The Battery Commander's AAR: "Hey, How Did We Do Today?".

The Chief of Staff of the Army recently visited the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, and commented on the Army's after-action review (AAR) process. He remarked that one of the highlights of a unit's NTC training experience is the quality AARs observer/controllers (O/Cs) conduct during its rotation.

These AARs range from the formal, fully instrumented AARs conducted several hours after a battle to the more informal "Hummer-Top AARs" conducted just minutes after the battle. While the Chief was very impressed with the quality of O/C AARs, he was less certain that commanders and leaders in the field could lead AARs to the same standard for their own units.

The Chief tasked the NTC to allow unit commanders to lead AARs during their rotations as a vehicle to export high-quality AARs to Army units. With that guidance, the NTC embarked on a leader-led AAR program now in place from the platoon to the brigade commander levels.

This article illustrates the experience of Captain (CPT) Melvin Hubbard, a Paladin battery commander, who led such an AAR during his recent rotation at the NTC.

It had been another tough battle for CPT Hubbard. He knew that providing artillery fires in support of a brigade deliberate attack against the highly trained "Krasnovians" would be a tough mission for his Paladin battery. He had been in Mojavia for more than two weeks and fighting the Krasnovians for six days. Following his third encounter with the Krasnovians, he set up his campstool by his high-mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and went over the four-hour battle in his mind. He jotted down several remarks in his green notebook and then began to prepare for his AAR.

After participating in two AARs, it was CPT Hubbard's turn to lead a post-battle AAR for his battery. Before rehearsing his AAR, CPT Hubbard pondered on what he had learned about facilitating a battery-level AAR.

Before deploying to the NTC, CPT Hubbard had reviewed "Training Circular 25-20 A Leader's Guide To After-Action Reviews" dated September 1993. This was an excellent starting point to prepare for a professional AAR. From this handy circular, CPT Hubbard had noted the AAR process follows four simple steps: planning, preparation, conduct and follow-up. He also had learned a great deal about AAR delivery techniques during the AARs after his first two missions. He reviewed his experiences with O/C AARs.

Observer/Controller AARs. The day after the first battle, a defense in sector, CPT Hubbard joined other key leaders from his battalion for his first formal NTC AAR. During this AAR, the Senior Fire Support Trainer, Wolf 07, facilitated a two-hour, fully instrumented AAR for the FA battalion. As CPT Hubbard sat there in the expandable van just a few kilometers from his battery's final position, he marveled at all the high-tech equipment Wolf 07 had at his disposal for gathering tactical information and providing feedback to the leaders in his battalion. He knew he would not be as fortunate to have access to this equipment or feedback mechanism for his own AAR.

CPT Hubbard noticed that Wolf 07 focused the AAR on only three topics: delivery of fires, crew drill and the military decision-making process (MDMP). Before delving into these areas, Wolf 07 briefly discussed what happened and why it happened. But, the bulk of Wolf 07's AAR centered on having the unit identify who was responsible for fixing the shortcomings and how the unit would fix them for the next battle. CPT Hubbard would remember this directed focus approach.

After the second battle, a movement-to-contact, Wolf 13, a firing battery combat trainer, exposed CPT Hubbard to another AAR style: the informal counterpart AAR. Wolf 13 had been in CPT Hubbard's shoes before and knew what was going through his mind. Wolf 13 recalled his own NTC experiences as a battery commander when he had become a true believer in the coaching and teaching approach to training.

Within minutes after the second battle, Wolf 13 and CPT Hubbard met next to Wolf 13's HMMWV. This Hummer-Top AAR was much different than Wolf 07's instrumented AAR. There were no screens, boards, computer-generated graphics or air conditioning. It was a one-on-one dialogue between two professional artillery officers.

Wolf 13 began the discussion with a simple, "How do you think we did today?" In an honest self-assessment, CPT Hubbard identified several areas that had not gone well during the fight. Wolf 13 let him dissect each of these topics, and the two determined fixes for the upcoming battle.

Toward the end of the exchange, Wolf 13 remarked, "OK, BC [battery commander], we have identified a bunch of areas that need improving. Let's narrow the list down to three, call them the 'Big 3' and work on those for the next battle." Without hesitation, CPT Hubbard replied, "We've got to 'get our arms around' reconnaissance operations, pre-combat checks and emergency fire missions before the deliberate attack."

The entire dialogue lasted 40 minutes, and CPT Hubbard left with his marching orders for the next battle. He also noted this self-discovery technique for his own AAR.

Battery Commander AAR. After learning from O/C-led AARs, CPT Hubbard now was ready to lead his first battery-level AAR. It was shortly after the third battle as he glanced over his notes from the last AAR and felt comfortable his unit had tackled the Big 3 successfully during this battle. It did not take CPT Hubbard long to come to the conclusion that ammunition resupply, battery time line and M825 smoke rehearsals had plagued his unit throughout the deliberate attack. He concluded these challenges would be the focus of his AAR. It was time to organize his own AAR. (See Figure 1.)

Based on this assessment, he decided to include all key leaders in the battery. Although he had the option of having the entire battery present, he wanted to concentrate on fixing leadership systems rather than individual soldier skills in this AAR. In addition to platoon leaders, fire direction officers (FDOs), platoon sergeants and section chiefs, he directed ammunition team chiefs and palletized loading system (PLS) drivers to come to the AAR.

He then moved on to AAR site selection. He chose a site underneath the fire direction center (FDC) camouflage net that provided some shade from the blistering desert sun. He also ensured the site was free of such distracters as the blare of radio traffic and the noisy FDC's generator.

As the battery's leaders assembled, all toting their campstools, a canteen of water and notebooks, CPT Hubbard looked over his training aids. He scrounged up a butcher-block easel with paper and a dry erase board with markers and used the FDC's map board with the maneuver graphics posted. With the few minutes he had remaining, he conducted a brief rehearsal with his scribe to ensure a smooth delivery.

CPT Hubbard had set the stage for his AAR. He had gathered all of the tools, selected the perfect site and assembled the key players. He now turned his attention to the AAR delivery.

Before covering the house rules, he grabbed the audience's attention with a relevant brief historical vignette about fire support in Vietnam. He then briefly discussed what happened in the battle action summary portion of the AAR. He included the battery's mission, the enemy's final positioning and battlefield statistics, courtesy of Wolf 13. CPT Hubbard then began with the first of his Big 3--the focus of his AAR.

Ammunition Resupply. CPT Hubbard started the discussion with an open-ended question, "How did we manage ammunition today?" At first there was silence. CPT Hubbard was tempted to fill the silence, but paused--waiting for his battery leaders to respond.

Finally, after several seconds, the 2d howitzer section chief, spoke up and responded with, "Sir, my job is to fire the rounds; it's the platoon leader's job to track the bullets! It's been that way since I've been a section chief."

One of the platoon leaders quickly chimed in, "Sir, the XO [executive officer] and the FDO decide when and what goes on the gun and ammunition vehicle. So how am I supposed to manage the ammunition?"

Sensing he had struck a nerve, CPT Hubbard interjected a leading question, "Who is responsible for ammunition management in our battery?"

A hand appeared in the back of the assembled leaders. It was the 4th section ammunition team chief. He remarked, "Sir, I have a suggestion. I haven't been assigned to the battery that long; however, isn't ammunition everyone's responsibility?" Before Hubbard could ask another question, the headquarters platoon sergeant replied, "He's right. I know I didn't get into the details on how we track ammunition distribution from the PLS to the howitzer. We have to develop a better system."

The discussion went back and forth amongst the leaders for about 15 minutes with Hubbard facilitating and staying focused on fixing ammunition management. For the next fight, the XO said he would fix turret loads and PLS ammo accountability. The FDO would keep the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) ammunition database up to date. The section chiefs would manually update ammo counts on the howitzers and FA ammunition supply vehicles (FAASVs), using DA Form 4513 Record of Missions Fired, as well as the automated fire control systems (AFCS) every hour.

CPT Hubbard knew the AAR was working. His unit was responding, and his subordinate leaders, the ones who would implement the fixes, were doing most of the talking. The battery was now ready to tackle its second topic.

Battery Time Lines. CPT Hubbard had depicted the battery time line graphically on the butcher-block easel prior to the AAR. He asked his 3d howitzer section chief to talk the battery through the planned time line.

The commander then asked, "XO, did you experience any time constraint issues during the planning portion of today's mission?" The XO responded, "Sir, we didn't receive the battery OPORD [operations order] until 2400 hours and immediately began ammunition upload. This took us most of the night to accomplish. According to the time line, I was supposed to have your directed PCCs [pre-combat checks] and inspections accomplished by 0800 hours, which we did not begin until 0900."

The battery ammunition NCO-incharge (NCOIC), joined in: "Sir, there was nothing we could do. Battalion did not send us the correct ammunition on the PLS, so we were dead in the water."

CPT Hubbard sensed he was at risk of losing the training point. If he allowed the battery ammunition NCOIC to deflect the issue to battalion, then the battery would miss its own issues with the time line. Hubbard gently had to nudge the discussion back into the battery's court.

He refocused the AAR by asking, "Gentlemen, the PLS were late; however, did we download our current ammunition on the FAASVs to the guns to facilitate the ammunition upload?"

The XO responded, "Sir, we allowed ourselves to go into a wait-and-see mode and did not stay proactive. We'll get after that one."

CPT Hubbard now looked for a fix by asking the following question, "Who directed ammunition upload after 2400 hours?" The ammunition NCOIC quickly jumped in and said, "Sir, we had to unload the PLS immediately for them to return to the CAT [combat artillery trains] so they could upload our FASCAM [family of scatterable mine] for our upcoming mission."

CPT Hubbard realized, once again, that his key leaders had identified a problem and were working through fixes. The discussion continued for approximately 20 minutes with communications flow and flexibility being the solutions for updating the time line for the next fight. The ammunition NCOIC and the two platoon leaders signed up to fix the problem by recommending to the battery commander changes to the time line that would streamline communications and facilitate adjustments to the time line.

CPT Hubbard now thought the battery was ready to address the third topic.

M825 Smoke Rehearsals. The commander facilitated the discussion by asking the battery FDO, "Did we accomplish our M825 EFAT [essential FA task] during this last battle?"

The FDO replied, "No Sir, we had a 10-minute separation between the build phase and the sustainment phase. The AFCS on two of our guns went down, and those sections called themselves out of the mission."

CPT Hubbard asked, "Okay, so why did it take us 10 minutes to hand off the mission to our operational howitzers to fire? Did we rehearse contingencies?"

The 6th section ammunition team chief stood up and said, "Sir, I don't know if we rehearsed contingencies; however, I do know we did not get hot chow last night. We were told we were going to get hot chow and we didn't--talk about lowering a soldier's morale! Maybe we should rehearse LOGPAC [logistics personnel and administration center] procedures?"

Knowing that discussing LOGPAC procedures would lead the discussion away from one of his Big 3, CPT Hubbard replied, "That's a great issue. But let's finish our discussion on smoke, and then we'll discuss LOGPAC issues."

The 1st howitzer section chief said, "Sir, if I may, the FDC conducted a rehearsal with the 1st, 4th, and 6th sections last night because they were going to be our primary sustainment shooters during the battle; however, we did not rehearse any contingencies."

The battery fire direction NCO, interjected, "Sir, the other problem was that all of the smoke rounds were only uploaded on the three sections that conducted the rehearsal. We did not upload smoke rounds across the rest of the battery, causing us to have to cross-level rounds from section to section during the middle of the mission.

CPT Hubbard, feeling his leadership had found the source of the problem, now looked at fixing responsibility. The XO spoke up, "I will ensure M825 rounds are included in the turret load for all sections."

The FDO said, "I will make sure we rehearse contingencies with the entire gun line." After an additional 15-minute discussion, CPT Hubbard knew the AAR had been effective.

At the conclusion of the AAR, CPT Hubbard reviewed and summarized the key points from the scribe's board. CPT Hubbard brought the discussion full circle and emphasized the fixes for the next fight. He remarked, "OK, let's review the bidding here. XO, you've got the mission of fixing this ammunition issue for the next fight. We've got a good jump on it already. Get with the ammunition NCOIC and fine-tune it. Be sure to update the ammunition portion of our TACSOP [tactical standing operations procedures] as well.

XO and platoon leader, keep the communications flow open with the ammunition NCOIC throughout the planning and preparation phases of the battle so I can make adjustments to the time line, as necessary.

FDO let me know the rehearsal schedule for special munitions so I can include them in the battery OPORD and rock drill. XO and platoon leader, I'll give you guidance on turret loads for the battery. You must ensure they are complete and report to me when they are.

Before releasing his leaders, CPT Hubbard asked several of them to highlight one safety issue to address with their soldiers. As his leaders left the area, CPT Hubbard knew his unit would be ready for their next fight.

CPT Hubbard had learned to focus his AAR on the Big 3-that too many topics make the AAR unwieldy and hard to work the details for implementing fixes. He also had learned not to waste a lot of time on what happened (just enough to set the stage) and the key is to identify the problems and ensure at least one leader is responsible for fixing each. He had learned that self-discovery is how soldiers learn best and that asking leading questions involves the whole team and is more productive than a lecture from the boss.

He had learned how to set up the AAR site, how to keep it free of distracters as well as what equipment and assistance he needed to facilitate the AAR. He had learned about selecting the audience for his AAR and how to deal with silence, externalizing issues and keeping soldiers on track. (See the check list in Figure 2.)

Finally, he had learned about bringing both issues and the entire AAR full circle-closing out the discussion with realistic fixes as well as designating leaders to implement the fixes.

Armed with the confidence and experience of having led an AAR, he knew he would be able to conduct AARs at his home station and continue to increase the proficiency of his leaders and his battery.

AARs at home station can have a significant impact on the readiness of our Army-just as they had had on CPT Hubbard's battery during his trip to the High Mojave.

Captain Ryan J. La Porte is a Firing Battery Combat Trainer on the Werewolf Team at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. His previous assignments include serving as Commander of B Battery, 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery and Task Force Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry and 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, all in the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. He also served as a Company FSO, Battery Fire Direction Officer (FDO), Firing Platoon Leader and Assistant Operations Officer in the 3d Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Captain Mark O. Bilafer is a Firing Battery Combat Trainer on the Werewolf Team at the National Training Center. His previous assignments include serving as A Battery Commander, Task Force FSO and Assistant Operations Officer in the 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, part of the 1St Armored Division in Germany. While serving in 2-3 FA, he deployed to Bosnia in support of the Implementation Force (IFOR). At Fort Wainwright, Alaska, he also served as a Battery Executive Officer, Battery FDO and Company FSO in the 4th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery, part of the 172d Separate Infantry Brigade.

                    After-Action Review (AAR) Criteria
                         Personnel Considerations:
                        AAR Focus (Leader vs Unit)
                            Unit Battle Rhythm
                                Travel Time
Site Selection     Pros                      Cons
* TOC/Battery FDC  Central Location          Can't See the Terrain
                   AAR Product Availability  Distracters
                   Participant Comfort
* Battery Position Terrain Unit Fought On    Travel Time
Areas              Reduced Number of         Product Availability
                   Distracters
* Forward          View Battlefield Effects  Travel Time
                   See the Enemy             Battle Rhythm
                   (Routes/Battle Positions)

Training Aids allow the unit to capture and maintain historical reference of the AAR (videos, map overlay, etc.). To select the right training aids, trainers should ask:

* What points do I want to make, and which aids support/illustrate the points?

* Can I use the actual terrain or equipment?

* Will the participants be able to see and hear the AAR?

Presentation:

* Maintain focus.

* Maintain Professionalism.

* Focus on the issue, not individual.

* Ask leading questions.

* Find two or three problems to fix for the next fight.

Company-Battery-Troop Commander Web Site

Nine active-duty Army officers at the US Military Academy at West Point operate a nonprofit web site dedicated to helping company, battery and troop commanders lead their soldiers more effectively: www.companycommand.com. The web site serves as an online forum of resources and mentoring for company-level commanders in the Army.

CompanyCommand.com is a user-driven forum. All its contents come from the voluntary submissions of officers who are either past, present or future company commanders. The "Cmd Net" portion of the site includes on-line discussions with company command experts. For the month of January, commanders can have on-line discussions with Ed Ruggero on Cmd Net. He is a former company commander and author of 38 North Yankee, co-author of the latest FM 22100 Army Leadership and has a new book Duty First: West Point and the Making of American Leaders due to be released in January. In addition, the site includes Cmd Tools, Cmd Challenge, Cmd Reading and other features.

The site's co-founders-Infantry Majors Nate Allen and Tony Burgess- attribute its success to military leaders' ethos of teamwork. "Now," said Burgess, "CompanyCommand.com is harnessing the power of the Internet to transform the way the Army shares information-laterally rather than vertically-so company commanders can have the resources they need to create winning teams of warriors."

Founded in February 2000, the site has been received enthusiastically, logging more than 900,000 hits. For more information on the web site, see several articles linked to the site. Volunteers at West Point plan to bring a Platoon Leader web site on line by the middle of 2001.

CPT Peter G. Kilner, IN

Assistant Professor, Department of English

US Miltary Academy, West Point, NY