The 2003 Arab Human Development Report: a critical approach.

IT IS AN EMBARRASSING TASK to comment upon such an impressive piece of work as the Arab Human Development Report 2003, which is the outcome of the collaboration of highly esteemed Arab thinkers of various countries and backgrounds. This comprehensive attempt to describe the Arab reality, within the framework of a selected theme, this year that of knowledge, has to be lauded for its honesty and courage to denounce, without complacency, the setbacks and loopholes of development in the Arab world. But it is a challenge to try to deliver relevant and useful comments on all statements and analysis given in this Report, precisely because of its wide range of approaches, and at the same time because of the number of concrete cases that could be cited to support, modify or deny the conclusions of the chosen global approach.

Thus, knowledge has been aptly selected as a key to development and as a pre-requisite for the access to individual freedom and dignity. In short, after lengthy developments of the factors contributing to a knowledge-based society, the Report concludes that there has been a large-scale failure of the Arab world in achieving this goal. In my view, it cannot be disputed that the status and role of knowledge face severe shortages, but I am of the opinion that the root causes of the problem are not always as accurately addressed as its manifestations. What is more, the remedies are, sometimes too easily or simply, sought after in a western mode of thinking and in western technological advances, which appear to carry as a side (and perhaps main) effect the reinforcement of western and more specifically U.S. influence on Arab societies. To start with, a simple question could highlight the contradiction contained in such an endeavor: to whom is this report addressed? The Arab public does not need such a report to discover what it knows all too well: the pitiful situation of knowledge in its society, and the reasons for this situation. That is, first of all, the refusal of the leaders to let culture and knowledge flow into their countries.

THE ARAB WORLD AS A FRAMEWORK FOR A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY: IS IT RELEVANT?

An important preliminary question can be raised about the relevance of adopting the Arab world as the proper frame for this type of development study. This amounts to privileging a particular aspect of cultural unity over others, one that gives precedence to the elements of diversity of the same gathering of peoples (Markaz al-Wihda al-Arabiya, 1980, 1996). The idea of a so-called "Arab Development" assumes that there is an Arab identity that involves peculiar features, and that these may have an influence on development. This is, that an Arab cultural pattern, in its essence, can be accurately considered as providing the ground for economic and political developments (J-F. Bayart, 1996). This is a view widely shared in the Arab world itself, since the second half of the 20th century, which witnessed the growing influence of ideological views of movements claiming the unity of the "Arab nation" as a self-imposed goal which would heal the dividing wounds of colonialism, and bring about a solution to the problems of a newly independent Arab world.

This ideological premise, despite its failure in achieving political unity, gained new support based on quite questionable neo-conservative U.S.-sponsored Weltanschauung best summarized in a well publicized book (S. Huntington, 1996), which sees the world divided into several "great civilisations" that are definitely separated by strict boundaries, in the same way as the "Arab nation" as defined by the promoters of Arab unity, depicts the Arab culture as being composed of fixed, a-historical elements. This leads to considerations that Arab culture is based on so-called "traditional" values, inherited, for instance, from a mythical Bedu way of life, cradle of purity, as opposed to "modernity," which amounts to rejecting the imports of cultural mixture, viewed as a result of foreign domination. But Arab culture should not be seen in an anachronistic way, by vesting it with an a-historical essence and unity. Just as any other culture, it is the result of a mixture of foreign influences (A. Hourani, 1962). Therefore it is diverse and can express opposing views, which are not at the service of any cause, not even that of Arab nationalism or Arab Unity. This diversity is a valuable and useful tool for progress. Sadly however, this does not seem to be sufficiently admitted by the writers of the Report, who, for instance, use both the concepts of "tradition" and "modernity" without precise definition or proof.

The report-team avoids the debate about the content and meaning of the term "Arab" by referring only to the statistics and references produced within the spatial boundaries and the political frame of the Arab League. This leaves to the side qualitative interpretations, such as the definition of an Arab culture, if it is admitted that something close to that, from a scientific point of view, actually exists, in favor of quantitative data provided by official statistics. If language is selected as a major indicator of cultural belonging, it can be noted that these boundaries do not fit with those who practice Arabic as a mother tongue. They include a wide diversity of linguistic languages and dialects, Arabic being by no means the sole language spoken in most of these 22 countries. The reference to the search for Arab integration, based on an assumed common culture, religion and history is also worth questioning, with an objective look at the reality of inter-Arab relationships in all fields. Arab identity and self-consciousness has developed only since the end of the 19th century, in certain intellectual and then political circles. It has only gained a wide audience and a political expediency from the 1940's onward, following the model of European nationalism in the 19th century, and of the Turkish resurgence within the Ottoman Empire. If the 11th of September and the invasion of Iraq are to be viewed as the hallmark at the end of that period of time, it would be worth questioning the validity of the concept, in view of the threats of globalization on the one side, and of the strengthening of other identifications that defy the sole reference to the Arab State, as part of a wider Arab nation in the making, on the other.

In order to support their statements, the authors rely to a large extent on statistics produced by official bodies, that are aimed at presenting comparative data between Arab States. Exclusive reliance on indicators is indeed a warrant of neutrality and objectivity in the analysis of social and cultural trends in the Arab societies, but it may also indicate a lack of direct knowledge and understanding of the larger segments of the population by the intellectual western educated elite. One should also keep in mind the fact that figures are just an illusion of objectivity, since the choice to measure a factor or another is a political one, which tends to give a certain image of society. Figures are never, however, the exact reflection of reality and they can be biased either on purpose or by lack of means to ensure the reliability of the counting. To give an example, the absence of data on poverty in the Arab world, shows an absence of in-depth thinking on this important but complex question. What is more, the human and social significance of poverty could be more thoroughly explored within the Report.

The weaknesses and biases of the statistical apparatus constitute an important part of the problem that is central to the Report. While Arab countries have established a "Central Statistics Bureau," that employs large numbers of civil servants, the Censuses and reports that are issued by them are often defective, and do not serve the purpose of giving an adequate image of the society. Therefore they are not used as a tool for decision-making in the political or in the developmental field. This is not entirely the fault of the administration, but also of the decision-makers or investors, whose rationale is not of a technocratic nature, but is based on various personal or social considerations. Statistics are therefore considered as a concession to the western approach of planning. The case of Lebanon, which is admired in the Arab world for its intellectual and technical abilities, is often cited, because it has not held a population census since 1932, in order to hide the reality of the religious repartition and to keep a political system based on a decades-old illusion, instead of tackling in earnest the consequences of the demographic trends. By so doing, Lebanon is unable properly to solve the problems of unequal development, of population movements, etc. That is, in short, to settle the root-causes of the internecine fighting that ended in 1991. But nobody seems to bother about the negative effects of this piece of "Lebanese folklore," which does not hamper buoyant business and political life. It is therefore doubtful that either this data, or a quantitative approach are keys to a better understanding of Arab Human Development, the more so as knowledge is the central theme of 2003 Report.

The quite pessimistic general tone of the Report suggests implicitly that the Arab society might still be in the state of darkness, which evokes a--perhaps unconscious--religious reference to the pre-Islamic jahiliyya. The Islamist movement, based on the same analysis of the present situation, advocates that the only valid knowledge is the one that can be extracted from the reading of the Sacred book, and that all cultural links with the western world, and the materialistic values it is accused of carrying, should be cut off. But the Arab world is obviously not void of knowledge, and the progress in the last decades, in terms of literacy rates and higher education has been tremendous.

THE PROGRESS TOWARD A KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

Much information can be gleaned throughout the Report, showing the indisputable progress in the field of knowledge that has been achieved in the Arab States over past decades. The term "knowledge" is perhaps not the most accurate to identify this progress, which could be more accurately termed as education or culture. A striking change in the Arab countries is the overall spread of education since independence. In every country, the State has devoted large budgets to ensure mass education at the primary and secondary levels, and dozens of State universities have opened not only in the capital cities, but also in the provincial headquarters, ensuring access by the majority of the young generation to modern education (unfortunately, primary education is still too often confined into inculcating the children with nationalistic-chauvinistic ideas, instead of developing their ability for independent thought). An important and rather surprising feature of this education is the equality of access for boys and girls, that has been promoted and achieved by different means, according to the prevailing cultural background. This leads to two main commentaries: the first deals with the importance given to education by all Arab governments, whatever their political stand, and the second to the high demand for education by families.

Modern education has been considered as an achievement of the nationalist, socialist and progressive revolutions and coups d'etat of the 1950's and 1960's, after the frustrations of pre-independence when education was restricted to a bourgeois elite. It was seen, more generally, as a way to provide the new states with technocratic and bureaucratic cadres to achieve and channel development efforts. But it also responded to a high demand in Arab societies, where education is highly valued, to the point that one could almost speak of a "religion of the diploma," above all the PhD. This originates, to some extent, in religious and cultural inducements, but more concretely, it is reinforced by the need to migrate in order to make a living and support a family and by the prejudice against manual or technical work in Arab society. There are also the factors of the monopolization of the more lucrative fields of activity, and those linked to power, by small segments of society, thus excluding the mainstream of youth from some rewarding professional activities. The focus of Arab society on education can also be witnessed in rural and nomadic tribal groups, who, despite the hardship of the life and the mobility that is not conductive to continuous study, have always respected "men of learning" and have shown positive responses to economic development opportunities. This should help us to counter cultural prejudices sometimes expressed in the Report, that tend to some extent, to consider these societies as guilty for their pretended "backwardness." Last, but not least, uncertainty about life and the future have encouraged some people, like the Palestinians, to reinforce a traditional openness toward study in order to cope with an unforeseeable future.

It is true that the tremendous progress made in the field of education for all layers of the society has come to a standstill over the past 20 years, with the structural adjustment policies that led the States to limit their commitment in the field of social development, while the "open door" policy allowed for the blooming of private schooling institutions, from the kindergarten to the University. This has drastically reduced the access to a good education for the larger segments of society, while the rich enjoy an increasing chance of acquiring modern financial and technological knowledge, the middle class and the poor, who cannot afford to pay the fees of private schooling and see their chances of social upgrading through schooling annihilated. Moreover, the privatization of education, along with U.S. practices and inducements, may be the cause in the Arab world for the growing split between layers within society: in recently founded states, public education is a vital vector for promoting national and civic values and shared social behavior. On the contrary, the ideology supported by private institutions is one of a purely material, opportunistic and profit-oriented teaching, diffusing western values and fashions and cultivating the "American dream" in contrast with local social and economic difficulties, thus preparing the younger generation to turn to emigration as the sole way to escape their societies' problems (D. Dumortier, 2000).

The Report asserts in its conclusion that "Free flows of knowledge within society require a democratic value system and the elimination of corruption" (p. 143). This assumption can lead to passive behavior, since it rejects all hope of cultural progress as long as democracy and honesty are not established in the heart of Arab political systems. First of all, knowledge can be acquired by other means than "free flow," which is a rather quantitative and idealistic approach. Nowhere is the flow of knowledge completely free, contrary to the assumptions of the "society of information." Dictatorships and autocratic regimes have sometimes given birth, unwillingly, to flourishing cultural movements and creation, and the contradictions raised within society by such regimes can have positive effects on the intellectual and moral maturity of the population. So knowledge can flow in, or be generated from inside, even in the absence of democracy and under the rule of corruption, thus helping to relieve the pressure and possibly helping to bring an end to such regimes that prevail today. The access to Internet could help to enforce that free flow, if not in an absolute way, at least by creating a noticeable difference with the pre-Internet situation. Human Rights activists are now openly present in all countries, and the link they maintain with migrants or other organizations abroad, through the Internet, is a protection for them as well as a means to publicize the internal situation. Technically and politically, it is difficult for the security apparatus to control that flow of information. So the Report shifts between an unduly pessimistic view and a contradictory adherence to the mainstream opinion that Internet is the key to knowledge acquisition in a world transformed into a Global Village.

KNOWLEDGE AND DEVELOPMENT: WHERE IS THE MISSING LINK?

The Report seems to have adopted a narrow understanding of "knowledge," reducing it to the acquisition and mobilization of knowledge that is useful for development, i.e. for modern economic activities. But is the link between knowledge and economic structure really one of causality? The postulate that an increase in knowledge would automatically lead to a sounder economic structure is doubtful. The peculiarity of the Arab economy today is its concentration in the hands of a few tycoons in each country, that gather political access and business interests acquired through the diversion of public money. This primitive way of accumulating capital does not favor the reinvestment of profit in new enterprises that could give an outlet to university graduates, technicians and professionals. In this mode of development in dependency, there is no need for a "knowledge society," if this is supposed to mean a society that favors young entrepreneurship, that shows openness to new ideas and new activities. On the contrary, and this goes against the credo of the World Bank or the European Union expressed in the conclusions of the Barcelona Conference in 1995, this kind of economy, closely controlled by foreign companies through their local agents, is fearful of new intruders, and of a leakage from technical or scientific progress to new political and social ideas, that would endanger the present encompassing system based on tribalism, sectarianism and the so-called wasta. The ignorance or neglect of this character of Arab economy explains why the whole MEDA plan of the European Union toward the Arab countries has failed.

The vague term "knowledge" in the end covers only the acquisition of imported Technologies of Information and Communication, as opposed to a more comprehensive definition of knowledge that is likely to shape the human being as an autonomous, free individual, part of a mature and closely knit society. Therefore the aim of building a knowledge society, as it is understood here, goes not only through a continuous transmission of learning from elder to younger generations, or through manifold exchanges with foreign cultures, but also through the new information and communication means at its disposal. The Report deals mainly with sending youth to the western world in order to acquire technical expertise. Thus, the tool is privileged over the content, although it has more to do with profitability of investments and grandiose projects of Internet Cities, than with the progress and opening of the minds and development of creativity. Arab leaders and investors hope to achieve development without releasing the fences that lock up the minds of their people, but they should perhaps think more in-depth about the conditions of the success of the Silicon Valley in California. For example, like the start-ups of the primary wave of Internet, discoveries and progress were achieved by liberal and marginal youth, that were not primarily motivated by financial gains, and the model of concentrating the e-industry in one place that some Arab countries think of adopting, is now abandoned where it originated

The difficulties created for young Arabs to complete their study in North America after 11 September is presented as a major loss to the acquisition of knowledge in the Arab World. Such a statement is in many ways disturbing. Firstly, it refers to a privileged minority of Arab students (of whom a certain proportion is registered in U.S. higher education institutions with no serious academic credit in their own country). Secondly, it expresses the conviction that no other education can be acquired in order to be able to face the challenges of the modern world, than the one given by U.S. universities. This shows a deep state of self-contempt by the Arab thinkers themselves, since this mental polarization, if confirmed, does not seem to them to be a catastrophe that should be remedied. And one may wonder what is the use of the so many so-called private "universities" that sprawl all over the Middle East, adorned with impressive American names? In fact, as an impartial foreign observer, one could observe that this self-criticism is not supported by any real comparison between Arab and western universities, nor by the prior establishment of criteria about what higher education should provide, as a background and qualifications. An in-depth inquiry into these points could bring interesting and unexpected information about the potential of Arab universities. Those have been given the base to provide proper levels of teaching; their main defects lie, in our view, in the mode of recruitment, selection and orientation of students, that is still often based on family financial capacities, social connections, or social rewarding images of the academic fields, without taking into account the real interest of the students and the needs of the society.

RENTIER STATE AND DEVELOPMENT

So while the link between knowledge and development is not automatic, the link between external domination and the inner political structure is quite obvious, especially the political and economic system of rentier states of most Arab countries, which favor importers over national producers. Rentier states induce a rentier mentality, which leads to a tendency to export capital, which is also safer and more profitable in many fields and in many respects, than to import Foreign Direct Investments. These investments, whether they emanate from foreign groups or from migrants, are kept at bay by a lack of transparency and of safety, more than by a sheer lack of profitability itself, due to the close and perverse link between power and finance in the Arab countries. The reference to the conclusions of a group such as Transparency International are in that respect far from reliable, since this group aims at denouncing petty corruption, which helps poorly paid civil servants and employees to make a living, but keeps away from the "big money" corruption, that has become a rule in the passing of contracts between trans-national firms and local governments. This "State corruption," if widespread all over the world, is an essential feature of the functioning of Arab States. Still, no incantatory appeal to foreign investments will be able to reverse the fact that the Arab countries are generally not capital-attractive, and, as a general rule, are net capital exporters.

On the other hand, the lack of competitiveness of Arab economies is mentioned as a cause for the lack of attractiveness to foreign investments. Low productivity is part of this, which refers to the relationship of the Arab society toward salaried work. This can be explained by the economic factor of the oil rent, which has lowered the social and moral value of salaried work. But the cultural factor, that has maintained in the Arab world a tribal and pre-capitalist social structure, is also at the root of social behavior that explains the resilience of pre-capitalist modes of production and social relationships. These concur to a better quality of life, in terms of social relations, than the one ensured in industrialized countries by a higher financial income. Should this "under-exploitation" of the work force lead to the conclusion that the Arab economy is not up to the world standard, since it does not ensure the Wall Street imposed ratio of return on investment? This all depends on the political position of the analyst. Let us only underline the fact that the use of economic data and aggregates falls short of taking the human and social reality behind them into account.

So insisting on an educational system geared solely toward feeding the supposed needs of the labor market neglects the fact that the present societal and political pattern is not entrepreneurship-oriented, and that the rules of the game at the international level, between North and South, confine the Arab world to the role of provider of raw material and cheap labor. This leaves scope for a reassessment of the role of the humanities in reshaping the intellectual and moral architecture of the Arab society. Contrary to what is generally argued, I would argue that the main problem confronting education in the Arab world lies in the field of the humanities, rather than technology and sciences. The only way to correct the shortcomings that are mentioned throughout the Report, is to help the individual acquire maturity and autonomy in regard to the social structures that oppress him, to reform education and to give space to the teaching of nationhood, of public-spiritedness and of equity and justice.

This leads to the question of the language of education. The Arab world is heading towards dualistic societies, where the masses are restricted to Arabic, while the western-oriented bourgeois layers of society have adopted English or French, not only as their means of communication with the outside world, but even among themselves. This dichotomy is leading to individual schizophrenia, as well as to a rapid cultural split within society, which leaves the concept of nationhood meaningless. It also raises the question of the status of Arabic: Arabization is advocated by the authors of the Report, but without exposing its difficulties nor its benefits. It seems rather to be a lip service to the imposed credo of Arabism, although it raises a serious question: Arabic, no doubt, is as able as any western language to be the vector of modern thought and technology. But the experience of Arabization, as I myself witnessed in several countries, such as the Sudan in the early 1980's, or in French-educated North Africa, ended in a severe regression of the academic standards and in the angry frustration of the students. The lack of skilled lecturers with experience in teaching in Arabic could hardly be avoided, and should have been alleviated by the reliance on Arabic textbooks and inter-Arab co-operation. This could have been solved in a couple of years; but the absence of textbooks rendered the matter inextricable, especially when this policy was linked to a xenophobic dimension, as in the case of Islamist Sudan. This ended with the leaders of some countries sending their offspring to European or U.S. boarding schools, while condemning the larger part of the population to bear the brunt of a disrupted educational system.

The damage caused by the lack of translation efforts is obvious: teaching in Arabic, cut off from external cultural and scientific advances, has led to the isolation of younger generations from western influence, provoking an intellectual myopia which is the most noticeable in the mass production of poorly skilled doctors and engineers. The outcome is all too well known: the strong appeal of Islamist ideologies within those segments of apparently educated youth. So Arabic in itself is not at stake: other non-European societies, like those of the Far East, do not command a high fluency in English, which does not hinder their impressive efficiency in the economic or cultural field. So the turning of the Arab "elite" to foreign education and languages should only be seen as a reflection of their disinterest in the socio-political progress of their societies, and as part of an inferiority complex.

THE MYTHICAL "STRATEGIC VISION"

The emphasis on freedom in education fits more or less with what is presented as the purpose of the AHDR series: to "crystallise a strategic vision by Arab elites through a societal innovation process that envisages the restructuring of the region from within, and in service of Arab human development." But as this statement leaves one guessing what the "Arab elites" are, and what are the tools that could engineer, harness and channel the changes that are either imposed by outside financial institutions or political powers or demanded by internal emerging forces within the society, it may be that this "strategic vision" is nothing more than the motto of the old Comte in Giuseppe di Lampedusa's novel The Cheetah: "Change everything so as not to change anything", and aims at avoiding the overturn of these elites by helping them to adapt to new times. These new times can be accurately described as the Arab region's loss of sovereignty, a consequence of the reaction of the U.S. and their allies to the events of the 11 September. All the rulers, despite apparent differences in the preservation of their peculiar way of running their country on a day-to-day basis, are greatly subject to external forces. So the AHDR can be seen as an alarm bell to whomever might read it and who might be effectively in charge of the future of the Arab countries.

The strategic vision is shaped in a number of suggested reforms in all fields, which deserve a few comments: first, it calls for a "rigorous self criticism" to bring about the needed reforms. But this self-criticism leaves aside the fact that the intellectuals are not disconnected from their material and social positions. Arab intellectuals and thinkers are "organic intellectuals," heavily dependent of the State. So their suggestions for an overall improvement of the situation of human development in the Arab world are influenced by their background and their expectations. This intellectual community sees itself in the mirror of the outside world, to which it is linked by acquired values, ethics, behaviors and interests. So the Report is heavily influenced by a class-bound and cultural imported discourse of a North American rather than Western European origin.

Still, my criticisms should not be misunderstood: the situation of the Arab world, especially as far as younger generations is concerned, is so worrying that any intellectual attempt to improve it should be welcome. To measure the gravity of the phenomenon, one just needs to watch the queues of young people at the doors of western embassies in many Arab countries. Whatever their skills and training, social or cultural origin, most of the youth dream of obtaining a visa to leave. Far from earlier migrations, these are not primarily or only motivated by the need to survive; they are also the result of the opening of windows that give means to compare the Arab world with other parts of the world.

"PURE" RELIGION VERSUS....?

Religion is often presented, especially by outsiders, as the main cause of the "backwardness" of the Arab world, and as an obstacle to progress and development. Whether this opinion is valid or not has been much debated (M. Rodinson, 1966 and 1972; E. Gellner, 1981; B. Badie, 1986) but, as Brigitte Dumortier reminds us through the example of Roman Catholicism in Latin America, the same debate applies to other religions. The way the authors handle this sensitive matter is telling: they establish a distinction between "pure religion" and another brand, that is not explicitly defined, but suggests the existence and sometimes prevalence of a "wrong Islam," which would refer to the religion being used for political purposes or with a political agenda. But this distinction is in itself a political stand that dismisses other views as invalid in terms of fidelity to the divine word. The purity of religion is also not defined. One may suppose that it means the containment of religion in the private sphere, which is not the intent of the Divine Revelation, nor the historical practice of Muslim societies. The same could be applied to other religions as well, and the idea of a "pure religion" sounds strange. It is true that this wording is now commonly used by so-called secular powers to convince their populations to keep away from the Islamic political trend, but it is definitely not a valid scientific category. Religion is and has always been practiced in a social and historical context that influences the understanding of the religious message. Of course, religious official authorities or even activists of secular background on both sides, may go so far as to decide which is the true or false religion. To put it simply, Al-Qaeda and Al-Azhar are face to face, in a endless mirror game, but without any spiritual nor earthly relevance, except that of political expediency.

As a contribution to our topic, that is the relationship between Islam and knowledge, beside the well-known Qu'ranic verses encouraging science and knowledge, and the celebrated historical contribution of the Arab world to development of mankind, I would like to point out that political Islam, as a conservative trend, only gained its present appeal through the failure of secular states and their own manipulation by State security apparatus to crush the more progressive trends in the Arab university campuses. The pressure and intimidation to forbid other approaches to knowledge has proved to be a direct support to the rise of Islamism, which could then be easily presented as providing a comprehensive and exclusive solution to all problems facing society (G. Kepel, 1984 and 2000). The Report mentions the fact that the demand for religious books far exceeds that of other written works. This shows that the problem does not stem from the lack of funds or of literacy, but from state controlled education. The absence of censorship on the content of these religious books render them attractive and help people to fill the vacuum they feel in the demand for tools to understand and explain the society and mankind. If, as is said (p.167), progress can only be achieved through struggle, the fight of intellectuals in that respect should be two-fold: the fight against the instrumentalization of religion by political activists cannot be separated from the fight against so-called "secular" dictatorships, that pretend to side with western democracies on the path to progress and development.

FREEDOM, GOOD GOVERNANCE, WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT: THE KEY-WORDS OF GLOBAL HUMAN DEELOPMENT

The authors establish a direct connection between democracy and human development. If we refer to other historical cases on a world scale, the link is not so obvious. If democracy is now widely considered as the paradigm of progress and modernity, it is mainly because of the failure of present autocratic powers in the Arab world to achieve anything like Human Development. But this assertion too would deserve some criticism, since some Arab countries are presented by western governments and media as conciliating both. It could be argued that economic growth is not to be confused with development, even if Human Development can be seen as partly achieved in these examples, for instance in terms of education and health. But democracy is more than the fair game of pluralistic elections (G. Salame, 1994). It entails a whole set of social rules and individual behavior patterns that the Arab world is on the whole still lacking. In short, the democratic pattern is based on the precedence of the individual over collective affiliations, be they tribal, clan or sectarian. Still, to consider the autocratic ruling systems as an essential character of the Arab mentality is a prejudice that evacuates the whole historical context of the setting up of those regimes (J-P. Charnay, 2003). Patriarchal systems (see Box 7.1) cannot be accused as being opposed to progress and evolution, as can be demonstrated with the examples of the Confucian model in Chinese societies, as well as on the northern shores of the Mediterranean Basin. Essentialism thus leads to ignoring possibilities of change and exonerates the autocratic regimes that need to be removed, and that manipulate patriarchy for their own interest.

In fact, the Report resorts to the use of the term "freedom," which is quite vague and emotive, rather than to that of "democracy," which would refer to institutional and political structures and concepts. This reveals the double-sided approach of the Report: on one side, quantitative, data based and aiming at presenting an objective study, on the other quite emotional, referring to supposedly universal and unquestionable split between "good" and "bad," thereby evacuating the ideological backgrounds behind these concepts. This applies not only to "freedom," but also to "good governance," which despite its positive connotations, could also arguably be analyzed as opposed to democracy, in the sense given to it by its promoters, that is the World Bank and associate international institutions. "Good governance" is based on the idea that certain dynamic groups within society should be associated to government, so that top-down policies could be balanced by and mixed with a bottom-up approach. Good governance is thus the one that would enable the needs and demands of the citizens to be taken into account by the ruler, by selecting some groups (youth, women, entrepreneurs, NGOs and the like) and entitling them to a say in the running of public affairs. The benefit for the ruler is that this participation from certain sectors of society would help him smoothly to run public affairs and to avoid violent upheavals or any defiance from society, which have been, up to now, restraining possible investors in the Arab world. The objection that could be raised against this new worldwide credo is that the groups invited to have a say in public affairs do not emanate from any public legitimacy, such as granted by free and pluralistic elections, and are contradictory to the basics of democracy, that is an equal say ("one man, one vote") for all citizens, whatever their capacities and their opinions (REMMM, 1996).

Women's empowerment is in that respect no more than a part of such a strategy. The assumption, that may be true, is that, since women are oppressed by men, they have a vested interest in adhering to such a change of rules, and that they are the more willing party when it comes to implementing reforms consisting in breaking "traditions," that is the pre-capitalist structures of a still patriarchal society. But since the principle of good governance is imported from the North-American and North-Western European Protestant model, it is alien to Arab society. So the governments, on which this ideology is imposed, manage to give an impression to international institutions that try to promote it. An example of this "facade" change is given in the paragraph on women's advancement, which mentions the increasing number of women ambassadors in the Arab world as an indicator of progress in the fate of women as a whole. Indeed, the majority of Arab States are presently represented in France by female ambassadors. This token aimed at projecting a positive image toward western public opinion cannot hide a still dark human reality. It can even help the survival of untouched, through horrific social customs, like the "crimes of honor."

In dealing with good governance, the most risky attempt by the authors is to pass judgement on Arab governments and give out marks for their achievements during the previous year on the arduous path toward democracy. Three national cases of progress in the political sphere are selected for year 2003: Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Bahrain. But the criteria that lead to such a judgement are not fully explained, and seem based on current dominant values, more normative and moral than anything else. It deliberately ignores the fact that U.S. led-western influence on their rulers has become more blatant than ever, which applies also to decisions of political and social change. Promised reforms, like those of Crown Prince Abdallah in Saudi Arabia, should perhaps not be taken at face value, without inscribing them in the international, regional and internal context making concessions a necessity. These concessions might not be wholehearted, but more likely opportunistic and reversible. One might, for example, imagine that, since the danger of Islamic terrorism is now considered by the United States as the major threat in the area and at world level, democracy is a less important priority than political stability in the U.S agenda. Public opinion is often disappointed to have to content itself with cosmetic changes. It. seems in any case rather idealistic to imagine that dictators could spontaneously turn into democrats. Again, democracy is, before anything else, a system of checks and balances, which is not provided for in the developments announced. On the other hand, if these three countries have been isolated to receive laudatory comments from the authors, the four that have witnessed a worsening of their human rights situation are not named, which shows the timidity and the limits of this transparency exercise.

This said, the "Arab Charter against Terrorism" can only be seen as a poor answer to the casual and widespread human abuse in the Arab world. The wording itself, again, suggests that the Arab States focus on the fight against terrorism as it is understood in western countries. Indeed, it aims at curbing inner extremist, mainly Islamist opposition, while also, in many countries, trying to suppress Palestinian resistance, in order to comply with U.S. and Israeli demands. But this can only be done at the expense of human rights, as can be seen in the systematic torture inflicted on political detainees. Not only is the fight against terrorism run by torture, assassination and arbitrary detention, but it has to be emphasized that these acts are not just a regrettable deviance of the Arab political systems, they show the might vested in the intelligence or secret services in charge of controlling the population. The security apparatus enjoys a large degree of autonomy, and tends to develop its own way of handling the opposition, ending in setting its own goals as a professional interest group. opposed to any democratization.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that most of the above commentaries have pinpointed the negative and defective aspects of the situation in the Arab world, in terms of human development, the merit of this volume has to be noted. It represents an extensive work and it has succeeded in putting together various data and analyses to give a comprehensive and coherent view of the overall situation, in a comparative inter-Arab perspective. However, I would like to express my regrets, once again, that the Report relied more on delusions created by figures, than on the rich and diversified experience of its authors. Their ability to analyze concrete situations would, if it had been more exploited, have rendered a more accurate view of the complexity of the present knowledge situation in the Arab world.

Trying to assess the changes which have occurred within one year, the 2004 Executive Summary lists three development challenges "represented by the deficits in knowledge, freedom and women's empowerment" and two setbacks: the major events of the reoccupation by Israel of Palestinian territories and the invasion of Iraq by an international coalition. These events can certainly be viewed as major setbacks in regional politics, but it is difficult to see how they can be objectively presented as a setback for the "Arab world." This would imply that the Arab States actively share common interests and strategies in the region, which remains to be demonstrated. No Arab country, let alone the Arab "States community," took any concrete measure to prevent these events from happening. Given certain historical alliances, they even may have been profitable and secretly applauded in some Arab leading circles. So, not only is Arab co-operation not a prerequisite to improving the status of knowledge or the achievement of a higher measure of political participation, but as the example of the Al-Jazeera channel may, on the contrary, indicate, competition and challenge are the best incentives to achieving progress within the Arab world, especially if we compare it to the poor achievement of the Arab League or ALESCO.

If we turn to the three development challenges, it is all too easy to question the relevance of this particular choice at this particular time, and the accuracy of the measurement of changes in social and political behaviors in such a short period of time.

As for proposals and solutions to the problems identified, they are mainly based on good will, which is assumed by the authors as the sole realistic key for positive developments. Especially on the political scene, these developments might occur in some countries and not in others, according to the degree of enlightenment of political elites and rulers. But the simple linear view of History developed here is hardly helpful to describe and analyze the social and political changes occurring in Arab society. The same could be said about the use of the term "community" to describe any social group: it implies a sense of common interest, behavior and destiny which is rather difficult to assert in a society that could be, on the contrary, beneath the surface, noted for its many internal splits.

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Marc Lavergne is with the National Center for Scientific Research, University of Paris--Nanterre, France.