The Liberal/Conservative Split Within Islam.

Among many countries in the Middle East, including close allies of the US, there are deep divisions about the interpretation of Islam or the way it should be implemented in society. The liberals can be regarded as those who are willing to interact with the non-Islamic world at least to some extent on terms that are "universal" - i.e. human rights, ethics, etc. - whereas the conservatives (or radicals) may be seen as those who are not prepared to interact on "universal" terms. Rather they would prefer to interact from the standpoint of the Islamic perspective alone, and would expect the non-Islamic side to make the necessary adjustments.

The liberal/conservative split often exists across all strata of Muslim society in the Middle East - whether in Sudan, Iran, Algeria, Egypt or Saudi Arabia - and represents a major challenge for the ruling superstructure. This split is likely to be enhanced in the coming years as regimes are now being forced by the US to choose which side they are on. President Bush declared very early after the anti-terror war was launched that those who were not on the American side in this conflict would be regarded as being with the terrorists.

For regimes in the Middle East who are already regarded as "rogues", the choice was already made. It was up to the leaders of countries designated as terrorist havens to show that they were no longer involved in terrorism. Statements from the leaders or leading officials of Libya, Somalia and Sudan in recent months have made this clear. They did not want to be next on the list of US targets after Afghanistan.

The other two major states in the US terrorism list are Iraq and Iran. The latter, through a careful mix of pragmatic diplomacy and populist rhetoric, has managed to be one of the main winners in the first phase of the war against terror. Whether Tehran would become a target in the second phase of the war against terror remains to be seen, but few observers believe the US would take such a course in the foreseeable future. A far more certain target is Iraq, where the leadership has remained belligerent and refuses to fall in line with US demands. Indeed, it is widely expected that US forces will attack the regime of Saddam Hussein by mid-2002.

The more complex situation faces regimes that are regarded as allies of the US. This is where the internal liberal/conservative split is more marked, and more dangerous in the long-term, from an American perspective. Numerous influential theologians in states like Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan - all regarded as being friendly to the US - harbour views no different in essence from those of the Taliban or Al Qaida ideologues.

These views are sometimes expressed publicly, making it difficult for regimes to ignore their existence; this has been especially true in Saudi Arabia, where since Sept. 11, theologians have supported the Taliban/Al Qaida perspective. But the next logical step would be to target these theologians, a move which could further exacerbate the split. To complicate matters further, the differing perspectives extend to the royal family itself, which has a "progressive" wing comprising King Fahd Ibn Abdel Aziz and his full-brothers, and the "conservative" wing of Crown Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdel Aziz who is effectively the day-to-day ruler of the kingdom. A similar split exists within Iran, where the liberals led by President Mohammed Khatami are being constantly hindered in their objectives by the traditionalists and other hardliners, some of whom still believe that the Khomeini doctrine of exporting radical Islam is valid.

The tensions in the background between the liberals and conservatives in the Muslim countries of the Middle East will become more pronounced in the coming years as Washington prosecutes its war against terror by demanding specific actions from both its allies and its enemies. The US will be moving in favour of imposing a clear victory by the liberal side - as it is trying to do in Pakistan by bolstering President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and getting him to target the radicals - but whether it will succeed remains to be seen.