focusing on the organization and role of the Field Artillery as the Army transforms into a lighter, more lethal force.

Transformation recognizes that joint and coalition warfighting will remain preeminent, especially regarding fires the Field Artillery provides in support of these operations. Also, close support fires and precision engagement are critical capabilities that directly contribute to our ability to support the maneuver forces. Finally, and arguably most importantly, the Field Artillery relies heavily on its forces in the Army National Guard to provide decisive fires that will give our maneuver commanders the tactical and operational advantage in future engagements.

A mere two years later, our Army and the Field Artillery are consumed in a complex and demanding process that will enhance our ability to execute the missions we are assigned and provide the United States the capabilities it needs to meet 21st century threats to its interests and overall national security. During this year's Senior Fire Support Conference, command teams from the active and Army National Guard Field Artillery brigades and division and corps artilleries will assemble at Fort Sill to renew their ties to their branch home, fellow Redlegs and maneuver commanders. They also will come to share their thoughts and help shape the future Field Artillery force.

One fundamental that has not changed over the years is the Field Artillery's commitment to supporting the maneuver commander--nor should it change in the future. However, of primary concern to me, as the Chief of the Field Artillery, is the perception of some of our maneuver commanders that the Field Artillery is neither as responsive nor effective as it should be. I would like to share some of my thoughts on this topic in hopes they will generate productive discussions during this year's conference.

Responsive Fire Support--A Combat Multiplier. The Field Artillery does not fight alone. The American Army fights as a combined arms and joint team, and the Field Artillery is an integral part of that team. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and in the case of the Army, the summation of the various branches and components is what makes the whole Army a premier force--the best Army in the world.

Furthermore, the United States military fights jointly, and each service brings vital capabilities to that fight. To that end, the maneuver or joint task force commander is the leader of those combined arms and joint forces. As a component of that team, our job is to plan, synchronize and execute timely, accurate fires for that commander--to completely synchronize our fires with that commander's scheme of maneuver or plan for defense.

Selling Fire Support to the Maneuver Commander: A Simple Strategy to Maximize Effects. The relationship of the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) to the maneuver or joint task force commander is critical. There can be no hesitation or questioning when it is time to execute. The FSCOORD's word is golden. What the maneuver commander asks for is precisely what he needs and what he will get. Precision, lethality and responsiveness must be the FSCOORD's hallmark.

As FSCOORDs, we must give the maneuver commander achievable recommendations and options for what fire support tasks are essential to accomplish the scheme of maneuver or plan for defense. We must not oversell fires' capabilities or our skills. If we promise more than we can deliver or promise to deliver more quickly than we can, we put our credibility at risk and contribute to the perceptions of unresponsive fires.

Once the maneuver commander and FSCOORD agree on the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) for the mission at hand, the maneuver commander must exercise a degree of tactical patience while those tasks are performed to standard. If the maneuver commander does not demand the EFSTs be completed in accordance with his synchronization matrix and instead begins the maneuver phase of the operation, then either the tasks were, de-facto, not essential or the maneuver commander has made a conscious decision to take the risks inherent with their not being completed.

Issues that Affect the Perception of Unresponsive Fires. We, as fire supporters, must do some internal housekeeping to fulfill our part of providing responsive, accurate fires. I raised our three most pressing issues in my article "State of the Field Artillery 2000: Looking Ahead to the Objective Force" for the November-December 2000 Red Book edition: the poor replication of fires, the latency of the fire support system and a lack of truly digital targeting devices.

The poor replication of fires at our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) is a key reason for the perception of unresponsiveness. Maneuver commanders have the misperception that indirect fires are not the combat multiplier that both history and actual operations have proven.

Our automated fire support systems and top-down fire planning have encumbered our ability to provide timely and accurate fires. AFATDS user intervention points, when enabled, add latency to the fire direction process by requiring user action at each point, needlessly slowing our ability to provide fires.

Finally, our fire support teams (FISTs) and forward observers (FOs) lack the ability to push a single button and obtain an accurate target location and forward the mission onto the shooter. Instead, after obtaining the target location, the FO or FIST must enter the data manually into a handheld terminal unit (HTU) or lightweight computer unit (LCU), with the exception of the Bradley FIST vehicle (BFIST) observer.

We also must gain a better understanding and acceptance of procedures for clearing fires. We have effective doctrinal procedures for clearing fires that are neither followed nor trusted by our maneuver commanders. If the company commander clears a target in his area of responsibility, then that target is cleared and, under normal circumstances, should not require reclearance from higher-level commanders.

Our doctrine relies on the decision of the commander on the ground, and we must have confidence in our junior officers to do their jobs. Most importantly, lack of such confidence has an impact on the responsiveness of our fires.

These are some of the issues that the Field Artillery School is working. We feel confident in our ability to advance these issues through trends reversal initiatives and during two fires-focused CTC rotations in 2001.

I am looking forward to our conference in April: "The Field Artillery in Transformation." I know all Field Artillery leaders will come prepared to articulate many solutions to these problems. In my first "From the Firebase" column for this magazine (September-October 1999), I asked our maneuver commanders to send me their perceptions of fire support. I haven't received many replies. Of critical importance for the April conference is for our respected maneuver leaders to help us frame the problems and formulate solutions.