The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. Volume X: 3 December 1781-6 April 1782; Volume XI: 7 April-30 September 1782; Volume XII: 1 October 1782-21 May 1783; Volume XIII: 22 May 1783-13 June 1786, with Additions to the Series.

The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. Volume X: 3 December 1781-6 April 1782; Volume XI: 7 April-30 September 1782; Volume XII: 1 October 1782-21 May 1783; Volume XIII: 22 May 1783-13 June 1786, with Additions to the Series. Edited by Dennis M. Conrad [X-XII], Roger N. Parks [XIII], and others. (Chapel Hill and London: Published by the University of North Carolina Press for the Rhode Island Historical Society, c. 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005. Pp. xlvi, 663; xliv, 811; xlviii, 755; xxxviii, 827. $85.00, ISBN 0-8078-2419-4; $95.00, ISBN 0-8078-2551-4; $95.00, ISBN 0-8078-2419-4; $95.00, ISBN 0-8078-2943-9.)

These four volumes, which complete the Rhode Island Historical Society's edition of the Papers of General Nathanael Greene, provide a rich documentary history of Greene's command in the South during the last eighteen months of the War for American Independence and of his subsequent efforts to establish himself as a planter in postwar Georgia and South Carolina. Volumes X, XI, and XII deal primarily with the last months of the war--with that period after Lord Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown when the remaining British forces in the South retired to Charleston and Savannah and when Greene sought to drive them from those posts. Volume XIII deals with the years after the war when Greene, having disbanded his army, devoted himself increasingly to his private affairs: to clearing himself of debts, relocating his family from Rhode Island to Georgia, and developing the lands that he had been awarded for his military service. Taken together, the nearly thirty-five hundred documents printed or abstracted in these four volumes (64 percent abstracts) mark a bittersweet end to Greene's service and life.

Greene was, by the last months of the war, a skilled and popular leader of Continental forces. In maintaining his small army, containing the British, supporting republican government, pacifying the people, and securing the postwar frontiers of South Carolina and Georgia, Greene exhibited an exceptional talent for leading men who did not wish to be led. He pressed his officers and men to cooperate in winning independence: to endure hardships, compose personal differences, and subordinate private ambition to the public good. He exercised command pragmatically: without apparent favor to his friends but with a willingness to make concessions to units that were tactically effective (he refused to let General Anthony Wayne violate congressional regulations on foraging; he did allow his light troops to forage at will in compensation for their hard service). He was tactful--even deferential--in dealing with civilian leaders. But he was also persistent in placing the interests of the army and the United States before those of any individual state. He ever sought independence and a national government that was capable of protecting its territory and citizens.

Greene knew that the success of the revolution in the South depended on an effective army. Yet to create and maintain such an army in a country that had been ravaged by war, he had to endure many frustrations. He had to appeal to state governments that were reluctant to tax or conscript their citizens, that preferred employing militia for short periods of service to creating permanent state regiments, that only rarely impressed supplies, and that absolutely refused to enlist Africans to meet quotas for troops. When southern legislatures were unwilling or unable to help, he turned to a Congress that had few ways of raising money, almost no power over the American people, and a war to wage with the British at New York. Even when he had money or credit for supplies, Greene had to compete with the British who could pay more than his own commissaries. In desperation he commandeered food from the people of South Carolina and, at least once, shipped rice to British merchants in Charleston to secure winter clothing for his troops. Nor did his troubles end after the British army withdrew from Savannah and Charleston. The American people, thinking peace was at hand, were more reluctant than ever to support the army; and without adequate pay or provisions, the army began to drift away. Greene used force and persuasion to keep his troops together until peace had been made and the South was reasonably secure.

In part because he had so much trouble recruiting and supplying his army--because he was unable to assemble forces enough for an attack on Savannah or Charleston--Greene could not drive the British from the South. He arranged his army loosely around Charleston and Savannah, the better to feed his men and to contest British parties that marched into the countryside seeking food, forage, hostages, or intelligence. He occasionally launched attacks on British outposts near Savannah and Charleston to probe their defenses, take prisoners, and crowd the enemy into their ports. He hoped through the winter and early spring of 1782 to have the assistance of the French West Indian fleet in besieging Charleston; and even after that fleet was defeated in the Battle of the Saints (April 1782), he urged Washington to bring Continental forces from New York for an attack on Charleston. Although Washington declined, saying he had not the resources for a siege, Greene persisted in contesting the British as long as they remained in Savannah (July 1782) and Charleston (December 1782)--refusing a ceasefire, engaging their detachments, and doing his best to keep them from trading with the people of South Carolina or Georgia. He could and did keep pressure on their garrisons; and when they chose to withdraw, he not only negotiated an orderly recovery of both Savannah and Charleston but also claimed that his forces, unassisted by the French, had liberated the South.

While Greene commanded in the South--both before and after the British withdrew--he sought to support civil government and to protect the people. Although state officials regularly put local interests before those of the United States, although they could be maddeningly indifferent to the war and his army, Greene continued to treat governors and legislators with respect; and he required his soldiers to do the same. Only when state officials challenged his authority as a Continental officer--when they claimed horses that the army recovered from the British or interfered with flags of truce passing between the armies at Charleston---did Greene become stubbornly insistent on his prerogatives as a commanding officer and representative of the United States; and even then he referred disputes to Congress. These disputes took their toll on Greene and confirmed his belief that the national government needed to be strengthened, that it should have the authority to force the states to support the war. He complained repeatedly that state legislatures were too shortsighted-too reluctant to tax their citizens and to cooperate with other states--to provide for their security. Anticipating peace, he urged the states to forget their hatred of the Loyalists and the British and think of their own long-term prosperity by allowing Loyalists to regain their citizenship through military service and by supplying the British in Florida to discourage their raiding Georgia and South Carolina. But as he disbanded his army, he saw the South divided, without revenue and vulnerable to attacks. His efforts to strengthen government and society--to promote a peaceful and prosperous South--were, he thought, consistently obstructed by a selfish and shortsighted populace.

Although Greene was widely praised for his military service and showered with gifts and honors, his return to civilian life was at least as frustrating as it was rewarding. The legislatures of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia granted him extensive tracts of land; citizens of towns from Richmond to Baltimore and Newport proclaimed their appreciation for his services; Congress awarded him two captured British fieldpieces and ordered his official correspondence copied; and his fellow officers elected him president of the newly organized Society of the Cincinnati for Rhode Island. Even so, he returned to Rhode Island burdened with debt and needing capital to develop the lands he had been given in the South. The debt was mainly the result of Greene's efforts to supply his troops at the end of the war--of his having contracted with and stood surety for an unscrupulous merchant, John Banks. When Banks defaulted on his obligations, Greene was forced to deal with Banks's creditors. Congress refused to help, and Greene had to try a variety of expedients to protect his assets while planning to move his family from Rhode Island to Georgia. He urged his wife to be frugal, sold lands in the northern states, gave up some of his business interests, and sued Banks to offset debts incurred in his behalf. Greene had considerable trouble, in these circumstances, borrowing money to buy slaves for his rice plantations in South Carolina and Georgia and to make the payments on his purchase of Cumberland Island, Georgia. Not until November 1785 was he able to embark with his family from Newport for their new home, Mulberry Grove, a rice plantation on the Savannah River in Georgia. He was delighted with his estate and with Cumberland Island, which was to serve as a summer retreat. But his mansion and gardens needed restoring; his rice crops had fallen short of expectations; he still had his debts; and he was far from family and friends. He died unexpectedly at Mulberry Grove in June 1786 leaving many of his hopes unfulfilled.

These four volumes complete the Rhode Island Historical Society's letterpress edition of Greene's papers--an edition of thirteen volumes and 9,682 documents (38 percent printed in full, 62 percent abstracted) that adds substantially to our understanding of Greene and the Revolutionary War--that shows his development as a Revolutionary leader and the persistence of the obstacles that he and other Americans faced in winning their independence. From the beginning of the war, Greene was an avid patriot and a creative strategist. But as a division commander under Washington and quartermaster general, he was also an excessively ambitious and difficult colleague who plagued his superiors with demands for preferment and threats of resignation. Once in command in the South, he retained his flair for imaginative strategies but became a more tactful and effective colleague. He used his small forces to exhaust the British, pacify the Loyalists, and sustain the fragile republican governments of the states. The problems he faced were those he had encountered while serving under Washington: how to create and sustain an army without adequate support from the states or the central government, how to blend loosely disciplined militia with state and Continental troops, how to prevent hatred of Loyalists from jeopardizing government and society, and how to satisfy the ambitions of officers without weakening his army. Although he never really solved these problems, he kept his army together long enough to preserve the South as a part of the new United States and to become--next to Washington--the most celebrated American general of the War for Independence. This comprehensive and authoritative edition of his papers--a tribute to the scholars who for more than thirty years gathered and prepared texts--makes clear what a complex and talented man Greene was and why the winning of independence was such an arduous task.

IRA D. GRUBER

Rice University