The Clash with Distant Cultures. Values, Interest, and Force in American Foreign Policy.

Reviewed by Carlos A. Parodi

Richard Payne's book is a bold effort, first, to demonstrate the double standard in U.S. foreign policy and, second, to explain its causes. Payne relies on three "cases" - the Gulf war, the Arab-Israeli negotiations, and the Bosnian crisis - to demonstrate the double standard of U.S. foreign policy. Central to the idea of double standard is that the meaning of each of these cases can only be understood in relation to one another. The forceful U.S. response against Iraq can only be understood when compared to the soft treatment of Israel's violations of human rights. The conciliatory approach of the U.S. toward the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Serbs can only be understood when contrasted to the intolerance in relation to Palestinian violence. Underneath it all Payne sees a dominant culture in the United States that produces and reproduces negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims and positive stereotypes of Israelis and Serbs in order to protect U.S. interests and values.

The 1991 Gulf War was essentially controlled by President Bush himself (p. 93). Military force was used because President Bush was determined from the beginning to use force against Saddam Hussein. However, Mr. Bush's determination to go to war was possible because he was operating in a culture with "negative stereotypes . . . and prejudice against Arabs" (p. 96). In a culture that glorifies violence as a means of resolving disputes, the steps taken by President Bush were carefully crafted to make the use of force appear as the only alternative.

First, Bush built an image of Iraq as an imminent threat to U.S. survival. Second, Bush "demonized the enemy" by portraying Hussein as Hitler (p. 101). Third, the need to go to war was reinforced by drawing on the major lesson of World War II and Vietnam: "Aggressors must be stopped at the earliest opportunity" (p. 104). All these were simply tactics used by Bush to justify a decision already made. The decision to use force was made before considering the facts or other alternatives, according to Payne, because of cultural factors.

Payne concludes that "negotiations were never seriously tried by the United States" (p. 107). Iraqis faced the alternative between giving in unconditionally or being crushed militarily. Bush was "determined to bully his adversary into submission" (p. 108). His administration "dismissed legitimate Iraqi concerns" (p. 109). Economic sanctions were tried but never given a real chance. "A military confrontation was the only option seriously considered by Bush and his small circle of advisers" (p. 116).

Even worse, Payne argues, the war against Iraq was conducted "with a vengeance unmatched in any previous war." (p. 122) In order to show American savagery against Iraq, Payne mentions that:

A civilian shelter, alleged by the United States and its allies to be a military command and control center, was bombed, and approximately eight hundred Iraqi women and children were killed. Mosques and museums were also hit. (p. 122)

Not satisfied with such destruction, the Bush administration decided to impose sanctions after the war. "In late 1994 the UN estimated that half a million children had died since the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council in 1990" (p. 124).

In contrast to the prompt recourse to force against Saddam Hussein, the United States has shown an incredible patience with Israel, a state that also militarily occupies territories and violates international law. Why was the same patience and understanding not shown to Saddam Hussein?

Israel, according to Payne, has always had a special place in U.S. foreign policy. America's empathy and identification with Israel is reinforced by the power of the Jewish-American community (pp. 134 and 138). Most, if not all, American presidents have made explicit statements of support and defense of Israel. In Payne's words,

. . . shared cultural values and the affinity between the United States and Israel predispose policymakers and the general public to be generally supportive of and to empathize with Israel. (p. 138)

Payne sees the pro-Israeli commitment of the U.S. questionable at least for two reasons. First, the commitment has led American foreign policymakers to even sacrifice their own national interests. The United States, for example, opposed Israel's invasion of Lebanon,

But preferred to convey its concerns privately. . . . Some American leaders even attempted to portray the destruction of Beirut as a humanitarian venture (p. 145).

Second, and more importantly, Payne argues that America's commitment to Israel has contributed to the violation of international law and human rights (p. 141). Israel has systematically ignored UN Resolution 242 that "called upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces from territories occupied during the war. . . ." (p. 143) Although violations of human rights by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the occupied territories have been well documented, "cultural similarities between the United States and Israel influenced the former to overlook many of the latter's violations of human rights." (p. 148) Payne provides plenty of evidence to show the foolishness of committing U.S. foreign policy to protecting Israel. "Amnesty International, the U.S. State Department, and various human rights groups documented reports of torture by the IDF." (p. 149) Israel has demolished the homes of "individuals suspected of committing crimes prior to trying the suspects." (p. 150) "Ignoring UN Resolution 194 of 1948, which gave Palestinians refugees the right to return to their homes, Israel implemented laws that effectively denied Palestinians residency in the Occupied Territories." (p. 151)

In contrast to the "unshakable commitment" to Israel, Americans have negative stereotypes of Palestinians "which are then perpetuated by the mass media and other agents of socialization." (p. 139) Palestinians have been traditionally "dismissed as troublemakers determined to destroy Israel and to undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East." (p. 139) For Payne the Palestinians were justified in acting aggressively against the U.S. because from their point of view, the "unshakable commitment" of the U.S. to Israel proved that there was no difference between the two countries.

Consequently, PLO guerrillas attacked American citizens and property as part of their anti-Israel campaign, and were deeply suspicious of and hostile to U.S. initiatives to resolve the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Believing that proposed negotiated settlements were designed to diminish their organization's significance as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, many PLO members responded with increased violence against both Israel and the United States. (p. 139)

Why the double standard? Why use force against Iraq but not against Israel? Why did the U.S. condemn the PLO's terrorism but support Israel's violation of international law and human rights?

Double standards are characteristics of U.S. foreign policy that can only be appreciated by observing events on a comparative basis. U.S. policy in the Bosnian conflict makes sense when compared to U.S. policy toward Iraq, and vice-versa. Similarly, U.S. policy in the Arab-Israeli negotiations make sense only when compared to U.S. policy in the Gulf war, and vice-versa. "Principles that the United States had ardently proclaimed and forcefully implemented in the Gulf were essentially ignored in Bosnia only a few months later." (p. 166)

More repulsive, from Payne's point of view, was the blatant bias against the Bosnian Muslims reflected in this policy. The noninterventionist policy was a cover-up for what essentially was a preference, first, for Serbs and, second, for Croats. This preference was cloaked with views that killing was natural in the Balkans and nothing could be done about it. The truth, however, was the closeness of the U.S. with the Serbs. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Slobodan Milosevic, "who later became the president of Serbia and the architect of ethnic cleansing, were social friends." (p. 168)

Payne sees very clearly through the double standard in U.S. foreign policy. While the Hitler analogy was used to attack Saddam Hussein, in Bosnia "this analogy has been largely ignored by American foreign policymakers" even though "there are similarities between Nazi Germany's genocidal practices and Serbian ethnic cleansing in Bosnia" (p. 176). While the Gulf war was presented by Bush in terms of good versus evil, the Bosnian conflict was presented "as an ethnically and historically based war." (p. 179) "Whereas Hussein was clearly identified as the ruthless aggressor, the outlaw, who had to be brought to justice, Milosevic was not." (p. 180) "In contrast to America's providing leadership of the international community in the Gulf Crisis, the United States deferred to the UN and the EC in Bosnia" (p. 186). While all statements made by Saddam Hussein were dismissed as blatant efforts to deceive, "the United States seemed to have unlimited patience with the Serbs and was inclined to believe them." (p. 195) In contrast to his immediate commitment to the use of force against Saddam, President Bush, "at the height of the Serbs' ethnic cleansing campaign, . . . was anxious to show that diplomacy was working" (p. 196).

The concept of double standard is essential in Payne's understanding of U.S. foreign policy. He probes behind the rhetorical statements made by U.S. foreign policymakers in particular events to explain seemingly inconsistent policies. The grotesque manipulation of moral principles by U.S. presidents to wage war against Iraq is unveiled by Payne when he shows how those same principles were violated in relations with Israel and Bosnian Serbs. Payne argues that U.S. foreign policy is systematically biased against Arabs and Muslims. Why the double standard? Why the bias against Arabs and Muslims?

First, there is the "cultural" component. The double standard reflects the "cultural proximity" between the U.S. and Israelis and the Bosnian Serbs and the "cultural distance" between the U.S. and the Iraqis and the Palestinians. "The greater the cultural distance between the United States and another society, the more likely Americans. . . threaten or resort to violence to resolve conflicts with it that endanger America's perceived interests." (p. xvi) Second, a "realist" component explains the double standard as no more than the differences in foreign policy resulting from the pragmatic evaluation of U.S. national interests in particular circumstances. For example, Israel is given preferential treatment as long as it helps to secure economic and security interests in the Middle East. With the end of the cold war, the value of Israel as an ally is declining. Third, double standards reflect the differences in the influence of domestic groups, such as the powerful pro-Israel lobby and the weak pro-Arab lobby.

Payne's theoretical approach is unique in his identification of the cultural domestic roots of U.S. foreign policy. The violence and discrimination that Americans practice at home is reflected in their actions abroad. Payne cuts through the rhetoric and apparent inconsistencies to reveal an American foreign policy that is a reflection of the violent U.S. culture.

The Clash With Distant Cultures is a valuable teaching resource. I am using the book at the senior undergraduate level and students have found it challenging and insightful.

Carlos A. Parodi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Illinois State University.