The Challenges Of Terrorism - Iraq, Part 25 - US-UK Challenges.

Animosity between British and US troops is re-surfacing, underlining trans-Atlantic unease over Iraq. In a case of unfortunate timing, British forces on Sept. 3 completed withdrawal from their last position in Basra city. The pullout left UK troops based at one site, Basra airport, in what British PM Gordon Brown called an "over-watch" rather than a "combat" role. With the UK preparing to withdraw from the oil-rich south, the Shi'ite theocracy of Iran is being tempted to fill a resultant power vacuum there.

The animosity - a serious strain in US-UK relations remains remote - recently arose when a former vice-chief of staff of the US army questioned the competence of British troops in Basra and that, when the British withdrew from the south, US troops would have to go in and "restore" order. It was a less than subtle criticism of the commitment of British troops, who were there under US command anyway. Nonetheless, the remark stung the professional soldiers and there has been sniping at each other ever since.

The Tehran strategy, meanwhile, is to deter the US from attacking Iran. One of its moves is to form in Hizbullah's new enclave north of the Litani River in Lebanon and the Hamas ruled Gaza Strip two arms of a lethal pincer which can be used against Israel in the event of attack. Another is a restructuring of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which the Bush administration is to designate as a terrorist organisation (see news11-IranIRGC-Sep10-07). This is apart from the Shi'ite southern Iraq front.

Bush In Anbar: The US, however, is concentrating on the western Iraqi province of Anbar where the Sunni challenge is being met with an American charm offensive. During a surprise Sept. 3 visit to Anbar, declared "lost" to Neo-Salafi violence by US military intelligence in 2006, President Bush raised the prospect of bringing home some American troops without affecting the security situation in Iraq. In Anbar he said the "surge" strategy of sending 30,000 extra US troops was succeeding.

A strategy for US exit from Iraq has become a mainstream topic in Washington's political circles. To exit Iraq with the continuing challenges of terrorism, however, the question is how to do it which is more important than when this is to be done. US military experts say any American troop withdrawal from Iraq could take up to 18 months and would need careful planning (see sbme2-Iraq-USexitOptionsAug13-07). Regional powers, including China through Iran, are arming local insurgents. There have been accusations that Iran and Syria have been arming both Shi'ite militias and Neo-Salafi insurgents with the purpose of defeating the US in Iraq (see Part 23 in sbme1-IraqChinaJuly9-07).

After meeting Shi'ite PM Nouri al-Maliki, Kurdish President Jalal Talabani, Sunni VP Tareq al-Hashemi and other members of the Iraqi leadership, Bush said: "Here in Anbar and across Iraq, al-Qaeda and other enemies of freedom will continue to try to kill the innocent in order to impose their dark ideology. But General [David] Petraeus (the top US commander in Iraq) and Ambassador [Ryan] Crocker tell me if the kind of success we are now seeing continues, it will be possible to maintain the same level of security with fewer American forces".

Bush - on his way to Australia - was in Anbar accompanied by Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Defence Robert Gates for a highly unusual foreign "war council" meeting only a week before top US commanders in Iraq present their assessment of the "surge" to Congress. Bush also met the US commanders at al-Asad air base, 120 miles north-west of Baghdad in Anbar. He held meetings with Anbar's Sunni tribal leaders who had joined the US to drive out al-Qaeda, resulting in a sharp drop in violence there.

Bush's visit to Anbar was to rally domestic US support behind White House strategy by highlighting that part of Iraq where violence had fallen and the "surge" were working. Referring to Anbar, Bush said: "It was once written off as lost. It's now one of the safest places in Iraq". Bush's report to Congress - together with testimony from Gen Petraeus and Crocker - should intensify debate about the war on Capitol Hill, where prominent Republican lawmakers have joined Democrats in questioning the war.

The US has welcomed the improved security in Anbar but Shi'ite MPs in the government, including Maliki, have expressed concern that the US was arming Sunni militias who could later rise against Shi'ite groups. The FT on Sept. 4 quoted a "senior defence official travelling with Mr Gates" as suggesting that the Sept. 3 visit of Maliki to Anbar could help bridge some of the mistrust. US commanders want to incorporate Sunni fighters in Anbar into the national Iraqi security forces, thereby shrinking independent militias and helping political reconciliation.

After talks with Petraeus and Crocker, Bush told reporters: "Congress shouldn't jump to conclusions until the general and the ambassador report". Bush did not say how large a troop pull-out was possible. Nor did he say whether he wanted withdrawal of forces sooner than next spring, when the first of the additional 30,000 troops Bush sent to Iraq earlier this year are due to return home anyway. US officials said Bush wanted the face-to-face talks with Petraeus and top Iraqi leaders before completing a review of his strategy.

It was the first time Bush had been in Iraq with his top advisers, and his third trip to the country. By summoning Maliki and other top officials to the Sunni heartland, a region the Shi'ite PM has rarely visited, Bush wanted to demonstrate that reconciliation among warring sectarian factions was conceivable, if not yet a reality. He effusively greeted Talabani, the last of the five Iraqi leaders to enter the small conference room. "President, president, the president of the whole Iraq", Bush said, kissing Talabani three times on the cheek.

After meeting with top military advisers at the Pentagon on Aug. 31, Bush approved an acceleration of a new programme to intensify assistance directly to Sunni parts of Iraq. Spending in Anbar by US military commanders would be increased. Gates' trip was aimed in part at explaining the US concept for stepped-up aid to officials in Iraq's government, who had raised strong concerns about the idea of assisting their Sunni rivals, before the development programme was announced publicly.

Petraeus is to ask that additional troops sent to Iraq be kept in place at least until spring, a course Bush backs. But the gathering was instrumental in formulating recommendations to Bush on possible adjustments to the plan. The move to increase aid to Sunni groups is one example of adjustments coming out of the strategy review, and the move reflects frustration that Maliki's government has not taken advantage of improvements in security to move forward on reconciliation. While backing Sunnis is an attempt to circumvent Maliki, Bush officials stress the goal is broaden support for his government.

US officials said the American aid to the Sunni tribes came with "a quid pro quo" - the need to recognise the legitimacy of Maliki's government. Bush and Gates pressed the Shi'ite and Sunni sides to move forward on reconciliation and to discuss steps like provincial elections aimed at drawing former Sunni insurgents into a closer relationship with Maliki. A US defence official was on Sept. 4 quoted as saying: "One of the great concerns many have is that it not be a temporary marriage of convenience", referring to the growing American relationship with Sunni tribes. The goal, he added, was to ensure that "Sunnis in Anbar are drawing closer to the central government".

Some of the tribal leaders Bush met were probably involved in operations against US forces before switching allegiances. A Pentagon press secretary said: "You don't reconcile with your friends; you reconcile with your enemies". The meetings were held at the air base rather than in Baghdad because Bush wanted to see at first hand the progress in Anbar.

The base, the second largest in Iraq, is a parched, dusty place. Temperatures on Sept. 3 were about average for this time of year - about 115 degrees Fahrenheit (46 degrees Celsius). After his greeting, Bush posed for pictures before being taken by motorcade to a building where a Marine gave him a short briefing. The Marine said there was progress being made with Iraqi security forces in Anbar handling more urban duties, allowing the Marines to hunt for insurgents. But he said there was a problem with the short home leaves - five months - which strained training, not to mention family life. "Morale? How is morale?" Bush was overheard asking. "Very high, Sir", the Marine responded.

The money to Anbar would also come by spending State Department funds through provincial reconstruction teams, which are finally being deployed in significant numbers. Some would come from US military commanders, who have emergency funds at their disposal, and some from a Pentagon programme to generate jobs by revitalising state-owned industries - a reversal from the privatisation begun in 2003 by US occupation authority (CPA).

In the past, the US would see a project in Anbar finished, only to be destroyed. Now, say US Marine officials, they will spend money on a project which tribal shaikhs want only if those shaikhs get buy-in from the provincial governments which will ultimately own and maintain it. Brig. Gen. John Allen, who oversees reconstruction for the US-led Multi-National Forces-West, on Sept. 5 was quoted as saying: "We don't want this to be about us spending American money for the shaikhs. We want this to be about American money that makes a difference in bringing government along and making the shaikhs part of the government".

The Special Inspector General of Iraqi Reconstruction's report, released this summer, lamented the dismal ability of Iraqis to accept responsibility for projects the US had completed. Political and budgetary weaknesses, combined with lack of bureaucratic know-how, had resulted in thousands of US-finished projects across Iraq not taken over by the Iraqis.

Under the new system, says General Allen, a project would not begin until the local shaikhs and governments agree on how, say, a new school building will be staffed, funded, and maintained. It weakens the position of the shaikhs, who were the lone leaders in Anbar just five months ago. But that tough approach forces them to connect with local governments, resulting in a project which is relatively secure - and paid for. Allen said: "Does that threaten the shaikhs? It can. But they're not going to get the money from us".

Bush hinted that if those improvements can spread to other areas, the number of US troops in Iraq could be reduced. Referring to the roughly 25,000 Marines in Anbar, Allen said: "This time next year, we could be half our size". He said the Marines' future in Anbar will be one of "operational over-watch", in which Marines will retract their operations as Iraqi police forces stand up to provide their own security. "We'll be out there if they need us, but we want [the police] to be the first line of defence, and if [the threat] is too big for them, then the Iraq Army can handle it, and if it's too big for them, then we'll come back in".