The North & West - Central Asian Countries, Russia & Iran.

The Central Asian countries have been directly affected by the process of Talibanisation. Each of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, both ruled by strongly secular-oriented leaders of the former Soviet cadre, has faced unrest linked to opposition forces with ties to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and their counterpart Islamist leaders in Pakistan. Moscow has alleged that the Taliban are training Chechen and Dagestani separatists, with one wanted Chechen leader having been hosted while on the run from Russian security services by a former chief of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence. Only Turkmenistan has managed to stay relatively immune, with observers saying this is because its government has refrained from associating too closely with either the US or Russia.

Uzbekistan, in particular, is fighting a fanatical religious movement with ties to the Taliban: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Uzbek government has accused the Taliban and several Pakistani religious organisations of aiding religious radicals against the government. It was reported in recent months that Juma Namangani, leader of the IMU, crossed the Amu Darya River separating Afghanistan from Central Asia, in hopes of assisting the radical groups fighting their respective governments. Namangani, whose stated goal is to overthrow President Islam Karimov's government in Uzbekistan, is financially backed by Osama Bin Ladin and had been aiding the Taliban in its war effort in northern Afghanistan. The IMU is also targeting the governments in Tajikistan and Kyrgyztan.

Namangani came into the spotlight in 1999, when he launched a high profile guerrilla incursion into Uzbekistan. By April 2000, he was strong enough to have a base in Tajikistan, reflecting the weakness of the Tajik government. His force included about 1,200 men including many families. About 600 or 700 men were Uzbeks from Ferghana, dissidents escaping various crackdowns by the Karimov regime. About 500 were local Tajiks. There were also Chechens, Arabs sent by Bin Laden and Pakistanis, the last mostly from two groups responsible for killing Shiites in Pakistan. His objective was to launch an offensive into the Ferghana Valley - which straddles Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - in the summer of 2000, but this did not materialise as planned.

Another group of Central Asian militants is based at Kamsachi, 15 miles from Mazar-e-Sharif, which is under Taliban control. This group of militants is led by Tal Udeshef, an Uzbek who escaped immediately after the attempt through bomb-blast on President Karimov's life in Tashkent in February 1999. He developed a very good rapport with the Taliban and lived for a time in Peshawar (Pakistan), where he forged close links with Pakistan's Islamic militant groups. He has been personally hosted by Mullah Omar in Kandahar and was given complete freedom to set up the camp in Kamsachi, and he was reportedly given seed money by Bin Laden in 1999 to set the camp. Through these linkages, Udeshef developed a very close association with Bin Ladin. At the Kamsachi camp, Arabs helped to co-ordinate between Bin Ladin and Udeshef. There were also Chechens, Pakistanis and Xinjiang Uighurs at the camp.

According to sources, the Chechen-Taliban connection is essentially a business partnership. It was a drug-trafficking joint venture which prompted the Taliban recognition of the Chechen breakaway republic, the only movement/country in the world to do so, prompting some tough threats from Russia. The Chechens had the best drugs distribution network in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern Europe. However, they lost their source of supply because of the war with Russia and the resultant devastation. The Taliban stepped in and offered the Chechens a source of supply while the Chechens facilitated the Taliban with an extensive distribution network. Thus, for the first time, the Taliban became involved in actual distribution of drugs and as a consequence, they received far more profits from the drug trade than they had received until then.

Over the past year, there have been strong indications that - as the isolation of the Taliban increased over its refusal to hand over Bin Ladin - the various non-Afghan groups (including Arab, Pakistani and Central Asian formations) based in Afghanistan had increased their influence with the Taliban. Guerrillas of the IMU and the Chechens strengthened their bases and training facilities while assuming a more prominent role in the battlefield on the Taliban's side against the NA. New recruits from Central Asia and the Caucasus also moved to Afghanistan. IMU numbers were estimated in July this year by 'Jane's Defence Weekly' at between 2,000-3,000, including Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Xinjiang Uighurs. Russian sources claimed that some 2,500 Chechens were operating in Afghanistan. If the US carries out a strong campaign and installs a new regime in Afghanistan, however, the IMU and the Chechen guerrillas will be weakened and will find it hard to survive.

Iran sees the Taliban as a radical Sunni group with demonstrated anti-Shiite leanings. As the only Shiite Muslim country, Iran feels a patriarchal role towards the Shiites of the world. For Iran, the actions of the Taliban towards the Shiites in Afghanistan have come to signify the dangers of Sunni radicalism. In 1998, after the Taliban killed Afghan Shiites and Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif, Iran threatened to invade Afghanistan. It demonstrated its resolve by holding military exercises along its border with Afghanistan.

Iran's anger with the Taliban increased at the their harsh treatment of the Shiite Hazara minority. Furthermore, Iran sees itself as a competitor with Pakistan for influence in Afghanistan and also as an alternate transit route for Central Asia's oil and gas exports. Iran has for some years been verbally and militarily backing the Northern Alliance and also arming the Hazaras in central Afghanistan. Apart from the targeting of Shiites, the Taliban has been undermining Iran's economy through smuggling of oil and consumer items as well as drug-trafficking. Tehran has been fighting the battle to prevent both mostly on its own, although over the past year some Western countries - including Britain - have agreed to help.