The Role of the FA and Fire Support in Transformation.

General John N. Abrams, Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe, Virginia

Q During the past year, the Army has been taking actions to bring about the Chief of Staff of the Army's vision to transform the Army. What is the transformation and how will it impact the Army?

A The transformation is the Army in action to remain on the cutting edge in terms of capabilities for soldiers and leaders to do their jobs. So the transformation is about change--taking a look at who we are and the environments in which we have to be able to operate and posturing ourselves for the future.

Two other times in our history the Army has had to go through similar processes. Between World War I and World War II, Leslie J. McNair, the famous educator, trainer and Field Artilleryman, led a strategy for change. The by-products of that effort were the creation of branches and branch schools and the creation of a quality Active Component Army that could expand and that had redundant capabilities in the Reserve Component. The model was built around a draft army, an army of involuntary members led by a cadre of professionals. That framework of the nation's Army served us very well at the time.

The second period where the Army underwent significant change was the post-Vietnam era. The change, again, was in the human dimension; it wasn't a material thing. The Army moved from a draft to an all-volunteer army. Enlisted and junior officer draftees no longer came into the Army, served for a short period and then departed.

During this transformation, we went from an army postured for mobilization to major theaters of war and world wars to a professional army. We retained our branch orientation during that process and moved forward with the McNair model. The Army committed to developing a professional force, an army at the cutting edge in terms of knowledge, skills and attributes, one with an enormous sense of pride--from the most junior private to the most senior leader.

What's different now in today's transformation is we have seen an operational environment emerge. The new patterns of warfare and behavior--the willingness to use force--and the proliferation of technologies and capabilities in the international market have demanded we look at how we're organized and equipped and whether our previous strategies and operational concepts will be effective for the future.

As you know, we've been working for decades on digitizing the force and other initiatives, such as Force XXI and Army After Next. We no longer are postured to defeat the Warsaw Pact, a monolithic threat that operated with a professional cadre in patterned and echeloned capabilities. The Army is taking a more introspective look at how to operate in the presence of new threat variables with the requirement to be more capable across a broader range of tasks, across a full spectrum of contact.

We need a universal quality in the Army that allows us to win in all-out war but also accomplish small-scale contingencies and other missions, including humanitarian relief, homeland defense and stability operations, such as in Kosovo or Bosnia, all the while serving as a deterrent, which we have done so well on the Korean peninsula since the Korean War.

This transformation will affect our organizational construct for education, training and leadership development to ensure we are getting the human dimension "about right." Such a construct includes three theoretical foundations for land warfare: maneuver, maneuver support and maneuver sustainment. It is from that perspective that Leslie J. McNair came up with the idea of branches. He asked, "How do I promote excellence in each of the three primary functions for land warfare?"

For example, combat arms, a core theoretical construct of how land warfare is conducted, is a tradition of Infantry, Armor and Field Artillery. That triad was built around the early partnership of those three branches working together to seize upon their decisive qualities. Today, Army Aviation is a part of that construct along with Air Defense.

Q This transformation--will it have as dramatic an effect as the other two?

A This transformation will evolve over time, but we are set on a pathway for it to be as revolutionary as the Leslie J. McNair model was.

To put it in context, our transformation is a part of national discussions that have been ongoing for five years. These discussions are led by panels commissioned by both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the US Congress and are not just focused on the Army but on the United States armed forces. So the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army are looking at the Army as part of US land forces, which includes the United States Marine Corps and our special operations forces as the two other components. The transformation is a holistic view for the joint force capabilities of the armed forces of the United States of the future. Each of the services is moving down this path.

Q The July 2000 edition of Army contains some thought-provoking articles on transformation. One of the most futuristic articles was "The Defense of Fombler's Ford" written by General (Retired) Paul F. Gorman. It introduced the future combat systems (FCS) concept of operations with technology that can be fielded by 2012. Do you agree with the concept of operations presented in "The Defense of Fombler's Ford," and if not, why not?

A General Gorman is one of the finest military minds of the 20th century. He is a seasoned vet and clearly an influential contributor to our thinking, not just about the Army but in the totality of warfare. His article discusses the application of advanced technologies in the hands of small units in a setting postulated in the future. These technologies are significant--are on the order of magnitude of the introduction of the repeating rifle following the black powder rifle.

He writes about advanced sensors that can sniff things going on and tell soldiers about it early before the enemy knows, enabling our soldiers to respond early. He writes about precision munitions and armaments that are "automatic" without a lot of layers of bureaucracy between the point of action and the unit with the delivery system. He operationalizes the advanced technologies of 2012. It is a wonderful think-piece.

So, the short answer is "Yes, I basically agree with the article." Now, having said that, our transformation effort has a complementary piece: When emerging technology drives our soldiers' abilities to contribute to land warfare, we have it a little bit reversed. Technology should enable the soldier to perform, not drive him. So we are looking for increases in the effectiveness of teams of soldiers at the lowest possible level as enabled by technology. Our transformation strategy focuses on the human dimension.

In the Army transformation periods that succeeded and had enormous impact on our force, we kept the human dimension at the forefront. Attempts at major transformations did not succeed when the Army focused on material solutions. The Army is not about things--it's about people who must perform difficult tasks while in harm's way.

Technology is a two-edged sword. If we are not careful, it can work against us. It can consume our energy. It can shift us from focusing on performing our task to operating the equipment to perform our task.

Q Although the Objective Force will evolve as we get closer to its implementation, what is your vision of the FA's role in the Objective Force? Of fire support's role?

A Field Artillery and fire support will provide critical support to complement the capabilities of forces engaged in land warfare. That's true today, and it's going to be true in the future.

Just as General Gorman's article illustrated, teams of soldiers in contact are going to need additional capabilities from somewhere to create overmatch...to create shock effect and change the correlation of forces so smaller groups have greater effect. So the force will need precision and responsiveness as well as the desired effect. It's the "fire support equation," the core of which is this wonderful branch. That equation will include not only the Army, but also joint capabilities to achieve the effects. And some of those effects needed are non-lethal.

Today, when people think of the Field Artillery, they think "lethality"--which needs to remain at the forefront of the FA's continued capabilities. But there is a second, equally challenging dimension for the future: increased range with variety of effects. Ranges of weapons have increased to the point that it is difficult to find sanctuary from the opposing forces' combatant elements operating in proximity.

For decades, we have created an overmatch in lethality by denying sanctuary to those who we would oppose us, whether they were the Warsaw Pact or the Iraqis. It was our responsiveness and accuracy. Because of the proliferation of technology, we no longer have the clear advantage in terms of range and effects.

In our new operational environment, forces will oppose each other in general proximity to each other, both with access to enormous lethality. So what do we need to achieve overmatch? What is going to make the difference? We are at the cutting edge right now in the world. Built around a breakthrough in information technologies and the development of advanced sensors, our force will be able to see first and take action first with greater precision.

So the notion is that our force in close proximity to the opposing force must have the ability to take decisive action in a very timely way--spontaneously react to a threat. This future battlefield will have a mix of combatants and noncombatants on it, further complicating the situation. So the construct of effects in time and space is going to be a challenge, not only from the technology perspective, but also in terms of fire support operations in urban or restricted environments at a tempo that demands agility, the ability to maneuver at will and maintain freedom of action to support integrated teams. Those teams must be able to conduct very deliberate, decisive actions to achieve results with continuous, reliable support that comes from over-the-horizon.

Such a formula reverses a potential stalemate or war of attrition. That's the core of the theoretical foundation of fire support for the future force. It is the connection of sensors, command and control and delivery means, but it's also an operational paradigm that's much different with a different tempo. I'm not talking about a sequence of fires to complement maneuver, but a seamless integration of real-time fires as part of maneuver--a synergy of combined arms. That is the core of the Objective Force capabilities the Field Artillery needs to achieve in the transformation.

Transformation is more than a process. It's a clear understanding of what kind of future operational capabilities we need to achieve. The force must be more lethal, more survivable and more mobile. We need very agile, responsive forces that are proactive in imposing their will on the other force. We then will maintain our freedom of action and survive.

Q What message what you like send to Field Artillerymen around the world?

A Field Artillery, the King of Battle, always has had a wonderful tradition of significant contributions to the Army. The level of professionalism of Field Artillery NCOs sets the standard. They have a high level of technological competence and tremendous leadership skills--you can see that down on the gun line watching the "Smoke" operate.

Field Artillery officers are all raised as commanders and staff officers to support our formations in a very strategic way. Fire support officers and artillery commanders develop strong bonds with the field commanders, and the Army has greatly benefited from those relationships.

Well done; keep up the good work.

General John N. Abrams has commanded the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, since September 1998. Before assuming command of TRADOC, he was the TRADOC Deputy Commander. He commanded V Corps, US Army Europe in Germany; the 2d Infantry Division in Korea; 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany, and, in Vietnam, a cavalry troop in the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, deployed from the 2d Armored Division in Fort Hood, Texas. In other assignments, he served as Chief of Staff of the 3d Armored Division, Military Science Instructor at the US Military Academy at West Point and Staff Officer in War Plans and Deputy Director of the Operations Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at the Pentagon. He holds a Master of Science in Public Administration from Shippensburg State University in Pennsylvania. He was commissioned an Armor officer through Officer Candidate School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in 1967.