The Politics of Change in the Middle East.

This book is a product of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy which was formed under the initiative of former AIPAC officials. It focuses on change and continuity in the domestic politics of seven countries - Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt - and the PLO. In analyzing the sources of, and challenges to, legitimacy in each regime, Satloff says that these "actors" are chosen for the central role they play in the region's two main conflicts: the Arab-Israeli dispute and control of the Persian Gulf.

The focus on domestic, as opposed to regional, politics is intentional because, as Satloff argues, it "reflects the fundamental notion that the quest for survival is the chief, overriding factor in understanding most political institutions. . . ." He asserts that, in the wake of the Cold War and the Gulf War, demands on these regimes by their domestic constituencies will prove paramount in the politics of change in the region. Emile Nakhle's chapter on Saudi Arabia illustrates this point well: The Saudi elite's increasingly vocal

demands for greater participation, fueled by shrinking oil revenues and the modernization process (i.e., education, urbanism and technocracy), have upset the equilibrium and stability of Saudi governance. Nakhle asks poignantly: "Can regimes survive without greater participation? Can they survive with greater participation?"

A major theme running through this volume is best expressed by Satloff's comment about Arab regimes: "Throughout the [majority of] Arab states, longevity appears to be the rule, not the exception" but also that "longevity and stability, of course, are not synonymous." Indeed, in the Gulf War's aftermath, the only leader to have lost his job was Israel's Yitzhak Shamir but an undercurrent of instability can be felt throughout the Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt.

The book's chapters are essentially expository in nature. Some of them are exceptional for their grounding in a solid conceptual framework - notably the chapters on Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Shaul Bakhash describes Iran's "typical pattern of post-revolution malaise" through an analytical lens designed to show the limits of the Iranian pragmatists' success.

For the most part, the volume falls short of definitive predictions, opting instead for a more cautious approach which is exemplified by presenting a series of possible scenarios. Predicting events in the Middle East is a risky venture, one which the authors are right to approach cautiously. Middle East actors often defy expectations, as evidenced by the surprise signing of the PLO-Israel agreement on 13 September 1993. Like most observers, the authors of this volume did not foresee that event. Indeed, it has rendered much of the analytical predictions in Barry Rubin's chapter on the PLO outdated. He argues that the PLO's opting for the peace process could lead to its demise. Almost overnight, however, the PLO has dramatically strengthened its hand. Indeed, the PLO's survival has become a national interest for both Israeli and American policy makers.

By qualifying most of its predictions about change, the volume affords itself a reasonable shelf-life. Nevertheless, as in any edited volume, some chapters are more enduring than others. For instance, much of the content in Marvin Feuerwerger's analysis of Israel is weighted down by a plethora of voter statistics which at times clouds the inquiry and gives it a short-term perspective. On the other hand, Itamar Rabinovich's modest assessment regarding Syria might better stand the test of time: "Developments since the Gulf Crisis have revealed the limited effect that the far-reaching changes in regional and international politics have so far had on the regime's stability."

Adam Garfinkle makes one of the most provocative statements when he says Jordan's King Hussein faces an imminent crisis which is the result of structural economic weakness, a new political activism, and questions about the well-being of the King - a crisis which the monarchy might not survive. "One thing is clear," he continues, ". . . the Hashemite regime as it has been known over the decades - a centralized and nearly absolute monarchy - is unlikely to survive a transition from Hussein to either his brother or son."

Use of the case-study approach in this volume allows for rich detail in each section; this helps make the book a good reference source. The chapters on Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the PLO present actors (groups, institutions and individuals) and their goals in an exceptionally well-organized fashion. However, Ami Ayalon's explanation for the presence of a traditional "presidential monarch" in Egypt stems, in part, from a rather abbreviated version of Islam which he says "requires believers to obey the ruler, whoever he may be," as "an article of faith." But this ignores a vast and rich tradition of civil disobedience which has been extolled as an Islamic principle in many different contexts, from the Qur'an and the Hadith to Islamic jurisprudence. Ayalon's rendition of Islam is at least disconcerting, at most irresponsible.

While this volume eschews a systemic approach in favor of the case-study method, there is little attempt at comparative analysis which can give case-studies a richer tone. Only Satloff's introduction and Nakhle's chapter on Saudi Arabia make a sustained effort at comparative analysis. But Satloff's contribution is too short and tentative to fully compensate for the remainder of the volume and Nakhle's conclusions are extended only to other Gulf regimes.

Overall, the book is better at describing the impact of changes that have already occurred (or are in the midst of occurring) - modernization, Islamic revivalism, the Gulf War, the Cold War - and less adept at predicting future changes and their impact.

Finally, it should be noted that Satloff's attention to the nuances of language is inconsistent. On the one hand, he refers to the "1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War," a war that is rarely referred to in the West as anything but the Yom Kippur War. On the other hand, he sometimes refers to the "PLO," and at other times (in the same context) he refers to the "Palestinians," a significant difference that is left unexplained. Additionally, the quality of editing is a bit shoddy. No less than 16 editorial and grammatical errors were found in the first reading. Of course, this is not an insurmountable problem, but it distracts readers, interrupts their flow, and tempts them to put the book down in favor of something else.

Michael J. Nojeim is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the American University, Washington, D.C.