Terrorism: books in brief--spring and winter 2002.

AbuKhalil, As'ad. Bin Laden, Islam and America's New "War on Terrorism." New York, N.Y.: Seven Stories Press, 2002. Paper, $8.95.

Written before the defeat of the Taliban, the book makes for interesting reading about America's role in the Middle East and its stance toward Islam. The author shows how "Islamophobia," which has always been present in the U.S., experienced new heights after September 11. U.S. support for repressive regimes in the Middle East and its pro-Israeli bias in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitute the main underlying causes of terrorism. The Saudi and American connection in the support of the Mujahideen and later the Taliban is highlighted. America's war on terrorism is fraught with danger, including the clear and present danger to civil liberties in America. The author predicts that the war will expand and that the way the U.S. is going about conducting it might mean "that this is a war without end and without conclusions" (p. 97). Several typographical errors in the book constitute a significant irritation.

Chomsky, Noam. 9-11. New York, N.Y.: Seven Stories Press, 2002. Paper, $8.95.

The book is based on interviews conducted after September 11 and revised/edited until it went to press on October 15. Chomsky regards the U.S. as a leading terrorist state and that its response to the 9-11 attacks might lead it into a trap. This new type of war is a setback for the worldwide protest against globalization. The attacks on the U.S. also gave Israel an excuse to crack down on the Palestinians. As the U.S. media and popular culture are replete with symbolism and discourse against Islam and the Arabs, Chomsky reminds the reader that American society is one of the most extreme religious fundamentalist cultures in the world. Listening to Pat Robertson or Jerry Falwell as they discuss Islam or Christianity, for that matter, makes one appreciate Chomsky's point of view. Chomsky also reminds the reader that terrorism is not only the weapon of the weak since states also engage in it.

Chomsky is critical of America's response to the September 11 attacks. Instead of going the route of international law, the U.S. chose to respond in kind, thus answering Bin Laden's prayers. Finally, Chomsky shows that what happened on September 11 was not because of clash of civilizations since the U.S. itself has supported terrorist regimes and conducted terrorism in the 1980s against Nicaragua.

Despite editing, the reader still encounters a substantial amount of repetition in the interviews. Nevertheless, this short book constitutes a counter point to the propaganda that we have been subjected to daily on a mass scale.

Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Translated by Anthony F. Roberts. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002. Hardcover, $20.97.

Gilles Kepel presents a thorough analysis of political Islam from its expansion in the 1970s to its decline beginning in the 1990s. He attributes the rise of political Islam to: (1) the failure of the nationalist project, primarily, in the Arab countries, such as Egypt and Algeria; and (2) the repression that political Islamists suffered under some nationalist regimes. Kepel analyzes political Islam in several countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Afghanistan, Palestine, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Turkey. He also shows the political and economic underpinnings that led to the rise of the Islamist movement. Kepel also provides a comparative analysis around two main theses: First, in countries where the leadership of the Islamist movement was able to unite the poor urban youth and the devout bourgeoisie, that movement was able to take power through a popular revolution. Kepel cites Iran as the only country that witnessed such a revolution under the leadership of Khomeini, its leader and main th eoretician. The second and equally important thesis is that the expansion of the Islamist movement did not last and, in fact, its decline began in the 1990s. Appearances not withstanding, the expansion (for example, the Taliban rise to power in Afghanistan) and the concomitant violence since the 1990s point out the movement's "structural weakness." The two theses are interrelated: the failure of the two wings of the movement (the urban poor and the devout bourgeoisie) to unite, is, indeed, its main structural weakness. That fact led to reversals in Algeria, the Sudan, Malaysia, Turkey and Pakistan. Bosnia was a case where Islamists failed to transform the struggle to an Islamist one.

Violence perpetrated by radical Islamist organizations, including Osama Bin Laden's group points out the desperation of those radicals in their attempt to have the Muslim masses rise up in rebellion against the West and the corrupt regimes in the Muslim countries. The failure of the radicals was because: (1) the devout bourgeoisie, through the Islamist intellectuals, sought to unite with secular forces against the urban poor and their radical leadership and; (2) there was no real effort by the radicals to organize and mobilize the masses, especially after committing spectacular violence.

Islamic societies are leaving the Islamist period and are open to democracy. However, much depends upon whether the regimes in those countries will be open to democratization and economic reform. Failure to implement reform could drive those countries to political crisis that could be Isalamist, ethnic, racial, religious or populist in form.

The book has its weak points. Kepel exaggerates the strength of Palestinian Hamas and the weakness of the secular organizations that are fighting Israeli occupation. Otherwise, he would not have committed the error of stating that Hamas was about to take control of the first Intifada. It would have been proper for Kepel to show the extenuating circumstances that allowed the Palestinian movement to continue along its secular path despite the pressure from Hamas in Palestine and the expansion of Islamist movements in other countries.

Perhaps a more significant weakness is that Kepel attributes the failure of jihadists to take power in certain countries to the failure of the two wings in the Islamist movement to unite. While this is critical for success, the fact of the matter is that in countries such as Egypt, entire civil society and governmental institutions and a sizable public sector, all militated against the Islamist movement assuming power.

Logevall, Fredrik. Editor. Terrorism and 9/11: A Reader. Boston: Houghton Muffin Company, 2002. Paper, $6.95.

This brief (146pp.) and affordably priced anthology is aimed for classroom use at the university or advanced preparatory level; it includes a number of previously published essays by a wide variety of scholars in Islamic and Western Asian studies. John Esposito in "The Compatibility of Islam and Democracy," and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad in "The Globalization of Islam" offer welcome and balanced discussions on the nature of Islam and factual material on Muslim communities throughout the world. A number of other essays cover material on Afghanistan, Bin Laden (including an interview with him), women and the U.S. role in bringing the Taliban to power.

Reuel Marc Gerecht in "The Counterterrorist Myth," debunks the notion that the U.S. has historically been successful in its long and exceedingly expensive "war on terrorism." In a closely argued and dense essay, "Jihad vs. McWorld," Benjamin R. Barber describes the conflicting trends of splintering and factionalization of nations and the ongoing globalization or "McWorldization" of the post-Cold War world. He argues that neither McWorld or Jihad are democratic but predicts that McWorld is the more likely victor in any struggle between the two. He concludes by recommending the establishment of federal or confederal representative governments as a means of maintaining some degree of democracy.

Mahajan, Rahul. The New Crusade: America's War on Terrorism. New York, N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 2002. Paper, $12.57

This is a well-documented book that succeeds in debunking the various myths about the U.S. war on terrorism and examines the context in which the war on terrorism is being conducted. The author delves into likely trajectories for U.S. action against certain countries and societies accused of harboring or being the source of terrorism. Some of the myths that Mahajan shatters is that the war on terrorism is a humanitarian war, a war for civilization, and a war for U.S. security. Instead, he posits that the war is a war for power and domination. To rally the American people for the war, the U.S. capitalized on their thirst for revenge and solicited the services of the media in this major coup. In doing so, everything was permissible, including the loss of freedom, ostensibly to protect freedom.

The Patriot Act is a case in point. What became obvious after September 11 was the way in which racism was on public display: in the media and at airports (racial profiling). These kinds of events demonstrated that democracy and racial equality are skin-deep in America. Institutionally, the white man's burden is still alive and well in the U.S. empire. U.S. practices before September 11 show how brutal the U.S. empire's record has been. One has only to examine its track record in Nicaragua, Panama, Vietnam, Iraq, and Somalia. Propaganda about human rights allows the U.S. a cover to maintain, and deepen its domination. The U.S. prepared the ground for its war on terror long before the terrorist attacks of September 11. Mahajan calls for a "broader human rights movement--one based on a fundamental understanding of the neocolonial role of the West, in particular the imperial role of the United States and a commitment to erase neocolonialism simultaneously with advancing human rights in the Third World" (p. 123).