The Role of Presidential Advisory Systems in US Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of the National Security Council and Vietnam, 1953-1961. (Book Reviews).

THE ROLE OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY SYSTEMS IN US FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING: The Case of the National Security Council and Vietnam, 1953-1961. By Pasi Tuunainen. Helsinki (Finland): Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura (Finnish Literature Society). 2001. 523 pp. (B&W photos.) 160 MK/EUROS27.00, paper. ISBN 951-746-285-9.

Pasi Tuunainen, a history professor at Finland's University of Joensuu, presents "the viewpoint of the NSC [National Security Council] organization" in "the development of the Eisenhower Administration's Vietnam policy" for the purpose of providing "augmented and supplementary insights in the study of the Eisenhower Presidency, particularly generalizations about his use of the NSC as an advisory body, and ... into the historiography of the Vietnam War" (p. 57). There are many oddities in this detailed and tedious account, notably a strange citation style in footnotes that regularly consume a third of a page and often contain misspellings. Scattered through the narrative are twenty grainy photographs and a good map of Vietnam appears on the page before the index. Grammatical flaws damage Tuunainen's laboured prose and careless copyediting misses many typographical errors. Nine appendices provide biographies of top policymakers, and two more describe the "multiple advocacy model" and prior scholarship on the to pic. A main thesis surfaces in the conclusion, where the author writes that "the NSC and its supporting committee and staff structure appears to have operated ... with considerable efficiency and flexibility, thus providing the President with a wide range of options and demonstrating an ability to adapt even, to some extent, to rapid situations" (p. 446).

Tuunainen's lengthy introduction provides a ponderous explanation of the structure and operation of the NSC under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. One figure depicts the NSC power tree and a second elaborates on the multiple advocacy model that the author develops as an "apt... view of the workings of Eisenhower's Council" (p. 452). After praising Eisenhower's leadership style and his system of "consultative management" (p. 17), he covers, chronologically in eight unnumbered chapters with awkward tides, US policy toward Vietnam from its origins in the Truman administration to January 1961. Tuunainen summarizes discussions at the NSC, the Operations Coordinating Board, and other gatherings in agonizing detail. Rather than offering his own assessment of their importance, he explains what prior scholars have written about these meetings. Changing subjects abruptly and invariably stating the obvious, the author also consistently uses the word "appears" to qualify his judgments and ends chapters without analysis. H is treatment adds little to existing literature on Eisenhower's policy regarding Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords and Ngo Dinh Diem, except perhaps the claim that the Roosevelt administration started the US commitment to Vietnam. Tuunainen even contradicts his main thesis, writing that "the advisory system considered a pressing question with the basic policy decision having already been made" (p. 336) in an informal meeting.

A solid conclusion partially expiates these weaknesses. Another major strength of this study is research. Tuunainen cites seemingly every relevant secondary source and a vast array of primary materials ranging from private archival collections, to government documents, to oral histories. His findings add valuable insights on such issues as the State Department's dominance of the advisory process and Vice President Richard M. Nixon's ability to provide sensible advice. He also argues persuasively that both inadequate and faulty intelligence resulted in "mistaken perceptions" and "flawed decisions" (p. 453). Less convincing is his contention that previous "scholars have been working with inadequate NSC-related source materials" and therefore "have produced one-sided and not particularly well-argued interpretations" (p. 57). Readers of my generation will understand why I checked Tuunainen's claim that American Embassy officials in Paris referred in May 1954 to Diem as a "'Yogi-bear-like' little man" (p. 243). No t only did Diem more resemble sidekick Boo Boo, but at that time neither cartoon character existed. Ironically, Tuunainen shares with Eisenhower policymakers a "lack of cultural understanding ..." (p. 420). That "Yogi-like mystic" was the correct description raises questions about how many other errors of fact and opinion are buried in this plodding and bloated study.