The Iraq dilemma.

Byline: The Register-Guard

At the dawning of a new year, the same life-or-death question continues to divide the nation: What is the right course for the United States in Iraq?

Is it, as President Bush maintains, to fight on to achieve "total victory," no matter how long it takes? Or should a specific timetable be set for the withdrawal of American troops?

The fundamental problem is that on one level, it's possible to answer "yes" to both questions simultaneously. Yes, the United States needs to achieve something that can be characterized as victory in Iraq, without which the country could be torn apart by a civil war unleashed by the U.S. invasion. And yes, one key component of that victory depends on eliminating the most powerful recruiting tool available to the insurgents: the open-ended occupation of Iraq by U.S. troops.

Reasonable people may disagree on the best strategy for resolving the complex, confusing conflict in Iraq, but when the political spin is removed from the debate, it boils down to a question of timing. Even those who subscribe to Bush's "total victory" scenario would balk at suggesting that Iraq could become another South Korea, with a significant U.S. troop presence still stationed there 55 years after hostilities ended.

For one thing, the staggering costs of the Iraq occupation - more than $8 million an hour - are unsustainable, politically as well as budgetarily. For another, the toll the war is taking on the U.S. military has national security implications that reach far beyond Iraq.

Even with lowered standards and huge cash enlistment bonuses, the Army isn't meeting its recruitment goals. Stop-loss orders preventing soldiers from leaving the military and personnel needs that force troops to serve three or four combat tours in Iraq are crippling retention and recruitment of key specialists.

Apart from its astronomical cost and the damage it is doing to the military, there is a grimmer reality affecting long-term prospects for "total victory" in Iraq. It's a reality about which Bush appears to be in complete denial. Iraqis do not want U.S. forces to remain in their country and fiercely resent the occupation. Opinion polls indicate that at least 80 percent of Iraqis want the United States to leave their country - the sooner the better, and preferably by the end of 2006.

Given such overwhelming antipathy, U.S. commanders know they can't completely stop suicide bombings, rid Iraq of jihadists or disarm the militias. As some officers have acknowledged privately, a military victory in Iraq is as unrealistic as the idea that Iraqis are grateful for the presence of U.S. troops.

Without a firm commitment to U.S. troop withdrawal tied to quantifiable measures of Iraqi progress, Americans will be fighting some combination of foreign jihadists, Saddamists, rejectionists, Islamists and homegrown insurgents for the foreseeable future. It is an unavoidable consequence of U.S. ignorance of Iraq's history and culture.

There's no need today to put an X by a specific date on a calendar, but concrete commitments must be made to bolster U.S. credibility. The Bush administration should pledge, in writing, to leave Iraq completely and unequivocally if asked to by the Iraqi government. That pledge should include an ironclad declaration that the United States has no intention of establishing permanent military bases in Iraq.

A 12- to 18-month window for troop drawdown should be established, during which the U.S. promises to dramatically reduce its forces as Iraqis agree to assume responsibility for their own security. Troop reductions should begin in 2006 by bringing home the 40,000 National Guard and Reserve soldiers currently in Iraq.

Redeployment of other U.S. forces to Afghanistan and Kuwait would accelerate American troop reductions while still maintaining a regional presence. United Nations and NATO troops could assume greater responsibility for training Iraqi police and security forces, and could augment Iraqi efforts to quell vio- lence.

What began as a war of choice launched under false pretenses in 2003 has in 2006 become a war of necessity prolonged by bad choices. But it is unnecessary to perpetuate Bush's misguided policies by pretending that a clear timetable for withdrawing from Iraq is a prescription for defeat.

Winning the war in Iraq doesn't depend on an abstract plan for "total victory." It depends on a concrete plan to leave.