The FA is alive and well: in fact, thriving.

Soldiers and leaders have heard stories of the FA reconfiguring as part of the modular Army. It seems some only hear the downsizing aspects of the FA transformation and are certain the FA is dead or, at least, on life support.

Some believe that the Field Artillerymen's only contributions to the future Army will be driving trucks, becoming military police (MP) and serving as operating base mayors, as some Field Artillerymen are doing in the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater today. While these jobs are important in Army operations, they are not what the FA's job has been since 1775--providing fires for the ground force commander. The same misinformed people who only see the downsizing believe the FA no longer will play a critical role in joint and combined arms warfare.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The FA is alive and well--in fact, thriving. When the modular reconfiguration is complete, the active Army will have more FA weapons systems and more FA battalions in direct support (DS) of brigade combat teams (BCTs) than it had in Force XXI. In addition, the majority of Field Artillery units in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) are providing FA fires for their BCTs while, simultaneously serving as motorized infantry units with the same duties and responsibilities as their Infantry and Armor brethren. (1)

This article provides five major reasons why the King of Battle is alive and well and dispels rumors about the demise of the FA. These reasons are (1) The FA in the active force BCTs actually is growing; (2) New technology is giving our branch unprecedented capabilities for the joint and combined arms fight; (3) US joint force operations require a balance of fire support from the ground and the air; (4) The FA is leading the Army in developing "Pentathletes;" and (5) The Army will continue to conduct full-spectrum operations in the future--requiring FA fires.

1. The FA in the active force BCTs is growing. With the increase in the number of modular BCTs, there will be more FA battalions than in Force XXI. With the expansion of BCTs from 33 to 42, the growth of fires battalions in the BCTs will provide more battalions to fill the previous DS role performed by battalions under the division artillery (Div Arty) organization. Before this transformation effort, the typical organization was three to four Artillery battalions in each of the 10 Div Artys. The modular design's implementation calls for each of the BCTs to have an organic cannon-equipped fires battalion. This reorganization to make the battalions organic to the BCTs translates into 42 fires battalions, some with 155-mm weapons and some with 105-mm weapons. This is a net increase of seven battalions over the Force XXI construct. (2)

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The active modular force also will have six fires brigades, each with at least two Artillery battalions and most with three battalions, all with a mix of rocket/missile capabilities fired from the M270A1 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) launcher or high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) along with 155-mm Paladin or lightweight M777 howitzers.

It seems that some thought the "sky was falling" on the FA when the Army decided to have fewer FA weapons per battalion (12 vice 18) and fewer firing batteries per fires battalion (two vice three) in the heavy BCTs (HBCTs) and infantry BCTs (IBCTs). And if the sky is falling on the FA, it also is falling on Infantry and Armor because the modular redesign calls for fewer Infantry and Armor weapons per company and fewer companies per combined arms battalions in the HBCTs and IBCTs.

At the same time, the FA is moving from a 3x4 organization (three batteries per battalion with four howitzers in each battery) in the Stryker BCTs (SBCTs) to a 3x6 organization to facilitate platoon operations. All echelons-above-brigade (EAB) units will retain their 3x6 organized FA battalions. (3)

For the active force, adding FA battalions and weapons systems does not signal the demise of the FA--it is growth in the FA.

The Army National Guard (ARNG) FA is losing some force structure in EAB. (4) Although that might sound like "bad news," it ultimately will benefit the total Army by enhancing the remaining ARNG FA units' modernization, making them more capable and deployable.

The Army is in the process of rebalancing the force to generate the kinds of capabilities it needs. ARNG FA units that are not deployable, such as those with Vietnam-era M102 105-mm howitzers or other modernization deficiencies, will be drawn down or converted into other capabilities the Army needs.

However, for the first time in US history, the remaining ARNG FA units will mirror the active FA units in terms of modernization--they will have all the systems and capabilities as the active FA units. (5)

Unit-for-unit, the total Army will have more fully capable FA units available for deployment in full-spectrum operations than in the Force XXI. (6)

In addition, the ARNG will have seven of the 13 fires brigades, also fully modernized to match the active force's fires brigades. (7)

2. New technology is giving our branch unprecedented capabilities for the joint and combined arms fight. The FA is alive and well with new technologies that are providing unprecedented capabilities--in fact, capabilities beyond any FA in history. The ground commander now can precisely locate, target and attack a point target with precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in all weather conditions, 24/7, and have "steel" on target faster than before. His FA now gives him a choice of rocket, missile and 155-mm PGMs and also is improving the precision of his suppression and area fires for increased effectiveness in full-spectrum operations.

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Today in the CENTCOM theater. Soldiers and Marines are using the guided MLRS (GMLRS) unitary PGM in urban operations with incredible effectiveness. GMLRS unitary has no duds; minimizes collateral damage, even when fired from as far away as 70 kilometers; and can impact within 200 meters of friendly forces. Its target sets are enemy structures, light vehicles and personnel.

The Army's first fire-and-forget 155-mm round, the Excalibur unitary high-explosive PGM, will be fielded in CENTCOM in the Second Quarter of FY07. Its non-ballistic flight trajectory, nearly vertical terminal dive and ability to penetrate concrete optimizes it for urban operations from an expanded range of 40 kilometers (objective). Excalibur unitary's test results have been excellent; it will be fielded to the BCT's fires battalion as a brigade-level PGM.

In addition to these PGMs, the FA already has the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) Block 1A quick-reaction unitary (QRU) in the inventory. It is a fire-and-forget missile that provides precision effects from a range of 270 kilometers. It first was employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) major combat operations (MCO) in 2003 with great effectiveness.

In FY08, the Army will field the FA's new precision attack missile (PAM) to the Evaluation BCT (EBCT) at Fort Bliss, Texas. PAM has 15 missiles in a portable container that can be fired from standoff distances. These fire-and-forget missiles will be able to attack moving targets. They will be effective against both hard and soft targets from up to 40 kilometers away, allowing ground force commanders the ability to employ them in a variety of scenarios across the spectrum of conflict. PAM also will be in the fires battalion, a PGM readily available to the BCT commander.

The FA has fielded or is developing these PGMs, along with the precision guidance kit (PGK) to improve the precision of existing 155-mm and 105-mm "dumb" rounds. For more information on these PGMs and other munitions' advances, see the article "FA PGMs--Revolutionizing Fires for the Ground Force Commander" by Colonels Gary S. Kinne, John A. Tanzi and Jeffrey W. Yaeger in the May-June edition online at sill-www.army.mil/famag.

The FA PGM article also discusses the use of the precision strike suite-special operations forces (PSS-SOF) software that now allows forward observers (or joint terminal attack controllers, JTACs) on the front lines to determine three-dimensional grid coordinates accurately enough to employ PGMs, including the Air Force's joint direct attack munition (JDAM). Locating the target precisely enough to employ PGMs previously had to be done at the theater level, a process called "mensuration" that took 30 minutes. Now the front-line observer can determine precise enough coordinates for PGMs in minutes.

3. US joint force operations require a balance of fire support from the ground and the air. A reader can find many success stories of close air support (CAS) for Soldiers in combat from World War II to the present. I think everyone agrees that the US Army always will fight as part of a joint force and rely on joint capabilities for its ground operations, including Air Force, Navy and Marine CAS. However, there are times when CAS cannot be employed due to adverse weather or the non-availability of aircraft or because of the munition's large footprint that would endanger friendly troops in close proximity to the target.

In Iraq, the weather in the spring of 2003 served as a reminder of why the Department of Defense (DoD) needs a balance between air and ground fire support. When the "Mother of All Sand Storms" slowed the 3rd Infantry Division's advance on Baghdad, "the all-weather capability of artillery and mortars became literally a lifesaver when the storm limited the ability of airpower to deliver precise, close-in strikes." (8)

When air support cannot fly because of weather, FA units can conduct missions in a variety of environments, 24 hours a day. For example, in adverse weather, ATACMS Block 1A QRU can take out an enemy stronghold from 270 kilometers away in support of a moving friendly force. In fact, ATACMS Block 1A QRU was employed in excellent weather conditions in conjunction with operational-level joint airpower during OIF MCO to eliminate several Iraqi command and control nodes. (9)

Redlegs have argued for the need for a balance between air and ground forces for fire support. In the article "Why Organic Fires?" Colonel Robert Barry, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Systems Manager for Cannons, argued for the continued fielding of organic fire support assets. (10) He used examples, such as the 1973 Arab Israeli War, the US involvement in Vietnam, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF, to argue for the use of FA to support maneuver commanders. He recommended that as the Army moves forward with transformation, we remember the lessons of the past.

Another argument for FA fires for the joint force is in the article "It's a DUMB idea" by Colonel Daniel Whiteside, a retired Field Artilleryman. (11) He argues for maintaining the FA and maximizing the effects created using both air and ground fires.

Joint fires must complement and supplement each other. FA fires fill some of the joint warfighting gaps that airpower cannot.

4. The FA is leading the Army in developing Pentathletes. Both the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Peter J. Schoomaker, and the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, are promoting the development of Pentathletes in the Army. In part, the Pentathlete is a "multi-skilled leader" and is a "competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier." (12)

The Army's Soldiers and leaders overall have demonstrated tremendous adaptability and flexibility in OEF and OIF, characteristics of Pentathletes. However, the FA, probably more than any other branch, has successfully executed the most diverse variety of nonstandard missions in GWOT. Redlegs not only have served as transporters, MPs and motorized infantrymen as already mentioned, but also as coordinators/synchronizers of nonlethal effects (information operations, civil military operations, civil affairs, etc.) at the company, battalion, brigade, division and corps levels in GWOT. (13) That is not to mention that Field Artillerymen also have been delivering thousands of FA rounds per year in GWOT. (14)

When the Army needed MCO fires during OIF, the FA was there. When the Army needed other skills sets for stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), the FA was there. When BCTs did not have enough ground-owning units, the FA was there. (See the figure.) With leaner modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs), FA battalions transformed into maneuver battalions, while their brother maneuver battalions had considerably more assets to execute the same mission. (15) In addition, most of those same "maneuver" battalions maintained the capability to provide their BCTs FA fires. (16)

As indicated in the figure, Field Artillerymen not only have commanded maneuver battalions, but also maneuver BCTs in both OIF and OEF. (17) In addition, the 4th BCT in the 82nd Airborne Division was stood up and first commanded by the 82nd Div Arty commander who has gone on to become the Chief of Staff of the division. (18)

Some have been concerned that the drawdown of the Div Arty and corps artillery organizations has limited opportunities for Field Artillerymen who successfully command FA or motorized infantry battalions/task forces to command at the brigade-level. The active FA's current brigade-level commands are the six fires brigades and four battlefield coordination detachments (BCDs).

A request for Field Artillerymen to become eligible for DA selection to command BCTs is before Army's senior leaders. If approved, it will be good for the Army to be able to consider not only the most capable Infantry and Armor officers, but also the most capable Field Artillery officers to command these critical organizations.

5. The Army will continue to conduct full-spectrum operations in the future--requiring FA fires. Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations states, "Full-spectrum operations are the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war." (19) The current employment of the FA in non-FA tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq will not always be the rule.

During an interview, Major General Martin Dempsey, who commanded the 1st Armored Division in Iraq for 15 months, instructed Field Artillerymen to "... maintain your ability to provide full-spectrum fires and effects whenever the ground force needs them, including massed fires and precision lethality." (20) This sound advice is important for FA leaders to remember, no matter what the state of change is within the Army.

Using history as a way to predict the future, the FA always must be ready and capable of conducting lethal, high-intensity conflict at some time in the future. The US has relied on the FA since 1775. In modern, mechanized warfare, the FA was a significant part of World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm (ODS), OEF and OIF. Experience in combat repeatedly has demonstrated the need to conduct operations using a joint and combined arms approach.

FM 1 The Army lists offensive operations as one of the three types of operations for overseas joint campaigns. It states offensive operations "carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces ... and imposing the commander's will on the enemy." (21) During MCO, the FA contributes to full-spectrum operations by providing the means to destroy enemies with overwhelming firepower.

In addition, consider what the status of the US would be if its military lethal warfighting superiority "slipped." Would we ever want an Air Force that did not first "own the skies"--or a Field Artillery that, bottom line, was not superior to potential enemy artilleries to conduct counterfire to protect our ground forces and enable their operations? That all translates into maintaining military superiority in high-intensity conflict.

Perhaps because of our military superiority, future conflicts will be with enemies who will be reluctant to come "toe-to-toe" with our military might--enemies who will be inclined to fight us asymmetrically in guerilla or insurgent operations, most often in urban environments, as is the case in Iraq today. However, even in this scenario, the Army needs the FA's fire support capabilities.

First, the FA will provide high-intensity fires during MCO. As conflict slows for SRO, the requirement for FA fires will become less and less frequent but when required to support or protect the force, just as critical as those for MCO. During SRO, inevitably there will be the occasional conflict "spikes," such as in the battles of Fallujah II, Tal Afar and many others in OIF. FA fires in those conflict spikes in urban operations also will be critical to our success and the protection of our forces.

During the times that FA fires are required less frequently, Pentathlete Field Artillerymen will be multiply useful to serve in nonstandard roles, as already demonstrated in GWOT. The role of Field Artillerymen in full-spectrum operations is expanding, not shrinking.

But before we become too focused on current operations as the "way of warfare," I would caution that we look around the world and see who our potential enemies could be in the future and note that several have considerable military might, which still is growing, and much larger armies than ours. That caution alone ensures the future of the best, most lethal Artillery in the world.

For the foreseeable future, the FA will continue to contribute to joint and combined arms warfare. The Army is not a static institution; change is inevitable for it to stay relevant, effective and superior. That change process is helping to ensure its Field Artillery--its most lethal surface fire support--is very much alive and well.

Major Mark E. Brock recently graduated from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This article, in large part, is based on his 2006 SAMS monograph "We Cannot Take Your Call-for-Fire Right Now--Does the Global War on Terrorism Signal the Demise of the Field Artillery?" Currently, he is a Division Plans Officer in the G3, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. In his previous assignments, he served as a Battery Trainer at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and commanded A Battery, 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery (A/1-77 FA) (Multiple-Launch Rocket System) in the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He also was a Battery Fire Direction Officer (FDO), Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) and Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) in 1-10 FA, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia. He holds a Masters of Military Art and Science (MMAS) from SAMS.

Endnotes:

1. Major General David C. Ralston, Chief of Field Artillery, in his "Joint Fires Coordinator (JFCOORD)" column titled "Modularity Update: Transforming the FA," Field Artillery, (March-April 2006), 1. General Ralston said, "Our incredible Field Artillerymen 'keep on keeping on,' firing thousand of rounds in Iraq and Afghanistan last year and continuing today." He then goes on to document his statement.

2. Ibid., 2.

3. Sam Coffman, Director of the Futures Integration Directorate (FDIC), Fort Sill, OK, email dated 5 June 2006.

4. Ibid.

5. Major General Ralston, "Field Artillery Azimuth 2005 to 2015," Field Artillery (November-December 2005), 2.

6. Sam Coffman email.

7. Ibid.

8. Robert Scales, "Artillery Failings in the Iraq War," Armed Forces Journal, Vol 141, No 4 (November 2003), 46.

9. "FA PGMs--Revolutionizing Fires for the Ground Force Commander" by Colonels Gary S. Kinne, John A. Tanzi and Jeffrey W. Yaeger, Field Artillery (May-June 2006), 18.

10. Colonel Robert Barry, "Why Organic Fires?" Field Artillery (March-June 2004), 13-18.

11. Colonel (Retired) Daniel L. Whiteside, "It's a DUMB Idea," Armed Forces Journal, Vol 141, No. 5 (December 2003), 46-47.

12. Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey, "A Strategic Framework ... The Army Plan," Slide 9, "Growing Army Leaders in the 21st Century: 'The Pentathlete.'" The entire document was available at http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/upload/102005Harvey on 9 May 2006.

13. Colonel Annie Baker, "Is it Time Now for HQDA to Implement a Practice Proven Successful in the Field and Select Field Artillerymen to Command BCTs?" being considered for publication. Colonel Baker discusses FA Pentathletes and the diversity of missions Field Artillerymen have been performing in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

14. Major General Ralston, "Modularity Update ..." 1.

15. Lieutenant Colonel Steven M. Merkel and Major John G. Clement, "Battlekings Return to Baghdad as a Maneuver Battalion--Doing More with Less," Field Artillery (July-August 2006).

16. Lieutenant Colonel David J. Brost, Chief of the FA Proponency Office, gathered the information in phone conversations with Lieutenant Colonel James L. Miller and Joseph R. Connell, Senior FA Observer/Controllers at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA, and the Joint Readiness Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, respectively. Lieutenant Colonel Miller says that in the past 18 months, all FA units rotating through the NTC have had maneuver and fires missions in his article "Observations from the Wolf's Den: Training to be a Maneuver (and Fires) Task Force," Field Artillery (November-December 2005), 30. Lieutenant Colonel Connell says that 100 percent of FA units rotating through the JRTC have maneuver missions and 95 percent also have fires missions.

17. Colonel Kevin P. Stramara, 4th Infantry Division Artillery Commander, commanded Task Force Gunner with an area of operations in northern Baghdad from April 2003 until March 2004 during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I as stated in an email from Colonel Stramara dated 3 May 06. Colonel Gary H. Cheek, Commander of the 25th Infantry Div Arty, commanded the Combined Task Force Thunder for 12 months in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as outlined in his article "So You Want to Be a Maneuver Commander? CTF Thunder in Afghanistan," Field Artillery (March-April 2005). Colonel Richard C. Longo, 1st Infantry Div Arty Commander, commanded a Coalition and combined arms brigade for six weeks in the hotly contested region of An Najaf, Iraq, to cover the gap between the 1st Armor Division's departure and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Force's (MEF's) arrival as he discussed in his article "1st ID in Iraq: The FFA HQ Mission Endures," Field Artillery (May-June 2005. Colonel Stephen R. Lanza, 1st Cavalry Div Arty Commander, commanded the 5th BCT in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II from January 2004 to March 2005 as discussed in his article "Red Team Goes Maneuver--1st Cav Div Arty as a Maneuver BCT," Field Artillery (May-June 2005).

18. Colonel Victor Petrenko, former 82nd Division Artillery (Div Arty) Commander, stood up and, until June of this year, commanded the 4th BCT in the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, He was selected for that mission and command by Major General William B. Caldwell IV, the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division. See the letter-to-the-editor "High Praise for the 82nd Div Arty's Support of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Relief" by Major General Caldwell, Field Artillery (November-December 2005), 7. Colonel Petrenko currently is the Chief of Staff of the 82nd Airborne Division.

19. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-4.

20. Major General Martin E. Dempsey, "Fires and Effects for the 1st Armored Division in Iraq" in an interview with Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Field Artillery (January-February 2005), 9.

21. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1 The Army (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 3-6 to 3-7.

By Major Mark E. Brock

* 4th Infantry Div Arty, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I
* 25th Infantry Div Arty, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
* 1st Infantry Div Arty, OIF II
* 1st Cavalry Div Arty, OIF II
* 82nd Airborne Div Arty, 4th BCT, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
* TF 1-17 FA, 75th FA Brigade, attached to the 4th Infantry Division,
  OIF I
* TF 2-82 FA, 1st Cavalry Division, OIF II
* TFs 1-5 FA, 1-6 FA and 1-7 FA, 1st Infantry Division, OIF II
* TF 1-37 FA, 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry
  Division, OIF II
* TF 4-27 FA, 1st Armored Division, OIF II
* TFs 1-9 FA and 1-10 FA, 3rd Infantry Division, OIF III
* TF 3-319 Airborne FA Regiment (AFAR), 82nd Airborne Division, OEF
* TF 1-37 FA, 3/2 SBCT, OIF III
* TF 4-11 FA, 172nd SBCT, currently in Iraq

This is a list of division artilleries (Div Artys) or FA battalions as
maneuver brigade combat teams (BCTs) or task forces (TFs), respectively,
in the Global War on Terrorism. This list is not comprehensive.