The Defence bureaucracy.

SIR: I retired in 2001 after more than thirty years as a Defence Department public servant. During the latter part of my career, I worked in the Force Development and Analysis, Human Resources and Management, and Resources and Financial Programs Divisions, and in the Defence Personnel Executive. I was on the team that prepared the Force Structure Review of 1991, assisted in implementation of the 1997 Defence Efficiency Review, and was involved in some of the other reviews held in the 1990s. Given that background, Michael O'Connor might be surprised that I agree with much that he says ("The Pen-Pusher is Mightier than the Soldier", January-February 2008).

Mr O'Connor notes that the many defence reviews seem to have had little effect. This is not for lack of good intentions. A specific aim of the Force Structure Review, for example, was to reduce "the numbers of service personnel involved in headquarters and base support functions", while the Defence Efficiency Review attempted to "free up resources from support and administrative activities to strengthen the ADF's combat capabilities". The reviews had little long-term effect on the targeted areas.

I consider that a principal cause of the problem is that while these and other reviews aimed to reduce markedly the bureaucratic structures (both military and civilian) in Defence, the individuals who had major input into the actions needed to implement change were the majors, lieutenant-colonels and colonels, and the civilian executive level 1 and 2 officers, who stood to lose most from the reforms. Some 90 per cent of military officers at major/lieutenant-colonel level are employed in staff jobs servicing the higher defence organisation, and the figure for the executive level civilians would be similar. Reform of the higher structures would most severely affect the careers of those whose task it was to do the fundamental work necessary to make reforms happen.

Mr O'Connor also makes a good point about the waste of people skills. Without going into the background to the civilian--military relativities, whatever their validity when established in the early 1970s, they are clearly not well matched now. It is impossible to argue sensibly that an officer posted from unit command to a job in Defence headquarters, who moves from having authority over perhaps hundreds of personnel and equipment worth many millions, should not be rated higher than an assistant director in a (probably) small directorate. The relativities need to be brought into line with present reality. As Mr O'Connor would be aware, the effect of such a change would be a significant reduction in the high proportion of officers in the ADF which so concerns him, as fewer officers at major/lieutenant-colonel/colonel level would be needed in headquarters jobs, with flow-on effects down the promotion structure.

Turning to a couple of points of disagreement, it would certainly be possible to separate Defence's military and civilian roles if there was a better arrangement for establishing national security policy and national strategic policy. However, removing the diarchy would not solve all the internal bureaucratic problems. It is more realistic to suggest that Defence now has a quintarchy, not a diarchy, as the development of the integrated military command structure has not removed single-service structures, which continue in parallel, with responsibilities overlapping those of HQADF and the Department. Removal of the secretary from the structure would still leave a quadrarchy. This structure contributes to the numbers of staff officers that Mr O'Connor bemoans. It also provides ample opportunity for buck-passing, reinforcing Defence's poor culture of accountability.

As an example, the 2005 helicopter crash to which Mr O'Connor refers took place some years after Defence began receiving real budget growth. Each service controls significant budgets, but Navy helicopter maintenance apparently did not receive enough priority. I suspect that if Mr O'Connor were given the opportunity to review all of Navy's internal expenditures in the two or three years preceding the crash, he would find many items that he would judge to be of lower priority than helicopter maintenance, but senior Navy officers apparently did not force through such a change in internal priorities. Instead, the board of inquiry pushed the blame elsewhere.

My other main disagreement with Mr O'Connor relates to his apparent belief that greater ministerial involvement is the solution to Defence's problems. Even activist ministers (Kim Beazley, John Moore and Peter Reith come to mind) had little long-term effect on the Defence bureaucracy.

Finally, as Mr O'Connor himself points out, the result of up to a thousand recommendations for change has not been what the governments that accepted those recommendations wanted. At the very least, some military officers (and public servants) seem less than committed to implementing the decisions of the elected government.

What to do? Governments of both political complexions have agreed (in 1991 and 1997) that reductions should be made to headquarters and administrative structures. Claims of great progress have been made, but through all of the changes, the Defence bureaucracy (military and civilian) seems to survive essentially untouched. If genuine reform is to occur, it will only be as a result of bi-partisan commitment and sustained effort, followed through at a high level. As a first step, the minister and his Opposition counterpart could agree on the principal necessary actions. This should not be difficult, as each political party has already agreed to the basic principles while in government.

Next, they would need to agree on a process to supervise the implementation of change. Perhaps this could be through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. This committee is well placed to demand accountability by Defence to parliament. There could be some constitutional issues with such a process, as the minister would remain fully responsible for administration of Defence. However, as the committee would be supervising implementation of the minister's decisions, hopefully with Opposition support, these issues should be surmountable.

John Donovan, Canberra, ACT.