The American peace movement and the Middle East.

Over the past few decades, popular movements in the United States challenging the U.S. role in Southeast Asia, Central America and Southern Africa have been an important factor in confronting foreign.policies seen to be inconsistent with the officially-stated goals of peace, democracy, international law and self-determination. Yet, during this same period, U.S. policy toward the Middle East has been particularly problematic regarding effective popular mobilization. This essay takes a look at the American peace movement and its role regarding the U.S.-led 1991 war against Iraq and the long-standing U.S. support for Israeli policies toward its Arab neighbors, as well as the movement's strengths, weaknesses, and possible future directions.

First, I will examine the reasons why the peace movement was unable to stop the Gulf War, why it failed to turn public opinion against the war once it started, and how it has failed to address the resulting humanitarian crises. At the same time, I will argue that the movement was far more successful in many respects than even most of its supporters credit it for being. Using the Gulf War as the opening context, I then turn to broader issues of peace, human rights and justice in the Middle East and how the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been an obstacle to building an effective peace movement. I critically examine the failure of the peace movement to address the question of Israel and Palestine in a more forthright and effective manner, particularly the difficulty in influencing decision-makers into supporting Israeli-Palestinian peace, despite popular support for such a shift in policy from its current bias in favor of Israeli government policies.

GULF WAR AFTERMATH

The current weakness of a Middle East peace movement in the United States comes in part from the popularity of the 1991 Gulf War and the resulting marginalization of its opponents. There were a number of factors that made the peace movement appear weak and lacking popular support - a highly effective propaganda barrage by the Bush Administration, the censorship of the press at the war front, the deliberate falsification of reports from the battlefield to exaggerate military successes and underestimate civilian casualties, the low number of American casualties, the short duration of the war, and the nefarious nature of the Iraqi regime. In addition, the media played largely a cheer leading role, with opponents of the war - including Middle Eastern experts - largely ignored as analysts and notably absent from network talk shows.(1) Pro-war sentiment was stage-managed from the highest level and was no match for an underfunded grass roots movement.

There were also some serious errors which cost the peace movement some support: One was the fact that peace activists largely shared with most Americans a profound ignorance of the Middle East, Islam, and the Arab World) For example, during the months preceding the outbreak of hostilities, Time observed that "The public response resembles a massive cram session, as earnest people try to understand the complex forces at work and calculate the potential costs, human and material of going to war."(3)

One result was a series of tactical errors: for example, many anti-war activists focused on the precedent of Vietnam, despite great differences between the two situations. As with the old adage about generals, anti-war activists also tend to fight the last war, often ignoring the unique aspects of an upcoming crisis. For example, Vietnam did not have the capability of threatening large populations beyond their borders, as did Iraq, thereby the Bush Administration could raise a more credible - though still questionable - specter of further aggression.(4) In Vietnam, the U.S. fought a popular nationalist struggle utilizing guerrilla warfare in a mountainous jungle terrain. The Gulf War was in a flat desert area against a conventional army in a territory that was either uninhabited or supportive of the U.S.. Another error came in emphasizing the potential of large American casualties in an era when the high-tech equipment of American forces can keep "kill ratios" so favorable to allied forces and the war could be fought and won in a matter of weeks. Indeed, it was the relatively low number of American casualties and the brevity of the ground war, in the face of dire predictions by some that it would turn into "another Vietnam," which helped undermine the peace movement's credibility.

Still another problem came with the peace movement's late start in opposing the preparation for war. Despite the apparent absence of any real Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia, that the rush to send foreign troops hardened Iraq's refusal to withdraw,(5) and that the initial U.S. troop build-up was, rather than being defensive, actually a calculated preparation for offensive military action, the deployment received near universal support from decision-makers, as well as from such progressive political figures as Jesse Jackson, Todd Gitlin, William Sloane Coffin and Bernie Sanders. Outside of some traditional pacifist groups, such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the anti-war movement did not respond, in large part, until November, when the Bush Administration went public with its intention to launch a war.

Many peace activists also fell victim to some of the same anti-Arab racism of which they accused many supporters of the war, seeing the Kuwaitis as primarily a group of oil-rich sheiks not worthy of concern. Actually, most rich Kuwaitis fled south the day of the invasion. Those who suffered the most under the Iraqi occupation were the less well-off Kuwaitis who stayed behind as well as the large numbers of Palestinian and other foreign workers. Peace activists also tended to ignore the fact that though the Sabah dynasty had many faults, Kuwait had made more advances toward political pluralism than any other country in the Gulf region and that the human rights situation under Iraqi occupation was qualitatively worse than what was experienced under the monarchy.(6) Some peace activists blithely accepted the Baghdad government's statement that Kuwait was historically part of Iraq.(7) Indeed, given the propensity of the U.S. government in the preceding years to mislead the American public regarding the nature of the Sandinista government of Nicaragua and other Third World adversaries of the U.S. government, many peace activists were understandably skeptical about the reports of atrocities by the Iraqi government or of its totalitarian nature. In this case, however, most of these reports were true.

There were also some cases of Israel-bashing, with some war opponents even going as far as insisting that Israel was the cause of the conflict and that it was the pro-Israel lobby that led to the U.S. decision to launch the war.(8)

Some far right groups, including the Liberty Lobby, the John Birch Society, followers of Lyndon LaRouche and independent rightists known for paranoid conspiracy theories (which on some occasions happened to parallel more thoughtful left critiques) joined in with anti-war efforts, and were at times allowed into coalition efforts by those unaware of their anti-Semitic and far right ideologies. The LaRouche Movement had actually developed close ties with Iraq's Ba'ath party, with which it shares an essentially fascist ideology.(9) These alliances harmed the credibility of the peace movement.

There were also serious divisions within the left. Some prominent figures respected by the American left actually supported the war: Patrick Lacefield, a former staff member of the radical pacifist magazine Win, a leader in the Democratic Socialist of America, and editor of a popular anti-war anthology on Central America;(10) Fred Halliday, a Marxist scholar of the Middle East from Great Britain who serves as an editor of New Left Review;(11) and, John Judis, a senior writer for In These Times and former editor of Socialist Revolution.(12) More seriously, however, were divisions within the anti-war movement itself: Two coalitions organized separate national demonstrations in Washington, DC on two separate dates in late January 1991, after the war was underway. The primary differences revolved around the preferred date of the rally as well as on the question as to whether to condemn Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait along with the U.S.-led war. Arguing that Iraqi aggression was not the cause, but the excuse, for U.S. intervention, the more radical of the two coalitions - the Emergency Committee to Stop the United States War in the Middle East, which organized the 19 January rally - insisted that any denunciation of Iraq would confuse the issue. Supporters of the 26 January rally, led by the National Campaign for Peace in the Middle East, a coalition of over 400 more mainstream organizations, stressed the importance of taking a principled - as well as more politically-acceptable - position condemning both Iraqi and American actions.(13)

Despite these problems, however, the anti-war movement showed some real strengths as well.

STRENGTHS OF THE ANTI-GULF WAR MOVEMENT

One interesting aspect of the anti-war movement was its popular appeal in areas not usually known as strongholds of dissident politics in recent decades.(14) Some of the most widespread opposition was in the West and Midwest, where anti-war sentiment was strongest prior to the Cold War. Unlike the Vietnam War, it was not hippies versus hard-hats or one generation against another; indeed, the strongest anti-war sentiment was among the elderly,(15) and a far lesser proportion of the movement was made up of students. In addition, intellectuals were behind, rather than ahead of, public opinion regarding opposition to the war. Since the armed forces had a disproportionate number of people from lower-income backgrounds, students at the less-prestigious universities were more likely to know someone at risk and thus more likely to oppose the conflict. One reason that the national media coverage understated the strength of anti-war sentiment was because they tended to look primarily at elite campuses and leftist white male intellectuals, and concluded that opposition was weak.(16) Yet a decentralized populist movement organized at the grassroots, often spontaneous and improvised without sophisticated media outreach efforts, was in evidence throughout the country.(17)

Despite President George Bush's claim that there was "no anti-war movement" opposing the Gulf War, hundreds of thousands of people mobilized across the country in the three months before and during the war in opposition, more than during the first three years of major U.S. combat in Vietnam.(18) The movement was overwhelmingly nonviolent and practiced an impressive degree of internal democracy. Unlike a tiny and irresponsible fringe of the anti-Vietnam War movement, anger was reserved for the policy makers, not the individual soldiers. Unlike any previous American wars, large-scale opposition began prior to the first shot being fired.(19) The movement was inter-generational, with new activists on the campuses joining those who have fought for peace and social justice for decades. The large gap in attitudes toward the war between men and women detected in public opinion polls stimulated a growing understanding of the role of patriarchy in war-making and encouraged more leadership by women in the movement.(20)

While less visible in the national demonstrations, there was impressive anti-war organizing among minority communities in both urban areas and in the rural South. Virtually all African-American denominations came out against the war, in contrast to the noted lack of support among much of the Black leadership of Martin Luther King's outspoken opposition to the Vietnam War.(21) A weak economy meant that the economic consequences of the war were apparent to those who bore the brunt of its effects, leading to greater participation and leadership by people of color, who were particularly disturbed at the disproportionate representation of minorities on the front lines.(22)

Unlike movements concerned with Central America and Vietnam - where there was strong sympathy for the other side among some peace activists - there was little support for Saddam Hussein. As a result, this was perhaps a more purely and genuinely anti-war movement than the United States had ever seen. There was no hidden ideological agenda. There was no draft, so people did not oppose the war for self-centered reasons. There was a lot of popular support for the war, so it was certainly not fashionable to oppose it. It represented a very deep sense that, on both pragmatic and moral grounds, there were reasons to question war as the answer.

In a dramatic shift from the 1960s, the peace movement had support immediately prior to the war from key segments of organized labor. Nine major unions, representing six million workers, announced their opposition on 10 January, a major departure from the widespread support by union leaders of the war in Vietnam.(23) Hundreds of district offices from other unions were also announcing their opposition, often citing the disproportionate number of working class children in uniform.(24)

The opposition to the war by the majority of major Christian denominations was significant. Every major mainline religious denomination in the country went on record opposing the war as morally unjustifiable and supported continuing sanctions. An overwhelming majority of the 300 members of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops supported a resolution against the war as morally wrong; they did not publicly oppose the Vietnam War until 1971.(25) Eighteen prominent church leaders issued an anti-war statement in early January after visiting with religious and government officials in the Middle East and the National Council of Churches also challenged U.S. policy.(26) Churches in several cities declared themselves sanctuaries for war resisters.

Citing "just war" teachings, religious leaders observed how the Gulf War did not meet the criteria of "last resort" or "proportionality." What makes this notable is that in an economically inter-dependent world, the power of economic sanctions makes it difficult to imagine an actual situation where military force could be considered the only means available to the world community to challenge aggression. Similarly, the power of modern weaponry against large segments of a country's population raises serious questions as to whether the criterion of proportionality could be met, either. In effect, it may be that even the mainstream American Christian community in the late Twentieth Century is now, for the first time, unable to support any real war.

The great division in public opinion prior to the war was all the more remarkable given that, while there were certainly strong arguments against the use of massive military force against Iraq, the case for the war was stronger than any U.S. intervention since World War II: the U.S. government was responding to a case of aggression in a region where the U.S. had vital interests, the U.S. had the support of the United Nations Security Council, the president had an effective declaration of war by Congress, and there was little risk of a nuclear exchange.

Given these unique circumstances, the popularity and apparent success of this war does not mean that future U.S. military interventions of this magnitude are necessarily more likely - the odds of such a blatant provocation by an adversary of the U.S. against a strategically-important ally in the future are remote. Indeed, given that the peace movement forced the Bush Administration to go to extraordinary lengths to legitimate the war effort, such as asking for formal Congressional and U.N. backing and emphasizing principles of self-determination and enforcement of United Nations resolutions as justification for the war, it will be hard to legitimize further U.S. military interventions without such a clear mandate. In effect, while the peace movement was unable to stop the Gulf War, it may have effectively prevented future wars.

The censorship of media reports from the battle area, the threats and harassment against activists, and the enormous propaganda machinery mobilized to support U.S. policy were all predictable responses to a serious popular challenge to the war-making power of the U.S. government. If the peace movement did not pose a serious challenge to U.S. Gulf policy, the Bush Administration and its supporters would not have gone to such extraordinary efforts to counter it. As a result, there are many reasons to believe that anti-war sentiment is seen by those in positions of political power as a force with which to be reckoned.

THE DEFEAT OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT

Public opinion polls indicated that support of the war was widespread but shallow - people wanted to believe the government was right, even if upon further reflection of the facts, many came out in opposition. Such further reflection was difficult, however, since they received only heavily-censored news from the war front and a propaganda barrage from the government and media. Meanwhile, in Washington, even liberal Democrats went along with the policy once the war started, showing the same moral cowardice they did during much of the Vietnam War. The fact that the war was successful militarily made it all the more difficult to question whether it was right.

Todd Gitlin, a University of California sociologist and former leader of Students for a Democratic Society, has observed that there are three conditions necessary for dissent to have an effective impact: "Number 1, the elites have to divide. Number 2, people have to feel there's a politically convincing alternative. Number 3, people have to feel the war is going badly on its own terms. Because Americans love a winner. And, by the same token, are squeamish about a loser."(27) The first two conditions were in existence between Bush's 8 November announcement of a buildup for offensive military action and the start of the war on 16 January. But when the war started, Gitlin observed, "these two conditions evaporated overnight. The choice wasn't no war or war anymore. . . . The elites lined up for the war."(28) Americans tend to be notoriously impatient with foreign affairs; issues that drag out, whether they be U.S. military interventions - like Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia - or even treaty negotiations - like the Panama Canal or SALT - tend to hurt those in power; those that are quick, like Panama, Grenada, the Mayaguez incident, the bombing of Libya, and the Gulf War tend to receive overwhelming popular support.(29)

After the large demonstrations in Washington, the anti-war movement focused on teach-ins and other community education efforts. However, by this time, most Americans were either enthused at or resigned to the fact that the U.S. government would prosecute the war as it saw fit regardless of public opinion. The 21 February campus days of protests were widespread but sparsely attended, reflecting the burn-out and frustration of war opponents. The widespread civil disobedience which had some popular support during the initial days of the war, became seen increasingly as excessive and inappropriate. Saddam Hussein's public announcements praising the anti-war movement further harmed its credibility. By the end of the second week of the war, a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll asked respondents, "Have you gained respect for anti-war demonstrators, lost respect, or is your opinion unchanged?" Sixty percent said they had lost respect, while only 11% said they had gained respect.(30)

POST-WAR ISSUES

When the war ended and with public opinion firmly and overwhelmingly in support of President Bush, the U.S. military and U.S. Gulf policy, the anti-war movement found itself in disarray. The Middle East was once again on the back burner of the peace movement's agenda. This came despite the fact that the worst suffering by the Iraqi people - both in the immediate post-war repression by Saddam Hussein's regime as well as the devastating impact of the heavily damaged infrastructure and post-war sanctions on the economy - was yet to come.

Though the traditional pacifist groups, such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the American Friends Service Committee, have continued to address the situation in Iraq - particularly the devastating humanitarian crises resulting from the war and the ongoing sanctions(31) - such efforts have failed to create much popular support. While the initial outcry to the slaughter of Iraqi Kurds by the Baghdad regime in 1991 did lead to the establishment of U.N.sponsored safe areas, there was little opposition to the open U.S. backing of subsequent Turkish repression of its own Kurdish minority or Turkey's large-scale incursion into the U.N. safe area in early 1995 and again in 1997. Similarly, periodic bombing raids by the U.S. air force in Iraq since the war has met with little organized opposition, though there was widespread skepticism across the political spectrum from the September 1996 air strikes against Iraq in response to Hussein's intervention in a Kurdish civil conflict.

While peace and human rights activists have made U.S. support of undemocratic governments in Latin America and Southeast Asia more difficult politically, there has been little domestic opposition to U.S. support of similar rulers in the Middle East outside of these countries' (often exaggerated) potential threat to Israel. Despite this, the recent rise of human rights movements in the Middle East has been impressive.(32) While their successes have not been as dramatic as their counterparts in Eastern Europe or Latin America, the potential is there, and the level of international solidarity with such movements could play a major role in their chances of forcing political change. So far, however, it has not been forthcoming in the United States, perhaps due to the widespread racism in this country, which includes an assumption that Arabs are not deserving, or even desiring, of basic human rights, including the pseudo-sensitivity espoused by American proponents of such regimes that it is wrong to "impose" our "cultural bias" of individual liberty.(33)

The U.S. is the largest arms supplier to the Middle East. In just the first three years following the Gulf War, the U.S. shipped over $35 billion in weaponry to the Middle East - more than 72% of total U.S. arms transfers to the Third World, a 61% increase from the previous four years.(34) The Federation of American Scientists has established a project on the arms trade which has attracted some limited support from traditional peace groups, as has the Demilitarization for Democracy project, yet these efforts fall far short of constituting an authentic movement. Several Congressional resolutions were passed in the wake of the Gulf War calling for limitations of U.S. arms exports, yet these included sufficient escape clauses as to render them essentially meaningless.(35) Despite continued popular concerns in the United States about the high levels of arms transfers to the Middle East, this has continued to be a low priority for peace activists.

Clinton Administration policy in the Middle East parallels policy in other parts of the world by U.S. administrations which have engendered mass opposition: arms transfers to repressive regimes, violations of international law, support of military solutions to political problems, and economic policies which appear to favor elites at the expense of sustainable development. However, there are no demonstrations with tens of thousands of people in Washington, no sit-ins at Congressional offices, few folk singers and other cultural workers addressing the issue, or other activities indicative of a popular mobilization comparable to those waged against U.S. policy toward Central America or Southern Africa. There is little question that if there was a comparable movement, policies would be altered or at least the government would find itself on the defensive. Until the Middle East does become such an issue, however, there is unlikely to be any major changes in U.S. policy.

This is not just a reflection of the moribund state of the peace movement as a whole in the post-Gulf War and post-Cold War period. Even during peak periods of the peace movement in the 1980s, peace groups failed to mobilize against U.S. backing of controversial Israeli actions (such as the invasion of Lebanon and suppression of the intifada), U.S. support of Morocco's conquest of Western Sahara, and the dramatic increase in U.S. arms transfers to the autocratic Gulf monarchies. Such a reaction, or lack thereof, is indicative of some larger problems that the American peace movement has had historically in addressing Middle Eastern issues. At the root of these problems is the issue of Israel and Palestine.

ADDRESSING ISRAEL/PALESTINE

Though the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has never affected American peace activists with the same sense of urgency that came with direct large-scale U.S. military involvement as in the Gulf War, the U.S. has played an active and - according to most knowledgeable peace activists - a counter-productive role.

For example, many American peace activists involved with the Middle East cite how there has been a growing international consensus over the past twenty-five years that the only realistic peace option for the Middle East is the recognition of the rights of both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs for national self-determination. On one extreme, there are rejectionist governments like Libya and Iran, as well as radical Islamic movements, which refuse to recognize Israeli national rights, while, on the other extreme, there are the rejectionist governments of Israel and the United States, which likewise oppose Palestinian national rights. The Oslo Accords provide a framework for limited autonomy for Palestinians in parts of their territory occupied by Israel, but both the U.S. and Israel are explicit that this agreement will never lead to statehood. For many years, the U.S. refused to even talk with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization - the effective Palestinian government - or allow them into the U.S.-led peace process until Israel unilaterally began secret talks with the PLO in a third country in 1993.

As with the major peace issues of the 1980s - the nuclear freeze and U.S. intervention in Central America - the peace movement's support of a two-state solution is backed by a majority of Americans.(36) Sizable majorities have also supported linking U.S. military and economic aid to both Israel and Arab states to human rights concerns.(37) Very few prominent American political figures support such positions, however. Indeed, there is perhaps no issue of U.S. foreign and military policy where there is such a large gap between public opinion and U.S. policy. The peace movement has failed to take advantage of this divergence of opinion, however.

The first major peace group to directly address the Arab-Israeli conflict was the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) which, in 1971, published a report entitled The Search for Peace in the Middle East, which called for the recognition of both Israeli and Palestinian national rights.(38) This report was strongly denounced by influential Jewish individuals and organizations, some of which grossly distorted the Quakers' position in a series of widely-circulated propaganda efforts.(39) Despite this reaction, however, other pacifist groups, such as the War Resisters League and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, came forward with similar statements in subsequent years. By the 1980s, a wider array of peace groups - such as SANE/Freeze and the Mobilization for Survival - were adopting similar positions, though the AFSC was the only organization to make the Middle East a major focus of its program work. A number of smaller organizations, focused specifically on the Middle East but allied in their orientation with the broader peace movement, came into being during this period. Several liberal Christian, Jewish and Arab-American groups also began to advocate positions which similarly supported the national rights of both Palestinians and Israelis to self-determination and for direct negotiations between the major parties to the conflict.

During the late 1980s, activist groups placed popular referenda on the ballot in several jurisdictions calling for the recognition of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. These were part of the increased use of voter initiatives during this period to mobilize support for other progressive causes, 'such as the nuclear freeze, reductions in military spending, an end to U.S. intervention in Central America, and sanctions against South Africa. To a greater degree than these other efforts, however, the organized opposition was stronger, better financed, and received the backing of a broad spectrum of elected officials. As a result, most of these initiatives failed, even in liberal cities like San Francisco, thanks to near-universal opposition of the local political establishment. In the nearby city of Berkeley - which had established sister city relationships with a black South African township, a Nicaraguan city, and a town in guerrilla-controlled section of El Salvador - an initiative to establish a similar relationship with a Palestinian refugee camp was soundly defeated.(40)

Another effort surrounded efforts to influence the Democratic Party platform. At the 1988 Democratic convention, a minority plank was proposed calling for a two-state solution, with the language taken directly from a 1985 New York Times advertisement by dozens of prominent liberal Jews, but Democratic party leaders refused to allow it to even come for a vote.(41) There were a series of battles at several state conventions in subsequent years, some of which were successful, but all of which were eventually overturned as a result of efforts by party leaders and powerful special interest groups.(42)

Despite this increased concern over Middle East issues, some peace groups, particularly those involved in the electoral arena, continued to refuse to support pro-peace positions. For example, from its founding in 1973 until its demise in 1988, the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy was the peace movement's leading lobbying group on Capitol Hill. However, they consistently refused to address the issues of Palestinian rights or U.S. aid for Israel. A 1981 Coalition statement re-affirmed the group's support of the "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence" of Middle Eastern states, but explicitly stated that this principle "does not necessarily apply" to lands seized by Israel in the 1967 war. The Coalition also refused to include Israel in their normally strict standards of linking human rights and nuclear non-proliferation issues with U.S. military aid.(43) Coalition staff members refused to even respond to the widespread protests over this statement from individual members.(44)

Similarly, Gretchen Eick, a former Coalition leader who became leader of National Impact, a progressive lobbying coalition which claimed to provide "leadership of peace and justice issues," declared soon after the group's founding, that they also consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "off limits."(45) The Human Rights Political Action Committee, which raised funds for candidates based on their support of a human rights agenda in U.S. foreign policy, also made an exception regarding Israel.(46)

A number of former peace activists who subsequently held electoral office even supported Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. As hundreds of thousands of Israelis demonstrated against their government's action, California State Assemblyman Tom Hayden toured Israeli-occupied sections of Lebanon with his wife, actress Jane Fonda, during the fighting, and both praised Israeli actions. Washington mayor Marion Barry, a former leader in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, spoke at a rally sponsored by the city's right-wing Jewish groups in support of the invasion.(47)

The peace movement is not just challenged by anti-Arab sentiments among its erstwhile supporters, but from anti-Israel elements as well. Many activists, particularly on the far left, have expressed solidarity with the plight of the Palestinians in a manner which has at times been insensitive to legitimate Israeli security concerns and often goes beyond questioning Israeli government policies in the occupied territories to questioning Israel's very right to exist. This has created a reluctance on the part of many peace activists to address U.S. policy toward Israel/Palestine for fear that it might unwittingly encourage anti-Semitism. In addition, while American peace activists have had no trouble attributing U.S. support of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor or Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara to the exigencies of American imperialism, U.S. support of Israeli occupation forces, by contrast, is often attributed to the "Jewish lobby," effectively blaming a small and historically-oppressed minority group - rather than the powerful vested interests which normally dictate the direction of U.S. foreign policy - for the policies of Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department and the president. This exaggerated view of the economic and political power of American Jews is widely interpreted as a form of anti-Semitism and has undoubtedly hurt the credibility of some elements of the Middle East peace movement.

This polarization between these two extremes in the peace movement creates problems: in popular movements concerned with Central America, Southern Africa, and the arms race, there was general agreement from across the broadly progressive political spectrum on what was wrong with U.S. policy and how it needed to change. On the Middle East, however, such unity is hard to find. Indeed, many peace groups have demonstrated a profound reluctance to address the Middle East at all for fear of the divisiveness which would result from taking even a highly principled position. Many individual peace activists, concerned at the often hostile reaction from their Jewish friends who support Israeli policies and out of fear of appearing anti-Semitic, have also remained silent on the matter. In addition, there is concern that many otherwise liberal Jewish donors would be reluctant to continue their support of organizations critical of Israeli policies.

Indeed, with the exception of the period surrounding the Gulf War, it has been progressive Jewish and Arab-American groups which have provided the most visible peace activism on the Middle East. Without the support of mainstream peace groups, however, groups working for peace in the Middle East have remained on the fringes of popular consciousness.(48) The failure to successfully challenge U.S. policy toward Israel/Palestine, then, may be not as much a result of the financial and political clout of those supporting the Israeli government as the failure of those supporting peace in the Middle East to mount a counter-challenge.

One problem facing peace activists is the perception that - because U.S. policy is perceived to be pro-Israel - criticism of U.S. policy appears to some like criticism of Israel itself. Many on the Israeli left, however, have argued that U.S. policy is ultimately anti-Israel, since it discourages the Israeli government from making necessary compromises that would ensure peace, isolates Israel further from its Arab neighbors and the international community, and increasingly militarizes its economy at the expense of sustainable economic development. As a result, these Israelis argue that the American peace movement must emphasize that its opposition to U.S. support of the Israeli occupation is not just pro-Palestinian, but ultimately pro-Israel as well.(49)

POINTS OF CONTENTION

Many American peace activists argue that Israel should be treated like any other country that invades and occupies the territory of its neighbors, engages in systematic human rights violations, refuses to recognize the national rights of a people that it exiles and continually subjugates, uses American weapons against civilian targets, arms and trains death squads, ignores United Nations resolutions, and systematically flaunts international legal conventions. The question is not an insignificant one - Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, consuming nearly half of all U.S. foreign aid despite being a small and relatively affluent country. Much of the weaponry responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as well as the teargas, guns, and troop carriers utilized in the ongoing repression in the remaining occupied territories today comes to Israel courtesy of the American taxpayer. In addition, few Israelis believe that their country could afford the heavy economic burden of the occupation - the costs of maintaining a large occupation force, the subsidies for the illegal settlements in the occupied territories, etc. - without the U.S. government transferring massive amounts of unrestricted grants into the Israeli treasury. Finally, such an unconditional largess from the United States provides no incentive for Israel to go beyond the extremely limited autonomy thus far offered to the Palestinians, to withdraw from additional Arab lands, or to recognize an independent state of Palestine.

Still, many peace activists oppose raising the issue of U.S. aid to Israel since, while most strategic analysts recognize that Israel - unlike some periods earlier in its history - is not under immediate military threat, there is still a widespread perception that Israel is under siege. As a result, those who oppose military aid to Israel are easily depicted as advocating the military destruction of the Jewish state, and are thus relegated to the fringe of U.S. public opinion along with anti-Jewish bigots. Consequently, there is virtually no chance that the U.S. government will consider a cessation or reduction in military aid to Israel any time in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is argued, peace activists should focus their energy on more immediate attainable goals, such as supporting the ongoing peace process and supporting an Israeli freeze on expanding their settlements in the occupied territories, and not risk losing their political credibility on the aid issue. Furthermore, those opposing emphasis on the aid question believe that it raises an unnecessarily divisive issue at a time when there is a pressing need to reach out to those with a more mainstream political perspective in both the Jewish community and elsewhere. Opposing military aid to Israel will inevitably be depicted as putting Israel's survival at risk and thus alienate many potential allies.

Even if such a movement to cut U.S. aid were successful, it is argued, it may make matters worse. Such a cutoff may cause the Israeli public, increasingly open to the idea of granting the Palestinians at least some rights, to close ranks behind right-wing politicians and destroy the peace process. Many Israelis would see such a move as abandonment and betrayal, which would reinforce feelings of isolation and persecution built over centuries. According to this argument, this would not encourage necessary compromise, but might lead to even more reckless behavior by the Israeli military. Such concerns have led many Israelis on the left, including most of the recognized leadership of the Peace Now movement, to oppose any threatened cutoff or reduction in U.S. aid.

Those peace activists advocating this more cautious approach point out that many critics of Israeli policies do not share such universal principles, and use Israeli violations of human rights and international law as an excuse for attacking the world's only Jewish state. While such people are certainly a minority among those critical of U.S. policy in the Middle East, it reinforces a widespread assumption that any criticism of U.S. support of the Israeli government carries just such a hidden agenda. For this reason, many who support a two-state solution and a more even-handed U.S. policy believe that a confrontational approach is counter-productive, that there should be no threats on a reduction of aid and that any criticism of the Israeli government should be kept private. While critics of this approach note its similarity with the Reagan and Bush administrations' "quiet diplomacy" toward Latin American dictatorships and "constructive engagement" toward South Africa, its defenders observe that Israel's isolation and the Jews' history of persecution dictates the utilization of such a cautious strategy.

Others argue that it is just as wrong to single out Israel for immunity from criticism as it is to single out Israel for criticism. In addition, it is argued that if peace activists do not raise the question of assistance to the Israeli government on grounds of human rights, international law, and Israel's own self-interest, the only ones left to do so will be those on the right who appeal to nativistic or even anti-Semitic sentiments. Furthermore, supporters of challenging unconditional aid to Israel observe that far more Israelis support such a move than can say so publicly, pointing to Israeli concerns that calling for such action openly would seriously damage the credibility of the Israeli peace movement. In addition, a growing number of Israelis on the left-wing of the peace movement, including the late Major General and Knesset member Mattityahu Peled, have called for cutbacks in U.S. aid publicly.(50) Advocates of addressing the arms question also observe that Israel is so heavily dependent on U.S. aid that a cutback in such assistance would force Israelis - on economic grounds - to pressure their government to curb its heavy military spending, its support for settlements in the occupied territories, and other high costs of military occupation and territorial aggrandizement. As long as the Israeli government knows it will be subsidized regardless of its policies, it is argued, they will have no incentive to change them. Pressure from the United States about freezing settlements, for example, without the threat of sanctions as enforcement is worthless.

In addition, many believe that the over $4 billion of aid sent to Israel annually would be better spent on social programs in the United States that have been subjected to major cutbacks. Indeed, since public opinion polls show a majority of Americans supporting reducing or conditioning the level of U.S. aid to Israel, so - once again - the peace movement would find itself representing the majority of the American public. Those advocating a concerted effort against military aid to Israel observe how support of such aid to Israel by members of Congress hampers efforts to curb U.S. military aid to repressive regimes elsewhere. Efforts to pass legislation that would restrict aid systematically to countries which refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or engage in certain violations of international law have been blocked solely because the provisions of the bill would include Israel.

Many who advocate addressing the question of U.S. aid are left Zionists who point out that Israel's dependency on the U.S. violates the principle of nonalignment, a cornerstone of the Labor Zionist movement. They fear that Israel's close ties with what is seen by many as an imperialist power like the United States alienates Israel's potential allies in the Third World and leaves Israel vulnerable to the whims of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, for every dollar of U.S. military aid to Israel, Israelis have to pay two to three dollars in training, personnel, maintenance and spare parts.(51) Furthermore, it is noted that increasingly interlocked military-industrial complexes of the two nations have furthered the negative projection of U.S. military power in other conflict-ridden areas. For example, since the American peace movement had mobilized public opinion in the U.S. to levels which prohibited direct U.S. military assistance to Guatemala, South Africa, Iran, and the Contras, the U.S. simply armed these countries through Israel.

Those who have been most successful in raising the question of U.S. aid to Israel have been those who have also opposed such arms transfers to Arab states, emphasizing issues of peace and human rights as grounds for ending U.S. aid and avoiding such divisive ideological debates as the nature of Zionism. To be effective, the arms issue regarding Israel should be treated like questions of arms aid to any other repressive country: a campaign against U.S. military support for such undeserving governments stems not from a desire to see a given nation destroyed by outside forces, but instead from a belief that such assistance violates U.S. and international law, is contrary to both U.S. interests and basic human decency, and promotes intransigence and warfare rather than negotiations. Opposition to U.S. military assistance to Middle Eastern countries should be based not on any ideological bias against the state of Israel, but must be within the context of advocacy for fundamental human rights and social justice worldwide. Some have recognized the importance of repeatedly emphasizing that a military defeat of the state of Israel is neither possible nor desirable and that a two-state solution is the only realistic solution since that alone would recognize the national aspirations of both peoples and thus end the conflict. Such a position is obvious to many, but needs to be emphasized repeatedly since many supporters of Israel are convinced that those who oppose the policies of the Israeli government are opposed to Israel itself, and believe that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a zero-sum game. Peace activists, then, will likely be more successful by emphasizing that the opposite is true: Israeli security and Palestinian rights are not contradictory but mutually dependent, and a serious re-evaluation of U.S. military and economic support of Israel and other Middle Eastern countries must play an important role in establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Until the peace movement can reach a consensus on such a basic issue as U.S. aid to Israel, however, its ability to influence U.S. government policy will be minimal.

THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL IMPACT

A key test of any grassroots political movement is in its ability to have an impact on the electoral process and thereby on government policy. It is here that the Middle East peace movement has had its greatest failure. Part of this is undoubtedly related to the impressive organizational and financial strength of organizations and individuals, predominantly Jewish, which support Israeli government policies. While I have argued previously thai the impact of the "pro-Israel lobby" and its related political action committees has been greatly exaggerated as a major determinant for U.S. Middle East policy,(52) it cannot be denied that such organizations have a real impact.

At least as important, however, has been the willingness of prominent peace activists and their organizations to support candidates who take anti-peace positions. Perhaps the most glaring example of this phenomenon was the 1992 presidential candidacy of Senator Tom Harkin. Some of the movement's top fund-raisers and organizers enlisted in the Iowa Democrat's unsuccessful primary campaign, and he was overwhelmingly the top choice among supporters of the peace movement involved with electoral politics.(53) This widespread support for Harkin, however, came despite his positions regarding Israel/Palestine which placed himself as the most right-wing of all the presidential contenders that year.

Despite President Bush's refusal to support Palestinian self-determination, to rule out even negotiating with the PLO, and to continued large-scale military and economic aid to the Israeli government and its occupation forces, Harkin criticized the Bush Administration for being too hard on Israel and too soft on the Palestinians. He even attacked President Bush for pushing Israel too much in the peace talks, claiming that Bush of being "quick to accommodate the terrorist PLO." Harkin further claimed that Bush had "turned his back on Israel." He promised to "turn up the heat on the Bush Administration" regarding increased support of the Shamir government, stating, "I plan to use my campaign for the Presidency to teach that lesson to George Bush and the public."(54)

As a senator, Harkin established a reputation as an outspoken opponent of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, an opponent of peace talks with the PLO, an opponent of the Bush Administration's position that all the land seized in the 1967 war should be open to negotiations, and an opponent of tying U.S. aid to Israel to concerns over human rights, international law, or a willingness to negotiate land for peace.(55) Interviews with scores of Israeli peace activists indicated a strong sense of betrayal that their American counterparts threw their support to someone who opposed virtually the entire agenda of the Israeli peace movement. Indeed, Harkin's positions would have put him decisively on the right-wing of the Israeli political spectrum?

The widespread support by peace activists of Harkin's presidential bid was a serious setback to those hoping for a sustained popular movement in the United States for peace and justice in the Middle East. It demonstrated that no matter how far to the right a candidate might go on Middle East issues, he could still expect support from peace activists. This contrasts with the enormous pressure the peace movement had placed on Democrats who opposed the nuclear freeze or supported aid to the Salvadoran government and the Contras. As a result, there was little incentive for Harkin or any other presidential candidate to alter their positions on the Middle East. More fundamentally, it showed that there is even less incentive for policy makers to alter current U.S. policy.

The Harkin campaign was not an isolated case. Many peace activists were involved in the presidential campaigns of Alan Cranston in 1984 and Paul Simon in 1988, who took positions on the Middle East virtually identical to those of Harkin. In addition, peace organizations have endorsed, and peace activists have supported, the campaigns of senators whose positions are similarly as hard-lined as Harkin, including Edward Kennedy, Carol Mosely Braun, Patty Murray, Harris Wofford, Barbara Boxer and others. Similarly, peace groups in Massachusetts endorsed the Congressional campaigns of Barney Frank and Joseph Kennedy immediately after they had led efforts to defeat a popular referendum calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Likewise, in California, peace groups endorsed the campaigns of leading opponents of similar initiatives, including Robert Matsui, Henry Waxman, Harry Berman, Mel Levine, and Kathleen Brown.(57)

Essentially, while the peace groups in the United States are willing to pass resolutions and take formal positions in support of popular movements for peace in Israel and other Middle Eastern countries, there has been a marked unwillingness to translate these sentiments into political action, particularly in the electoral arena. As a result, their impact becomes minimal. For example, in 1991, the influential national peace group SANE/Freeze (now Peace Action), like other peace groups, formally adopted a resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which supported a two-state solution, negotiations which would include the Palestinians' chosen representatives, and making housing loan guarantees conditional on freezing construction of Israeli settlements. However, on the survey of candidates circulated by their political action committee the following spring, while continuing to include questions about sanctions against South Africa and aid to El Salvador, there was no mention in the questionnaire of Israeli-Palestinian issues.(58)

This may explain why the peace movement's agenda regarding the Middle East has been held back. With a few conscientious exceptions, liberal politicians have rarely led on major foreign policy issues. It was only when grass roots pressure made it clear that failure to support a foreign policy based on human rights, international law, and non-military solutions to conflict would mean loss of support, did these politicians shift their positions. This was the case with ending the Vietnam War, supporting the nuclear freeze, imposing sanctions against South Africa, and advocating non-intervention in Central America. These became Democratic Party campaign issues only after mass movements were organized and enormous pressure was brought upon Democratic candidates.

Part of the problem stems from the lack of perceived urgency regarding the Middle East. Progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations has led many to believe that a just and lasting peace will be the inevitable outcome, not realizing that the strict limitations of Palestinian rights under the agreement actually threaten longterm hopes for peace.(59) There is also the very real problem of urgently-needed activism on the domestic front in the face of cutbacks in social programs and the weakening of environmental and consumer protection. Such a decline is not unique to activists concerned with the Middle East: Though plenty of work remains regarding nuclear disarmament and justice in Central America, these once-burgeoning movements have largely evaporated. More than these other issues, however, the Middle East is far more likely to deteriorate into a bloody confrontation where the United States would likely play a most unhelpful role.

It is unlikely that there will be peace in the Middle East until Israel withdraws from the occupied territories and grants Palestinians their right to full national self-determination. It is unlikely that Israel will be willing to make such compromises unless pressured by the U.S. government. And it is unlikely the U.S. government will make such a move unless the peace movement demands that there be a change in policy. Ultimately, it is the peoples of the Middle East who will determine their own fate. Yet U.S. policy needs to change if such a peaceful resolution will ever occur. Not only is U.S. policy wrong in an ethical sense, but it is simply unworkable. It is not only harmful for the inhabitants of the region, but, in the long-term, damaging to American interests as well. Current U.S. policy increases the prospects of terrorism and puts future diplomatic initiatives, as well as economic and cultural exchanges, at risk. Public opinion polls indicating popular support for U.S. Middle East policy does not mean that most Americans support that policy. It merely means that they support what they think that policy is. Most Americans actually believe their government's rhetoric that the United States supports democracy, international law, demilitarization, economic development, and Israeli-Palestinian peace, is true. The challenge for the American peace movement is to expose the real nature of U.S. policy and to work for change, as was done regarding Vietnam, Central America, and Southern Africa. The mobilization of a popular movement for peace and justice in the Middle East which avoids the ideological divisiveness which has often limited the effectiveness of such efforts up to this point may be the best hope for changing American policy. The opposition to the Gulf War demonstrated that the peace movement can mobilize regarding the Middle East in a crisis situation. Yet the silence on Israel/Palestine and other important Middle East policy questions may be sending just the wrong message. For the Gulf War also demonstrated how quickly the Middle East can suddenly find its way to the forefront of American politics and catch the peace movement unprepared. The question is whether it can successfully mobilize to prevent such a crisis from occurring again.

NOTES

1. Several studies are cited in William Haynes, "War as Video Game: Media, Activism, and the Gulf War," in Cynthia Peters, ed. Collateral Damage: The "New World Order" at Home and Abroad, Boston: South End Press, 1992, p. 308. In addition, see reports from Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) during the period in question.

2. I noticed this during my lectures during the Gulf crisis and the ensuing war. Indeed, I met activists who had traveled to Nicaragua on several occasions, could quote statistics regarding the appalling human consequences South Africa's apartheid system, and could argue the technical details of nuclear weaponry, but did not know even the basics of Middle Eastern geography, culture, or politics.

3. "Giving Peace a Chance," Time, 26 November 1990, p. 33. There were similar cram sessions at the time of the oil crisis of 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979.

4. Vietnam did invade Cambodia in 1979, but this move was largely supported by the Cambodians suffering under the brutally repressive Khmer Rouge regime. While this initial welcoming eventually faded, Iraq's neighbors have never welcomed Baghdad's military intervention.

5. See my article, "Arab Nationalism and the Persian Gulf Conflict," Peace Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1991.

6. See Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

7. Kuwait has had its own distinct identity since the 1700s, and while legally incorporated into an Ottoman province that included parts of what is now southern Iraq, Ottoman influence in Kuwait consisted of little more than a customs office. See Crystal, op. cit.

8. In at least half of my public appearances speaking against the war, there were questions and comments from the audience which tried to link the "Jewish lobby" to the war. In reality, the U.S. had its own reasons for fighting the Gulf War, regardless of what Israel's right-wing leadership saw as to their benefit. American interests in the region's oil and the establishment of a permanent military presence pre-date the establishment of modern Israel. And the decision to go to war in this case was far beyond the reach of any single lobbying group, no matter how influential. The U.S. refused to link Kuwaiti independence to Palestinian independence not because of Israel's resistance to ending its occupation, but because the U.S. has never supported any radical nationalist movement in the Third World. The U.S. refused Iraq's offer for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, not because of Israel's unwillingness to eliminate its nuclear arsenal and thereby forfeit its nuclear monopoly, but because the U.S. opposed nuclear-free zones anywhere. It is also noteworthy that the majority of Jewish members of Congress voted against the war - which is more than can be said for Christian members.

9. Chip Berlet, Political Research Associates, 23 December 1990, unpublished manuscript "Right Woos Left Over War Issue."

10. Commentary on National Public Radio's "All Things Considered," 31 January 1991.

11. See Alexander Cockburn, "Where is Saddam Now That They Need Him?", The Nation, 1 April 1991, citing Halliday's commentaries in The Guardian and New Statesman and Society.

12. See Judis' regular columns during this period in In These Times. Judis also wrote a scathing attack on former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark's opposition to the war which appeared in the 2 April 1991 issue of the New Republic.

13. Todd Gitlin, "Jump-Start for the Peace Forces," The Nation, 4 February 1991.

14. For example, in late November, more than 1000 people rallied in Missoula, Montana. In Kannapolis, N.C., a company town, a group called the Piedmont Peace Project was organized consisting of more than 500 mill workers, farmers, truck drivers and others. There were 59 vigils seven days a week in New Hampshire, a conservative state. Such organized opposition to the war surpassed such activities during the Vietnam War.

15. Typical was the New York Times/CBS News poll on the eve of the war showed that following the United Nations' January 15 deadline. When asked should the U.S. take military action, 35% of those over 65 replied in the affirmative, as compared with 47% of the general population. When asked if the U.S. should instead wait longer, 51% of those over 65 replied in the affirmative, as compared with 46% of the general population. [New York Times/CBS News Poll, 2nd January Poll, 11-13 January 1991].

16. See Gitlin, op. cit.

17. On my speaking tour during the war, I found impressive grassroots efforts in a series of small towns in Oregon, Washington, Montana and California. Various progressive periodicals, including the Guardian, Nonviolent Activist, Fellowship, and others during this period gave quite a few examples.

18. Gitlin, op. cit.

19. Ibid.

20. Typical was the New York Times/CBS News poll on the eve of the war showed that following the United Nations' January 15 deadline. When asked should the U.S. take military action, 56% of men applied in the affirmative, as compared with 40% of the women. When asked if the U.S. should instead wait longer, only 39% of the men replied in the affirmative, as compared with 52% of the women. [New York Times/CBS News Poll, 2nd January' Poll, 11-13 January 1991].

21. Salim Muwakkil, "African-Americans and Foreign Policy," in Cynthia Peters, op. cit, pp. 339-340.

22. "Who Died for Whose Way of Life? Reflections on the Burdens of Race," Monthly Review, Sept. 1991, p. 34.

23. The statement was issued by nine union presidents which appeared in the Washington Post. Two others added their names after the ad appeared in the 10 January edition.

24. Michael de Courcy Hinds, "Drawing on Vietnam Legacy, Antiwar Effort Buds Quickly", New York Times, 11 January 1991.

25. Ibid.

26. Peter Stienfels, "Beliefs," New York Times. It is rather noteworthy that with the presiding bishop of his own denomination, Episcopal Bishop Edmond Browning, advising him against war, Bush turned to fundamentalist Southern Baptist preacher Billy Graham, a supporter of the Vietnam War and confidant of President Nixon, for spiritual advice.

27. Cited in Scott Harris, "Anti-War Activists Regroup,", Los Angeles Times, 26 March 1991.

28. Ibid.

29. See Theodore J. Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg, American Government: Freedom and Power, New York: Horton, 1992, pp. 303-307.

30. Cited in David Shirbman, "Anti-War Activists, Finding they Don't Always Favor Peace, Lack Alternatives to Gulf Strategy," Wall Street Journal, 1 February 1991.

31. Estimates from the U.N. and private humanitarian groups have shown that increased rates of deaths related to malnutrition and preventable diseases as compared to the pre-war period have far surpassed the numbers killed in the actual war. These post-war victims have primarily been children.

32. See Jill Crystal, "The Human Rights Movement in the Middle East: The Arab Organization for Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly, #16, August 1994; and, "The Emerging Human Rights Environment in the Arab World" in Volker Bornschier, Peter Lengyel, eds., Conflict and its Solution in Worm Society, World Society Studies, Vol, 3, Frankfort: Campus Verlag, 1994.

See also: Ann E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, Boulder: Westview, 1991; Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991; and Abdullahi Naim, ed., Human Rights in Cross-cultural Perspectives, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992.

33. See my chapter in an upcoming volume edited by David Forsythe, The United States and Human Rights: Looking Outward and Inward, University of Nebraska Press, 1999.

34. See Joe Stork, "The Middle East Arms Bazaar after the Gulf War," Middle East Report, November-December 1995, p. 16. See also, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-92 (Washington, DC, 1994) pp. 6-7, 22-23.

35. Stork, op. cit., p. 15.

36. For example, by a margin of 52.9% to 20.8%, a representative sampling favored "creation of an independent Palestinian State in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip that would co-exit with a secure Israel." Polling was done by the Gordon S. Black Corporation in August 1991. John Zogby, "The Emerging Majority: American Voters and Palestinian Rights in the 1990s," Washington: Arab American Institute, 1992. This report quotes similar figures from other polls, including those by New York Times/CBS News and Gallup.

37. A 67% majority in 1978 agreed that the "U.S. should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights." Gallup poll of November 1978, cited in Anne E. Geyer and Robert Y. Shapiro, "The Polls - A Report: Human Rights" in Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 52, p. 390: Agree strongly 31%; Agree somewhat 36%; disagree somewhat 17%; disagree strongly 8%; not sure, don't know 8%. N = 1,546.

Regarding Israel specifically, a Wirthlin Group poll of 6-9 September, 1994 indicated that 69% believed that aid to Israel should be reduced or phased out.

38. Subtitled A Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee, New York: Hill & Wang, 1971.

39. The best known of these attacks was in Arnold Soloway, Truth and Peace in the Middle East, (New York: Friendly House Publishers for the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1971) which, like similar criticisms during that period, quoted segments of the Friends' report grossly out of context and made numerous sweeping and unsupported statements which created the false impression that the AFSC was anti-Israel and an apologist for radical Arab regimes.

40. See Jeffrey Blankfort, "Proposition W," Marianne Torres, "Berkeley's Sister-City Initiative," and Matthew S. Gordon, "Cambridge Voters Challenge U.S. Policy," all of which appeared in Middle East Report, March-April 1989.

41. Atlanta Constitution, 19 July 1988.

42. Interview with James Zogby, Arab-American Institute, Washington, DC, 13 May 1992.

43. "Statement on the Middle East," Coalition for a New Foreign Policy, Washington, DC 1981.

44. In a decision which carried some rather strong racist overtones, when the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which has taken progressive positions on Central America, nuclear disarmament, and other issues, first tried to join similar organizations as members of the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy in 1983, they were initially refused admission.

45. Interview, Washington, DC, May 1989.

46. Interviews with staff, November 1982.

47. Washington Post, 8 June 1982.

48. James Zogby, op. cit.

49. Interviews in Israel, January 1992 and January 1993.

50. Public address at the University of Washington, 12 May 1992, Seattle, Washington.

51. Interview with Major General Mattityahu Peled (Ret.), then a leading Israeli leftist, 12 May 1992, Seattle, Washington.

52. See my article "The Roots of the U.S.-Israeli Relationship," New Political Science, Spring-Summer 1992, Nos. 21-22. For similar conclusions, albeit from a very different perspective politically, see A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, especially chapter 3.

53. These came from a series of interviews in the summer and fall of 1991, particularly at the annual meeting of SANE/Freeze in Chicago in July.

54. Tom Harkin fundraising letter, Fall 1991.

55. See my article "The Invisible Issue: In the Presidential Campaign, Nobody Talks about the Middle East," The Progressive, July 1992.

56. Interviews conducted in Israel, January 1993. 57. See Blankfort, Torres and Gordan, op. cit.

58. I served as chair of the board of directors of Washington State SANE/Freeze (the largest state chapter in the country) during this period, made frequent visits to the state office in Seattle and national office in Washington, D.C., and participated in the discussions on the questions to be included in such candidate surveys. The Middle East repeatedly proved to be the most contentious issue on whether to include in such questionnaires, and was usually omitted.

59. For example, see Edward Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994 New York: Pantheon, 1994; or, Naseer Aruri, The Obstruction of Peace: The U.S., Israel and the Palestinians, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995.

Stephen Zunes is an assistant professor of Politics and chair of the Peace and Justice Studies Program, University of San Francisco.