The "Old Fox" fools the hounds: General George Washington, referred to as the "Old Fox" by Britain's Lord Cornwallis, employed innovative measures to outsmart the British and win the Battle of Princeton.

The situation could not have been worse for George Washington's army and the patriot cause. Battered and beaten in a succession of battles surrounding New York City, Washington's army of Continental troops, state militias, and volunteers had been reduced in number from approximately 20,000 to about 3,500 by the time it limped into northern New Jersey in late November 1776.

American defeats at Brooklyn, Kips Bay, White Plains, and Forts Washington and Lee compelled Washington to move the remnants of his disintegrating army to the south and west where he could use the Delaware River and its surrounding tributaries to his advantage. Washington was confident that he could outmaneuver the British and their Hessian mercenaries using the skills of the Marblehead Mariners. He remembered well that the intrepid seagoing unit from Massachusetts had saved nine thousand of his men with a successful amphibious rescue along Long Island's East River in August. The Delaware River, he decided, would serve as his base of operations and first line of defense.

The difficult maneuver southward was made all the more painful by the oncoming winter weather and a lack of food, clothing, and shelter. Much of the army's baggage had been left behind when Fort Lee was abandoned, and the men suffered mightily as a consequence. New Englander Joseph Hodgkins wrote of the difficulties to his wife Sarah, "I Cannot Express the hardships & feteague we have under gone on our March from Place to Place." Pressed by the pursuing British, Washington's half-naked veterans continued their orderly withdrawal until they arrived in Trenton, New Jersey, in early December. It was there that Washington regrouped briefly to send his men and supplies across the Delaware to Pennsylvania. With the assistance of the Marbleheaders, Washington's army crossed the river safely, the last men arriving on December 8.

During late tall of 1776, Washington's near-miraculous movement from New York into New Jersey and Pennsylvania must have seemed but a futile attempt to prolong the inevitable. British and Hessian mercenaries comfortably ensconced in winter quarters had only to wait until Washington's army simply melted away. The decisive New York campaign led Britain's Lord Rawdon to gloat that "their army is broken all to pieces." Lord Rawdon's assessment was no doubt shared by many American patriots fully aware that Washington's meager forces were up against a numerically superior and supremely confident foe.

Going on the Offensive

The impending expiration of terms of enlistment on December 31 for many of Washington's troops further threatened to reduce his numbers. Washington knew that he must move decisively before his army simply melted away before his eyes. A decisive battlefield victory might attract new recruits and boost morale, perhaps encouraging reenlistments among veterans nearing their separation date. It might even convince the country that the British and Hessian troops were not unbeatable, perhaps inducing Congress to provide additional funding for the war.

With his dwindling army spread out along the Delaware, keeping a vigilant watch for any signs of British activity, Washington planned a daring, three-pronged attack that would alter the course of the war. On December 23, he told his generals of his plan to assault the Hessian outpost at Trenton, New Jersey. Brig. Gen. James Ewing's 500-strong unit of Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia men was ordered to cross at Trenton Ferry and to block the Assunpink bridge at the foot of Trenton's Queen Street. Further to the south, Lt. Colonel John Cadwalader's unit of 1,900 men was to cross at Bristol to advance toward Burlington. Washington would cross at McConkey Ferry with 2,400 men and 18 field pieces. Sometime after 4 p.m. on December 25, Washington's forces began to board boats piloted by the Marbleheaders. He did not know it at the time, but neither Cadwalader nor Ewing would follow the plan through, leaving Washington to attack Trenton on his own.

Washington launched his surprise attack on the outnumbered Hessian outpost at about 8 a.m. on December 26. Within 45 minutes the battle was over. Washington's forces had killed 21 Hessians, including their commander Johann Rall, wounded 90 and captured nearly 900. About 500 hundred escaped over the Assunpink Creek bridge. American losses totaled only four wounded.

Washington's army returned to Pennsylvania with their Hessian prisoners, captured stores, weapons, and clothing. More importantly, they returned as victors, erasing nine months of misery and defeat at the hands of the seemingly invincible British and their Hessian hirelings.

Despite the stunning victory, Washington still faced the daunting task of keeping his army together. As the December 31 expiration of enlistment date drew near, Washington employed a brilliant strategy to induce reenlistments. On December 28, the American army returned to Trenton. There, on December 31, Washington made an impassioned plea to each regiment, imploring the men to extend their enlistments for another six months. Without authority, he offered a $10 bounty to each man willing to extend his enlistment. Most of the men were New Englanders, and having served in the army longer than most, were under no obligation to sign up for six more months of misery, despite the recent turn of events. Unmoved by Washington's offer, none stepped forward.

Minutes passed when Washington asked again, "My brave fellows, you have done all I asked you to do, and more than could be reasonably expected, but your country is at stake, your wives, your houses, and all that you hold dear. You have worn yourselves out with fatigues and hardships, but we know not how to spare you. If you will consent to stay one month longer, you will render that service to the cause of liberty, and to your country, which you can probably never do under any other circumstance." Slowly, men began to step forward. First one by one and then in groups. When it was over, Washington had successfully persuaded 1,200 men to reenlist. They were joined by 3,400 militia, as well. Washington had his army.

Eaton-educated Charles Lord Cornwallis had his army too, and he meant to avenge Trenton as soon as possible. In New York, he canceled plans to sail home and began to move his 8,000 man army of British and Hessian forces into New Jersey. In speedy fashion, he reached Princeton on January 1, 1777. The next day he led 5,500 troops on the road to Trenton with the objective to crush Washington's forces in the field. Hessian troops were instructed by their commanders to take no prisoners. The Americans were to pay for the death of Colonel Rall.

An early winter thaw muddied the roads, slowing Cornwallis' advance, and Colonel Edward Hand's riflemen, sent to check the British advance, peppered the redcoats with deadly accuracy. Hand's Pennsylvania frontiersmen gave ground grudgingly, buying time for Washington's army entrenched on the south bank of the Assunpink Creek. But this time Washington had miscalculated. Retreating back through Trenton, he found his army pinned between the creek and the semi-frozen Delaware River--an untenable position under any circumstance. He held the high ground, but only the Assunpink Creek bridge separated the Americans from Cornwallis' advancing British and Hessian troops. Intense fighting ensued at the bridge as Cornwallis' lead elements launched three assaults, only to be driven back each time by Henry Knox's close-range artillery fire.

Outfoxing the British

The Assunpink Creek bridge ran red with the blood of Cornwallis' men, but the Americans had suffered as well. With their backs to the river and bloodied by the severe fighting, they appeared to Cornwallis ready for the taking. As the sun went down, the confident British commander elected to cease the advance and wait until daylight to pursue Washington. So confident was Cornwallis that he issued invitations to his officers at Princeton and Maidenhead to join with him the next day to celebrate the inevitable victory over Washington's Continental Army. But at least one British staff officer, Sir William Erskine, argued for a night assault, warning Cornwallis that "if Washington is the general I take him to be ... you will see nothing of him in the morning." Undaunted, Cornwallis replied, "We've got the old fox safe now. We'll go over and bag him in the morning."

Washington knew, however, that he could not hope to defend his position against another series of assaults, and under cover of darkness he began to move 5,200 men on a wide arc, on seldom used back roads, to engage Cornwallis' numerically smaller rear guard at Princeton. It was a bold and unexpected move. Conventional military wisdom dictated a move south to Bordentown, but Washington would have none of it. He was not about to lose the initiative gained at the first battle of Trenton. Another retreat would send the wrong message to his men, Congress, and the country. This time, Washington elected to go on the offensive and there would be no appearance of retreat.

Providence smiled upon his efforts as nighttime temperatures hardened the previously impassable roads. Moving east to Sandtown and then northeast to the Quaker Road, Washington's men, some without shoes, moved silently through the cold dark night. Only a small contingent remained at Assunpink Creek, left there to distract the British by keeping fires burning and noisily constructing defensive embankments. In the early morning, Cornwallis woke to discover that Washington and his men had left for Princeton. The British commander ordered an about-face and soon had his men marching back toward Princeton, "running, puffing and blowing, and swearing at being so outwitted."

On to Princeton!

Washington's plan to capture Princeton called for dividing his force, sending Nathanael Greene's column left, and John Sullivan's forces to the right. The battle began at sunrise on January 3, when General Hugh Mercer's brigade of 350 troops, sent to guard Sullivan's left flank and destroy the Stony Brook bridge, unexpectedly met elements of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mawhood's 17th and 55th Regiments of Foot moving south toward Trenton about two miles south of Princeton.

With the element of surprise gone, Mercer's troops delivered the first volley. Mawhood's battle-hardened regulars of the 17th Regiment of Foot wasted no time in returning the volley, following it with a bayonet charge that scattered the weary American line. Mercer, who was severely wounded early in the action by a musket blow while trying to organize his troops, suddenly found himself surrounded by a number of British soldiers. Wearing an overcoat that obscured his rank, Mercer was mistaken for George Washington. Refusing to surrender, he was bayoneted seven times and left for dead. Despite medical efforts, Mercer died an agonizing death nine days later.

Just as Mercer's men fled the field, Colonel John Cadwalader's inexperienced Pennsylvania militia unit arrived on the scene, but they too wavered under the onslaught of Mawhood's gallant bayonet charges. Shielded by Continental Army veterans and Philadelphia's 1st City Cavalry, Washington, Greene, and Cadwalader rode to the battle front to rally Mercer's shaken troops. Washington, on his white horse, presented a tempting target, but it did not prevent the Virginian from moving within 30 yards of the British line, where he gave the order to "Halt" and "Fire." Mawhood's outnumbered regulars began to fall back as more Americans entered the ferocious battle. The sight of Washington astride his white horse set an example of courage in the face of the enemy that galvanized the Americans. Within 15 minutes, Mawhood's force was in full retreat toward Trenton. Washington pursued for a few miles, shouting to his troops, "It's a fine fox chase, my boys!"

Meanwhile, elements of the 40th and 55th Regiments of Foot prepared to defend Princeton. After a brief engagement, Sullivan's force was successful in driving the British back to the area in and around Nassau Hall. Nearly 200 British troops had barricaded themselves inside the main building of the college. A few rounds from Alexander Hamilton's artillery quickly persuaded the British to surrender.

In less than one hour, the Battle of Princeton was over, and Washington had achieved another decisive victory. He considered moving on to Brunswick to capture 70,000 pounds sterling stored there among the British supplies, but the condition of his troops would not allow it. They were simply too worn out to attempt yet another bold move. The Army settled into the relative safety of winter quarters at Morristown. From there, Washington could keep an eye on the large British force operating out of New York.

The effect of the Battle of Princeton was profound. Coming within 10 days of Washington's stunning victory at Trenton, it boosted morale and helped preserve the Continental Army. Washington's willingness to take risks and to employ innovative measures signaled to the enemy that the war would not be easily won. More importantly, Washington emerged as a national hero when the fledgling nation needed one most.

Michael E. Telzrow is a historian/museum professional living in De Pere, Wisconsin.