The Background: Ehud Barak.

History has been no kinder to former PM Ehud Barak than the Israeli voters who ran him out of office in February 2001. Not two years earlier, Barak - running on a platform of peace - narrowly defeated hawkish Likud PM Netanyahu. Barak's victory excited peace proponents, including then US President Bill Clinton, who believed it was a harbinger of a new era in the Middle East. In office Barak, with Clinton's support, quickly engaged in peace talks. But Likud believed he revealed all his cards - including the possibility of handing over occupied lands in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon - without receiving anything in return. The left felt he did not offer enough. Barak was then said to believe that any "peace formula" he had or convinced Americans to offer included almost everything the Arabs needed. As his plans incorporated both Arab and Israeli positions, Barak felt there was little need for actual negotiations; the Arabs should simply accept.

Frustrated by what he saw as Arab obstinacy, Barak in May 2000 unilaterally withdraw from south Lebanon - minus the disputed Sheb'a Farms. Barak intended the dramatic move to break the stalemate in talks with Syria and the PA, while simultaneously generating goodwill on the international stage - particularly in the US. So Barak expected to be rewarded domestically, as the public had grown tired of the Lebanese occupation.

Barak's gamble backfired. Syria prevented the fragile Beirut government, recovering from civil war and occupied by both Israel and Syria, to send its army south. Nor did Beirut disarm Hizbullah, which was credited with forcing Israel to withdraw. Syria's position hardened. Yasser Arafat told Barak that, by withdrawing from Lebanon in the face of armed opposition from Hizbullah, Israel had emboldened militant Palestinian factions who believed the gun offered more than the olive branch. In Israel itself, Barak was pilloried by his opponents, namely Sharon, for capitulating to "terrorists". The failure of Israel-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David and Taba mortally wounded Barak.

His successor, Sharon, rejected Barak's raison d'etre - peace through negotiations. Instead, Sharon made clear he would act only "in Israel's interest", a thinly concealed message for the US and the Arab world that Israel intended to chart a unilateral course. The Bush administration's approach to the peace process - biased and hand's off - enabled Sharon and his successor to act largely unhindered by outside interference. Sharon's unilateral strategy first resulted in construction of the massive wall separating Israel and its West Bank settlements from the Palestinians. Next was the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, which came about not through negotiations with Abbas and the PA, but a decision made by Sharon. The next step was to be a withdrawal from the West Bank.

Implementation of the plan was delayed by Sharon's incapacitation, but it was endorsed by the Israeli public on March 28 when Kadima - a party devoted to implementing Sharon's West Bank plan - captured the largest parliamentary bloc. Based on polls taken in Israel, Olmert's government may well become a casualty of the war in Lebanon. On Aug. 22, his government scrapped its plan to withdraw from the West Bank. Also abandoned, at least temporarily, was Israel's belief that it can forever act unilaterally.

Statements made by Israeli Public Security Minister Uri Dichter and other government officials supporting talks with Syria confirm this turn. But in order for change to take place on the ground, the US must alter its regional strategy. And judging from the White House press conference on Aug. 21, this is unlikely to happen. As in previous public statements, Bush said: "What's very interesting about the violence in Lebanon and the violence in Iraq and the violence in Gaza is this: These are all groups of terrorists who are trying to stop the advance of democracy". Bush insisted he remained optimistic and stressed the need to stay the course, despite the mess in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian road map to peace. Bush is watching fanatic Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad thumb his nose repeatedly at the US and UN.

David Dumke, principal of the Washington-based MidAmr Group, recently wrote: "If Bush is wearing the proverbial rose-colored glasses in seeing 'the New Middle East', few are still seeing the world through the same lens. Certainly not the Israelis, who appear to be modifying their strategy after receiving a black eye".