The 'al-Aqsa Intifada' as a result of politics of transition.

THE VIOLENT CLASHES BREAKING OUT in the West Bank and Gaza in late October 2000-following the breakdown of negotiations in Camp David and the provocative visit at the Haram ash-Sharif by Likud-leader Ariel Sharon have shown a greater persistence and momentum than most observers initially thought possible. To Palestinians, demonstrations and attacks against army posts and settlements have become known as the 'new intifada,' or the 'al-Aqsa Intifada,' drawing on the rich symbolic capital of the intifada in the late 1980s. According to most observers the reasons for an upheaval at this point is to be found in the profound mistrust of the peace process and the intentions of the Israeli regime that is to be found in the Palestinian population. (1) Growing discontent was evident in the Spring of 2000. Although a clear majority of 71 percent continued to support the peace process, there was an increase in the support for armed attacks against Israelis from 39 percent in February 2000 to 44 percent in April that same year. Confidence in Barak's government declined from an already low 29 percent in July 1999 to 13 percent in April 2000. Forty-six percent of the Palestinians believed that a Palestinian state would be established in the near future, but 59 percent did not consider it possible to reach a mutually acceptable solution to final status issues. However, 63 percent of the Palestinians were still optimistic about the future. (2) A particular source of frustration was the expansion of settlements under the leadership of Ehud Barak. (3)

Widespread Palestinian disappointment over a faltering and protracted peace process was therefore certainly one of the primary factors behind the outbreak of violence at this particular time. Less noticed, but equally important was the fact that clashes took place within the framework of an established Palestinian authority. Domestic politics were as much a part of the picture as were the peace process and the Israeli actions. This article analyzes this phase of transition of Palestinian politics as a necessary point of departure for understanding the turn of events in late 2000 -- the year that was supposed to mark the signature of a peace agreement.

THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: FORMATION OF A PROTO-STATE

Despite the highly restricted circumstances of Palestinian autonomy (4), Palestinian self-rule during the last years has implied the gradual establishment of state-like structures. (5) This quasi-state, under establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), has become known for authoritarianism, centralization, personalism, neo-patrimony, violence, lack of rule of law, and arbitrariness in decision-making. (6) Also, however, self-rule has implied the holding of general elections, institutionalization of political processes and the emergence of new discussions on internal politics, features of government, prospects for democracy and the content of the potential state-to-be.

Rather than viewing the Palestinian Authority as an already established regime with a set of established rules of governance, an alternative approach would be to conceive of the PNA, representing an interim government, as a transitional regime. Self-rule represents a transition from external to internal rule, from occupation to some sort of state-hood, although territorial sovereignty does not yet exist and the institutional powers of the PNA are limited. Also, this transition implies a simultaneous transformation from a military, revolutionary, exiled liberation organization to a territorial government with responsibility for administration and bureaucracy. These shifts raise questions related to the possibilities of a corresponding third transition from an authoritarian and centralized movement to a democratic government.

The concern in the following is the position and discourses of different elites within the political system: how elites position themselves vis-a-vis core institutions, how they view potentials for democratization and what discourses they use to legitimize their claims. The focus is on the mainstream political elite, i.e., representatives of core institutions of government, leaving aside the (equally important) factional divisions and the oppositional challenge. This is motivated by the fact that the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative branches of government has become of major importance in order to understand the characteristics of the post-Oslo political regime in the West Bank and Gaza. Also, despite participation of Hamas and the leftist opposition in the current uprising, it is clear that organizations under the command of Fateh pull the strings. Thus, this means that the article focuses upon the contemporary intra-Authority and intra-Fateh problematique. (7)

TRANSITIONS AND ELITES

During the last decade, much attention has been devoted to times of 'transitions' to democratic rule in different parts of the world. (8) A transition is defined as 'the interval between one political regime and another,' (9) and thus not an established order. Transitions therefore constitute periods of disorder. There are no clear-cut rules of the political game and those that do exist are still controlled by the authoritarian power structure. Simultaneously, however, the rules of the political system are contested. Different actors struggle not only to pursue their own interests, but to influence the hows of the political system in the long run. (10) The most general claim to be made about 'transitions' or 'democratization processes' is that they are uncertain, often slow, rocky and uneven. (11) As Przeworski has explained:

Anyone who has lived through moments when a dictatorship was about to fall and democracy become a real possibility remembers almost constant tension, hopes that repeatedly alternated with fears, outbursts of enthusiasm and the pain of defeat. Every step seems difficult and yet nothing seems out of reach. (12)

Periods of transition are underdetermined and our tools for the study of such processes are necessarily insufficient. (13) Limited political openings or political reforms create a space for other spheres of elites as well as for civil society, which in turn tend to give rise to a reaction by authoritarian regimes, often implying repression.

In this process, the role of elites is of particular importance. Transitions to democracy only rarely imply the complete defeat of elites that have previously constituted the backbone of authoritarian regimes. Instead, transitory periods often include pacts (14) and accommodations between different segments of the political elite, as well as internal struggles and battles over power as well as values and ideas. 'Pacts' are thus forms of compromises between groups in order to seek stability during a period of transition. If a transition to democracy occurs, the function of the pact has been to introduce democracy by 'undemocratic means.' (15) A slightly different view of the role of elites is provided by Rustow, (16) who has claimed that 'inconclusive political struggles' between elites are significant of early phases of democratization.

This struggle may be fought between 'hard-liners' and 'soft-liners,' where 'hard-liners' are constituted by those who struggle for the perpetuation of some kind of authoritarian rule, while 'soft-liners' also are represented in the authoritarian power structure but increasingly come to embrace the idea that legitimacy must be sought through elections. (17) Elites that do opt for democracy may motivate their choice by self-interest, which is why elite support for democracy is one of the weak points in democratization processes. (18) Therefore, in all transitory periods, we need to understand the position, interests and political orientations of elites.

Assessments of the Palestinian political system during the last few years have tended to emphasize not only the authoritarianism and personalism of this regime, but also the political monopoly held by Yasir Arafat and the hegemony of the political class surrounding him. This political class is primarily constituted by Fateh members and cadres, by returning Fateh/PLO bureaucrats and former fighters and by the traditional conservative family elite of the West Bank and Gaza. (19) This article suggests an alternative approach, implying that the contemporary period implies contestation between different elite sections, although asymmetric power relations are certainly evident.

The article is divided into three sections. First, there is an outline of the legacy of the PLO in terms of democracy. Second, there is a description of the role and position of elites vis-a-vis core institutions in the contemporary phase of state-building. Third, I draw attention to the discourses used by elites in order to legitimize their claims.

THE PLO LEGACY: AUTHORITARIANISM AND PLURALISM

As a de-territorialized, exiled organization with its main energies directed towards the liberation of land, the PLO provides a particular historical legacy when it comes to politics and democracy. The 'armed struggle' of the late 1960s and early 1970s was seen as requiring a secretive, consensus-based political system. The decision-making structure (20) of the PLO has been based on appointments according to a quota system, allocating places in the PNC according to pre-set quotas that assured Fateh's dominance. The absence of access to a constituency as well as lack of territory has further rendered democratic processes troublesome. Elections for seats in the PNC have taken place in, for example, trade unions, women's movements, and student unions. General elections were considered impossible as long as the Israeli occupation continued, the population was dispersed and the land was not liberated. The Palestinian movement nevertheless fostered semi-democratic institutions in the form of its intense political d ebates and the existence of several ideological movements, (21) ensuring one layer of pluralism and a certain degree of freedom of opinion and expression. A political system and culture of, on the one hand militarism and centralism, and on the other pluralism and lively ideological debates thus belong to the legacy of the PLO.

The PLO left internal structures or the issue of 'what kind of state' when the struggle is completed, as well as questions of internal politics, governance and social stratification, for 'later,' with the (partial) exception of the leftist fronts. The future state was defined in abstract terms as 'independent' and 'democratic,' but no real political standpoint was formulated of how this state should be organized. As in other anti-colonial struggles "democracy was seen as an ideal writ large, as a macro symbol of grand historical processes. It became the password for the enfranchisement of broad social communities. [...] Representation [of democracy] was primarily psychological and rhetorical, future-oriented and, above all, outward-oriented." (22) All decisions on the content of statehood were postponed.

However, in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, the future 'independent' state was defined as 'democratic,' based on constitutionalism, parliamentarism and respect for civil rights. (23) Democracy has thus not been absent from the political discourse of the PLO. The discourse of democracy has been embedded in the nationalist struggle for liberation and self-determination and has therefore implied a populistic kind of pluralism. (24)

The PLO logic of state-building in exile was also built upon a system of personal loyalties and patron-client relations, where economic incentives were used to maintain the system as well as nurture support for Arafat personally. (25) A 'personalized system of patronage' (26) was combined with bureaucratization and favored the establishment of a political class directly linked to Arafat and the 'system' through salaries and numerous fringe benefits, social welfare systems, etc. (27) This system has a logic of its own in the sense that a de-territorialized movement, alienated from large parts of its population as well as from the land, seeks legitimacy from other sources than enfranchisement of the people.

'Democracy' took on another meaning in the West Bank and Gaza during the intifada and its mass activism and institution-building in the form of health care institutions, agricultural cooperatives, human rights oranizations, solidarity networks, etc. (28) These mainly grass roots and civil society (29) initiatives which both preceded and channeled the intifada, also provided for the rise of a new middle class. This new class reached positions of intermediate power, challenging both the role of the traditional elite and the urban notables in the West Bank and Gaza and the influence of the PLO outside. (30) NGOs were often channeled by organizations set up by the factions. This middle class was 'larger, younger, better educated, from more modest class origins, and less urban than its notable counterpart.' (31) This new elite was made up of middle range leaders of the different factions playing prominent roles in the popular committees that were created to organize every day life in the Occupied Territories durin g the uprising. Prominent Palestinian personalities also took a step forward. The public figures were a combination of traditional and 'new' leaders. (32) The 'new' leaders exhibited a high proportion of intellectuals and professionals. These personalities were generally more conservative and pragmatic than the UNLU (33) and the intifada activists.

Although the intifada is a rather late phenomenon, it was preceded by grassroot mobilization in the form of women's movements, student's movements, trade unions and solidarity organizations. In those, elections (34) were held from early on in the Occupied Territories, providing for a democratic experience. Both competition and participation, key principles in the notion of democracy, therefore have historical resonance.

STRUGGLE AS POLITICAL CULTURE AND IDENTITY

Perhaps the most substantial representation of Palestinian national identity is to 'struggle,' which serves as the action or the strategy through which to transcend and refute the denial, humiliation and dispossession which have served as core experiences informing Palestinian identity. (35) As Yezid Sayigh had noted: "armed struggle was the main theme around which Palestinian nation-building was established." (36) Struggle through the resistance and revolution, which followed upon the 1967 war, nurtured a revolutionary political culture, promoting values related to a romanticizing discourse on heroic fights and militarism.

Both the PLO Charter of 1964/1968 and the Declaration of Independence of 1988 circle around the notion of 'struggle.'

And in generation after generation, the Palestinian Arab people gave of itself unsparingly in the valiant battle for liberation and homeland. For what has been the unbroken chain of our people's rebellions but the heroic embodiment of our will for national independence? And so the people was sustained in the struggle to stay and to prevail. (37)

The struggle as part of Palestinian identity is emphasized over and over again in official PLO documents, as well as in intifada leaflets. A typical passage in an intifada leaflet reads:

O masses of our struggling people! Your ongoing response and your precious sacrifice for your homeland is daily paving the way toward the independent state. Daily the masses of the stone and the Molotov cocktail evince their national will. The occupation stands with hands bound in the face of the heroes who are making history toward the liberation of their people and is bewildered in the face of the flaming uprising that burns the occupiers and their henchmen. (38)

It is of fundamental importance to understand the role of 'struggle' in Palestinian political culture. Until the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, legitimacy in the Palestinian political system has primarily been drawn from the discourse of struggle.

SELF-RULE, STATE-BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY

The intensification of state-building in the era of self-rule from 1994 and onwards (39) allowed for the debate on democracy to take yet another shape. Vast powers have indeed been extended to the President who issues law on decrees, controls the budget, controls several Authority-institutions, and involves himself in small-scale bureaucratic matters. (40) The Executive has been relatively weak in relation to the President. The Council, representing a new form of legitimacy through its formation in general elections, met with a number of problems in asserting itself as at the core of legislation and accountability. The Council was subsequently further weakened in relation to the Executive and the President. No independent judiciary existed and the system of law was fragile. (41) There were many human rights violations and many were severe as the powers of the repressive authorities were extensive. The heavy bias towards a security-oriented apparatus, called for by the signed agreements and the assignment give n to the PA to provide Israeli security during the interim period, paved the way for a militarization of society. Fear spread owing to violations of human rights and neglect of the rule of law. (42) The concretization of the state-building project also, however, provided institutionalization of core state functions, (43) the holding of elections as a bases for legitimacy.

Although some observers have elaborated on the semi-democratic aspects of Palestinian rule, rather than a dictatorship, the Palestinian Authority has showed a certain degree of diversity in its rule. However, few have tried to analyze the present state of affairs from the perspective of transition. (44)

THE PRESIDENT: 'THE STATE IS ARAFAT'

Most assessments of post-Oslo Palestinian politics post-Oslo have focused on the role of Arafat (45) and his methods of personalizing power. Extensive powers were vested into the hands of the President who headed the executive branch of government. This was partly related to the Interim Agreement giving the president the right to veto legislature and to issue laws by decrees. (46) The President was also authorized to make appointments to both the civil service and the police. He could establish or dissolve public institutions and he had the right to disburse public funds. A number of public institutions were attached directly to the President's office. In addition, the President was involved in 'extensive micromanagement activities,' such as requests from civil servants and police officers for vacation and petty expenditures. The Minister of Finance could not disburse approved budgets to the ministries and agencies, as these must have direct Presidential approval. (47) The President also had sole control of t he various security branches, inhibiting civilian control over the police and security.

To a large degree the political system thus resembled a neo-patriarchal regime (48) circling around Yasir Arafat as the 'charismatic leader,' who permeated all spheres of public life. This led observers to assert that the 'state is Arafat.' (49) Alter the inauguration of the PNA, criticism against Yasir Arafat increased. (50) An independent member of the Palestinian Legislative Council claimed: "There are no restrictions, there is no limitation. He is the political system." (51)

However, at the time of the 1996 elections, despite the deep internal cleavages concerning the pros and cons of the Oslo Accords, Arafat represented the unquestioned symbol and hero of the Palestinian struggle. Arafat's legitimacy has historically been based in his total and personal manifestation of the 'armed struggle' and the crafting of a Palestinian identity based in the struggle. (52) During the years of self-rule, this legitimacy in Palestinian society has increasingly been questioned. A Fateh member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) characterized the role of Arafat in the following way:

Some of the credit was with him, personally for overcoming many obstacles that came across during our struggle. It was he personally, and his perseverance, his vision and his courage, both physical and moral courage that kept us on the line. If it was not for him, I don't think we would be here now. But under such leaders, people also suffer. Such leaders give a lot to their people, but they take a lot. He's a dictator. But his dictatorship was not the result of a coup d'etat. His dictatorship was the result of several factors. And his ability to take historical decisions. Because he has a sense of history, or the importance of the historical moment. He takes the right decision, even when people don't understand such decisions, when people are against such decisions. After a while they appreciate it. That's why he became the only person who can take decisions. He doesn't want the law ... any law, any regulation ties him up. The Council could be a great help to Arafat, the Council could be his main tool. But t he Council cannot function as a yes-man, as a yes-body, that's not why we were elected. But Arafat, I mean to be with him means not to say no ever. It doesn't work. You are with him, or you are not with him. (53)

In the above, Arafat appears as an 'enlightened despot' who, by virtue of intuition, knowledge and experience and other potential qualities, almost instinctively took the 'right' decisions, typical of the ways that charismatic leaders portray themselves. (54) At the same time, there was an ambivalence of how to judge Yasir Arafat in his new role as a state-maker and a President, yet still dressed in fatigues. Arafat took the right decisions, but he was also a 'dictator.'

Maybe we can understand it [Arafat's personalization of power] in Beirut. I can't say we accept it, but we can understand it at that time, but we will never accept it here, on our land. (55) Maybe this man [Arafat], because of his historical role and being the leader of the Palestinian people for over 30 years, it's OK if you accept many of the things for him. But I am not going to accept it for the others. (56)

Such comments indicate that Arafat, during the time of the revolution outside, represented a political system defined by exceptional circumstances-'on the land' and after 'him,' authoritarianism would not be tolerated. Part of the legitimacy of Arafat and the PLO stemmed from the very absence from the land. Although the PLO engaged in institution-building in the diaspora, (57) its main concern was the struggle and external relations. When territorializing and acquiring new responsibilities in terms of governance, without the formal achievement of the long-standing goals of the Palestinian movement, the legitimacy upon which the PLO had been based waned.

A decline in legitimacy was indicated in opinion polls. In an October 1999 opinion poll, 53 percent of the respondents evaluated the performance of the President's office as 'very good' or 'good,' (58) which is to be compared with 71 percent in June 1998. (59) Corresponding figures for the Legislative Council were 37 percent in October 1999 (60) and 44.6 percent in June 1998. (61) The Cabinet was evaluated positively by 43 percent of respondents in October 1999 (62) as compared to 53 percent in June 1998. (63) If presidential elections would have been held in April 2000, 39 percent of the respondents answered that they would have voted for Yasir Arafat, (64) as compared with 62 percent in November 1997, (65) and 88 percent in the elections of 1996. (66) The legitimacy of Yasir Arafat was negatively affected by the al-Aqsa intifada. In September 2001, 23.5 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza stated that Yasir Arafat was the Palestinian personality whom they trusted most. However, Arafat did not loose legitimacy to someone else, but rather 26 percent did not trust anyone. (67)

These figures were to be seen as indicative of a loosening of political legitimacy on behalf of Yasir Arafat and the political system which he has incarnated. There was a corresponding decline of trust in all government offices, as well as a general decline in the support of the political factions, including Fateh. (68) In March/April 2000, 36.7 percent of the population stated that they supported none of the political factions or groupings indicated in the survey. (69) In September 2001, 29.2 percent supported Fateh and 20.7 percent supported llamas. Thus the gap between Fateh and Hamas was narrowing. Forty-two point seven percent did not trust any of the political factions. (70) Fateh was not able to capitalize on its role in the intifada. Instead, there was an increase in sympathies for llamas and a slight increase in support for Islamic Jihad and PFLP. The peace process therefore generated a crisis of political legitimacy on behalf of the political system towards a process of political alienation. Despite high support for the intifada, (71) this process of delegitimazation continued throughout 2001.

THE CABINET

Centralization and personalization of politics was reflected in the composition of the government. One of the means of personalizing power was the continued problem of appointments in the Palestinian Authority, first set up in 1994. The staff of ministries and departments were appointed by the President, meaning that deputies and directors-generals were not always on the same line as the minister. (72) Many claimed that the appointments amounted to a divide and-rule strategy. The cabinet was primarily made up of a combination of representatives of the large families from the traditional elite and urban notables (e.g., Maher Masri representing one of the influential families of Nablus and Feisal Husseini (73) and Muhammad Nashashibi, representing the Jerusalem-elite as well as the historical cleavage between these families) and PLO-bureaucrats (such as Nabil sha'ath and Ahmed Qreia), together with a few representing the West Bank/Gaza political independents or professionals and civil intelligentsia (such as Ha nan Ashrawi and Saleh Abdel Jawwad Saleh in the cabinet between 1994 and 1998). Also Hamas sympathizers, or former members, who ran in the elections to the legislative despite the official llamas boycott, were given ministerial positions in the cabinet. The Fateh movement has become the main basis for the Authority, with the majority of high ranking positions in all governmental sectors being distributed to Fateh members. Hilal therefore argued that the PNA was a one-party regime. (74) Another way of understanding the composition of the PNA is that it reflected an attempt to balance the interests of various segments of the elite. (75) Balance was sought between influential families who constituted the traditional elite, between different regions of the West Bank and Gaza, between outsiders and insiders, and between bureaucrats and fighters.

Because of the accumulated frustration within the Council concerning the neglect of the Council recommendations following the 'corruption report' issued by the Legislative Council in the summer of 1997, Arafat faced a threat of no-confidence in the Legislative Council in August 1998. (76) In response, Arafat announced a change in the government. Much to the dismay of large parts of the Council, all ministers remained in office, including Nabil Sha'ath and Jamil Tarifi, who had been accused of corruption in the Council report. The main change was the enlargement of the cabinet through an addition of some ten ministers. Some of the new ministers, such as Sa'id el-Krunz and Yousef Abu Safiyeh from Gaza belonged to the category of previously critical Fateh PLC members. Others were more loyal PLC-members, such as Fateh member Ziad Abu Zayyad. The balance of the cabinet was nevertheless tilted, through including more PLC-members and more 'insiders' in the cabinet. Nevertheless, top ministerial positions were kept b y returning PLO-cadres and influential families. Many viewed the inclusion of critical Fateh members as co-optation (77) It could also, however, be perceived as an attempt to make political pacts in order to facilitate the current phase of transition, whatever the end-station might be. Inclusion of critical persons/opinions during transitions may serve to create as broad a base as possible for the formulation of the rules of the political system. Independent figures Hanan Ashrawi (previously Minister of Higher Education) and Saleh Abdel Jawwad Saleh (previously Minister of Agriculture) declined to serve in office, because of attempts to diminish their influence. The Council voted in favor of the new government by 55-28 and three abstaining votes.

All in all, this amounted to a system of rivalries between institutions as well as between different segments of the elite. Tensions between 'insiders' and 'returnees' therefore increased. The large number of returnees in public positions led to feelings of marginalization among insiders. Positions in the Authority have been partly distributed due to demands and wishes for compensation among returnees. The intifada elite, and the new intellectuals who rose to the fore as NGO-leaders during the 1980s were, to a large extent, left outside effective political power. In line with this policy of ignoring or minimizing the impact of the challenging younger and more radical generation, political decisions taken by the Palestinian Authority have generally worked so as to revive the hamuleh (78) (clan based) structures, weakened during the decades of revolution, resistance and the intifada. (79) Patronage politics implied the distribution of positions as well as benefits of various forms. Although this has given rise to a heated debate on 'corruption,' (80) this political approach could be understood as a continuation of the kind of patronage system the PLO established during its years of displacement. Certain strata of the political elite were supported in order for the 'system' (Arafat and the cause) to benefit from assured political loyalties. (81)

The neo-patrimonial characteristics of the Palestinian Authority should be understood in relation to its security predicaments The Authority needs guaranteed political support by various elite groups owing to the uncertain setting. Security predicaments are by and large an effect of the agreements with Israel, but are also related to the problem of internal factionalism and a lack of institutionalization. (82)

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

A conflict of both interests and values has evolved between the Executive and the Legislative branches of authority. The Executive has tended to neglect the law-makers in terms of legislation, recommendations and accountability. Consequently, the Council has been weakened and its efficiency has been seriously curtailed. Most seriously, the Basic Law83 has not been passed by the Executive.

Although most PNA candidates were elected to the Legislative Council in the January 1996 elections, and although the vast majority of Council members were also elected on official (54 out of 88 seats) or independent Fateh-lists (12 out of 88), (84) it could be argued that the PLC represented a different political logic than the Executive. A not insignificant number of Fateh members of parliament were sharply critical of the Authority and Yasir Arafat. Some of the candidates on the independent Fateh-list ran independently after they were excluded from the official list or were advised against running on the official list. Examples include: Husam Khader, intifada-activist from Balata refugee camp; legendary PLA-officer Salah Ta'amari and intifada-activist Abdul Fateh Hemayel from the Ramallah area. Many of the outspoken Fateh critiques come from the intifada generation and from those with a history as 'strugglers;' this rendered them significant popular legitimacy. (85) In addition, West Bank and Gaza residents , i.e., 'insiders' held a majority of the seats. (86)

During the first years of its existence, the PLC articulated something completely new in Palestinian political life. The Council represented a political body based on general elections and thus on a new form of political legitimacy, as opposed to the one based on a revolutionary liberation logic. (87) Parliamentary debates were lively, independent and pluralistic. (88) Council members did not refrain from sharply criticizing the centralization of the regime, and complained about executive neglect of law-making, executive media-blocking of the Council, (89) 'corruption,' and human rights violations, etc. As time passed, Council-members, however, grew increasingly frustrated over Executive attempts to weaken the Legislative. (90) In a study conducted by the Jerusalem-based Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC), 79 percent of the Council members stated that the Executive Authority had a negative impact on the performance of the Council. (91) During the last few years, there has been a marked decline of the number of Council members attending Council sessions, further weakening the impact of the parliament. The Council found itself in a particularly problematic situation, since its mandate was originally for the interim period, intended to last until May 1999. The interim period was subsequently prolonged with the peace talks with Ehud Barak in 1999. No new elections have been held since.

According to many PLC members, as well as opponents, the Executive was deliberately trying to marginalize the Legislative.

So far the attitudes of the Executive Authority are very negative. The Executive is violating democratic values, legal principles, human rights principles. And this is part of the terrible situation we are enduring. The Executive Authority is neglecting the Legislative Council completely. So what we have really is an autocracy. And that's what the Chairman is interested in. (92)

The frustration within the Council over the obstacles established by the Executive led Haidar Abdel Shafi to resign as a member of the Council in the autumn of 1997. Other members of the Council phrased the problems in the following ways:

But in the end Mr Arafat will interfere and blow up any kind of decision. So from the outside, if you come to attend, it's nice, you can see that we are playing good games. But there is no way to be part of the rolitical decision or to be part of the real work in the society. (93) "They [the Authority] fight against us more than they fight against Netanyahu politics. They leave us shouting in a closed bottle." (94)

But despite the difficulties, a significant number of Council-members considered the Council to be the backbone of any emerging democratic regime.

We are the founding fathers of the Palestinian state. Anything that we do today will be a precedent for the future, it will become like law, even if we are without a state. If we do it right, then those who come after us, they will do it right. Because we are puffing the steps for the future. (95)

PLC members of the more radical (and democratic) kind tend to see the Council as the democratic core of the state-building project. The Council is seen as the center from where legislation and accountability are to define Palestinian politics.

From the Executive-point of view on the other hand, there are sometimes accusations that the Council is stepping out of its limits and assuming authorities it does not (and, according to the Executive, should not) have.

You know those who were elected in the Legislative Council, most of them were in jail here or there. They are the fighters of freedom, and not the professionals of a parliament. They involve in the daily life rather than lawmaking. They think that they are a party from the Palestinian Authority.

Sometimes they mix between legislative council authority and between executive authority. And you find them everywhere, even in the negotiations. (96)

There was thus a tug of war between the Executive and the Legislative-seen as institutions-concerning accountability, constitutionalism, separation of powers and the role of core institutions in the contemporary period of state-building.

ELITE DISCOURSE AND POLITICAL CULTURE

In this conflict, different discursive strategies were employed in order to legitimize the claims of clashing segments of the elite. In those discourses the notions of revolution, resistance and intifada were deeply entrenched. There was by and large a consensus--despite the cleavages--that the military and militant struggle(s) during at least three decades had a direct and profound impact upon the possibilities of establishing a democratic political order. However, the meaning this discourse was given by different groups sharply differed. One argument often brought forward was that former revolutionaries have institutionalized a political form and style which serves as an impediment to democracy.

Someone who has never practiced democracy, neither in his institution nor in his home, he can't really cooperate or be responsive to democratization. There are no democratic people. (97)

So I think there is a mentality, a military mentality. According to their previous, secret experience, they didn't believe in NGOs or in public opinion. They depend on slogans, sometimes on secret agreements, they have no experience in implementing laws and respect laws. (98)

Many claim that the PLO logic and history implied that there were no democratic 'people' or experiences to rely upon in the current period of transition. This argument was often presented as a criticism, implying that the current elite needed to be changed. Others employed the history and discourse of struggle as an excuse for the current democratic deficit. Time was needed in order to adapt. Respondents often made a distinction between 'revolution' and 'struggle.' The revolutionaries (or the bureaucrats of the revolution) were perceived as undemocratic, while the civil intelligentsia, the strugglers of the inside, the intifada activists, the street fighters and prisoners of Israeli jails were depicted as the democrats. 'Revolution' was seen as an exile, outside and elite experience, while 'struggle' was portrayed as inside, middle-command activist and more participatory. A discursive practice creating new boundaries between what was portrayed as a 'returning' political culture and identity and a 'native' pol itical style has emerged.

'INSIDE'--'OUTSIDE' (99)

A common perception among insiders was that the returnees had a different 'mentality' than those who had lived under and with the occupation from 1967 and onwards. Those who lived outside had lived their experience in the Arab world, under various versions of authoritarian Arab regimes. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, on the other hand, have been exposed to Israel and internal Israeli democracy, causing them to be more democratic, and more critical against authorities. This created a gap between the two experiences. Such discourses should be seen in light of the problematique of returning exiled leaderships, for whom legitimacy has to a certain extent been created in their very absence from territory. Although '[n]ational movements formed in diaspora must territorialize or risk withering away,' (100) processes of (re-territorialization and emplacement of leadership are not necessarily smooth. In the Palestinian case, the 'inside-outside' divide is intertwined with the determination of the exiled leade rship to maintain control vis-a-vis the inside challenge.

DEMOCRACY: NOW OR LATER

The battle between elites led to different conclusions regarding the implementation of democracy as a form of governance. In abstract terms, even Arafat loyalists, or in the terminology of O' Donnell and Schmitter, 'hard-liners,' adhered to democracy as the principle of governance in the long run. However, in their view the lack of sovereignty and the continuous negotiations with Israel were of overall importance and the political system had to direct itself towards securing control over land and solving the conflict with Israel. There was a need for the Authority to centralize power in order to deliver effectively in the form of tangible results of the peace process.

How can you build institutions for the Palestinians based on democracy and human rights while most of our land is under occupation until now? (101)

Arafat is under pressure. He believes that his top priority and his main job and his main duty and the only thing he has to do is to liberate the land and every other thing is minor, is not important. For him nothing is important except how we can take our land from the Israeli occupation and to put an end to this Israeli occupation. (102)

Adherents to this trend therefore believe that democracy 'must wait' until the negotiations had delivered. Democracy was here depicted as impossible to implement without land, sovereignty and self-determination. Patience was called for. (103) This discourse was a continuation of a revolutionary political style, which is partly legitimized through the restricted circumstances of self-rule.

To the 'democrats,' or those who called for political reform, democracy was rather seen as part of and as a continuation of the struggle. This position was held primarily by former activists and the oppositionals.

Without democracy there is no change between the authority and the occupation. So we shouldn't wait until the independent state for example and we shouldn't say first we should have the independent state and then democracy. (104)

Democracy was part and parcel of the liberation issue. To this political trend, liberation was not only about the land, but represented a more radical position, including the establishment of a 'democratic' state and society.

The fight against ourselves in order to build our democratic society, it will be more difficult than our fight against the Israeli occupation. (105)

Of course you can hear from many people that we are in the beginning and we will (106) on. OK, why don't we begin right? We are able to do that.

To large parts of the Fateh movement, the period of transition must also entail a process of democratization. To these Fateh activists, there was now an internal struggle to fight. Democracy represented the struggle within and would therefore be more problematic as power plays, interests and manipulations, as well as conflicts over resources that had previously been downplayed would now be acted out more manifestly. Although a strict outside-inside divide is much too simplified, (107) leading figures in the call for democracy were critical Fateh PLC-members such as Husam Khades, Abbas Zaki and Marwan Barghouti. Barghouti was General-Secretary of the Fateh movement. He pushed for primary elections within Fateh. In 1994, such elections were cancelled following initial elections in Ramallah. The result of these primaries implied that the 'new elite' from the intifada generation gained in legitimacy. Refugee camp residents were, for example, highly represented among those elected. This caused Arafat to cancel the elections. In 1999, a new round of primary elections were held in the Fateh movement in the West Bank. (108) Approximately 85,000 Fateh activists participated and 2,500 leaders were elected. Conferences were held also in Gaza. Such regional elections and conferences aimed at electing a new Fateh Central Council and a new Fateh Revolutionary Council with a considerably stronger representation of 'inside' Fateh activists. (109)

The Palestinian political elite was thus divided into two camps of either defending the growing authoritarianism for the time being and as a necessary condition during negotiations or demanding democratic reform. There was thus a deep cleavage concerning democracy, accountability, human rights, constiutionalism, and separation of powers, which cut across Palestinian political society, the core institutions of state-building and the Fateh movement. (110) There were critical voices in the cabinet, but in general, the

Executive followed the presidential line. The Legislative Council was more divided, as shown in important voting procedures, such as in August 1998. Although the majority tended to follow the official Fateh line, as much as one-third was openly critical against the Authority. The mainstream political elite was therefore divided between 'hard-liners' and 'soft-liners' when it came to the issue of political reform.

These differences were highlighted in November 1999 when a number of prominent Palestinians were arrested after signing a petition criticizing the Palestinian Authority for 'corruption' and 'tyranny'-the Petition of 20. Nine members of the PLC who had also signed the petition were threatened with having their parliamentary immunity lifted and then facing arrest. At a PLC meeting, the Council voted not to lift the immunity of the parliamentarians, and called for the release of the personalities still imprisoned, but voted (33 for, 8 against and 3 abstaining votes) (111) to censure the nine members of parliament and to form a committee to 'monitor the behavior' of Council-members. The PLC-statement adopted "condemns and denounces the statement with all accusations, defamations, and curses, and rejects all of it." (112) The nine signatories refused to denounce the petition. After the meeting, one of the parliamentarian signatures of the petition, Mouawiyah Masri, was attacked by masked gunmen outside his home an d shot in his right leg. (113) Later in December, PLC member Salah Abdel Jawwad Salah was beaten by intelligence forces at a demonstration demanding the release of the remaining imprisoned petitioners. (114)

Both sides used the rhetoric of struggle in their descriptions of the event. PLC member Hassan Khreishe and a signatory of the petition said: "What is of more value, the leader or the homeland? I believe the homeland is larger than the leader, whoever he may be." PLC member Saleh Abdel Jawwad Saleh stated: "This is a country that gave martyrs for a homeland, not for a mafia." Both quotations indicate the use of a homeland rhetoric. An official communique from the Fateh movement defended the arrests, saying: "What interest is served in having an atmosphere of confusion and internal strife and in dividing the ranks of the nation?", also indicating the use of a discourse underlining the needs related to the struggle for independence. That is, national unity is required in order to face the external pressures. (115) The PLC official statement used a similar rhetoric, i.e., that the petition caused unnecessary division in the national ranks, when unity was needed and should be fostered. (116) Reactions were strong against the arrests of the 20 signatories and included protests from international human rights organizations. (117) The Petition of the 20 is indicative of the conflict between different segments of the elite, although this battle was fought with highly asymmetric means in terms of power. Also, the petition manifested how this struggle cut across the Legislative Council and had further fragmented the Council.

THE AQSA INTIFADA

The second or al-Aqsa Intifada must therefore be understood in the context of competing political discourses and the contest for legitimacy. The Arafat elite, the old PLO-bureaucracy together with influential families, did not prove capable of concluding either the transition from occupation to statehood, or the transition from a revolutionary movement to a structure of governance based on prospects for a democratic political system. Although the old elite dominated the scene during the years of the peace process, the 'new elite,' discontent inside Fateh activists, bided their time.

Authoritarian repression and strategies of cooptation limited the space open for a politics of democratization and the needs of internal political reform. The one realm where the Authority was vulnerable and where it was possible openly to step forward was therefore the peace process. (118) The Authority has shown that it was incapable of 'basic governance and, at the same time, was unable to operate as a national liberation movement." (119) Although the Authority has concealed its authoritarian decision-making style behind a revolutionary nationalist discourse, the legitimacy of the Authority has waned. Fateh activists thus entered the scene from this angle, i.e., challenging the Authority's credibility as a revolutionary force. The intention was not only to show that there was an alternative to the peace process, but that there was an alternative political leadership, more faithful to the Palestinian discourse of revolution and struggle. The al-Aqsa Intifada therefore resembles not only the intifada of 1987 , but the Great Revolt in 1936. The legacy of Palestinian uprisings subsumes a problematic relationship with the leadership.

Also, the fact that civil society was largely absent from the current revolt as opposed to the intifada, (120) supported the claim of an elite competition. That is, rather than an event of mass-mobilization like the first intifada, the new uprising was connected to Fateh and various elements of the security apparatus. Although much has been said about the Fateh tanzim as the main organizer behind the current uprising, the tanzim is a rather loose organization of various Fateh elements. Unable openly to challenge the Arafat regime, the uprising initially enabled Yasir Arafat to capitalize on the dramatic turn of events. He came forward as unyielding to impossible Israeli demands and as close to the sentiments of the Palestinian street, without being directly involved himself. However, in the course of the uprising, the continued existence of the Palestinian Authority was increasingly questioned. (121) The Palestinian Authority received its main legitimacy from the peace process, rather than the struggle. When the peace process collapsed, where then was the legitimacy of the Authority? In addition, the Authority suffered severely from Israeli policies during the uprising, with the harsh use of force including attack helicopters, tanks and--following the murder of Israeli Minister of Tourism in October 2001 (122)--a reoccupation of A-areas. The Palestinian areas found themselves in a situation of a siege, with catastrophic economic consequences. Infrastructure was destroyed. Politically as well as economically, the Palestinian Authority was in a severe crisis. Institutions proved unable to meet with public needs in the emergency situation which evolved. (123) In late November 2001, Israeli forces assassinated a leading Hamas figure and a ghastly revenge occurred in early December in a series of terror attacks in Jerusalem and Haifa. The Israeli retaliation was uncompromising; infrastructure was destroyed in missile attacks designed to show Yasir Arafut and the Palestinian Authority that they were no longer safe. At the time of concluding this article (fall 2001), Palestinians and Israelis therefore found themselves on the brink of the abyss.

The intifada appears to have not only sharpened the cleavage between reformists and loyalists, but brought forward another gap, i.e., between those who call for a reformist change of the political system in charge, and those who claim that the PA needs to be replaced by the PLO. Although the Fateh movement, including Mawran Barghouti, supports the PA as a system, its leading role in the intifada together with the role of various security branches have exacerbated the tensions within the ruling elite. (124)

CONCLUSIONS

The reorientation of Palestinian politics without the 'real achievement' of sovereignty and independence created ambiguity. The Palestinian political system of today is between and betwixt, no longer representing a revolutionary liberation movement, and not yet a sovereign state. As one member of the PLC said: "This is a transformation between the legitimacy of the revolution and the legitimacy of the constitution," (125) illustrating the problematique of the current transition.

The political system in-the-making could best be described as neopatrimonial with a charismatic leader and extensive powers extended to the repressive apparatus. Although institutionalization has occurred at a rather rapid pace, there is a heavy imbalance between the different institutions. Power is concentrated with the President, while the Legislative and the Judiciary remain marginalized. A constitutional basis is absent. The Authority is oversized, with an authoritarian, personalized and blurred decision making and leadership structure, inhibiting popular influence. The lawmakers tend to be neglected and ignored both in their function as legislators and as government controllers.

The process of institutionalization has also, however, and paradoxically, favored democratization in the sense that the institutionalized political elite has been widened by the establishment of the PLC, and by the formal allegiance to elections as the means of choosing representatives. There has thus been a partial opening up of the political sphere. This had created new room of maneuver for challenging views on authority and governance. Also, the boundaries of the political debate have been broadened and there is an emerging articulation of different opinions related to the political system in the making, although freedom of opinion and expression is seriously curtailed by the powers of the Executive. In line with O'Donnell and Schmitter, the rules that exist in the uncertain period of transition are controlled by authoritarian power structures.

This turbulent setting is typical of transitions. A limited opening, i.e., the elections and the establishment of the Legislative Council, implied increasingly vocal formulation of alternatives to the current rules of the game. 'Hard-liners' in the authoritarian regime fear for their long-term positions; this had led to a reaction and repression which again restricted the sphere where counterarguments can be brought forward. This repression seems also, however, to have contributed to the crisis of legitimacy that the present regime is experiencing. This crisis of legitimacy and the internal contest between elite constellations (i.e., largely within the Fateh movement) paved the way for the al-Aqsa intifada. In turn, the uprising appears to have widened the gap between the main controllers of the PA and the challengers within Fateh.

ENDNOTES

(1.) This article is part of a larger research project, State-building and Democracy in Palestine, which is a cooperative project between the Department of Sociology at Bir Zeit University and the Department of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University. The financial support by Sida/SAREC is gratefully acknowledge.

(2.) CPRS Opinion Poll #48,30 March-l April 2000.

(3.) "Settlement Monitor," Geoffrey Aronson (ed.), Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXIX, No.3, Spring 2000:130-134.

(4.) The territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority is both severely limited and divided. In the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority controls about 60 percent of the land. The West Bank after the Interim Agreement of September 1995 is divided into three zones. In the Sharm el-Sheikh-agreement from September 1999, revising the Wye River Agreement from October 1998, three redeployment schemes were outlined. The two first of these took place before the end of 1999, and the third occurred in March 2000, bringing the territory under control by the Palestinian National Authority to a combined 42 percent of the West Bank. Permanent status negotiations and negotiations on the outstanding questions were initiated 13 September 1999, and scheduled to be finalized 13 September 2000. The intense Camp David-negotiations in July 2000 failed to produce an agreement. There are also institutional and functional limitations. Borders are under the control of Israel, economic relations are regulated by the agreements wit h Israel. The Palestinians are not allowed foreign relations others than such that are related to development assistance or cultural relations, and Israel may veto Palestinian lawmaking.

(5.) Cf. Chase, Anthony B. Tirado, The Palestinian Authority Draft Constitution: Possibilities and Realities in the Search for Alternative Models of State Formation, IPCRI Law and Development Program, Civil Society Publications: Jerusalem; Hillel Frisch, "Modern Absolutism or Neopatriarchal State Building? Customary Law, Extended Families and the Palestinian Authority," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 29, No. 3, August 1997: 34 1-358; Mark Heller, "Towards a Palestinian State," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 1997: 5-22.

(6.) Frisch, 1997; Glenn E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997); Jamil Hilal, "The Effect of the Oslo Agreement on the Palestinian Political System," in George Giacamen and Dag Jorund Lonning (eds.), After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (London, Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), pp. 162-188.

(7.) The bulk of the material on which this article is based, consists of qualitative interviews with 48 Palestinian political leaders, including 28 PLC members, 9 PA ministers and 11 oppositional leaders. The last category has, however, been excluded from this article. The bulk of the interviews were conducted in October-November 1997, with 15 follow-ups in April/May 1998 and March/April 1999. The follow-ups were primarily with PLC-members. All interviews were conducted by Helena Lindholm Schulz or Michael Schulz. The interviews cover how respondents would like to describe the current period in Palestinian political life, the institutions set up, their attitudes towards these institutions, as well as discourses on how the political system built up could best be understood. What do members of elites say about the functions of core institutions and the relations between them? Although none of the interviewed has declined to appear with their names, I have decided to let the respondents remain anonymous through out this article.

(8.) O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986); O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986); Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1990: 143-164; Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz, Between Governments: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

(9.) O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies: 6.

(10.) Ibid

(11.) Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative Politics, Vol. 2: 1970, 327-63; O'Donnell et al., 1986, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives; David Potter, "Explaining Democratization," in David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloch, Paul Lewis (eds.), Democratization (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 1-14.

(12.) Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," O'Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, pp. 47-63.

(13.) O'Donnell et al., 1986, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.

(14.) Ibid

(15.) Ibid: 38.

(16.) Rustow, 1970.

(17.) O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 16.

(18.) Przeworski, 1986.

(19.) Frisch, 1997; Robinson, 1997; Hilal, 1998.

(20.) The PLO in exile has worked as a quasi-government, (cf. Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Laurie Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State ( New York: Columbia University Press; 1984) Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), with the Palestinian National Council (PNC) serving as the legislative body assembled at "need;" the Central Council functioned as an intermediate body between the "parliament" -- the PNC and the "government," the Executive Committee, with its 18 members.

(21.) Manuel, Hassassein, "The Democratization Process in the PLO: Ideology, Structure, and Strategy," in Edy Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed and Robert L. Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Boulder, CO: .Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 257-285; Rex Brynen, "From Occupation to Uncertainty: Palestine," in Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, pp. 185-202.

(22.) Naomi Chazan, "Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and Democracy," in Larry Diamond (ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 67-76.

(23.) Palestine National Council, "The Palestine Declaration of Independence, 15 November 1988," in Yehuda Lukacs (ed.), The Israeli Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record 1967-1990 (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.41 1-415.

(24.) Brynen, 1998.

(25.) Robinson, 1997; Sayigh, 1997; Hillel Frisch, Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and Gaza (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).

(26.) Sayigh, 1997, p. 458.

(27.) Ibid: 603. Analyses of the class-base of the PLO are made by Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 1979); Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994) and Y. Sayigh, 1997.

(28.) Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (Boston: MERIP/South End Press, 1989); Ze'ev Schiff and Ya'ari, Ehuri, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front( New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock (eds.), Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); Robinson, 1997.

(29.) See also Muhammad Muslih, "Palestinian Civil Society," in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, Volume 1 (Leiden, New York, Koln: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 243-268; Roy, Sara, "Civil Society in the Gaza Strip: Obstacles to Social Reconstruction," in Augustus R. Norton (ed.), Volume II, 1995: 221-258.

(30.) Meir Litvak, "Inside Versus Outside: The Challenge of the Local Leadership, 1967-1994," in Avraham Sela and Moshe Ma'oz (eds.), The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Settlement, 1964-1994 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 171-196; Robinson, 1997; Frisch, 1998.

(31.) Robinson, 1997:19.

(32.) Ali Jabrawi, "Palestinian Elites in the Occupied Territories: Stability and Change through the Intifada," in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (eds.), 1990:287-305.

(33.) The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising; a clandestine leadership organization, constituted by representatives from Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the then Palestine Communist Parties. Members were rotated according to the security situation.

(34.) In 1972 and 1976, Israel allowed municipal elections to take place in the West Bank. After the sweeping victory of pro-PLO forces in the 1976 elections, Israel never allowed such elections to occur again (see Ma'oz, 1994).

(35.) Cf. R. Sayigh, 1979, 1994; Peteet, 1991; Y. Sayigh, 1997; Helena Lindholm Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

(36.) Sayigh, 1997:18.

(37.) The Palestinian Declaration of Independence, Algiers, 15 November 1988, in Lukacs, 1992:411

(38.) Intifada Leaflet No. 11, in Saul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones: Communiques from the Intifada Underground (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), p. 72.

(39.) Cf. Heller, 1997; Robinson, 1997; Frisch 1997.

(40.) Sayigh and Shikaki, 1999.

(41.) E.g., LAW, 1999.

(42.) Usher, 1998.

(43.) For a detailed account of Palestinian institution-building during self-government, see Sayigh and Shikaki, 1999.

(44.) One of the few who has claimed that the Palestinian state-in-the making must be judged in accordance with its transitory nature as well as in relation to its external pressure is Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

(45.) Yasir Arafat won the 1996 presidential elections with 88 percent of the votes.

(46.) Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington, 28 September 1995, Chapter 3, Article XVIII.

(47.) Ibid.

(48.) Frisch, 1997.

(49.) Robinson, 1997.

(50.) Some do not hesitate to call Arafat a dictator. See Said K. Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 1998).

(51.) Interview, #22 PLC-member, independent, 23 October 1997.

(52.) Cf. R. Sayigh, 1979; Y. Sayigh, 1997; Helena Lindholm Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalisms: Between Revolution and Statehood.

(53.) Interview #21 with PLC-member, Fateh, 19 October 1997.

(54.) Cf. Sharabi, 1987, for a discussion of neo-patriarchy in the Arab world, and Frisch, 1997 for an application to the Palestinian Authority.

(55.) Interview # 18. PLC-member, Fateh, 20 October 1997.

(56.) Interview #22 PLC-member, Fateh, 23 October 1997.

(57.) Brand, 1988; Y. Sayigh, 1997.

(58.) Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) , Opinion Poll # 44, 14-16 October 1999.

(59.) CPRS, Opinion Poll # 33, 3-6 June 1998.

(60.) CPRS, Opinion Poll #44, 14-16 October 1999.

(61.) CPRS, Opinion Poll #33, 3-6 June 1998.

(62.) CPRS, Opinion Poll #44, 14-16 October 1999.

(63.) CPRS, Opinion Poll # 33, 3-6 June 1998.

(64.) CPRS Opinion Poll #48, 30 March-1 April, 2000.

(65.) CPRS, Opinion Poll # 30,27-29 November 1997.

(66.) It should be emphasized that in the CPRS opinion polls, several hypothetical candidates are posed against Yasir Arafat, whereas in the 1996 elections, there was only one runner-up, Samiha Khalil.

(67.) JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 42, www.jmcc.org.

(68.) CPRS, Opinion Polls 997-2000.

(69.) CPRS, Opinion Poll # 48, 30 March-1 April 2000.

(70.) JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 42, www.jmcc.org.

(71.) Ibid.

(72.) The work of the Ministry of Agriculture under Saleh Abdel Jawwad Saleh was paralyzed for large parts of 1997 and 1998 as the deputy and general-directors pursued different lines than the Minister. Mother example was the conflict between Minister of Environment Yusif Abu Safiyeh and the director general of the ministry. The director general is an Arafat appointee. The conflict resulted in the Minister being beaten severely after which the director general and five suspects of the abuse were arrested.

(73.) Although it should be noted that Feisal Husseini, as Minister without Portfolio, responsible for Jerusalem, has been out of the grace of Arafat during the last few years. The appointment of Ziad Abu Zayyad, as Minister without Portfolio in 1998, was by many seen as a way to undermine the influence of Husseini in the Jerusalem-area.

(74.) Hilal, 1998: 133. Given the fact that the oppositional forces have all tended to see the Authority as illegitimate because of its establishment as a result of negotiations with Israel, the fact of Fateh-dominance appears to have been difficult to avoid.

(75.) Rex Brynen, "The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 31-43: 38.

(76.) PLC Report on the Findings of the General Control Office, August 1997, translated and provided by Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre.

(77.) Interviews with PLC members, April/May 1999.

(78.) The patrilineal extended family.

(79.) See Graham Usher, "The Return of the Tribes," al-Ahram Weekly, 30 October-S November, 1997; Frisch, 1997; Robinson, 1997.

(80.) Reaching peak levels with the Council report on mismanagement, improper accounting structures and misuse of public funds, in the Authority. The report was formulated as a study of a prior report conducted by the PA General Control Office, operating under the Ministry of Finance. The Auditor's report had revealed that US$ 326 million had been mismanaged. The Council report also recommended that criminal charges for corruption should be brought upon Minister of International Cooperation and Planning, Nabil Sha'ath as well as the Minister of Civil Affairs, Jamil Tarifi.

(81.) Sayigh, 1997.

(82.) Cf. Brynen, 1995, 1998: 197.

(83.) Draft Basic Law for the National Authority in the Transitional Period, December 1995, published by Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, Jerusalem as Occasional Document Series, February 1996, No. 5. The discussion on the Draft Basic Law began after the Declaration of Independence and has since been adjusted to the situation post-Oslo. See H. Aruri, Nasser and John C. Carroll, "A New Palestinian Charter," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 92, (XXIII) , No. 4, Summer, 1994, pp. 5-16; Gregory S. Mahler, Constitutionalism and Palestinian Constitutional Development, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996, for discussions on various drafts. An open and participatory debate including viewpoints from different sources has taken place. The Palestinian Legislative Council approved the Basic Law in its third reading in 1997, but it has not been approved by the President.

(84.) Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 1998a, Palestine's Interim Agreement with Democracy, Jerusalem: JMCC.

(85.) Returning PLA-officer Salah Ta'amari won an overwhelming victory in the Bethlehem-district and Abdul Fateh Hemayel ranked third in his constituency, Ramallah. Husam Khader came fifth in the Nablus-constituency (Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 1998b, The Palestinian Council, Jerusalem: JMCC.)

(86.) Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 1998a.

(87.) Khalil Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine," Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume XXV, No. 2 (Winter 1996), PP. 5-20; Hilal, 1998.

(88.) Interview with Chris George, Association for Rural Development, November 1997. Cf. also Palestine Report, 1997-1998; People's Rights, 1997-1998.

(89.) Palestinian Legislative Council, Self-Evaluation Report, October 1996, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 160-161.

(90.) Interviews with PLC-members, April 1998; April 1999.

(91.) Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 1998a: 102.

(92.) Interview #11 PLC-member, independent, 13 October 1997.

(93.) Interview #22 PLC-member, independent, 23 October 1997.

(94.) Interview with PLC-member, independent Fateh, 10 April 1999.

(95.) Interview #25 PLC-member, 27 October 1997.

(96.) Interview #29 PA-minister, Fateh, 2 November 1997.

(97.) Interview #2 PA-minister, independent, 5 October, 1997.

(98.) Interview #7 PLC-member, 7 October 1997.

(99.) The conceptual dichotomy 'inside' and 'outside' is structuring Palestinian-Palestinian relations in a very real sense. 'Inside' refers to those living under occupation and 'outside' refers to the exile. 'Outside' often refers mainly to the exiled PLO-leadership, but also to the Palestinian diaspora at large. 'Inside,' 'inner' or "interior' is dakhli in Arabic and 'outside,' 'outer' or 'exterior' is kharji.

(100.) Frisch, 1998: 1.

(101.) Interview # 14 PLC-member, Fateb, 16 October 1997.

(102.) Interview # 1 PLC-member, Fateh, 3 October 1997.

(103.) Cf. Rubin, 1999: 52.

(104.) Interview #7 PLC-member, independent Fateb, 9 October 1997.

(105.) Interview # 1 PLC-member, Fateh, 3 October 1997.

(106.) Interview # 18, PLC-member, Fateh, 20 October 1997.

(107.) Cf. Rubin, 1999.

(108.) Interview with Marwan Barghouti, April 1999; Usher, Graham, 2000, "Fatah's Tanzim: Origins and Politics," Middle East Report, Winter 2000: 6-7.

(109.) Usher, 2000.

(110.) On the latter cf. Ali Jarbawi, "Palestinian Politics at the Crossroads," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 29-39; Jean-Francois Legrain, "The Successions of Yasir Arafht," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXVIII, No.4, Summer 1999, pp. 5-20.

(111.) This means that only 44 out of 87 parliamentarians took part in the debate. A decline in the number of Council-members that attend Council-sessions is noted by several Council-members (interviews April 1999).

(112.) People's Rights, January 2000.

(113.) Jerusalem Post, 2 December 1999.

(114.) People's Rights, January 2000.

(115.) Jerusalem Post, 30 November 1999.

(116.) People's Rights, January 2000.

(117.)"Palestinian Political Personalities, Reconciliation Document," 1 December 1999, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, Spring 2000, pp. 145 f.; "Statement in Support of the Palestinian Signatories," 1 December 1999, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, Spring 2000, p. 146.

(118.) Cf. Khalil Shikaki, "Returning to pre-Oslo legitimacy," Palestine Report, Vol. 7, No. 24, 29 November 2000.

(119.) Rema Hammami, and Salim Tamari, "Anatomy of Another Rebellion," Middle East Report, Winter 2000: 14.

(120.) Ibid.

(121.) Sara Roy, "Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 4, Summer 2001, pp. 5-20.

(122.) The PFLP took responsibility and claimed the killing was an act of revenge against the assassination of Abu Ali Mustapha, PFLP's General Secretary since April 2001, when he replaced George Habash.

(123.) Rema Hammami and Jamil Hilal, "An Uprising at a Crossroads," Middle East Report, Summer 2001, pp. 2-7.

(124.) Ibid.

(125.) Interview with Azmi Shu'aibi, PLC member, Fida, 11 April 1999.

Helena Lindholm Schulz is with the Department of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University, Sweden.