The Raid on Jifjafa -- April 1916 (Part 2).

The plan for the approach march to Jifjafa called for the establishment of a rear base at the cluster of cisterns in the Wadi um Muksheib near Moiya Harab. (Moiya Harab, a Bedouin campsite, was located on a tributary wadi approximately one kilometre south of the main wadi.) These cisterns, some 56 kilometres south east of Serapeum -- the start point for the raid -- and 30 kilometres south west of Jifjafa, had been examined by Captain Wearne during his earlier reconnaissance and were the only confirmed source of water between the Suez Canal and Jifjafa. This source would need to be secured to ensure water for the horses for the return trip to Serapeum.

Closer to Jifjafa, a forward base was to be established at Point 1340 -- 15 kilometres north east of the rear base and 15 kilometres south west of Jifjafa. Those elements accompanying the raiding force, but not essential for the actual assault -- in particular, camels carrying water and forage for the horses -- were to remain there until collected during the withdrawal from Jifjafa. Additionally, this forward base `formed a supporting point with water supply to fall back on in case of difficulties.' (1) Finally, an observation post and the `starting point' for the attack were to be established at Point 1082 -- six kilometres to the west south west of Jifjafa. From this `starting point', at the south west base of the feature and screened from Jifjafa, the actual assault on the Turkish post was to commence.

10 April 1916

Shortly after last light on 10 April, the Camel Transport convoy, escorted by the Bikaner Camel Corps and dismounted Light Horsemen, passed through the forward defences east of the Suez Canal at Serapeum and marched in a south easterly direction to cut the course of the Wadi um Muksheib. The train would then follow the bed of the wadi upstream until it reached a bivouac site near Point 850, 20 kilometres north west of the Moiya Harab cisterns. There it would wait until the Light Horse squadron and other mounted elements caught up. This was expected to be about midnight on 11 April.

11 April 1916

On the morning of 11 April the country between the Canal and Moiya Harab was scouted by a Royal Flying Corps (RFC) aircraft. All was apparently clear except for `a party of peaceful Arabs' sighted in the vicinity of Moiya Harab. (2)

At 1407 hours 11 April, the head of the mounted column passed through the forward defences at Serapeum intending to follow the same route to the rendezvous with the camel train. The commander 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade -- Brigadier General J M Antill -- who observed the troops' departure recorded in his diary `... men and horses well turned out -- all looking fit and hard ...'. (3)

The horse column proceeded in a south easterly direction at a normal walk -- approximately four miles per hour (6.4 kilometres per hour) -- with a halt of 10 minutes to each hour and resuming the march on the hour. At 1750 hours the column halted to feed the horses and for the evening meal of cold bully beef and biscuits. The only water available for the men and horses was that carried in the trooper's waterbottle. Initially, the going was over soft sand and the two ambulance sandcarts of the 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance bringing up the rear of the column found the pace too fast even though the carts were pulled by four-horse teams instead of the normal two-horse team. During the evening meal halt, the OC of the medical detachment -- Major Rowden-White -- asked Major Scott to slacken the pace of the head of the column as the carts had to travel an additional three or four minutes at every halt and even trot to catch up. The column moved off again at 1930 hours. Fortunately, the soft sand gave way to harder ground and the sandcarts were able to keep up with the column although it moved at a fast walk in the cooler night conditions. The Wadi um Muksheib was struck at 2130 hours and the column turned upstream along the bed of the wadi. At this point the bed of the wadi was hard sand averaging 50 metres in width and giving `the appearance of a prepared causeway' (4). In his after action report, Major Scott noted that in this section of the wadi `the travelling was very good ... and except for a few short patches which were sandy was fit for field artillery to move at the trot' (5). The sides of the wadi rose steeply 10-15 metres above the bed. The watercourse itself was marked by isolated clumps of stunted pine trees at intervals on either bank. North of the wadi the terrain was a level plain with no cover; south of the wadi the ground rose to low hills. At 2300 hours the mounted column caught up to the camel train at its bivouac near Point 850. Both elements bivouacked there for the remainder of the night.

12 April 1916

At 0715 hours a supporting RFC aircraft dropped a message to the column that it had sighted signs of Bedouin camps in the vicinity of Moiya Harab during its early morning reconnaissance ahead of and to the flanks of the raiding column. The column left the overnight bivouac at 0730 hours and continued up the Wadi um Muksheib. At 0900 hours the squadron reached a point some eight kilometres north west of the Moiya Harab cisterns where the wadi entered a range of broken hills and the bed became rocky and more difficult for wheeled vehicles. Some three kilometres west of the Moiya Harab cisterns, Major Scott halted the column. One Light Horse troop was detached which scouted around the north and east of the cisterns, as Bedouin had reported that a Turkish patrol had been seen in that locality some days previously. When this troop reported `all clear', the column resumed its march. The cisterns, which were identified by two ancient fig trees and the presence of birds attracted by the water, were reached at 1120 hours. Immediately the engineer detachment erected the canvas troughing which was filled with water drawn from a cistern using the rotary hand pump carried by the detachment. (It is presumed this troughing and pump were carried on the detachment's horses and not on the stores camels allotted to the detachment as the camel train did not arrive at the cisterns until some two hours later.) The horses were able to have their first decent drink since leaving the Railhead Camp at Serapeum some 22 hours earlier.

As soon as their horses were watered, three Light Horse troops were sent out to the north, south east and south of the cisterns to reconnoitre the surrounding country for water and to search for hostile Bedouin parties in the vicinity. These reconnaissance also had the aim of deceiving any watching Bedouin or Turkish patrols as to the objective of the column. No reconnaissance was carried out towards Jifjafa. Although fresh camel and human tracks were detected, no Bedouin were caught by these patrols. However, 9 previously unrecorded cisterns were located. While some of these cisterns were empty, others were estimated to contain a total of 140,000 gallons (637,000 litres) of water. It was 1730 hours by the time the three troops returned to the rear base bivouac.

In the meantime, the camel train under escort of the Bikaner Camel Corps, which had left the overnight bivouac at the same time as the mounted column, arrived at the cisterns at 1320 hours. During the morning, three Bedouin and a camel had been captured by the Light Horsemen who handed them over to the camel train for security. These personnel were held at the rear base and later released after the raiding force returned there. Five Bedouin were, however, known to have escaped. The camels whose loads had been used up and those carrying forage and rations for the return trip to Serapeum were left at the rear base. It was also decided to leave the two ambulance sandcarts there as a close reconnaissance indicated that wheeled vehicles would have difficulty moving over the initial leg of the route between the rear base and the planned forward base at Point 1340. Sixteen other ranks from the mounted squadron and four Light Horse camel drivers under command of Lieutenant A H H Nelson remained at the rear base to protect the camel train and to secure the water supply. Four Australian sappers were also left there to maintain the water supply and to complete a detailed survey of the cisterns.

In the late afternoon a British patrol consisting of one officer and 10 other ranks from the squadron of the Middlesex Yeomanry patrolling to the south of the Jifjafa force arrived unexpectedly to bolster the garrison. Contemporary records omit any order or reason for this patrol to join up with the Major Scott's force. It is probable the patrol headed to a known source of water. It is fortunate that there was no friendly clash on this occasion.

Night 12/13 April 1916

At 1900 hours the attacking column moved off north east up a branch wadi to establish the forward base at Point 1340. The going on this leg of the approach march was more difficult than any encountered previously. The advance was very slow; the force taking some seven and a half hours to cover the 15 kilometres from the rear base to Point 1340. The first three kilometres of the route along the boulder-strewn bed of the branch wadi were very rough and impassable to wheeled vehicles and caused difficulties for the camel train. Apparently camels have poor night vision! The course followed was not the main caravan route between Moiya Harab and Jifjafa -- the Darb el Maghaza -- but cross country. On climbing out of the head of the wadi, the column reached a high stoney plateau where the going was easier. During this night march the Light Horse squadron traveled for only 40 minutes in each hour, then halted and dismounted to allow the camel train to maintain contact.

At 0230 hours 13 April the column reached the planned forward base site at Point 1340. The Bikaner Camel Corps, the Royal Engineers Wireless Detachment and the camel train, including 25 dismounted Light Horse camel drivers, were left at this location under command of Captain B B Ragless, second in command of the Light Horse squadron. Meanwhile, as the column advanced towards Point 1340, the rear base came under persistent sniping from Bedouin. This shooting continued throughout the night and on several occasions the garrison returned fire to drive off raiders who made probing forays and one determined attack against the bivouac. Despite the heavy sniping and probing attacks, there were no British casualties. The number of Bedouin casualties is unknown. The 9th Light Horse regimental history simply states that the Bedouin `retired taking their casualties with them.' (6)

Attack on Jifjafa -- 13 April 1916

Descriptions of the action at Jifjafa in the Official Records are sparse. There are also some contradictions between the accounts published in H S Gullett's Official History 1914-1918 Volume VII, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, and in Major T H Darley's With the Ninth Light Horse in the Great War -- the unit's regimental history. The following account is largely based on after-action reports prepared by Major Scott, Major Rowden-White and Lieutenant Coghlan.

The attacking column remained at the forward base at Point 1340 for three hours. After watering the horses from water carried in fanatis and a cold breakfast of bully beef and biscuits washed down with water, the column moved out at 0530 hours on the final nine kilometre march to the `starting point' for the attack. The assault force was composed of the following elements:

The column arrived at the south west base of Point 1082 at 0730 hours. While the troopers waited for their final orders, the command group ascended to the summit of Point 1082 -- a climb of 100 feet above the plateau -- to observe the Jifjafa post for the first time through field glasses. At the same time, the RFC liaison party erected their ground wireless station at the foot of the hill and awaited the report from the 14 Squadron aircraft then scouting the Jifjafa position.

From earlier RFC flight reports it was known that each time a British aircraft reconnoitred the Jifjafa position, the Turkish garrison scattered in small groups into the low scrubby hills to the north and west of the post. At 0800 hours the supporting aircraft dropped a message into the FUP that stated `All was clear'. (7) Presumably, this meant that the crew had not observed any large bodies of Turkish troops near Jifjafa that could interfere with the raid and that the post itself appeared deserted. Major Scott therefore decided to launch the attack as soon as possible while the enemy had lost cohesion. (8)

The plan of attack was as follows: Lieutenant McDonald was ordered to take his troop of approximately 30 men as quickly as possible around the west and north of the Point 1082 feature to occupy a dominant knoll about 1.5 kilometres north of the Turkish post. This manoeuvre would require a ride of approximately seven kilometres across broken country on either side of the Wadi el Hegaiib. At the same time, Lieutenant Pender would move his troop to the east of Point 1082 and passing south of the enemy camp occupy a blocking position on the main caravan route about 1.5 kilometres east of Jifjafa. This was the most likely direction that any reinforcing Turkish troops would approach from and the route escaping Turkish troops would probably flee along.

Lieutenant Linacre and his troop (less 8 men) were to deploy north east and make a frontal attack on the enemy post. Actual numbers of personnel in each troop are not recorded but it is estimated that 22 to 24 men would have remained in Lieutenant Linacre's troop to make the frontal attack. Of the 8 men detached from Lieutenant Linacre's troop, 4 troopers were provided to escort the 4th Field Company detachment which would immediately move forward to destroy the drilling rigs and bores as soon as the firefight started and before the post had been captured. The remaining 4 troopers plus the machine gun section (Lieutenant Jacques and 4 men) were held at Point 1082 as a reserve.

On the order to move the three troops rode out on their allotted tasks. H hour was set for 0900 hours. As the day warmed, a hot blustery westerly wind began to pick up strength causing sand flurries hampering long range observation. The reduced visibility resulting from this wind may have helped conceal the initial deployment of the troops.

As Lieutenant Linacre's assault group approached the first suspected enemy outpost on a low ridge approximately one kilometre to the west of the Jifjafa post, Major Scott, from his position on the summit of Point 1082, observed that Lieutenant McDonald's troop making its long enveloping sweep to the west and north of Jifjafa would be late in reaching its objective -- a dominant knoll on the ridge to the north of the Jifjafa post -- because of the broken nature of the country it had to traverse. Consequently, Major Scott then ordered Lieutenant Linacre to take 16 men from his troop and to occupy the ridge to the north west of the enemy post to provide covering fire for the direct assault on the camp which Major Scott himself would now command. A new assault force was rapidly organised consisting of Major Scott's command group (five officers including Major McKenzie, the OC of the Light Horse squadron), the 6-8 troopers released from Lieutenant Linacre's troop and the reserve of 9 men (the machine gun section under Lieutenant Jacques and the original four troopers from Lieutenant Linacre's troop) -- a total force of 20 to 22, including 6 officers.

A Turkish soldier was seen to retire from the western ridge towards the Jifjafa post as Linacre's reduced troop closed on the ridgeline. This soldier obviously raised the alarm as a short time later a larger group of Turkish troops attempted to occupy trenches on the ridgeline to the north of Jifjafa post. This movement was observed by Lieutenant Pender's troop which had reached a point to the south east of Jifjafa. Pender's troop galloped to intercept the Turkish group. Several Turkish troops were run down as they attempted to flee to the south east. The main enemy party prevented from reaching the ridgeline then occupied trenches nearer the post and a short sharp fire fight ensued mainly involving Lieutenant Pender's troop attacking from the south east supported by Major Scott's force attacking from the south west. Although outnumbered and surrounded, the Turkish group put up a stout resistance, but after sustaining numerous casualties was forced to surrender. One participant in Pender's attack later described the action in a letter:

   Last week I went out into the desert on a bit of a jaunt after Turks. We
   were away 5 days and covered 60 miles before striking their camp.... They
   ran for their lives but they didn't stand a chance, for our fellows ran
   them down with their horses, and captured the lot.... We feel very proud of
   ourselves, as we are the first ALH to go into action as a unit on real
   Light Horse work.... (9)

Lieutenants Linacre's and McDonald's troops do not appear to appear to have been involved in the main action but were chiefly concerned with clearing the ridgeline to the west and north of the Jifjafa post and herding the small number of prisoners found there to a central collecting point. The after-action reports do not mention whether Lieutenant Linacre's troop had reached a position to provide covering fire for the assault group. Given the short distance it had to travel, it is probable that it had occupied a position on the ridgeline to the north west of the Jifjafa post from which it could bring long range covering fire onto the Turkish position when Lieutenant Pender commenced his attack.

Six Turkish troops were killed in the action. The Austrian engineer officer in charge of the well boring and 34 Turks and Arabs were captured. Five of the captured were wounded, including one who was too seriously injured to be evacuated. He was treated and left at the post when the attacking force withdrew. According to the Austrian officer, the post had been occupied by himself, 25 troops of the 4th Battalion, 79th Regiment, 27th Division, 8th Army Corps of the 4th Turkish Army and 15 members of an Arab labour corps -- a total of 41. (10) It would appear that the whole of the post's garrison was accounted for, but two personnel mounted on camels were seen to gallop away in an easterly direction as the firefight started. These personnel may have been visiting from a neighbouring post and narrowly escaped being caught up in the action.

One Light Horseman -- Corporal S F Monaghan, 8th Australian Light Horse Regiment -- was killed during the fighting. There were no other Australian casualties. Corporal Monaghan, an unmarried 28 year old sawyer of Launceston, Tasmania, joined the AIF on 18 February 1915 and was posted to the 6th Reinforcements, 8th Australian Light Horse Regiment. He departed Melbourne on HMAT Uganda on 26 June 1915. The dates of his disembarkation in Egypt and his arrival on Gallipoli are not recorded in his personal records. (11) However, he was one of the 8th Light Horse Regiment's survivors of the tragic charge by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade at The Nek on 7 August 1915. Writing after the Jifjafa raid, an Australian officer noted that:

   Monaghan ... took part in the famous charge of the 8th LH and was one of
   ten who escaped uninjured; then to come out here in order to be picked off
   in a rotten little scrap. (12)

Monaghan's luck on Gallipoli was not to last. On 1 November 1915, he was lightly wounded by shrapnel but remained on duty. On 7 November, he suffered a gunshot wound and was evacuated to the 19th General Hospital, Alexandria. He was then transferred to the No 1 Australian General Hospital, Cairo and later to the No 2 Australian General Hospital, Ghezireh. He returned to duty on 18 January 1916 and was promoted Corporal on 25 February. (13) Corporal Monaghan's body was buried on the battlefield at Jifjafa. Subsequently, the Imperial War Graves Commission was unable to locate his grave to re-bury his body in a War Cemetery. Corporal Monaghan is commemorated on Panel 58 of the Jerusalem Memorial in the Jerusalem War Cemetery. (14)

Destruction of Jifjafa Post

As the first shots rang out, Lieutenant Coghlan's 4th Field Company detachment moved quickly to begin the demolition of the three bores and the well drilling equipment which were the prime objectives of the raid. Fortuitously, Number 3 Bore was located approximately three kilometres to the south west of the Jifjafa post and well away from the action. The engineer detachment was able to move up to the bore and prepare their demolition as the Light Horse troops were deploying. This bore which was dry had been drilled to a depth of 266 feet (81 metres) before being apparently abandoned. Although a gin -- a metal tripod structure to support the drilling rig -- remained in position above the bore, there were no tools or other stores in this locality. Nor was there any sign of recent drilling activity.

Number 1 Bore -- drilled to 51 feet (15.5 metres) and apparently abandoned -- and Number 2 Bore -- drilled to 276 feet (84 metres) -- were located adjacent to the Jifjafa post. No water had been struck in either bore; however, the captured Austrian engineer officer stated that No 2 Bore looked promising as moist sand had been reached. All three bores were destroyed by blowing in the well casing 25 feet (7.6 metres) below the surface. This was achieved by lowering two or three slabs of guncotton on string into the bore hole after the fuse was lit. This proved very effective and fragments of well casing were blown up to the surface. Before Number 1 and Number 2 Bores were blown, a large quantity of hand tools, small parts of drilling equipment, 2,000 rounds of captured ammunition and seven damaged Turkish rifles were dropped into the bore holes. On the surface, two sets of gins, two winches, two 4-ton screw jacks and 400 feet (122 metres) of hydraulic piping used for boring purposes were also destroyed using guncotton charges. No part of the drilling plant was left intact. (15) In his report of the action, Major Scott described the plant as: `German Military Artesian. Very substantive, beautifully made, nothing temporary about any part of it.' (16)

Additionally, six bell tents, one large tent, 2,000 rounds of ammunition and supplies of biscuits, blankets and general camp equipment were destroyed by burning. Two Turkish camels and 19 rifles were captured and brought back by the raiding force. A quantity of documents, diaries and letters were also seized. (17)

Two of these documents proved of particular interest to British Intelligence. One paper found on the captured Austrian engineer officer stated that German aircraft would be flying over the Sinai front anytime after 8 April. While the arrival of German aircraft at Beersheba in March 1916 was known to the British Command, this document confirmed that the German air unit -- the 300th Squadron from Hamburg -- was about to commence active operations. The squadron was equipped with 14 Rumpler two-seater aircraft which were faster and had a better all-round performance than the BE 2c aircraft of the RFC. (18) The second important document captured was a Turkish report of water resources in the Sinai Desert and the progress of their water drilling program. (19) This document was to prove of great value for operational planning in the coming months of the Sinai campaign as it indicated those areas where water was available in sufficient quantities for mounted formations to operate.

Withdrawal to the Rear Base

The raiding force wasted no time in completing the destruction of the Jifjafa post; collecting, searching and hurrying the prisoners off to Point 1082; and burying Corporal Monaghan and the six Turkish dead. By 1100 hours 13 April all these activities had been completed and the withdrawal to the forward base at Point 1340 had begun. The RFC ground signal station which had been left at Point 1082 and the prisoners were collected on the way. The four Turkish wounded were evacuated on sitting-up cacholets; the five cacholet-bearing camels having accompanied the fighting troops forward to Jifjafa.

By 1200 hours the hot, blustery wind had developed into a full strength sand storm -- a khamsin -- that severely hindered movement and engendered a great thirst in both men and animals. The flying, stinging sand particles limited visibility to 20 metres. Pressing on, the column reached the forward base at Point 1340 about 1330 hours. Here the horses were fed and watered from supplies carried forward by the camel train. During this time an attempt was made by the Royal Engineers wireless detachment to send a message to Headquarters 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at Serapeum reporting the success of the raid. However, the severity of the sand storm prevented the message being passed. This message, originally drafted at 1530 hours 13 April, was eventually received by Headquarters 3rd Brigade at 0830 hours 14 April.

The column departed the forward base at 1630 hours 13 April en route to the rear base at the Moiya Harab cisterns. The boulder-strewn branch wadi which had caused so much difficulty on the outwards journey was avoided on the return trip. Nevertheless, progress was very slow as the sand storm continued late into the night. The mounted element had to make frequent halts to keep in touch with the slow moving camel train which included the 34 Turkish and Arab prisoners. The Austrian engineer officer was provided with one of the spare horses and he accompanied the mounted column. The rear base was finally reached at 2330 hours. Here the column rested for the remainder of the night.

Return to Serapeum -- 14 April 1916

By morning the sand storm had abated. Wireless contact was established with Headquarters 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at 0730 hours 14 April and a full report of the operation was sent. At 0900 hours the force departed the rear base on the homeward leg to Serapeum following the same route as the outward journey. The prisoners were now mounted on camels whose loads had been used up.

At 1300 hours the column halted for the midday meal and to allow the camel convoy to close up. During the halt congratulatory messages were received by wireless from Lieutenant General Sir A J Godley, Commander II Anzac Corps and Brigadier General J M Antill, Commander 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade. While these messages were being read out to the assembled troopers, a Light Horseman from one of the outposts came at a gallop shouting and waving as he rode into the assembly. As he neared the halted column, it was observed that the wadi was coming down in a spate. One troop's horse lines had been laid out in the bed of the wadi but all its horses and equipment were hastily evacuated to the bank before the flood reached its position. Had the camels been off-loaded in the bed of the wadi as was the normal custom for longer halts, it is likely that a quantity of equipment and stores would have been swept away and some of the animals drowned before they could be untethered, so swift was the onrush of the water. Initially, the flood was about 25 metres wide and 15-20 centimetres deep. Moving as fast as a horse could gallop, the water had the appearance and consistency of dirty white paint. Within five minutes, however, the wadi had become a raging torrent with waves breaking up to a metre high. This spate was due to a rare thunderstorm in the distant headwaters of the Wadi um Muksheib. There had been no sign of rain of the lower reaches of the wadi being traversed by the returning column and hence no warning of the impending drama. This was the only time during the year long Sinai campaign that the Light Horse saw a running stream in the Sinai Desert. (20)

The flood caused the column to be split in two, with an element on either bank. The force continued its march down both banks of the wadi. Within the hour the flood had subsided and the column was able to join up again. (The flood waters flowed into the shallow Er Rigm depression about 30 kilometres south east of Serapeum and soon soaked away or evaporated.) The march continued throughout the afternoon and into the night; the advance guard of the column arriving back at the Railhead Camp at Serapeum about 2400 hours 14 April. It was some hours later before the rear guard shepherding the camel train reached the Railhead Camp. In three and a half days the mounted element of the force had covered 260 kilometres (160 miles) of hard marching much of it over unknown territory by night. Although both troopers and walers were tired, the Light Horsemen were jubilant at the success of the raid. Only one horse was lost during the operation -- killed during the attack at Jifjafa. Four other horses went lame when they lost shoes in the rocky bed of the branch wadi during the initial stage of the night march from the rear base to the forward base. One camel was also abandoned.

15 April 1916

At 1400 hours 15 April, General Sir Archibald Murray, Commander in Chief Egyptian Expeditionary Force, wired Headquarters 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade announcing the following awards:

Major W H Scott, 9th Light Horse -- Distinguished Service
  Order
Sergeant P J McGinness, 8th Light Horse -- Distinguished Conduct
  Medal
Corporal P Teesdale Smith, 9th Light Horse -- Distinguished
  Conduct Medal

Subsequently, the following members of the Jifjafa force were Mentioned in Despatches:

Captain T C Macaulay, Royal Field Artillery
Captain A E Wearne, 8th Light Horse
Corporal J T Talbot, 8th Light Horse
Lance Corporal J W J Miles, 8th Light Horse.

On 18 April, the Corps Commander -- Lieutenant General Sir A J Godley -- inspected the raiding force and addressed the men:

   Officers, NCOs and men of Major Scott's Jif-Jaffa party, I am very pleased
   to be here to have the opportunity on behalf of all Australians and New
   Zealanders of the 2nd Anzac Corps of expressing our admiration for the
   gallant feat of arms which you have performed. We are, one and all, very
   proud of you. You have carried out an enterprise which can certainly be
   ranked as being equal to any that has been accomplished during the war and
   will no doubt be carried out in the future.

   It is unfortunate that more honours on an occasion like this cannot be
   distributed, but by His Majesty the King graciously consenting to confer
   the Distinguished Service Order on your commander, he not only honours him,
   but every one of the command. I again repeat my admiration for the work you
   have done, and congratulate you. (21)

The success of the Jifjafa raid, the first offensive action by the Australian Light Horse in the Sinai campaign, was of great psychological importance; both for the troops themselves and the British High Command. For the troops, the raid was a great morale booster. It demonstrated that they could move swiftly and surely across the desert to attack Turkish positions well forward of the Canal defences. Intelligence, planning, execution and logistical support for the operation had all been of a high standard. The Commander in Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force -- General Sir Archibald Murray -- appreciated that his planned Sinai offensive would succeed or fail on the combat effectiveness of his mounted troops. He was well aware even before the Yeomanry disaster at Katia (Qatiya) and Oghratina that in the early months of the Sinai campaign he would have to depend on his Australian and New Zealand horsemen as his principal striking arm while his Yeomanry regiments toughened up and gained experience in desert conditions. The Jifjafa raid vindicated his confidence in the Australian Light Horse.

The operation was also an excellent example of the cooperation which could be achieved between the ground force and the RFC. Air-ground cooperation in mobile warfare was in its infancy with procedures which would be refined in later years still being developed. The RFC aircraft provided eyes to the front and flanks of the raiding column and enabled it to advance with speed and confidence not having to rely on time consuming reconnaissance patrols to ensure its flank security and to probe ahead. The raid was an early example of the successful use of wireless telegraphy between the ground force and supporting aircraft. The operation also demonstrated the effectiveness of the newly formed Camel Transport Corps in logistically supporting deep offensive operations against the Turkish forces; albeit, at a cost in the large numbers of animals required and with some decrease in the security of the operation -- camels being notoriously noisy at the halt and on the march.

In particular, the Jifjafa raid demonstrated the fighting qualities and the outstanding endurance of the Light Horse troops in mounted desert warfare. The troopers and their walers were to be called upon to exhibit these attributes many times during the ensuing two and a half years of hard campaigning in Sinai, Palestine and Syria.

                             Officers   Other Ranks

Force Headquarters                  4           --
Light Horse Squadron                5           106
Engineer Detachment                 1             5
RFC Liaison Party                   2             2
Field Ambulance Detachment          1             6
Interpreter                       --              1
Total                              13           120

(1) AWM45 Item 7/8 Covering Letter by Lieutenant General Sir A J Godley on Report on Raid on Jif Jafa 10th to 15th April, 1916, p.2.

(2) AWM4 Item 1/9/1: Intelligence Summary. General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force. p.419.

(3) AWM 3DRL 6458: War Diary -- Major General J M Anthill, C.B., C.M.G., p. 63.

(4) AWM4 Item 14/23/6: War Diary -- 4th Field Company, Australian Engineers -- Engineer Officer's Report on Reconnaissance with Light Horse to Jif Jafa 11/4/16 to 15/4/16

(5) AWM4 Item 10/3/15: War Diary -- 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade. There is no War Diary for the 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment for March and April 1916.

(6) Major T H Darley, With the Ninth Light Horse in the Great War, Adelaide: The Hassell Press, 1924, p 37.

(7) AWM4 Item 10/3/5: War Diary 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade April 1916. Reconnaissance Report by Major W H Scott, 15 April 1916.

(8) Major T H Darley, Op cit, p 35.

(9) Quoted in Charles Duguid (Scotty's Brother), The Desert Trail. With the Light Horse through Sinai to Palestine, Adelaide: W. K. Thomas & Co, 1919, p 16. The assertion that this was the first Light Horse unit to see mounted action is incorrect. A composite Light Horse Regiment had been involved in countering the Senussi in the Western Desert of Egypt in December 1915 and January 1916.

(10) AWM224 Item MSS 36: 9th Light Horse Regiment, Narrative October 1914 -- November 1918, p 6.

(11) National Archives of Australia: World War I Service Record -- Corporal S F Monaghan.

(12) AWM PR84/87: J T H Aram Letter dated 25 April 1916. Arum was incorrect in his assertion that only 10 men of the 8th Light Horse Regiment returned from the charge at The Nek unscathed. Of the 300 men of the Regiment that took part in the charge, 234 were killed or wounded; 66 escaped injury. Source: Peter Burness, The Nek. The Tragic Charge of the Light Horse at Gallipoli, Kenthurst, NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1996, p. 123.

(13) National Archives of Australia: World War I Service Record -- Corporal S F Monaghan.

(14) Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Internet Database.

(15) AWM4 Item 14/23/6: War Diary 4th Field Company, Australian Engineers, April 1916. Engineer Officer's Report on Reconnaissance with Light Horse to Jif Jafa 11/4/16 to 15/4/16.

(16) AWM4 Item 10/3/5: War Diary 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade April 1916. Reconnaissance Report by Major W H Scott, 15 April 1916.

(17) Ibid.

(18) H A Jones, The War in the Air. Being the Story of the part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force. Vol V. Oxford: The Claredon Press, 1935, p 179.

(19) AWM45 Item 7/8: Raid on Jif Jafa -- 10th to 15th April, 1916. Covering Report by Lieutenant General Sir A J Godley, Commanding 2 A & NZ Army Corps.

(20) H S Gullet, The Australian Imperia/Force in Sinai and Palestine, Official History 1914-1918 Volume 7, Sydney: Angus & Robertson Ltd, 1923, p 73.

(21) Quoted in Darley, op cit, p 38.