The Arab Human Development Report 2002: review and reform.

THE UNDP REGIONAL BUREAU of Arab States made a major contribution to development debate when it published its first comprehensive report on Arab human development. While the Report builds on the concept of human development used by UNDP in its annual Report on the subject, it goes on to expand and modify the concept and methodology significantly. The Arab Human Development Report 2002 thus provides us with a tool of measurement which it calls an "alternative human development index" (AHDI). it argues that this index is a more representative and humane measurement of human development than the Human Development Index (HDI) used in UNDP global reports.

There is no doubt that the AHDI represents a comprehensive tool of measurement for monitoring human development in its broadest definition of enhancing human capacity and choices. But this very broad definition has required the construction of a very complex and not entirely reliable tool of measurement. It is rather biased toward complex qualitative aspects of human development, whose measurement may require a different methodology.

The AHDI is quite different from the HDI used in UNDP annual global reports. Only life expectancy and educational attainment are common to both indices. The AHDI makes a major departure from well established norms of measurement when it excludes average per capita income. This is most unusual, because empirical data have consistently shown a close positive correlation between increase in per capita income and advances in education, health and general living conditions. One only needs to look at the development performance of the Arab oil-exporting countries to confirm the strong causal relationship between increase in income and human development. To exclude per capita income from the AHDI is to put the Arab countries at a disadvantage, because their average income as a group is higher than other regions of developing countries. The result will be a negative contribution to the measurement of Arab human development.

The AHDI incorporates a freedom index, which, as stated in box 1.5, covers a "broad range of political and personal freedom enjoyed in reality, not in declared documents and policies." Although it is stated in the same box that the authors of the Report do not fully endorse the content of the Freedom House assessment or its methodology, the Report nonetheless goes on to include the index as a major component of the AHDI. Again, the Arab countries are put at a disadvantage regarding all forms of freedom as covered by the Freedom House index. Because political and civil freedom are either absent (in some Arab countries) or, at best, are restricted and constrained (in all of them), the net result will be negative on the scale of freedom measurement. Other components of personal freedom that are legally recognized in many countries, such as choice of one's religion or social behavior regarding marriage partners or gay tendencies, are strictly forbidden by law and social values in all Arab countries.

Another factor which contributes to placing the Arab countries on the lowest scale of human development is the inclusion of carbon emission. This inclusion punishes the Arab countries because of high per capita emission in all of the oil- and gas-producing Arab countries. Moreover, it is not at all agreed that carbon emission has an immediate or obvious impact on human development. This is not to deny the impact of the environment on human life, but carbon emission has more to do with the ozone layer and global warming than with urban environment and water pollution.

The inclusion of a gender empowerment measure (GEM) as developed by UNDP adds to the disadvantage of the Arab countries because women's education is a relatively recent development in most Arab countries. Girls who attended school in the last three decades are only now becoming qualified professionals available for positions of responsibility. Taking into account where most Arab countries began with girl's education, we must acknowledge that they have moved so fast that the girls have almost caught up with boys' enrollment at all three stages of education. As for political participation and effective leadership, the space so far has been rather limited for both male and female. It is only recently that we have begun to see men and women freely elected to public office. Wider and more rapid female participation is expected in most Arab countries in the coming years.

To compare women's empowerment in the Arab region with other areas with long established systems for women's education and public participation is to do injustice to the remarkable progress made by most Arab countries in women's empowerment. Most Arab countries have made a late start in this important component of human development. But the speed with which they have moved is impressive. The future holds more promise than is shown in the Report.

The other component included in the AHDI is Internet hosting per capita to measure access to information and acquisition of knowledge. Again, this aspect of human development is limited in the Arab countries as a group. One reason is the high rate of illiteracy in several Arab countries. The other reason is the limited spread of the English language among the literate population. But all this is changing rather rapidly. We have gone through this explanation of the components of the alternative human development index (AHDI) only to understand why the Arab countries almost by definition will be at the bottom of the scale of human development as measured by that index. But if we use the global UNDP human development index (HDI) we will find 4 Arab countries with a high level of human development, 10 with medium and only 4-5 at a low level. This basic difference between indices should be kept in mind when passing judgment on the relative progress of the Arab countries on the scale of human development as measured by population density, rate of illiteracy, level of education, life expectancy, public health and degree of social development. With such extreme variations as exist between individual Arab countries, it would be more realistic to measure the rate of human development case by case in each country. This approach would answer the question of how fast or slow a given country has advanced in comparison with another country under generally similar conditions. Were we to apply such a method of analysis, the Gulf Cooperation Council members would show a very rapid rate of human development during the last three decades.

THE PROBLEM WITH AGGREGATION OF DATA

As always, the common practice of aggregating all Arab countries under one figure leads to unrealistic generalizations with regard to their individual and collective achievements, capacities and potentials. The aggregate empirical data is not a true measurement of the individual country or the assumed collective entity, which does not exist. Conclusions based on gross aggregation will not be helpful in the formulation of development policy.

The Gulf countries began with similar conditions of underdevelopment, except for Bahrain and Kuwait. But all together, they only began their main quest for economic and social development about 30 years ago. Perhaps the main incentive for the development drive was the drastic adjustment of the oil price which began in 1973. From that time onward, the GCC countries have made rapid progress in human development compared with other countries in the region or elsewhere.

Other larger and historically more advanced Arab countries have not achieved a similar rate of progress during the same period. It would be of interest to understand the reasons for their low rate of development. To what extent has the socialist holistic political system negatively affected the scope and rate of their human development? In fact, several of these countries have regressed rather than progressed during the last three decades. Why is this? These are basic questions that need further studies. The generalization in the Arab Human Development Report tends to cover up the cases of both rapid progress in some Arab countries and evident stagnation in others.

Another problem with regional aggregation in the case of the Arab countries is the weakness and, in some cases, even the irrelevance of pan-Arab multilateral institutions. This is largely due to an absence of common trust and lack of mutual interdependence. It is clearly reflected in the way individual countries deal with large economic blocs such as the European Union and the United States. They tend to pursue separate and competitive rather than cooperative patterns in their relations with foreign partners. As long as this historical trend continues and until such time as the Arab countries begin to rely on a sense of common trust and collective capacity, there is little to gain from trying to generalize about their collective development prospects or their common future in general.

Following this summary of my critical observations regarding the methodology used to assess the current standing of the Arab countries, it should not be implied that I disagree with the main conclusion of the Report. In fact, I fully recognize and acknowledge the existence of the three main deficits: in freedom, in know-how and in the empowerment of the women. The Report presents solid evidence to illustrate the sad reality of these deficits. My disagreements are with the components of the alternative human development index, and with the reliability of aggregation of data for the purpose of comparison between different geographic regions. Using such comparisons together with the AHDI can only result in placing the Arab countries as a group at the very bottom of human development. Such a result does not reflect the true state of recent achievements in human progress in the region.

BUILDING AND USING HUMAN CAPABILITIES

The Report does a good job of presenting and analyzing the basic needs and requirements for building and making best use of human capabilities. It devotes four of its eight chapters to these two basic aspects of human development. A fifth chapter deals with the main issues and the fundamental requirements for liberating human capabilities. A normal productive life span, good health conditions and adequate habitat are essential but not sufficient requirements for building human capabilities. Good quality education and relevant training are of equal importance in this regard.

The demographic profile of nearly all Arab countries represents a serious challenge to present and future generations. The well known economic and social pressures of the profile are twofold: an increasing majority of young people and an increasing number of dependent old people, due to increasing life span. In order to meet this challenge, the Arab countries need quickly to mobilize resources, organize the relevant know-how and promote good planning and administrative capabilities. Time is of the essence here.

While an increase in life span is regarded as a positive achievement in human development, the pressing problem of high population growth in almost all Arab countries will continue to impact negatively on the rate and quality of human progress. Open and frank discussion and public debate should take up the challenge of the demographic profile in all Arab countries except Tunisia. It is the only Arab country which has achieved remarkable progress in reducing the national growth rate to 1.1 percent. All other Arab countries have a long way to go before they can match Tunisia's achievement.

The state of health of the population together with the environment constitutes an important pillar for building human capabilities. Here again, there are extreme variations between Arab countries. Despite repeated complaints regarding the inadequacy of data in this field, the AHD Report indicates that life expectancy at birth varies from 45 years in Djibouti and Somalia to nearly 75 years in the United Arab Emirates. But long life expectancy does not mean lack of illness or low level of disability. Infant and child mortality range from 10.2 per thousand in Qatar to 75.3 in Yemen. For children under five years old, the rate varies from less than 20 to more than 100 per thousand. However, despite these wide variations there has been rapid progress in infant and child survival in all Arab countries. This is the case for countries with very low per capita income (Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen). Only in the case of Iraq did the rate of mortality increase from about 20 to about 100 per thousands due to the impact of two major wars and 12 years of severe sanctions.

There exist extreme variations, similar to previously cited health indicators, in the case of stunting, maternal mortality and the health of the older population. Also, according to the Report, per capita health expenditure in (ppp) dollars varies from $11 to $1,105 in different Arab countries. The Report uses WHO findings to record the state of responsiveness and fairness of health systems in Arab countries. The criteria used to measure these two elements of the health system in each country are rather vague and not altogether convincing. This fact is clearly acknowledged in the Report itself when it states the following: "Any discussion of the responsiveness and fairness of health systems needs to be fully sensitive to the complexity of measuring these concepts and the pitfalls of comparative analysis across countries" (p.41). Perhaps that is why some conclusions in this respect do not truly represent realities on the ground.

However, regardless of whether the actual health conditions are better or worse than indicated by the Report, the need for reform in preventive and curative health systems in all Arab countries remains valid. The Report serves notice to all Arab countries regarding what it calls the 'silent threat' of HIV/AIDS. According to information presented on page 43, "By most conservative estimates, more than 400,000 people are thought to be living with HIV in the Eastern Mediterranean Region." Apparently, the HIV/AIDS threat is real, which requires full readiness and transparency in all Arab countries. This is not a threat whose existence may be ignored, or treated in a shy or silent manner due to social inhibition or stigma. All Arab countries have a very young population profile that is vulnerable to the threat of an HIV/AIDS epidemic.

I fully support the balanced recommendations in the Report with regard to both health and habitat as essential requirements for building human capabilities. Water, cultivable land scarcity and soil degradation are basic problems that need urgent national and regional action to cope with their vast damage to the environment. Very rapid and unorganized urbanization, together with air and coastal area pollution have added another serious threat to the health of the human habitat in all Arab countries.

Although environmental problems are global, it is evident that the Arab countries have more than their share. The UNDP Arab Human Development Report 2002 presents a set of policy recommendations (pages 45-50) that deserve most careful attention from all Arab governments, the private sector and the public at large. Health and habitat are too important to be left to governments alone or to any one segment of society. Effective solutions to problems in these sectors require coordinated and consistent collective programs of action and policy prospective. As stated in the Report, "displacing environmental problems from one area to another or postponing dealing with them will always be costly" (p.47).

EDUCATION

Education is a basic building block of human development. As indicated before, with regard to other measurements, there are wide variations in the status of education between Arab countries. Several countries have achieved nearly full enrollment for all school-age children, while others with larger populations are still far behind. This is true with regard to quantity, but for quality there is urgent need for improvement and reform in all Arab countries. Relying on private sector schools is neither sufficient nor affordable for most people. It is quite clear from the evidence in the Report that while each Arab country has to address its specific needs there are several problems common to all countries which may be summarized under the following headings:

1. Pre-school education.

2. Formal school enrollment not able to absorb all school-age children, with a bias against girls.

3. High rate of drop-out from primary and secondary schools, especially girls.

4. Recent decline in expenditure on education.

5. Very urgent need for quality improvements in all stages of formal education.

6. The need for more equity and affordability arising from the dual systems of public and private education.

7. The need to promote the spread of adult education as a way of life.

It is obvious from the Report and on the basis of field observations that there is an urgent need in all Arab countries for policy reforms and speedy action. Pre-school education is gaining increased recognition in developing the mental capability of children at an early stage. It is the initial stage for action to improve quality in education. The Arab countries are still behind the average performance of other developing countries with regard to enrollment in preschool education. According to the Report, there were only 2.5 million children enrolled in 1995, representing only 4 percent of that age group. Perhaps of even more concern is the decline in this percentage since 1980, with the share of girls declining to 42% of the total number of Arab children enrolled in pre-school facilities.

Although total enrollment in all levels of formal education increased from 31 million in 1980 to 56 million ten years later, the average percentage at the secondary and university levels was only 54% and 13% respectively. While these rates are slightly higher than the average for developing countries, they are far below the prevailing levels in the industrial countries. This is just regarding quantity, not to mention the huge gap in quality. But even in the case of sheer quantity of enrollment there is a serious problem of dropout, especially of girls.

Another area of common concern is the sharp drop in per capita expenditure on education in Arab countries. The Report states a decrease from 20 percent of that in industrial countries in 1980 to only 10 percent five years later. It is clear that education and health services are among the first sectors to suffer from recent economic structural reforms in several Arab countries. This trend should not continue if Arab leaders are serious about building human capabilities.

Quality improvement requires radical reform in teacher's education and on job training, as well as basic reform in school curricula and the general environment of learning.

The dual or triple systems of public, private and foreign schools in most Arab countries contribute to the general problem of equity and affordability. One way of reducing the negative impact of this problem is to expand and improve public schools in order to reduce the demand for private schooling. However, success in this area will take a long time and absorb substantial resources. But there is no escape from the need to improve the state of equity and increase affordability in formal education.

Another area that needs expansion in coverage and improvement of quality is adult education. The primary objective of adult education should be twofold: elimination of illiteracy, and the continuation of learning with upgrading the skills of educated people. Promoting self-learning should be a constant objective of adult education. In addition to its emphasis on adult education, the Report presents a strong case for the special needs of the gifted as well as handicapped children. Technical and vocational education and training should always be an integral component of national educational systems. The Report points to the need to expand higher education in Arab countries, together with improvements in quality. This should apply equity to existing institutions and to new public or private initiatives. Recent trends in the establishment of profit-seeking private universities should not be encouraged. Profit making is not compatible with well established norms of higher education.

Regarding educational reform, the Report makes good use of a document prepared by the Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO). It lists ten principles for the reform of the education system in different Arab countries. These principles include the central place of the individual in the culture of learning, the power of knowledge, the importance of free and critical dialogue, the need to promote a spirit of challenge in society, the need to expand opportunities and to promote flexibility in coping with uncertainty and change.

The central role of modern education in enhancing human capabilities and promoting human development is well presented in the Arab Human Development Report 2002. It should be a recommended reading for policy and decision makers in all the Arab countries. There are three strategic directions presented in the chapter on Education which should provide a policy guide for Arab educational reform in general. These are: "enhancing human capabilities; creating strong synergy between education and the socio-economic system; and formulating a program for educational reform at the pan-Arab level" (p.55).

This calls for the formation of a regional scheme built on the common areas of concern to all or several Arab countries. Fortunately, the region has already established an institutional framework for the implementation and following up of such a regional scheme. Different Arab countries can contribute different resources and gain different benefits according to their means and needs.

While the need for a regional education reform scheme is clear, it is not certain that Arab governments will see it in that way. Historically, there were several attempts made by various pan-Arab institutions, such as ALECSO and others, to implement regional educational and cultural reforms, without much success. In all past attempts, the essential political will was simply absent. Also, the kind of good governance needed for a long term regional vision was lacking.

Unfortunately, these serious country-specific problems and obstacles are still much in evidence in different Arab countries. It is an open question whether the Arab Human Development Report 2002 will make a difference in this regard.

USING HUMAN CAPABILITIES

The first four chapters of the Report are devoted to various problems and policy issues and to ways and means of building human capabilities. They cover definitions and concepts of human development, the state of such development in the Arab region, life span, health and habitat as well as education reform. Taken together, the four chapters provide enlightened and forward-looking policy guidelines for different Arab countries. It is my earnest hope that Arab governments will make good use of this guide in reforming their approach to building human capabilities, as it applies to their respective countries.

The remaining four chapters of the Report are devoted to ways and means of using human capabilities. They cover the essence of a knowledge culture in society, research and development, economic growth, human poverty, good governance and regional cooperation. All these major areas, when taken together in national and regional human development policies, can provide productive outlets for using human capabilities and liberating human potentials.

Effective use of human capabilities requires the creation of a knowledge society. To achieve that kind of society, several policy reforms and practical programs are needed. To begin with, there should be substantial and sustainable support for scientific research and technological development designed to cope with the needs of each country and the region as a whole. In this era of globalization, the choice of appropriate development technology for a specific purpose requires domestic scientific capacity, which is attainable only with applied research and institutional infrastructure. Substantial investment and sustainable research efforts are needed to achieve significant results.

Unfortunately, Arab countries rank rather low on the scale of research funding. As stated in the Report, total expenditure on research as a percentage of GDP was only "0.4 for the Arab world in 1996, compared to 1.26 in 1995 for Cuba, 2.35 in 1994 for Israel and 2.9 for Japan" (p. 65). There is hardly an Arab country with a clearly and effectively established national science and technology system, despite the crucial importance of such a system for domestic development and national security. It is no wonder that the total Arab scientific output in terms of number of scientific papers per unit of population in 1995 was not much more than that of Republic of Korea alone (p.66).

Essential means of linking internationally such as connectivity, outsourcing and subcontracting are rare in Arab countries. The net result of an underdeveloped or non-existing domestic scientific base is frequent purchase of technology at high cost. By contrast to this lack of regional and international scientific linkage, the Report states that countries so far apart as China, Brazil and the Republic of Korea have established links between their national scientific bases. Again, in this vital field of human development, there is an almost total absence of inter-Arab cooperation, despite the existence of pan-Arab institutions for this purpose. It is essential that Arab countries should come together to achieve significant progress in the direction of national and regional cooperation in research and development. The troubling question, as always, is why they have not done that obvious task before. What is the likelihood that they will act in that direction once they read and understand the Arab Human Development Report? What can scientific groups and institutions in several Arab countries do to encourage official action for the promotion of regional cooperation?

In order to achieve an effective research and development system it is necessary to create a conducive social, academic and commercial environment. In addition, there is urgent need for appropriate legislation and adequate financing. Chapter 5 of the Report is rich in content and clear in format regarding mobilizing Arab minds abroad and at home. It also provides sound suggestions for policy priorities and for research and development agenda. The agenda includes the following:

a. Build a small number of specialized centers of excellence.

b. Focus on fields in which distinctive capabilities exist.

c. Promote global competitiveness.

d. Focus on human-resource-intensive rather than capital-intensive R&D.

e. Learn from the global community.

No doubt this is a full agenda that needs speedy action at both national and regional levels. The basic question again is: will there be sufficient political will to build the necessary capacity for implementing such a comprehensive and coherent agenda? Only time can reveal the answer to this vital question.

Developing information and communication technology (ICT) is a central pillar for using and liberating human capabilities. The second half of the Report is fully devoted to this subject. Information, knowledge and technology are essential aspects of the so-called 'digital divide' between those who know and those who are behind in the run for the front line of information technology. The Report makes a good point of explaining how technology responds to social change rather than leads it. Technology seeks to meet changing social demands for convenience, speed and safety.

The digital divide between industrial and developing countries is wide and increasing. Not only that, but the divide between the Arab region and other developing areas is becoming more evident, particularly compared with Latin America and the Caribbean region as well as with South East Asia and the Pacific countries.

Because information technology is highly advanced, it is susceptible to monopolistic or oligopolistic control. Profit-making in this sector is the main driving force for innovation and change. National security and defense needs are leading factors in increasing the digital divide between the strong and the weak in this world. As the Report points out, there are also digital divides among Arab countries and within each country. 'Linguistic divide' is another serious problem in the spread of information. So far, English is the predominant language controlling the digital divide. Should this trend continue, there will not be a place for Arabic or other languages of developing countries. This is a real problem that should not be ignored.

As in the case of science and research, there are no well established national information policies. The content of information, the style and the format are the essential requirements of modern information policies. Important changes are taking place in both legislation and organizations affecting the digital divide in the Arab countries. Hopefully, current restructuring of the telecommunication and information sector will reduce the digital divide by making progress in ICT education and training, software development and increasing market competition.

The chapter dealing with the importance and requirements of knowledge society appropriately reminds us of some of the wisdom of Al-Imam Ali bin abi Talib, the fourth Caliph (556-629 A.D.) regarding the high value of knowledge. It is expressed in the following equations: "No wealth equals the mind, no poverty equals ignorance, no heritage equals culture and no support is greater than advice." "Knowledge rules over wealth" (p.82) Modern information technology vindicates this wisdom, well stated long before the age of modern science.

Chapter 6 of the Report presents strong arguments and relevant facts regarding the central role of economic growth and poverty reduction as means for better use of human capabilities. It covers such important subjects as the rate of economic growth in Arab countries, physical capital formation and efficiency, employment and income distribution. Recent trends in all these indicators are not promoting the effective use of human capabilities. Unemployment is increasing, due to a high rate of entry into the labor market and recent trends of growth in unemployment. Modern technology is more knowledge-based then labor intensive, which requires special care in selecting the appropriate technology.

High rates of population growth, with moderate and slow rates of economic growth, have resulted in stagnant economies for most Arab countries. Thus, despite the much publicized Arab wealth due to increase in oil prices, the average annual economic growth rate for the Arab region between 1975-1988 was only 0.5 per cent in real terms. By contrast, the same global average was 1.3 per cent (p. 88).

The sharp deterioration in oil prices which began in the early 1980s and continued for 18 years had the effect of reducing economic growth of the Arab region far below the world average. With such a sharp decline in purchasing power, most Arab countries had to cut their previous levels of investment and expenditure on various projects and activities, and this negatively affected human development. The Report states in this connection that by 1998, the real purchasing power parity (PPP) income of "the average Arab citizen had fallen to 13.9 per cent or one seventh, of that average OECD citizen" (p.89).

As is the case with other averages for the Arab region, average income, whether nominal or real, does not reflect actual conditions on the ground due to skewed income distribution. However, this is a worldwide issue. In fact it is stated in the Report that income distribution in Arab countries is slightly better than the world average. The same conditions exist with regards to the incidence of extreme poverty. Various charitable institutions and practices, together with generous government subsidies on food and housing, play a vital role in improving the state of income distribution and reducing abject poverty.

As stated in the Report, the most pressing socio-economic problem facing the Arab region is unemployment. With a high rate of entry into the labor market and a slow economic growth adversely affected by joblessness, the challenge of full employment in all Arab countries is very serious. In the long run, there is no alternative to reducing population growth and increasing job creation. To achieve sustainable success in these two difficult areas requires comprehensive and consistent demographic policy, combined with effective economic and social development performance at national and regional levels.

Persistent unemployment is an assured source of poverty and social instability. Indeed, there is a vicious circle of unemployment, poverty and ignorance. To break this circle, there is an urgent need to spread and improve education and training and increase investments on job creation. Public and private sector investments are needed to make the necessary impact in this critical area of human development. It is evident that past performance in this respect has not been sufficient. Urgent political and economic reforms are needed in all Arab countries.

Regional economic cooperation and inter-Arab trade and investments are needed to increase job opportunities for the growing number of youth. It is essential to point out that for the Arab free trade area to develop into a common market, there must be an agreement between countries willing to establish a common customs union. For that to happen, the parties must be free from external commitments on trade association with regional economic blocs. Unfortunately, this may be the case for several Arab countries that have concluded trade association agreements with the European Union and in some cases with the United States.

LIBERATING HUMAN CAPABILITIES

After covering the issues and requirements of building and using human capabilities, the Arab Human Development Report turns to the vital and central issue of liberating these capabilities. Good governance is the essential means to achieve that objective. Chapter 7 of the Report begins with the following statement: "Whether a nation succeeds or fails in its efforts to promote human development or whether it even attempts to do so is closely related to the character and quality of its governance" (p. 105). The Report goes on to define governance as "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels ... It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions though which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercises their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences."

I am in full agreement with this comprehensive definition of governance. But if this is true of governance alone, then how would 'good governance' be described or defined? On page 106 of the Report there is what I consider to be a fair definition of good governance. It is that "good governance is defined as a set of social institutions that fully represent the people, interlinked by a solid network of institutional regulations and accountability (with ultimate accountability to the people) whose purpose is to achieve the welfare of all members of society."

Based on this rather ambitious definition of good governance, it is obvious that there needs to be drastic and sustainable political reforms and institutional building in all Arab countries in order to meet the requirement for such a state of governance in both public and private sectors, as well in the society at large. Indeed, such ideal governance may not exist anywhere in this real world of politics and tricks.

However, the answer to the question of what is good governance is a relative concept. The closer it gets to the ideal definition the better it becomes in reality. At present, governance in the Arab region falls short of meeting the main characteristics of good governance. These characteristics are: full participation of all citizens, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, equity, accountability and strategic vision. The Report provides a good description and analysis of the content and importance of each characteristic (pp. 106-107). Policy-and decision-makers in the Arab region will do well to review the concept and content of good governance as presented in these pages.

Good governance as shown in reality in based more on well established institutions than on the good intentions of people in power. In other words, the existence of good governance is dependent on the good performance of public and private institutions, in all walks of life, beginning with the family and going up to the legislative, judicial and executive branches of government. Any country that aspires to attain and enjoy good governance must first recognize the importance of good institutions and gain wide respect for their protection and independence from political interference and power manipulation. Perhaps this is the first lesson to learn in the difficult and slow process of institution building. This is also the stage where the individual with personal integrity and public devotion can make a difference. Unfortunately, such people are often either not in power or, when in power, their efforts usually face heavy resistance from various groups with vested interests.

It is with traditions and institutions that government authority should be exercised. The three major aspects of governance are identified as follows: (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of government to effectively formulate and implement social policies; and (c) the respect of citizen and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interaction (p. 111). The Report describes various indicators of measurements under each of the three aspects of governance. Again, the Arab countries are found to be deficient in what is considered good governance, compared with other regions of the world, including many developing countries.

The Report provides standard and well-known proposals for necessary political reforms, leading to the attainment of good governance. The first step in this process is to ensure that legislative bodies are legitimate and representative of the people. National legislation and regulations should be fully based on modern democratic constitutions. There must be a clear division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of governments. All legislation should be subject to control by a supreme judicial authority. Different political parties are essential for authentic and sustainable democracy. The same is true for the central role of free parliamentary elections. Past mistakes of manipulating elections by various means of fraud must never be repeated in any country. Such practices are worse than not holding elections at all.

The reform of the executive branch of government should aim at making the cabinet fully responsible to the parliament. Whether the system of government follows the parliamentary, presidential or monarchical model, the ultimate power of the people and their right to hold the cabinet to account should always be vested in the legislative branch and the Head of State. No power should be given to any official, including the Head of State, without requiring a corresponding level of accountability and transparency.

Public administration and services are also in urgent need of reform and streamlining. The aim should always be to establish independent, efficient and honest civil service personnel. Appointments and promotions should be based on merit, free of political interference and favoritism. As the Report shows, Arab governments have a long way to go before they can reach this kind of modern public administration. However, they must face the challenge, because there is little chance for any political reform to succeed without a clear and efficient public administration. Adopting formal democratic constitutions and modern laws will not make a difference without adequate and up-to-date reform of public administration.

The main objective of reforming and upgrading the judicial system is to ensure the rule of law. Once legislation is passed and implemented, it is up to the courts to pass judgments on disputes between citizens or between any citizen and any part of the government. The independence of the courts should be fully protected by law and in practice. As in the case of civil service, an essential part of judicial reform should be the upgrading of the education and training of judges and their support staff. All appointments should be on merit and openly competitive.

Another good idea recommended in the Report is the promotion of local governance as part of a system of decentralization of executive authority. This is urgently required in most Arab countries with vast territories or large populations or both. Local governments should be provided with sufficient financial and human resources to meet their current expenditure and development needs. At the same time, such local units of government should be able to provide the central authorities with ideas and practical advice on development prospects, in accordance with their specific priorities.

In all Arab countries, local government units have been burdened with police and state security. It is recommended that this important function should be performed independently of local governments. Provincial governors with local councils should be in charge of local civil administration and development activities. They should not be responsible to any ministry or department that deals with state police and security. Maintaining law and order should be the job of a separate line of authority, without diminishing the overall importance of local governments.

I agree with a short statement in the Report that says "any society is only as free as its media." Responsible freedom of the media is an essential part of liberating human capabilities. Another requirement is the encouragement of social and professional groups to work for the development of an active civil society. Responsible pressure groups and reasonably informed public are essential for the formation and sustenance of legitimate political parties.

ARAB COOPERATION

The final chapter of the Report attempts to cover the present status of Arab cooperation and the prospects for its improvement. Perhaps there is no other group of countries anywhere that enjoys the same common cultural foundation as do the Arab countries. They use the same language and the vast majority of their people belong to the Islamic religion. They enjoy the same folklore and understand each others' jokes and sense of humor. They have all experienced the impact of Western colonialism and foreign domination.

It was rather natural, with such common background and homogenous culture, to expect the Arab countries to work together for regional cooperation and common action. The forceful takeover of most of Palestine by the new State of Israel in 1948 presented a challenge to all the then nominally independent Arab States. The establishment of the Arab League in 1945 was seen at the time as the right collective response to the needs and challenges of the Arab region. The UNDP Report mentions several important intergovernmental agreements that were concluded within the framework of the League. The long series of agreements begins with the well-known joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1950, running up to the Arab Free Trade Area in 1997 (p.122). In addition to these comprehensive and ambitious agreements, the Arab countries established common regional institutions and Ministerial Councils in practically every sector of economic and social development. The stated purposes and activities of these specialized institutions cover intergovernmental cooperation in investment, trade and industry, agriculture, labor affairs, public administration, health, education, culture, common internal security and more.

Again, with such wide ranging joint institutional infrastructure, one would normally expect strong incentive for regional integration and Arab cooperation. Why is this not the case? The Report attempts to answer this question with the following statement. "While many Arab regional institutions exist, they are characterized by fragility and ineffectiveness, and national considerations take precedence over wider regional ones, leading to disregard of wider Arab interest. Moreover, even if national interests were to converge rather than conflict, the fact that too many regimes cater to powerful entrenched interest groups means that there is no guarantee that they would serve the wider public good."

While I tend to agree with the essence of this general answer, I would add another observation. The lack of convergence of national interests between Arab countries is largely due to a lack of well defined national agenda. Domestic instability and weak or non-existent national institutions cannot formulate and implement sound national policies.

Most Arab countries gained their nominal independence under different conditions and at different times. Each of them had to cope with the task of nation-building according to its particular background and within its special circumstances and limited means. Due to significant foreign influence combined with internal pressure and demands, each Arab country had to concentrate on building state identity and state security. Development priorities and regional cooperation were accorded second place. Lack of properly designed development policy at the country level led to a lack of understanding and appreciation for the urgent need for general Arab cooperation based on strong regional institutions.

While the Report covers most joint Arab activities and institutions, it does not include any mention of the very important work and achievement of the Organization of the Arab Petroleum Exporting countries (OAPEC). This specialized commodity organization was established in 1968 by three countries: Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait. Its membership was soon expanded to include seven more Arab oil-exporting countries, including Egypt and Syria. OAPEC has sponsored several joint holding companies in the oil sector and related services such as finance and training. The potential for further cooperation is great.

The main obstacles to Arab cooperation are well stated in the Report (pp.128-129). Despite the complex nature of these obstacles they can all be overcome with good governance and mutual commitments among Arab countries, at both public and private levels. As the Report states: "what is required is to identify achievable goals, determine the nature of the effort needed to achieve them and commit to transparent implementation." I fully agree with this clear policy direction as well as with the following statement on the last page of the Report. "The future of the Arab States is to a large extent contingent on the responsiveness and the will of their governments, their businessmen and investors to initiate effective collective action." This adds up to a fair conclusion not only to the chapter on Arab cooperation, but also to the whole content of the Report on Arab Human Development 2002.

Prince Hassan bin Talal is President of the Club of Rome and the Arab Thought Forum.