The Objectives Of Phase One.

The US has made its aims for Phase One quite clear. First, it aims to capture or kill Osama Bin Ladin and other top leaders of Al Qaida, and to destroy its extensive terror network. Second, the Taliban regime, which is by now clearly identified as a rogue element that supports Osama is to be replaced by a more broad-based leadership - although Washington continues to keep its options open on the question of exactly what shape a post-Taliban Afghan leadership would take. Third, create the economic conditions which will ensure that Afghanistan would not revert towards becoming a safe haven for terrorism.

To achieve these objectives, the US has formed what it refers to as a "revolving" coalition. The implication is that the coalition, or at least some of its members, is on board on a temporary basis and that they may be replaced by new members as Phase One progresses or by the time it ends and Phase Two begins. The coalition, as it stands currently, has been formed as a result of (a) voluntary commitments by some countries, such as Russia, India, Uzbekistan, etc; (b) legally required commitments by security groupings, like NATO; (c) reluctant commitments by countries that are US allies in the Arab World, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others; and (d) coerced commitments, such as the one by Pakistan.

There are doubts as to whether the American objectives of Phase One can be achieved, given the way in which the coalition was formed. Moreover, there are also concerns whether the coalition can be maintained, especially from the Arab side, in light of the geo-political environment in the Middle East which is closely inter-twined both with the WTC/Pentagon attacks and the US response against the Taliban regime. There are concerns whether strategic considerations - for instance worries in Russia, China and Iran about a permanent US presence in Afghanistan - would undermine the coalition. Finally, there is the question of Pakistan's stability. If President Gen. Pervez Musharraf is unable to limit the protests in his country, or if he is removed in a coup, it could change the situation completely as it would mean that Washington would then have to deal with the Taliban as well as a radicalised Pakistan with nuclear weapons.

Provided such worst-case possibilities do not materialise, the objectives by themselves are not beyond Washington's grasp. The objective of killing or capturing Osama Bin Ladin and other top leaders of Al Qaida can be achieved. At the moment, the US has relatively good human intelligence inputs from across the region - Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, India and most importantly Pakistan - in addition to its own signals and electronics intelligence capabilities which are second to none. Bin Ladin and his allies are surviving through constant movement, total electronic silence and reliance upon low- rather than high-tech.

Provided none of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan allow Bin Ladin into their territory, it is only a matter of time before he is either killed or captured. But it cannot be ruled out, for example, that Bin Ladin may escape into Pakistan's border areas with Afghanistan, for example. The Islamabad military government does not have much authority in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and members of the armed forces - especially in the lower and middle ranks - are in any case sympathetic to his cause. It is not inconceivable that Bin Ladin may slip into that area in disguise. It is virtually certain that he will receive protection from at least some of the tribesmen in the area.

Washington is aware of this possibility, and is monitoring all vehicular movement in the area. Three Taliban helicopters, which flew from Afghanistan into Pakistan on Oct. 9, were detected by the US, and the Pakistani government was ordered to seize them when they landed. Apparently, the government forces were able to do this only after some resistance from local tribesmen.

The second objective, i.e. replacing the Taliban regime with a leadership more acceptable to the US and the West in general is more complicated as this requires diplomacy and a deep understanding of local socio-political realities, rather than high-tech warfare capabilities. As things stand at present, there are various possibilities emerging. One is the reinstatement of exiled King Zahir Shah, who is widely popular in Afghanistan. The 86-year-old monarch is living in Rome and is preparing to return with his entourage. Meanwhile, Burhannudin Rabbani is still recognised by most countries of the world as the legitimate president of Afghanistan and he is supported by Russia, Iran and India. For its part Pakistan, having had to participate in the destruction of the Taliban, which it created, says a return of a Rabbani government would spell anarchy in Afghanistan (see following pages).

From the US perspective, the third objective is probably the most important in terms of the long-term in the war against terrorism. This involves the creation of conditions within Afghanistan that would prevent it returning to warlordism and a status of terrorists' safe haven. However, observers say this is a very delicate matter because of religious and strategic sensitivities and also because US President Bush has said that he does not want to get into the business of "nation building".

Nevertheless, there are indications that humanitarian considerations will have an important role to play in Operation Enduring Freedom. Just as some jet fighters were dropping bombs, another fleet was dropping over 30,000 tons of humanitarian rations virtually every night. But humanitarian aid alone would not be sufficient, as it is essentially a short-term solution. The US would have to look at ways to create industries, jobs and rebuild society in Afghanistan if the country is to be stopped from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

To complicate matters further, it would have to do this in a way that does not alarm either of Russia, China, Iran or Pakistan by implying that it is seeking to use Afghanistan as a strategic foothold in the region. Moreover, it would also have to assuage the religious sensibilities of the Afghan tribesmen; while they are not by inclination generally as hardline in their religious views as the Taliban, they are also not as liberal as the US would like them to be. Work towards the third objective would have to begin in Phase One but the results can only be achieved in the long-term, during Phase Two.