Text calling for mandatory selective sanctions against South Africa vetoed in Security Council.

Text calling for mandatory selective sanctions against South Africa vetoed in Security Council

The United Kingdom and the United States on 15 November vetoed a draft resolution by which the Security Council would have decided to impose mandatory selective sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.

In opposing the text (S/17633), the United Kingdom said the draft was likely to be "counter-productive" and would have the effect of "pre-empting the strategy which we have agreed with our Commonwealth partners"--a reference to the 20 October plan of Commonwealth leaders, formulated at a meeting in the Bahamas, to impose economic measures against South Africa immediately, to be reinforced by further measures in six months if Pretoria failed to make progress.

The United States said that "actively engaged" as it was in seeking a negotiated solution to the Namibian problem, "we would negate utterly our good offices by supporting mandatory sanctions". It sincerely regretted that the draft "persisted in that short-sighted course of action".

The Council vote--12 in favour to 2 against, with 1 abstention (France)--came after five Council meetings on the situation in Namibia. India, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, and Mauritius, on behalf of the African Group, had requested the meetings.

The text--submitted by Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago--would have had the Council adopt, "as a matter of utmost urgency", enforcement measures, including an oil and arms embargo, a ban on all new investments in South Africa and Namibia and on "all new government and bank loans and credit guarantees to the racist Pretoria regime and the so-called interim government at Windhoek".

The enforcement measures would have included termination of all export credit guarantees for exports to South Africa and Namibia; and bans on importation or enrichment of uranium from Namibia and South Africa; on supply of technology, equipment and licenses for nuclear plants in South Africa, including the exchange of nuclear information with Pretoria; and on visits to and from South Africa and Namibia by military, security, intelligence and other defense personnel.

The measures would have also included the prohibition of the sale and export of computers capable of being used by the "racist army, police and security forces"; cessation of funding for permanent or temporary trade missions or for participating in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa and Namibia; termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa; and prohibition of the sale of krugerrands and all other coins minted in South Africa or Namibia.

South Africa's "persistent refusal" to comply with Council and General Assembly resolutions on Namibia would have been cited as "a serious threat to international peace and security" and its "continued illegal occupation" of Namibia as "a breach of international peace". The "repeated armed attacks perpetrated from Namibia by South Africa against independent and sovereign States in southern Africa" would have been termed "grave acts of aggression".

South Africa: In a 12 November letter from South Africa to the Secretary-General (S/17627), South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha called attention to "a new development with regard to the choice of the electoral system for the election contemplated in terms of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978)". (That resolution details the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, which calls for a ceasefire, troop withdrawal, free elections and establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force.)

At a 6 November 1985 "Cabinet meeting", he said, "the Government of National Unity in Windhoek" had decided to call on South Africa to select from options available a "system of proportional representation as a framework for elections leading to the independence of South West Africa". Agreement would have to be reached on how the system of proportional representation would be implemented in practice, he said.

In a 12 November statement, the "Cabinet of the transitional Government of National Unity", stated that the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) had "apparently indicated that it has no objection" to either of the two systems--proportional representation or the single member constituency system. "Neither, given the choice between the two systems advocated by the five nations of the Western Contact Group, do the parties represented in the transitional Government of National Unity have a preference for either one of the two", it stated.

The "Cabinet" stated it favoured the system of proportional representation "in the interests of economy", as the cost of organizing and administering an election on that basis was substantially less than arranging one on a constituency basis.

A spokesman for the Secretary-General stated on 13 November that the selection of the system of proportional representation could be regarded as one of the last outstanding points, as far as the United Nations was concerned, regarding implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibian independence. The only remaining point would be the setting up of and date for cease-fire and implementation.

Debate

Thirty-three speakers participated in the debate held from 13 to 15 November, many supporting the call for widened mandatory sanctions.

K.R. Narayanan, Minister of State for External Affairs of India, said the Namibian problem was one of decolonization but attempts had been made to artificially superimpose on it an aspect of East-West conflict. Comprehensive voluntary sanctions against South Africa applied by all countries, including those which had the strongest links with South Africa, could bring about a peaceful change in southern Africa, as well as justice and freedom to the immense majority of the people in that region.

Rameschand Seereekissoon (Mauritius), on behalf of the African Group, said South Africa intended to exert dominance and hegemony over the whole southern African region. It was now time to deal effectively with the rebellious and intransigent South African regime. More than four years of so-called constructive engagement had led to no progress. The path to liberation would depend on Council actions. He hoped the right decisions would be made to avert a potential conflagration with its dire consequences for the region and beyond.

Kurt von Schirnding (South Africa) said his country would continue to search for a reasonable formula for genuine Cuban withdrawal from Angola. If a firm agreement could be reached in that regard, it would carry out its undertaking to implement the international settlement plan for Namibian independence. South Africa would continue to strive for stability and peace in the region by encouraging all the parties, including SWAPO and Angola, to resolve their differences around a conference table and not by violence. It would continue to encourage dialogue and reconciliation between all the South West African parties in the hope that they would find a basis for still broader consensus in respect of the Territory's future. Finally, it would continue to insist that all the South West African parties be treated equally and impartially. If the United Nations wished to play a role in the future of South West Africa/Namibia, it would have to demonstrate that it would be able to carry out its functions impartially.

Andimba Toivo ja Toivo, Secretary-General of SWAPO, said there had been no change in South Africa's position concerning the speedy and unconditional implementation of resolution 435. The pre-condition linking Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola remained the major stumbling block. As long as the joint position of the Botha regime and the Reagan Administration remained intransigent on Namibian independence, there would be no progress anywhere on implementing the United Nations independence plan. Effective and binding sanctions should be instituted against Pretoria under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Council members: Noel Rakotondramboa (Madagascar) said the obstacles impeding implementation of the United Nations independence plan were: South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, whose territory it used to launch acts of subversion against neighbouring States; "ridiculous" attempts to link Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola; installation of an "interim administration" in Windhoek; and authorization given to foreign economic interests to improperly exploit Namibian resources.

Carlos Alzamora (Peru) said the Council should step up action to make South Africa agree to a genuine settlement of the Namibian problem. Pretoria must not be allowed to avoid such a settlement "by means of manoeuvres of political camouflage leading to a simulated process of self-determination" -- a "fiction fabricated to sidetrack the action of the Organization" and "deflect the inexorable course of history".

Li Luye (China) said South Africa had stepped up its efforts to foster the puppet regime in Namibia and to create new obstacles to the independence of Namibia. SWAPO and the frontline States had made tremendous efforts to ensure the early implementation of resolution 435, but Pretoria had responded with intransigence, procrastination and non-compliance. Certain countries with major influence on South Africa should denounce Pretoria and apply sanctions against it.

Guennadi Oudovenko (Ukrainian SSR) said South Africa continued to "pile up every conceivable obstacle" to the solution of the Namibian problem. Pretoria would not have dared to disregard United Nations decisions on Namibian independence if it had not enjoyed comprehensive support from influential Western protectors, primarily the United States. It was essential to secure immediate and complete withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia; administration and transfer of power to Namibians "in the person of SWAPO" was needed.

Ahmed Tawfik Khalil (Egypt) said South Africa must withdraw from Namibia to enable Namibians to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. Pretoria had spared no effort to fabricate reasons to hamper implementation of resolution 435. The Council must ensure that Pretoria implement that resolution.

Birabhongse Kasemsri (Thailand) said South Africa intended to "scuttle" the United Nations independence plan not merely by linking Namibian independence to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, but also by seeking unilateral settlement through a so-called multi-party conference and establishing a so-called interim government in Namibia. He hoped that the "latest move" by Pretoria was an indication of its change of attitude.

Ole Bierring (Denmark) said Pretoria knew that its overt military support of UNITA in Angola would postpone rather than accelerate withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Denmark rejected linking Namibian independence to withdrawal of Cuban troops. The Namibia question should not be seen in an East-West contect. "Countries with particular leverage" should try to convince Pretoria that its continued delaying tactics were not in its own long-term interest.

Leandre Bassole (Burkina Faso) hoped that those permanent Council members that had "so misused their right of veto, thereby helping racist South Africa to avoid heeding reason, will at long last deign to open their eyes to see, their ears to hear, their minds to understand". The Council must act in conformity with relevant Charter provisions, including Chapter VII. South Africa had taken advantage for too long of the "complicity and culpable support" of certain permanent Council members. Namibian independence was inevitable.

Sir John Thomson (United Kingdom) said the so-called "transitional Government of National Unity" had no validity. Equal treatment should be given to all political parties. The United Kingdom preferred conveying to South Africa "a unanimous message of firm and consistent persuasion and pressure" through the adoption of a resolution consistent with the Commonwealth plan adopted in the Bahamas. The United Kingdom would have supported a resolution which included a considerable list of non-mandatory economic measures, but that "serious, realistic and constructive" proposal had not been accepted.

Oleg A. Troyanovsky (USSR) said that Pretoria, in delaying implementation of resolution 435, had put forth certain types of fabricated obstacles, while the United States and certain other Western Powers defended it from effective international sanctions and tried to secure new concessions from the Africans. Pretoria was trying to "blackmail" the United Nations by demanding renunciation of recognition of SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of Namibians. The adoption of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa would be the "shortest route to a comprehensive political settlement" of the Namibian problem.

Richard Woolcott (Australia) said Pretoria was obstructing Namibian independence. Australia supported the United Nations independence plan and rejected linkage of Namibian independence and withdrawal of Cuban troops. The so-called transitional government of National Unity had no legitimacy. Australia had already introduced appropriate voluntary measures against Pretoria, and would support imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions to end apartheid.

D.H.N. Alleyne (Trinidad and Tobago) said that South Africa, attempting to give some degree of legality and credibility to "the collection of surrogates and puppets" that comprised the interim administration in Windhoek, clearly had embarked on a new phase of its obstructionist policy with regard to Namibian independence. Imposition of mandatory sanctions would be a most effective way to obtain South Africa's compliance with relevant Council resolutions.

Claude de Kemoularia (France) said Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 should be applied without any conditions or prerequisites. Linkage between Namibian independence and withdrawal of Cuban troops was irrelevant. Pretoria's obstinacy was fraught with consequences for the region's stability. France was concerned at achieving "realism and effectiveness", and while agreeing with the "feelings" that lay behind the draft, felt it did not meet those criteria. The wording was not "appropriate" for promoting progress towards solving the Namibian question. France would continue to exert increased pressure on South Africa.

Herbert S. Okun (United States) hoped the Council was near the end of an arduous journey. "An act or two more of goodwill, gestures of true statesmanship by the involved parties, and the region will have taken a major step towards a peaceful solution of the problems and strife that now beset it." His country expected that South Africa would strictly adhere to the election modalities outlined in resolution 435. All Namibian political parties should be accorded equal treatment under its terms. The United States vetoed the draft because it would have imposed mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter.